International Journal of Peace and Development Studies
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Article Number - E9A63B367077


Vol.8(7), pp. 69-83 , December 2017
DOI: 10.5897/IJPDS2017.0310
ISSN: 2141-6621



Full Length Research Paper

Natural resources and civil conflicts: Policy analysis under general equilibrium



Md. Didarul Hasan
  • Md. Didarul Hasan
  • Department of Economics, Asian University for Women, Chittagong, Bangladesh
  • Google Scholar
Sajal Lahiri
  • Sajal Lahiri
  • Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL 62901, U.S.A.
  • Google Scholar







 Received: 21 August 2017  Accepted: 10 November 2017  Published: 31 December 2017

Copyright © 2017 Author(s) retain the copyright of this article.
This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0


In this paper, a two-period general equilibrium model on the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict has been developed. Unlike existing literature, both resource extraction and wage rate are considered as endogenous during the conflict. The main purpose of the paper is to examine policy options for international community to limit the conflict intensity. It has been found out that a current international sanction will reduce civil conflict if the wage rate is fixed. However, when the wage rate is endogenous, the effect of current sanction is uncertain. Productivity improvement in agricultural sector may also subside the conflict. The study results also suggest that a bilateral piece-meal reduction in war efforts is the most effective policy for conflict reduction.
 
Key words: Natural resources, civil conflicts, general equilibrium, sanctions.

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APA Md. Didarul Hasan1* and Sajal Lahiri (2017). Natural resources and civil conflicts: Policy analysis under general equilibrium. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 8(7), 69-83.
Chicago Md. Didarul Hasan and Sajal Lahiri. "Natural resources and civil conflicts: Policy analysis under general equilibrium." International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 8, no. 7 (2017): 69-83.
MLA Md. Didarul Hasan and Sajal Lahiri. "Natural resources and civil conflicts: Policy analysis under general equilibrium." International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 8.7 (2017): 69-83.
   
DOI 10.5897/IJPDS2017.0310
URL http://academicjournals.org/journal/IJPDS/article-abstract/E9A63B367077

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