International Journal of Peace and Development Studies
Subscribe to IJPDS
Full Name*
Email Address*

Article Number - E7D077E61869


Vol.7(8), pp. 76-88 , December 2016
DOI: 10.5897/IJPDS2016.0276
ISSN: 2141-6621



Full Length Research Paper

Name your price: Economic compensation and suicide terrorism



Samuel Rohrer*
  • Samuel Rohrer*
  • University of North Georgia, United States of America.
  • Google Scholar
David Sobek
  • David Sobek
  • Louisiana State University, United States of America.
  • Google Scholar







 Received: 10 May 2016  Accepted: 24 October 2016  Published: 31 December 2016

Copyright © 2016 Author(s) retain the copyright of this article.
This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0


Suicide terrorism remains a difficult action to rationally explain. Often, scholars rely on ideological or religious motivations to explain these seemingly irrational actions. While it seems clear that non-economic motives matter, it is also the case that economic compensation can incentivize suicide terrorism in ways that allow for more robust suicide terrorism campaigns. As such, we would expect that organizations that provide cash to suicide bombers will generate more attacks. In addition, the general economic environment plays into this in that poor economic conditions should increase the attractiveness of monetary compensation. To test our arguments, we conduct a series of statistical analyses looking at seven terrorist organizations that engaged in suicide terrorism from 2000 through 2008 and find that both high levels of economic compensation and poor economic conditions are correlated with a greater number of suicide terrorist attacks.

Key words: Political economy, terrorism, compensation.

Abadie A (2004). Poverty, Poltical Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism. Am. Econ. Rev. 2(96):50-56.
Crossref

 

Ashworth S, Clinton J, Meirowitz A (2008). Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 102(2):269-273.
Crossref

 

Atran S (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Sci. Magazine. pp. 1534-1539.
Crossref

 

Azam J-P (2005). Suicide-Bombing as Inter-Generational Investment. Public Choice 122(1):177-189.
Crossref

 

Benmelech E, Berrebi C and Klor E. (2012) Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism. J. Polit. 74(1):113-128.
Crossref

 

Bloom M (2007). Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, New York City: Columbia UniversityPress.

 

Dunne M (2010). A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics. Middle East Program. Washington D.C.: Carneige Endowment for International Peace.

 

Esterbrook J (2002). Salaries for Suicide Bombers.

 

Fatah S (2007). Why the Disabled do Taliban Deadly Work. The Globe and Mail. Toronto.

 

Ferrero M (2006) Martyrdom Contracts. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(6):855-877.
Crossref

 

Goldberg J. (2001) The Martyr Strategy: What Does the New Phase of Terrorism Signify? The New Yorker. New York City, 34-39.

 

Hafez M. (2006). Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

 

Hafez M. (2007). Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

 

Hoffman B (2006). Inside Terrorism, New York City: Columbia University Press.

 

Hunter S (2004). Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, Armonk, New York: M E Sharpe Inc. Layne K. (2002) Saddam Pays 25K for Palestinian Bombers. Fox News. Fox News.

 

Maleckova J (2006). Terrorists and the Societies from Which They Come. In: Victoro ff J (ed) Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

 

Merari A (2010). Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2012). Global Terrorism Database [Data file].

 

Pape R (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97(31-19).
Crossref

 

Pape R (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York City: Random House.

 

Piazza J (2008). A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study. J. Polit. 70(1):28-39.
Crossref

 

Qirko H (2009). Altruism in Suicide Terror Organizations. Zygon: J. Religion Sci. 44(2):289-322.
Crossref

 

Ripley A (2002). Why Suicide Bombing is Now All the Rage. Time.

 

Santifort-Jordan C, Sandler T (2014). An Empirical Study of Suicide Terrorism: A Global Analysis. Southern Econ. J. 80(4):981-1001.
Crossref

 

Schbley A (2000). Torn Between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon's Religious Terrorists. Stud. Conflict Terrorism. 23(3):175-196.
Crossref

 

Silke A (2003). The Psychology of Suicidal Terrorism. In: Silke A (ed) Terrorist, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences. West Sussex, England: Wiley.
Crossref

 

Victoroff J (2005). The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. J. Conflict Resolution. 49(1):3-42.
Crossref

 

Williams BG (2008). Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Repoert on Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan. Middle East Policy Council. 15(4):26-46.
Crossref

 


APA Rohrer, S., & Sobek, D. (2016). Name your price: Economic compensation and suicide terrorism. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 7(8), 76-88.
Chicago Samuel Rohrer and David Sobek. "Name your price: Economic compensation and suicide terrorism." International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 7, no. 8 (2016): 76-88.
MLA Samuel Rohrer and David Sobek. "Name your price: Economic compensation and suicide terrorism." International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 7.8 (2016): 76-88.
   
DOI 10.5897/IJPDS2016.0276
URL http://academicjournals.org/journal/IJPDS/article-abstract/E7D077E61869

Subscription Form