

*Full Length Research Paper*

# **Do Samaritan migrants really work for the development of local communities? Evidence from Cameroon in Central Africa**

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**The aim of this paper is to analyze how Samaritan migrants really work for the development of local communities in Cameroon. We have used the game theory approach that is based on the Samaritan's Dilemma. The Samaritan Dilemma shows the superiority of collective responsibility on the individual or personal utility. Therefore, one of the solutions to development problem is to introduce and encourage other forms of altruism among individual and collective migrants who give, share and help local families and communities. In Cameroon and for many Central African countries, the Samaritan migrants constitute a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), market development, and new technology transfer.**

**Key words:** Samaritan migrants, altruism, well-being, local communities, cooperative game.

## **INTRODUCTION**

In an article from 1975 entitled "the Samaritan's Dilemma", Buchanan highlights the issue that the modern world is undergoing a loss of authority and the proliferation of predators such as student protesters, labor unions and terrorists. Faced with this problem, he recommends more power and especially a "strategic responsibility" to resolve this problem. He concludes on a dualism or contradiction between the long term utility and the short-term utility, between responsibility vis-à-vis the community and individual utility. In the field of development, particularly on aid, assistance, giving and sharing, Buchanan's research has proven too significant. Development, considered here as well-being (material, social and security), is synonymous to a good quality of life. This notion includes material well-being, often expressed as having enough bodily well-being (being strong, being in the right frame of mind and looking good). Social well-being includes caring for and settling children, having self-respect, peace, and good relations in the family and the community. Having security includes civil peace, a safe and secure environment, personal and physical security, and confidence in the future. Having freedom of choice and action includes being able to give, share and help other people in the community.

Some of the key indicators of well-being are: rate of poverty, life expectancy at birth (years), adult illiteracy,

access to health care services, access to safe water, access to sanitation, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, prevalence of malnutrition, population estimates, Gross National Product (GNP) per capita (World Bank, 2008b; Ajayi et al., 2009). Samaritan's dilemma refers to a dilemma in the act of charity. It hinges on the idea that when presented with charity, in some examples such as a soup kitchen, a person will act in one of two ways: using the charity to improve their situation, or coming to rely on charity as a means of survival. Argument against charity frequently cites the Samaritan's dilemma as reason to forgo charitable contributions. It is also a common argument against Communism and Socialism, claiming that state aid is equivalent to charity, and that the beneficiaries of such aid will be slothful or otherwise negligent members of society (<http://www.wikipedia.org>). Some critics deny that dilemma exists, and argue that there is no connection between charity and the incentive to improve one's life. Rather, many people, home or local communities rely on charity to survive, and this dependence on charity arises from necessity rather than an exploitation of human kindness. Even if a small portion of people misuse charity, the general practice of charity provides benefits that largely outweigh the disadvantages and the Samaritan's dilemma is a myth created to rationalize an

uncharitable lifestyle.

What is altruism? Altruism supposes loving others as oneself. It is a behavior that promotes the survival chances of others at a cost to one's own. It is a self-sacrifice to the benefit of others. Altruism is the renunciation of the self, and an exclusive concern for the welfare of others. It is a traditional virtue in many cultures, and a core aspect of various religious traditions, though the concept of 'others' toward whom concern should be directed can vary among religions. Altruism is the opposite of selfishness. Altruism can be distinguished from feelings of loyalty and duty. Altruism is a motivation to provide a value to a party who might be anyone but the self, while duty focuses on a moral obligation towards a specific individual (e.g, a god, a king), or collective (Ballet, 2000) (e.g, a government). Some individuals may feel both altruism and duty, while others may not. Pure altruism is giving up values without regard to reward or the benefits that recognition of the giving may bring (Oord, 2007). Altruism is the willingness to give part of one's time or resources for a good cause. In this sense, altruism and charity are embedded in most cultures. Although with education and globalization, people are migrating from the geographical locations of their clans, they continue to live according to the norms of the clans. Thus, clan leaders and norms continue to have strong influence and impact on citizens of a clan wherever they may be. This influence and impact is passed on to children born in the diaspora. Thus, clan members that migrate, continue to while adapting to their new environments, pay allegiance to their customs and practices in their home countries. A major way of paying allegiance is through repatriating funds to support various activities of the clan.

Even though philanthropy is defined in many different ways by researchers and practitioners, its most simple definition is that it is the practice of giving, sharing and helping the poor and those in need- a phenomenon that is embedded in the Central African culture(s). It consists of the voluntary means that any culture, social group or individual uses to redistribute financial and other resources for the purposes of promoting some collective good and social wellbeing. The institutional, social and cultural mechanisms that surround these voluntary, altruistic and charitable practices vary across societies and their constituent communities (Schervish and Ostrander, 1990; Copeland-Carson, 2004, 2005 and 2007; De Jong, 1999). Philanthropy is the act of giving, or of donating money, goods, time, or effort to support a charitable cause, usually over an extended period of time and in regard to a defined objective. Charitable contributions made by individuals (Clotfelter, 1992, 2002) and collectivities constitute one of the main sources of financing the vast nonprofit sectors in the world. In a more fundamental sense, philanthropy may encompass any altruistic activity which is intended to promote good or improve human quality of life. Someone who is well

known for practicing such acts is normally referred to as a philanthropist. Although such individuals are most often fairly wealthy, many people without or with limited wealth do perform many philanthropic acts. Proponents of transnationalism seek to facilitate the flow of people, ideas, and goods among regions. They believe that it has increasing relevance with the rapid growth of globalization. They contend that it does not make sense to link specific nation-state boundaries with for instance migratory workforces, globalized corporations, global money flow, global information flow, and global scientific cooperation.

Transnationalism refers to a recent shift in migration patterns since the 1980s. Migration used to be a rather directed movement with a point of departure and a point of arrival. It is nowadays increasingly turning into an ongoing movement between two or more social spaces or locations. Facilitated by increased global transportation and telecommunication technologies, more and more migrants have developed strong transnational ties to more than one home country, blurring the congruence of social space and geographic space (Rees, 2009). These transnationals people which social and economic ties to the native community and country become Samaritan migrants. Central Africans in diaspora fit the category of philanthropists. These migrants have settled in different countries (IOM, 2005), but continue to feel attached to their home countries. Migration is a complex and dynamic process that changes the migrants' home and destination country and, of course, the migrants themselves (Özden and Schiff, 2005). By working in host countries, migrants typically provide to the local community in addition to funds, business contacts and information about investment opportunities in countries where they are residing, laws and regulations, and differences in culture and ways of doing business. They serve as a bridge between the host country and their country of origin. Thus, migrants can increase exchange between three sets of locations:

- i) Between source and host countries;
- ii) Between different host countries, if people are from the same source country, region, ethnic origin or religious group; and
- iii) Between different regions of the same country in the case of internal migration (AFD, 2006).

The term diaspora has acquired a broad semantic meaning (Hovanessian, 1998; Sheffer, 1986). It now encompasses an array of groups such as political refugees, alien residents, guest workers, immigrants, expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas communities. It is used increasingly by displaced persons who feel, maintain, invent or revive a connection with a prior home.

Thus, concepts of diaspora include a history of dispersal, memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return - which can be ambivalent or utopian - ongoing support of the homeland,

and a collective identity defined by the aforementioned relationships. Remittances also enable people in the diaspora or Samaritan migrants maintain ties with their countries of origin (World Bank, 2008a). Remittances constitute a powerful economic and social force for social and economic development in many Central African countries. Remittances provide financial resources that alleviate poverty by sustaining the basic needs of many families and support private sector investments and hometown associations. Hometown associations are characterized by charitable and altruistic acts. They have recently become the focus of attention because they have been identified as potential new development actors. These philanthropic associations not only support migrants in the new location, but also undertake collective efforts to support development in the hometown. Hometown associations bring together indigenes of a given place living away from home (Page, 2007). They are a common means by which migrants from Cameroon maintain socio-economic and socio-cultural links with their place of origin, not necessarily a 'town' but sometimes a group of settlements, district or region. This can include their place of birth, that of their parents, or an ancestral homeland. Although philanthropic hometown associations have tended to be more firmly established among the urban domestic diaspora (for example in towns and cities of the home country), with growing international migration, they are increasingly found in cities in Europe, North America, and various parts of the world.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how Samaritan migrants really work for the development of local communities in Cameroon. This contribution is based on the hypothesis that the remittances of the migrants from Cameroon, and living abroad, are organized and motivated by altruism geared at improving the social welfare of the local people. Are they charitable or uncharitable? Are they pure altruists? Are they active or passive Samaritans? The methodology used in this paper is based on the cooperative game theory concept. A cooperative game is a game where groups of players (coalitions) may enforce cooperative behavior; hence the game is a competition between coalitions of players, rather than between individual players. The economic literature has highlighted the problem of perverse incentives known as the Samaritan's dilemma which is present in all social interactions and mutual situations.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

From Becker (1964, 1974, 1981, 1996), Becker and Murphy (1988, 2000), Stark (1991) and Bouba-Hagbe (2006), it becomes easy to incorporate altruism into the migrant's utility function. Altruism is considered as part of the migrant's utility function and depends on the utility level of others in the community. Whether altruism can

describe the "true" altruism is a sensitive issue. Barro (1974) also shows that the intergenerational utility function based on his theorem: "old protect young people" integrated the assumption of altruism and useful "chained". Barro's model is useful in societies where intergenerational transfers are important and can be generalized to the idea that a person can be responsible for another. Buchanan (1975) models the Samaritan's dilemma as a two-by-two matrix game.

Stone (2008) wrote a book on 'The Samaritan's Dilemma' for three reasons: 1) to reset the public moral compass, 2) to restore faith in government, and 3) to imagine what politics could be if it were based on altruism instead of self-interest. Rodrik (2007) and Stiglitz (2006) argue that whereas we are in a far and also contested stage of liberalizing trade, it is much more important to open up labor markets. Stressing diasporas' involvement in development also fits smoothly into a communitarian ideology, in which bottom-top approaches; grass-roots participation and civil society are considered as drivers of development (Chukwu-Emeka, 2007). Social capital became a central concept, indicating the economic resources and benefits social ties can bring such as trust, solidarity, and reciprocity (Faist, 2008). Over the past few years, a considerable number of research works have been conducted on the topic of diaspora remittances (Mohan, 2002; AFD, 2006; Page and Plaza, 2006). This is because, these contributions have become substantial, over 126 billion US dollars in 2004 (Sikod and Tchouassi, 2007). Remittances are becoming a vital component of liquidity flows (Mbutor, 2010) for developing countries. Some of these studies assumed that migrants leave their countries, settle in a new country, start integrating into their new society, and abandon their ties with their country of origin. Today, however, globalization, that is, modern communications makes it possible for those in the diaspora to remain connected with their native countries while residing abroad (Page and Plaza, 2006; Gupta et al., 2007).

Many comparisons have been made with this dilemma, especially with impure altruism, the warm glow effect (Bruce and Waldman, 1990, 1991; Koulibaly, 1998). Misinterpretations are related to the opportunism of the donor or recipient country. Firstly, the donor had a principal-agent relationship with recipient countries. In this scenario, the Samaritan, knowing the efforts and their effects may limit gift or aid to the country. Secondly, the recipient country tends to paint a gloomy picture of the situation to benefit from the kindness of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF, given its mandate and cooperative structure, faces what is called the Samaritan's dilemma. Countries know that, faced with underperformance and a weak economy, the IMF is unlikely to impose strict conditionality, because it is concerned with the country's welfare. Simply put, penalties established in advance have limited credibility because they are unlikely to be enforced. The helper makes

it even more vulnerable the person being cared for. The gift or the aid is opportunistic because it destroys the person, the community or the country being helped, thus strengthening his power. It is a well-known paradox of gift or aid and founder of socially sustainable development, but very far from the Samaritan's dilemma. Studies that have been done on diaspora remittances in Central Africa, have looked at the contribution of these remittances to development (Tchouassi, 2004). This paper is interested in venturing in the area of economics and human sciences by examining the motivations of those remitting. Whether, these remittances are motivated by philanthropy and Samaritan attitudes or some other reasons. Sikod and Tchouassi (2007) found that remittances from the diaspora played a very important role at the family level in smoothing consumption over time, and at the clan level in providing some social services like water points, health care centers, educational infrastructures and materials. Mohan (2002) argues that there are three inter-related aspects of diasporas' engagement in the world. The first is development in the diaspora, for example the circumstances under which diaspora communities operate in the host country - jobs, housing, and welfare among others. Second is development through the diaspora - how dispersed diaspora networks support each other, engage in trade, etc. Third is home development (Trager, 1998) by the diaspora - the support that the diaspora communities provide to ancestral home communities through, among others, remittances, lobbying, altruism and philanthropy. Everyday, thousands of Central Africans living abroad line up in money-transfer offices to wire home the odd dollar they are able to save. From the United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and France-the top sources of remittances to Central African countries- some of the money finds its way deep into the rural areas of Central Africa. There, it may send a child to school, build a house or buy food to sustain those remaining at home (Mutume, 2005). Besides remittances destined to individuals and households, remittances targeting village or development, generally go through philanthropic hometown associations.

According to Mbutor (2010), literature also documents the effect of the level of economic activity on diaspora remittances. Generally, remittances for welfare tend to increase during adverse economic conditions. Empirical findings that support the countercyclical nature of remittances include Lowell and Garza (2005), and Bouhga-Hagbe (2004, 2006). On the other hand, Elsakka (1998) showed that growth in Jordan leads to increased remittance at home. This is because most migrant remittances are for development through investment channels. If diaspora remittances are well invested, they contribute to output growth (Ajayi et al., 2009). If they are consumed, they generated positive multiplier effects. Diaspora remittances are also believed to have a positive impact on saving and investment, which on the other hand provide the hard currency required for important

scare inputs that are not available domestically.

## METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Before presenting the sources of data used in this paper, it is opportune to recall a few developments on the methodology employed.

### Method

Traditional applications of game theory define and study equilibriums in these games. In equilibrium, each player of the game has adopted a strategy that cannot improve his outcome, given the others' strategy. Many equilibrium concepts have been developed to describe aspects of strategic equilibrium. Game theory models strategic situations in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others (Myerson, 1991; Lucas, 1992). Mathematically, a cooperative game is given by specifying a value for every coalition. Formally, the game, known as coalitional game, consists of a finite set of players  $N$ , called the "grand coalition" and a "characteristic function"  $v : 2^N \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  from the set of coalitions to a set of payments that satisfies  $v(\emptyset) = 0$ . The function describes how much collective payoff a set of players can gain by forming a coalition and the game is sometimes called a "value game or a profit game". The players are assumed to choose which coalitions to form, according to their estimate of the way the payment will be divided among coalition members.

Conversely, a cooperative game can also be defined with a characteristic cost function  $c : 2^N \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  satisfying  $c(\emptyset) = 0$ . In this setting, players must accomplish some task, and the characteristic function  $c$  represents the cost of a set of players accomplishing the task together. A game of this kind is known as a "cost game". Although most cooperative game theory deals with profit games, it can easily be translated to the cost setting. From Buchanan (1975), we derive two types of games representing the active Samaritan's dilemma and the passive Samaritan's dilemma. This model has been revisited by Schmidtchen (1999), and Ballet et al. (2007) extend the Samaritan accountability on the community. First the active Samaritan's dilemma is presented in Table 1. If we consider the payments between the Samaritan migrant and the home communities in the Central Africa countries, each couple has a first gain of the Samaritan migrant, then the gains of the home communities. The first matrix corresponds to different possible outcomes of a sequential game. The active Samaritan migrant occur first.

We have two players: 1) Samaritan migrant and 2) potential home communities. The Samaritan migrant has got two strategies: 1) uncharitable or do not help and 2) help (charitable). This could mean transfer of an amount of money to potential home communities as a transfer gift. The potential home communities have also got two courses of action: 1) work or 2) do not work. The pay offs are ordinal utility indicators, with Samaritan migrant's pay off ranked first. We assume the matrix as well as rationality of the players being common knowledge. The game has one Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies, namely strategy combination (3, 4). Paying for example US\$ 30 is the dominant strategy of the Samaritan migrant, knowing that this US\$ 40 is the best reply of its potential home communities. The potential home communities get help and do not work. That is, in a nutshell, the result which many people lament as being the typical feature of the modern welfare state. Note that, the game represented by Table 1 must be interpreted as implying imperfect information on the side of both players. In other words, the game is a simultaneous game. As a sequential game the player moving second would have to have four strategies. The Samaritan's dilemma can also occur if the Samaritan migrant does not have a dominant strategy. This case is

**Table 1.** The active Samaritan's dilemma.

		Potential home communities	
		Work	Do not work
Samaritan migrant	Uncharitable	2, 2	1, 1
	Charitable	4, 3	3, 4

Source: Author's calculation from Schmidtchen (1999) and Ballet et al. (2007).

**Table 2.** The passive Samaritan's dilemma.

		Home communities	
		Work	Do not work
Potential Samaritan migrant	Uncharitable	4, 2	1, 1
	Charitable	2, 3	3, 4

Source: Author's calculation from Schmidtchen (1999) and Ballet et al. (2007).

depicted in Table 2.

Second, the passive Samaritan's dilemma is presented. In this case, the initiative is given to the home communities that decide whether or not to recognize the game, e.g. to act strategically with respect to the Samaritan migrant. When the game is launched - the home communities act strategically - just so the Samaritan migrant responds, in his best interests to the behaviors of the home communities. The matrix in the Table below describes the payments associated with this new game. This game is set up by simply transposing the pay off numbers for the potential Samaritan migrant as between cells (4, 2) and (2, 3). The game has two equilibriums, strategy profiles (4, 2) and (3, 4). Buchanan calls the games presented in Tables 1 and 2 the active and passive Samaritan's dilemma, respectively. The reason is that strategic behavior on the part of the Samaritan migrant is always dictated in the Table 1 game whereas in the case of Table 2, strategic behavior may be dictated only when a specific gaming situation is forced upon him by his opponent's (Buchanan, 1975) the home communities. That means, if by whatever reason the strategy profile (3, 4) happens to be the outcome of the game.

From the perspective of game theory, strategy profile (3, 4) is an example of a dilemma on the side of player Samaritan migrant because he cannot implement the outcome he prefers most. Thus, both games represent a personal dilemma and not a social dilemma, if the term social dilemma refers to an equilibrium which is Pareto inefficient. In the game of Table 1, the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient, as well as in cell (4, 3). The same holds for the two equilibriums in the game of Table 2. Of course, one is wondering whether potential Samaritan migrants with preference ordering as shown in Table 2 should be considered as being a Samaritan at all, since he prefers to adopt an outcome, in which he does not help. However, his preference ordering might reflect features of a Samaritan because helping is the option he prefers in the case of the home communities' choice not to work.

The character of the Samaritan migrant as revealed by his preferences in Table 1 needs some further comments. As can easily be seen, helping the home communities is the Samaritan migrant's dominant strategy. Whatever the home communities do to help is preferred by the Samaritan migrant to not doing so. Since helping has a higher pay off for Samaritan migrants, whatever the home communities choose to do, Samaritan migrants can be viewed as an unconditional Samaritan. Samaritan migrant's ranking of cell (4, 3) and (3, 4) compared to cell (2, 2) and (1, 1),

respectively, mirrors the ranking of these cells by the home communities. That is, what we would expect from somebody having altruistic preferences. However, Samaritan migrant's character is much more complex as made evident by a comparison of cell (3, 4) and (4, 3). Samaritan migrant's utility, increases by moving from cell (3, 4) to (4, 3).

With respect to these cells, the Samaritan migrant does not care about the home communities' preferences. Although the home communities would suffer a utility loss by the move from (3, 4) to (4, 3) this move increases Samaritan migrant's utility. This increase could be explained in several ways: home communities' works contribute to social product and the Samaritan migrant can participate in that. Or, from Samaritan migrant's point of view, being confronted with lazy-bones is a bad, which can be considered as a negative externality lowering his utility. Note that in the case mentioned first the personal dilemma of the Samaritan would also be a social dilemma.

### Data sources

Where are Sub-Saharan Africans (SSA) in the diaspora found? One finds them in Canada (206,425 immigrants born abroad, and of SSA origin as of 2001), in the United States (881,300 in 2000), in the European Union (1,042,897 as of 2000) (United States, 2003). This does not include Ireland, Austria and Luxembourg. Disaggregating the immigrants in the European Union by countries results in 274,538 in France, 249,720 in the United Kingdom, 156,564 in Germany, 137,780 in Italy, 88,956 in Portugal, 39,336 in Spain, 23,806 in the Netherlands, and 18,900 in Belgium (Eurostat, 2002). In the last few years, the number of people born in Africa and living in the United States has grown considerably. A 2000 census in the United States showed 881,300 Africans, representing 2.8% of the total population born outside the country. By region, the Africans living in the United States revealed the following figures: West Africa (326,507), North Africa (190,491), Central Africa (57,607), East Africa (213,299), Southern Africa (66,496) and 2690 Africans unclassified (United States, 2003). In the United States alone, where there is more detailed statistics, we find there are over 57000 Central Africans. Central Africa in the larger sense, is made up of the Central African Economic Community (CEEAC), represents an enlargement of groups in Central Africa such as the Central African Monetary Community (CEMAC), the Economic

Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL), made up of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, and Sao Tome and Principe. In all, Central Africa is basically the Congo Basin.

In Central Africa, regional migration is provoked mostly by political and economic instability, bad governance, inter-ethnic and interstate conflicts, inequality and poverty. Those most affected by regional migrations are the most vulnerable groups in the societies, for example, peasants. Migration to distant places like Europe and the developed and rich countries are mostly by the above average citizens, especially those with some means, from the political class, business class, and intellectuals. By migrating, this group tends to accumulate more human and socio-cultural capital than those that have remained back home. However, the migrants remain very sympathetic about the plight of those left behind, and consequently have developed international philanthropic networks that are located mostly in Europe and North America. In all the Central African countries, foundations are the main hometown association working in economic and social sectors: health and education.

In some countries these associations are regional; depend on ethnicity, languages and religion. In Cameroon and abroad, for example the United State, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Belgium, we have identified some networking altruistic hometowns associations: BANDECA, BASCUDA, AAED, BINAM, NUFI, and MECA<sup>1</sup> working in different areas. The members of these associations are living in America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Data used in this work are from these philanthropic groups.

## DISCUSSION

The Samaritan dilemma shows the superiority of collective responsibility on the individual or personal utility. Accountability becomes an issue of public good and the “soft” strategy in the short term implies negative externalities vis-à-vis the rest of the preference or future home communities (Ballet et al., 2007). If one refers, for example, to diaspora as a community of altruistic migrants, the result becomes interesting not on the side of the recipient, but on the aid disbursed, which throws light on the inadequacy of development assistance. The usual result of contributions to a public good in the presence of a generalized altruism on the diaspora side indicates that the provision for this property will be less than the optimum and the general altruism ineffective for redistribution. This confirms Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) results. So one of solutions to development problem is to introduce and encourage other forms of altruism among migrants who give, share and help home families and local communities.

Today there is a critical mass of Central Africans in the diaspora known as Samaritan migrants (first player in the Samaritan model) with high skills and critical work experience. While many have completely integrated into the systems and cultures of their host countries and may

have no desire to return to the continent, some still desire to return. This desire is being fuelled by the feeling of autochthony, a feeling of belonging to some group of people. Both groups, nevertheless, agree on one thing: that they have a positive and significant role to play in leveraging the socio-economic development of the African Region. For this reason, a significant number of Cameroonians in the diaspora have maintained strong socio-economic and socio-cultural ties with the Region. Diasporans are generally organized by hometown associations (second players in the Samaritan model), that is, associations are formed by those from the same family, clan, ethnic group, or community. In the case of few people from the same location, the organization could be by country. They meet at regular intervals or as the situation warrants, to discuss hometown issues, and issues of interest to their stay in the host country.

Historically, the primary concern of philanthropic hometown associations was charitable and mutual support among migrants, particularly when one of their member or close kin died and altruist members would collectively contribute towards sending the body home for burial. Most philanthropic hometown association activities (charitable and mutual support or developmental) still rely on endogenous means, although more dynamic or well connected philanthropic associations sometimes access resources from government, Non Governmental Organizations or international donors.

Cameroon Diaspora Philanthropic Organizations are characterized by considerable diversity in their form (individual and association), general objective and focus (medical, education, arts and culture, tourism, environmental protection, refugee, among others). The main objectives of these groups in Cameroon are to provide charitable funding, to support charity, religious, educational, scientific, and health-related programs and to help other organizations which are philanthropic in nature and the community at large. These situations correspond to the Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies, with combination (3, 4). A typical example of active philanthropic hometown association that has evolved over time is the Bali-Nyonga Development and Cultural Association (BANDECA), a constitutionally established, legally registered philanthropic association made up of both people living in the Bali-Nyonga fondom and also of people with an affinity to Bali-Nyonga who are living outside the fondom elsewhere in Cameroon (the domestic diaspora) (Page, 2007), and outside Cameroon. It aims first, to organize altruistic and charitable migrants, so that they can give, share, help and support each other when they are away from home and second, to foster social welfare and social development back in the hometown. It is part of civil society - that sector of public life upon which such a burden of expectation has been placed in recent years.

Another active hometown association is the Manyu Elements Cultural Association (MECA), which regroups the wider Manyu elements of the South west Province of

<sup>1</sup> AAED is the Association for Aid to Education and Development; BANDECA, the Bali-Nyonga Development and Cultural Association; BASCUDA, the Bali Social, Cultural and Development Association; BINAM, the West Cameroon people in the Diaspora; MECA, the Manyu Elements Cultural Association; and NUFI, the Haut-Nkam cultural Association regrouping people from Haut-Nkam in the West Cameroon in the Diaspora.

Cameroon. It started in the 1970s with the Manyu elements in Yaounde. Today there are sub-sections, representing villages, and even large families. This development or decentralization arises of course, as those in the diaspora grow, and the larger philanthropic group becomes more and more difficult to handle. In reality, the sub-groups function as independent philanthropic associations. Another active association of Central Africans in the diaspora is the Association for Aid to Education and Development (AAED) a nonprofit organization registered in Quebec, Canada with the vocation to fight poverty in developing countries by promoting education and health, in Africa. The AAED besides making the Canadian public sensitive to the fight against poverty and to international development supports projects in education and in health by collecting, acquiring and shipping drugs and pedagogic materials, as well as establishing partnerships between Canadian development organizations and their counterparts in the South.

Outside of those destined to individuals and households, remittances targeting village or local community development, generally go through philanthropic hometown associations. Philanthropic hometown associations (medical foundations, educational foundations, and other associations among others: BANDECA, BASCUDA, BINAM, MECA And NUFI), even if created in the diaspora, would tend to have a local or home-based branch that carries out activities as planned and financed by those in the diaspora. These groups and associations are usually initiated by village elites, because of chronic state neglect and the need to carryout various social development projects. These associations therefore become channels through which village elites can solicit funds from active and passive Samaritan migrants in the diaspora. Villages also copy each other, thus creating a positive externality. By their very nature as dispersed peoples, the diaspora have some experience in the use of networking to build connections among their charitable and altruistic communities abroad as well as with their countries of origin.

Hometown associations, even if created in the diaspora, would tend to have a local or home-based branch that carries out activities as planned and financed by those in the diaspora. Thus, if we consider the Manyu Elements Cultural Association; their early project was the construction of the Mamfe town hall. In terms of organizing adequate means to send money back home, the situations vary, depending on how each country views the diaspora remittances. Individual Samaritan migrant and charitable diasporas' associations in host countries are now organizing themselves to play an increasingly active role in financing projects to improve living conditions, well-being and promote development (Tchouassi, 2004) in their home communities in Cameroon. In this country, this has been part of a long tradition of community, ethnic charity and solidarity.

Some African countries have adopted innovative approaches, such as setting up transfer services among large Samaritan migrants' communities in industrial countries. In Paris, France, for example, three banks - the "Banque de l'Habitat du Sénégal", the "Banque de l'Habitat du Mali" and the "Banque des Ivoiriens de France" - offer special incentives to their nationals at rates lower than those charged by private transfers agents. As a result, the banks make about 400 transfers a day. In 1999, some US\$ 24 million was transferred to Senegal through the scheme. The following discussion gives an idea of how the charitable population of Central African countries (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda among others) in the diaspora and home are motivated to help local communities.

Why do Cameroonians give and share? In light of the apparent incongruity between giving, sharing and the kind of self-interested behaviour usually examined by economists, it is natural to wonder about what motivates Cameroonians to make charitable gifts in the first place. Indeed, members of philanthropic hometown associations in the diaspora are motivated to contribute by various factors: genuine altruism; economic self-interest; social or legal pressure; and, for some senior elites, the desire to nurture political capital at home. Underlying these activities is a sense of belonging, which connects those abroad to their home place and fuses spatially dispersed indigenes into a local community, described as translocal, multilocal or extended. Also, somewhere between socio-cultural activities and economic roles comes pure philanthropy. The groups most able to demand peace are those that in some way enjoy a degree of 'protection'. In the context of looking at passive Samaritan migrants in the diasporas, it appears that doing charitable work may be a way to provide a safe space for engagement with the home country whilst sidestepping some of the toxic politics of the period.

The Bali Social, Cultural and Development Association, was launched in 1999, claiming a regrouping role to include the Bali Cultural Association of the United States of America, and the women's philanthropic association, *nkumu fed fed*. This makes it easier to handle resources sent to the village for various purposes by individuals and groups in the diaspora, who may or may not have any direct ties with the village, and who may have no political ambitions. We see from the other African diasporan situation that even though the motivations are varied, sympathy, and the desire to help is usually at the root of remittances. While a person who escapes the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Darfur, may not want to go back, the thought of those left behind who continue to suffer is a powerful motivation to support philanthropic activities in these areas. The most moving is usually a state of war or some natural catastrophe that leads to mass displacements of people,

creating severe refugee situations in either some parts of the country, or in neighboring or foreign countries. Central African countries are replete with such examples. Displaced people from Darfur in the Sudan moved en masse into the Central African Republic and Chad; Rwanda and Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, continue to have ongoing skirmishes that lead to the displacement of people. There is no doubt that if you are from any of these regions, your involvement will be passionate. Although some of these areas are now stable, providing for those who went through the shock, and are still resident in these regions continues to pose major problems.

Those from these regions that migrated and settled in other parts of the world, look back as Samaritan with nostalgia, charity and sympathy, and feel morally obliged to contribute to the reconstruction of their homelands of origin. Samaritan migrants associations in host countries are now one of the key players with an active role in financing social and economic projects to improve living conditions and promote local development in their home communities in different regions of Africa. In Cameroon, this has been an informal part of a long tradition of community, family social protection system and ethnic solidarity. In recent years the establishment of migrant associations in host countries has instigated a new momentum to these efforts. For example, a significant proportion of Cameroonian migrant savings accumulated in Canada, in France, in United States, in United Kingdom, among others countries, was channeled through migrant associations to finance local community assets in the village of origin, including construction of schools and health facilities among others.

A striking feature of the new initiatives is that migrant philanthropic associations are mobilizing funds from external sources in the host country leveraging their own, collectively pooled, remittances to support community-level development projects. These activities can range from the supply of consumer goods and purchase of farming equipment to income-generating business ventures. Sometimes migrants from neighboring countries, but working in the same host country, join hands, forge inter-institutional links and plan collective action. They, for example, join hands by investing in various social sectors as health care, education, water supply.

## RESULTS

The Cameroonians diaspora has invested more in a local hometown burial, and the increasingly important philanthropic role of the United States, Canada, Germany, France, etc. diaspora in Cameroon has driven the vogue for constructing mortuaries in many local areas. However, its two largest projects were the reconstruction of the water supply and the equipping of hospital and the

mortuary. The mortuary cost around 19.5 million CFA francs (around £20,000), which was raised through general development levies collected from the BANDECA, with a huge support coming from the diaspora. The Bali Social Cultural Association (United States Branch), known as a Samaritan group, has sent containers of medication and equipment to the Bali district Hospital. Since 1999, the Bali-Nyonga Development and Cultural Association has raised tens of thousands of pounds and has undertaken a number of projects in Cameroon. It has renovated a building in Bali-Nyonga for its own headquarters and has also renovated the office of the government's principal representative in town (the divisional officer) and equipped the offices of the new "gendarmierie brigade" (the military police). BANDECA has provided bail for five Bali-Nyonga residents who were arrested after a violent land dispute with people from a neighboring sub-division. It has opened a public library with books provided by the Bali-Nyonga diaspora in the United States and it has organized a cancer-screening exercise.

AAED raised Can\$10,000 in 2005, Can\$40,000 in 2006, and Can\$60,000 in 2007 respectively. A quarter of which was expected from active and passive Samaritan migrants, altruistic and charitable members, and the remaining from external contributors. Most of these funds have been used to support the "Université des Montagnes" (UdM), a local community college founded in 2000 in Cameroon by the philanthropic non profit organization, Association for Education and Development (AED). The sustainability of this local community college relies essentially on philanthropy and the mobilization of civil society altruism. This is a pilot experience that is unique in Cameroon and in Central Africa. With the fund raised by AAED in 2006, we obtained Table 3, which related with active Samaritan migrants. According to passive Samaritan migrants, Table 4 presents the situation. The Manyu Elements Cultural Association, MECA, has supported improvements at the Mamfe General Hospital. MECA-United States continues to support the construction and equipment of a mortuary in the Mamfe hospital. The benefits of a few other MECA projects are spread around the division, notably medicines distributed to village health centres.

In terms of home area development, common village development association (VDA) projects include construction of town halls, classrooms, health centres, places of worship, and farm access roads, and rehabilitation of pipe-borne water systems. The diaspora thus supplies most of the cash and sometimes materials (such as cement) or expertise for VDA projects, either directly or indirectly. The effectiveness of VDAs as development actors therefore depends partly on the size and dynamism of the village diaspora.

In terms of tourism, arts and culture, there are some interesting initiatives taking place on bringing charitable people, known as passive Samaritan migrants, from



**Table 3.** The active Samaritan's dilemma.

		Potential home communities	
		Work	Do not work
Samaritan migrant	Uncharitable	20000,20000	10000,10000
	Charitable	40000,30000	30000,40000

Source: Author's calculation.

**Table 4.** The passive Samaritan's dilemma.

		Home communities	
		Work	Do not work
Potential Samaritan migrant	Uncharitable	40000,20000	10000,10000
	Charitable	20000,30000	30000,40000

Source: Author's calculation.

abroad to Central Africa. The charitable groups targeted as potential tourists are African Americans, not recent diaspora, but those whose roots go back to the slave ships taking their ancestors to the United States several centuries ago. Our results are in line with Brett and Santiago (2004) who have identified other forms of diaspora involvements that bring economic benefits to the local communities. In addition to the widely noted mechanism of remittances, they identify mechanisms such as business investments, investment instruments, and knowledge transfers. According to these authors, remittances are far from being the only vehicle for diaspora influence on the incidence of poverty in their local communities. In Cameroon and for many Central African countries, the Samaritan migrants are a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), market development (including outsourcing of production), and new technology transfer.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we analyzed how Samaritan migrants really work for the development of local communities in Cameroon. The main result is that Samaritan migrants really work for the well-being of home communities. In the Bible, Samaritans face no dilemma. It shows the path that leads to eternal life. He comes to rescue a local community. His help is purely free and this "pure altruism" is far opportunism surrounding economic theorems of altruism and the dilemma of Buchanan. People in the diaspora belong to various types of Samaritan hometown associations that facilitate charitable and mutual help, raising funds for economic and social projects in the home countries of origin, as well as transfer of various types of technologies. While recent migrants are motivated by the need to support families back home, distant migrants are motivated largely by altruism, charity,

and in today's globalizing world, by the desire to bridge the development divide.

The most extensive set of policy implications with respect to Central Africa are: (i) Lowering transaction costs and increasing the security of individual and collective transfers; (ii) Extending financial services to poor people and unbanked population, especially in rural areas, where financial intermediation is very limited; (iii) Encouraging collective remittances from Samaritan migrants organizations, by offering them technical assistance, help with institutional development, matching funds, marketing assistance, and other business and financial services; and (iv) Encouraging more "productive" or "developmental" uses of remittances for the welfare of hometown populations. These points are more complex, since the Samaritan migrants groups may have difficulty agreeing on the uses of collective remittances, but the suggested interventions are designed to assist in acquiring the organizational tools to make appropriate decisions and realize chosen goals in philanthropic ways.

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