

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Volume 9 Number 3 March 2015

ISSN 1996-0832



ABOUT AJPSIR

The **African Journal of Political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR)** is published monthly (one volume per year) by Academic Journals.

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR) is an open access journal that publishes rigorous theoretical reasoning and advanced empirical research in all areas of the subjects. We welcome articles or proposals from all perspectives and on all subjects pertaining to Africa, Africa's relationship to the world, public policy, international relations, comparative politics, political methodology, political theory, political history and culture, global political economy, strategy and environment. The journal will also address developments within the discipline. Each issue will normally contain a mixture of peer-reviewed research articles, reviews or essays using a variety of methodologies and approaches.

Contact Us

Editorial Office: ajpsir@academicjournals.org

Help Desk: helpdesk@academicjournals.org

Website: <http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR>

Submit manuscript online <http://ms.academicjournals.me/>

Editors

Dr. Thomas Kwasi Tieku

*New College, University of Toronto
45 Willcocks Street, Rm 131,
Toronto, Ontario,
Canada.*

Dr. Mark Davidheiser

*Nova Southeastern University
3301 College Avenue; SHSS/Maltz Building
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
USA.*

Dr. Enayatollah Yazdani

*Department of Political Science
Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics
University of Isfahan
Isfahan
Iran.*

Dr. Kannamma S Raman

*Department of Civics and polotics
University of Mumbai Vidyanagari,
Kalina
Mumbai 400 098
India.*

Dr. Upendra Choudhury

*Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University,
Aligarh-202002
Uttar Pradesh,
India.*

Dr. S.M. Omodia

*Department Of Political Science,
Kogi State University
Anyigba, Kogi State
Nigeria.*

Naheed Shabbir Goraya *Centre
for South Asian Studies University
of the Punjab, Lahore Pakistan.*

Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani

*Department of Pakistan Studies,
Bahauddin Zakariya University,
Multan,
Pakistan.*

Dr. Aina, Ayandiji Daniel

*Faculty of Management and Social Sciences
Babcock University, Ilishan – Remo, Ogun State,
Nigeria.*

Prof. F. J. Kolapo

*History Department
University of Guelph
N1G 2W1Guelph, On
Canada*

Dr. Nonso Okafo

*Graduate Program in Criminal Justice
Department of Sociology
Norfolk State University
Norfolk, Virginia 23504*

Dr. Johan Patrik Stålgren

*Department of Political Science,
Göteborg University,
Göteborg.
Sweden*

Dr. Nawal K. Paswan

*Centre for South, Central, South East Asia and South
West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi 110067
India.*

Dr. Okotoni Matthew Olu *Department
of Public Administration Obafemi
Awolowo University
Ile-Ife,
Nigeria.*

Dr. Rudra Prakash Pradhan

*Vinod Gupta School of Management Indian
Institute of Technology, Kharagpur West
Bengal- 721 302,
India.*

Dr. Murat Gül

*Department of International Relations
Süleyman Demirel University, ISPARTA, Turkey.*

Editorial Board

Prof. TOHĂNEANU, Cecilia

*Dean -The Faculty of Political Science
Christian University, Dimitrie Cantemir", Splaiul Unirii nr.
176, Bucharest Romania.*

Assistant Prof. Bulend Aydın ERTEKIN,

*Department of Journalism Anadolu
University Eskisehir Turkey*

Dr. Zakir Husain

*Assoc. Prof. Economics,
Institute of Development Studies Kolkata, (IDSK)
1 Reformatory Street, Calcutta University Alipore
Campus, 5th Floor,
Calcutta 700 027,
INDIA.*

Dr. Yu-Kang Lee,

*Associate Professor
Department of Political Economy
National Sun Yat-Sen University
Taiwan (R.O.C.)*

Dr. Xi Chen,

*Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences
208 SBS
1201 W. University Dr.
Edinburg, TX, 78541
USA*

Prof. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar

*Professor of Persian, Chairman,
Department of Persian,
University of the Punjab,
Lahore*

Prof. BOSTAN D. IONEL

*'A I . I. Cuza'
University of Iasi,
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
ROMANIA*

Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani

*Associate Professor,
International Relations, Solomon Asch Center for Study of
Eth-Political Conflict,
Department of Psychology,
Bettws-Y-Coed 237 Bryn Mawr College, 101N Merion
Avenue,
Bryn Mawr, PA, 19010-2899*

Prof. Branko Dimeski,

*Department of Administration and Management
Information Systems
St. Kliment Ohridski University
Partizanska bb
7000, Bitola
Republic of Macedonia*

Dr. PRAGATI JAIN

*Associate Prof.
Sanghvi Institute of Management and Science,
Indore- 453331
(M.P), INDIA.*

Dr. Jagdish P. Verma

*Post-Doctoral Fellow, UGC Major Research Project, Dept. of
Defence & Strategic Studies, Faculty of Science, Allahabad
University,
Allahabad*

Dr. Enayatollah Yazdani

*Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics
The University of Isfahan
IRAN.*

Dr. Amir Ahmed Khuhro,

*Assistant Professor
Department of International Relations
Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur (Mir's),
Sindh, Pakistan*

Dr. Bharat Chandra Rout

*Research Scholar
National University of Educational Planning and
Administration (NUEPA)
17-B, Sri Aurobindo Marg,
New Delhi
India*

Dr. Mohammed Viquaruddin

*Assistant Professor
Dept. of Political Science
Deogiri College,
Station Road,*

Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam

*Jimma University (JU) - Faculty of Law
Jimma, Oromia 378
Ethiopia.*

ARTICLES

Review

**The role of small arms and light weapons proliferation
in African conflicts** 76

Ayuba, Caleb and Okafor, Gerald

**The fallacy behind the role of civil society in transitional
democracies: The case of Kenyan ethno-political conflicts** 86

Mark Okowa

**Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequence of
insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited** 90

USMAN Solomon Ayegba

Research Articles

**Corruption and voting in Senegal: Evidence from experimental
and survey research** 100

Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews

Review

The role of small arms and light weapons proliferation in African conflicts

Ayuba, Caleb* and Okafor, Gerald

Defense and Security Studies, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria.

Received 2 November, 2014; Accepted 29 January, 2015

Africa is transiting through a trying phase in the history of its evolution as a major world civilization. These trying challenges are characterized by the extremes of hunger, the conditions of massive refugee flow and internally displaced persons occasioned by the gruesome phenomenon of violent conflicts and wars. The paper sets out essentially to establish the connection between the massive flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) since the end of the Cold War and the equally catastrophic revolutionary ferment that characterized the Arab Spring across the fertile crescent and the Maghreb. The paper is sustainably driven by core normative paradigms covering the vast area of illicit armaments and their orchestrating influence in igniting violence. To weave the perspectives captured herein, the paper depended almost exclusively on the content analysis of existing literary materials in the humanist and social science traditions. Findings confirm that indeed small arms and light weapons abound within our case studies (Nigeria and the CAR), a phenomenon that both ignites and sustains violent conflicts within these previously peaceful national territorial entities. By way of recommendation the paper advocates the strengthening of existing legal and political protocols and the fortification of the borders of these countries if they are to remain virile and relevant in the international socio-economic and political order.

Key words: Arms, conflicts, proliferation, war, insecurity, hunger, light weapon.

INTRODUCTION

The rhythm of international and African conflicts in the Post Cold War era has become increasingly fueled and sustained by the incidence(s) of the observable reality of the malignant scourge of the proliferation of Small Arms and Light weapons (SALW). Without any doubt, the end of the Cold War succeeded in bringing relief and optimism to people throughout the world. Former adversaries unanimously conceded on deliberately making major reductions in their conventional and nuclear arms

stockpiles. Globally too, leaders deliberately sought and found ways to cooperate on a range of international issues. As the extremely scary imagery of nuclear confrontation began to fade in the latter years of the decade of the 80s, many worked under the illusory assumptions that this spirit of cooperation might construct a structural framework, that with the end of superpower rivalry, nations of the world might find a new willingness to work together as a global community, to manage and

*Corresponding author. E-mail: ayubacaleb@rocketmail.com

resolve violent conflicts through peaceful negotiations and diplomacy. Yet events over the next decade proved this optimism premature, nowhere more so than in Africa.

Thus, from the 1990's legitimate government authorities and the institutional frameworks upon which these governments rest and receive legitimacy in the international system has become increasingly challenged by non-state actors and criminal gangs operating under different nomenclatures. From Mali and Libya in Central Sahara to the cancerous plague of the Boko Haram in the West Coast of Africa; from the newly birthed republic of South Sudan, to the Central African Republic's (CARs) Saleka and anti Balaka bloodshed, the challenge bears identical characteristic especially with regards the source of their livewire and existence which is easily located to SALW. This establishes the fact that the spread of SALW and the resulting armed conflicts it generates undermine good governance which determines to a large extent development initiatives in Africa more than in any other continent (Garcia, 2009)

Even though state actors are as guilty as non state actors in their arbitrary use of licit and illicit SALW especially in Africa, the thrust of our presentation will be focused and sustainably driven purely on discussing the negative influence of illicit small and light weapons and their impacts on livelihoods, social relations, the economy, international relations and national and regional peace and security. To achieve this objective, we will make specific case studies of the Central African Republic (CAR) and Nigeria. The choice of these countries is deliberate; basically, it is because these nations and their institutions are ravaged by the activities of terrorists operating under the hallucinating influence of religious ideology as motivation to perpetuate their state weakening onslaughts. Both the Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Saleka and anti Balaka challenge of insecurity in the CAR have religious undertone using an operational strategy that is asymmetrical in character with non state actors playing major roles in determining national histories and destinies.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

In this section, our discourse will be approached from a unique perspective that inclines towards the attempt to expound on the multidimensional approaches that give varied meanings to the concept 'small arms and light weapons'. Thus, according to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and other Related Material (ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2006)

Small arms are arms used by one person and which include notably firearms and other destructive arms or devices such as an exploding bomb, an incendiary bomb or gas bomb, a grenade, a rocket launcher, a missile, a

missile system or landmine: It also includes revolvers and pistols with automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.

Light Weapons: are portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team and which include notably heavy machine guns; portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted; portable anti-aircraft cannons; portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; mortars with a caliber of less than 100 millimeters.

Specifically, some of these SALW are;

The Tokarev TT pistols, Makarov PM pistols, AR-70 assault rifles (Beretta, Italy), Type 64 assault rifles (Japan), AKM-47 assault rifles (Kalashnikov), portable rocket propelled grenade RPG-7V1 Mukha "Fly", G3 assault rifles (Heckler and Koch, Germany), FNC (Fabrique Nationale Carbine, Belgium), 7.62mm PKMSN-2 machine guns (Kalashnikov), General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG), Light Machine Guns, Light machine guns (UK 59; Racht Czech), AK-47 under-barrel grenade launchers, RPG-42 hand grenades (Soviet), F-1 hand grenades (Soviet), Dynamite, explosives (nitropil, dynamite, plastic), and electronic remote detonation devices. More sophisticated weapons acquired by militia included those with features of night vision and increased targeting accuracy (Ikelegbe, 2014)

A glimpse at the destructive effect of arms flow to Africa

Irrespective of the source of arms, whether licit or illicit, arms do not portend anything positive in continental and national histories especially for a continent grappling with the negative index of extremely entrenched incidence of poverty; widening gaps in standards of living, lower incomes and consumption capacities, poor health services, low quality education and technology, lower peoples' self esteem, unstable political and economic systems and less freedom for the choice of goods and services (South Commission, 1983; Rajagopal, 2000). For instance, since the African continent staggeringly trudged out of the throes of a dehumanizing colonial experience in the 1960s, the African narrative has been characterized by the debilitating occurrences of violent conflicts and wars. A condition occasioned by the acquisition of arms by criminal non state actors and national governments. Resources that should be directed at infrastructure and sustainable growth and human development were, and are still increasingly channeled to arms purchase³. But Barman (2004) highlights the implications of the phenomenon most succinctly when he posited that small arms proliferation has the capacity for stimulating the following backlashes;

- Undermining development

- Weakening government ability to function.
- Hampering peace and provoking humanitarian disaster
- Threatening civil aviation
- Lead to detrimental long-term societal changes
- Facilitation of the production of craft weapons

In the period immediately after Nigeria's independence (during his first visit to the U.S.A.), Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa "asked the secretary of state, Dean Rusk for a jet fighter squadron of the latest type. In responding to the request, Rusk pointed out that the cost of such a squadron and its maintenance was so great that it might equal the cost of educating up to 5,000,000 Nigerians" (Mckay, 1963). Of course the fear of most independent African governments is not unfounded in the sense that the 'advent of new African states also possesses the possibility of irredentists movements and conflicts over international boundaries⁶. This misappropriation of resources to arms procurement has proven most disastrous to the development agenda of the countries of the South and inversely advantageous to the countries of the Northern hemisphere. A recent survey for instance has confirmed that the cost impact of conflicts on the continent's development was put at approximately US \$300 billion between 1990 and 2005 (Schnabel, 2008). This survey has been confirmed by such reputable international organizations as the Oxfam, the International Action Network of Small Arms and Safer World. This survey has also proven that the continent losses 15% of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to conflicts that are oiled and sustained by SALW, thereby threatening the possibility of Africa attaining the poverty-reduction scheme of the UN millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Ayissi and Poulton, 2006).

Thus, in the euphoria that greeted the emancipation narrative of post colonial Africa, the advocates of dependency theory, namely; Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Walter Rodney amongst many others, in their numerous treatises to the discourse regarding Africa's stagnant location in the international order have expressed the construction of their minds which ascribes Africa's underdevelopment to the slave trade and slavery that depopulated the continent's energetic youth population (Rodney, 1976; South Commission, 1983). Unfortunately, half a century of arms trade and gun running and the deployment of the same instruments in the execution of the debilitating warfare characterizing post colonial Africa has killed almost more than the trade in slave have done with regards to the forceful repatriation of the most productive of Africa's population thus, denying the continent of the much coveted benefits of socio-economic and political advancement.

The political economy of SALW and its implications on regional security

From the British Industrial Revolution in the 18th Century,

the world has experienced increase in production of goods and services which has ensured the creation of two distinct classes in the international economy-the upper class of industrial/landed property owners and the lower working class who eked-out their existence from the drudgery of industrial production that the economy of the industrial era provided--The repercussion of this evolving development at this particular point in human evolutionary history saw the emergence of men of means and wealth who indulged in conspicuous consumption and materialism and an equally impoverished human category (Ikelegbe, 2014). The life of indulgences engaged in by the rich spurred the poor who are now sequestered in urban ghettos to envy. This development has negatively impacted on crime wave bordering on robbery, kidnappings and the fraudulent exploitation of man by man at both the communal and international political economy levels in general (Rodney, 1976).

Within Africa, this reality became evident with the rising level of poverty that was occasioned by the integration of the continent into the orbit of the global colonial economy of the early 20th Century which was occasioned by the monetization of Africa's mining and agricultural production processes. It is necessary to establish that the colonial capitalist economic system pulled young and energetic youths from the rural economic setting, and through forced labour, initially introduced them to mining, cash crop production, and so on. Of course the money earned by this newly created urban working class was extorted in the equally newly introduced tax regimes and other forms of collections. The poverty that resulted from the activities of the colonial empire was real because the African actors within the system occupied the lowest rung of the colonial cadre with miserable income that hardly sustained the colonial employee (Rajagopal, 2000; Ikoku, 1976). It must be borne in mind that this lopsided colonial capitalist structure has over a Century of African history ensured the creation of a class of frustrated groups within society. A conspiracy of the deprivations suffered by these frustrated elements and the ready availability of SALW within the African continent have occasioned the rising levels of insecurity in the post colonial age.

In Nigeria, socio-economic upheavals since the civil war in the 1960s, almost immediately after independence, have increased the pervasiveness of poverty and hardships, while the boom in unearned oil income has accelerated the rise of a materialistic culture. Addressing the causal relationship between the poverty question and the inherent social malaise plaguing the Nigeria project, an analyst has driven the point home when he asserts that;

The answer is that Nigeria has become a predatory jungle in which, unlike in the animal kingdom, people devour their own kind; a society without a sense of community, or of public good. There is also a tendency for the attitude of political executives, from presidents to governors and chairmen of local government's councils (who live like oil Sheiks) to negatively influence the

behavior of those who voted them into office, but continue to subsist in squalor and degrading poverty. In sum, the prevailing societal values are principally a reflection of public morality as defined and debased by the ruling elite and people in public life in general (Akinola, 2014).

Thus, with the end of the colonial state and the persistence of a demeaning condition of livelihood as a result of official corruption and infrastructural decay, crime began to be seen as an avenue for breaking-off the York of this unpalatable human misery the poor category is going subjected to. Hence, with the massive inflow of small arms and light weapons into many parts of the continent, the incidences of high profile crime waves and criminality became entrenched. It is common to now hear young men pronounce the cliché “if the rich have smart cards to make purchases, I have my arm which is my smart card” (Dube, 2014: 11). By implication, the poor residents of rural ghettos use these acquired weapons to acquire materials that they feel could satiate their appetite for the things that modern consumerist culture provide as standard for determining prestige, self esteem, comfort and achievements in general (Smith, 1982).

On the place of envy, apart from SALW as motivator of criminality, Adam Smith, the thinker that fashioned the political economy thought, understood this provision perfectly. Smith argues that the fact that man seeks riches and avoids its inverse-poverty has very little to do with physical necessity. He maintains that “the wages of the meanest” laborer can supply the necessities of nature such as food and clothing, the comfort of a house and of a family and that much of the income, even of poor people is spent on things that are, strictly speaking, “conveniences, which may be regarded as superfluities”. Why then do men seek better conditions of life? The answer is easily located in the following brilliantly crafted wordings;

To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken noticed with sympathy, complacency, and with approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the pleasure which interest us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being the objects of affection and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally drew upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind is disposed to go along with him in all agreeable emotions with which the advantage of his situation so readily inspire in him.....The poor man on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of sight of mankind or, that if they take any notice of him, they have however, scarcely any fellow-feeling with the misery and the distress which he suffers..... (Smith, 1982)

This explains the motivation for criminality amongst the youth population. Now that they have discovered the ease with which SALW could be accessed, criminality has grown exponentially.

Contextualizing the nexus between SALW and regional insecurity: Nigeria

The different forms of security challenges plaguing Nigeria as a country are multiple. From those of armed robbery to kidnappings; from ethno-religious motivated violent conflicts to outright terrorism and insurgencies against the authority of the state. This reality has resulted in Nigeria churning out more than 3.3 million refugees since around the year 2010, making Nigeria the highest ‘producer of refugees in Africa and the third in the world after Syria and Colombia respectively (Voice of America, 2014). In addition, the same state of insecurity sourced in the various challenges as pointed above makes the country the fourth most violent country in the world (Aljazeera, 2014) These grim statistics have connection with the massive proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation. Recently, while commenting on the phenomenon of SALW in West and Central Africa and its scary implications, the Founder and Chancellor, Covenant University, Bishop David Oyedepo (2014) commented that;

War is a sucker. It has the capacity for sucking the resources of nations. Only those who do not know its cost implications propagate it. We must not allow war in Nigeria. We should not even think of it. Its consequences are unimaginable. War is a crime against humanity. It erodes dignity, destroys and devastates humankind. It is staring at us in the face but we must work assiduously at avoiding it.

Cogent as the above admonition is, every day, the country is increasingly plunged towards the precarious precipice. The senseless attacks on innocent citizens and core national institutions and infrastructure have continued to weaken the fabric of an organic national project. What were previously isolated and sporadic incidences of killings, raping and kidnappings of targeted victims has in recent times turned strategic and its consequences more and bloodier with each attack. The insurgency in the north east of the country has eventuated in the capitulation of human communities and villages that results in deaths in hundreds on each attack and the displacement of human populations, either as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees across the Niger, Cameroun and Chad borders.

Recently, it was reported that Boko Haram militants attacked three northeastern villages, killing approximately 200 people. The villages were all located in Borno State, which has seen almost daily violence from Boko Haram attacks in recent weeks. The militants were dressed as soldiers and they fired indiscriminately at civilians while setting fire to churches and houses. If the overall scenario is to be coherently articulated, it will be understood that the consistent strategic attacks on communities, the killing of this much number of people, the destruction

of invaluable goods and services across the three states under emergency rule (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe) and the entire northern region points to the fact that indeed a violence of near apocalyptic dimension is ongoing across the vast northern prairie (International Peace and Security Institute, 2014). Of course as mentioned severally, this catastrophe, beyond inducing bloodsheds, has now reached the threshold in defining one of the most genocidal and precariously challenging humanitarian disasters in the history of Africa in the 21st century.

In spite of the bloody and highly destructive phenomenon of the insurgency, the Nigerian security machine has increasingly proven incapable of meeting up with its constitutionally enshrined responsibility of defending the territorial integrity of the Nigerian state and its people and resource endowments. This failure is easily located in the ready access these criminal gangs have to small arms and light weapons and this is because of the inability of the security sector to coordinate their activities towards a positive synergy with the civil population. On the matter in discourse, the issue is summarized thus;

Community-oriented policing can make a significant difference to decrease the danger posed by Boko Haram and other threats to the safety and security of the Nigerian people. The strength of these militant groups rests in part on the lack of partnership between law enforcement agencies such as police or border security units and the public. This absence of a connection means not only that citizens don't get the quality protection they need but also that there are no established communication channels through which the public can share information with the police. Information from the public -- about threats or criminal activity or from victims or witnesses -- is a fundamental asset of effective policing. Security results from a close partnership between the public and the police tasked with protecting them. Each is a co-guarantor of security; one cannot work effectively without the other (Nwosu, 2010).

Apart from the insurgency in the North East, there is equally the threat of the Niger Delta militancy in the South-South region of the country. Until the advent of the Umaru Yar-adua's presidency and his national amnesty policy, the greatest threat against the state by any armed group was the Niger Delta militant youth movements. In a move that was interpreted as an attempt by this youth militants to question the appropriation formula of the oil resource that is sourced from the Niger Delta, the youths embarked on high level economic sabotage of Nigeria's economic interest on/off shore (Nwosu, 2010: 12).

Thus, these active youths, highly motivated by the massive arms build-up over the years (since the end of the Cold War), and the now sophisticated arsenal depot and the intrinsic desire to 'emancipate' their under-privileged communities and polluted environments have decided to domesticate and operationalize violence as a means of registering their grievances against the state. The results were not limited to only strangulating the

economic base of the nation through drastic reduction in the daily oil production but also in militarizing the entire region of Niger Delta. Hence, it became a very lucrative enterprise among the youth militant groups in connivance with local communities that provide tacit support in terms of information, shelter and other logistical assistance. It further provided an opportunistic environment for transnational organized criminal syndicates to sale these wares (SALWs) and in return criminally benefit from the abundant largesse of natural resources through provision of easy passage in the creeks to participate in illegal oil bunkering. Thus many expatriate workers, Nigerians, security agents serving on the Joint Task Force (JTF) and Militants died in these skirmishes accentuated by the availability and easy access to SALWs. Irrespective of the giant strides recorded through the Amnesty Programme, the maritime security in the region has remained challenging. This is attributed to the military capacity of unrepentant militants in terms of stockpiles of arms who mostly engage on oil theft for their own benefits. In the same view, the South-East zone of the country has equally being plagued with serious crisis of security arising from incidences of kidnapping for ransom. This crime is being strongly aided by the availability of illicit SALWs, which could easily move internally from one zone to the other in the country. Seizures by the security agencies operating in the zone attest to the high level of sophistication of the weaponry available of kidnapping gangs in South-East zone, and the nexus between arms availability and burgeoning kidnapping enterprise.

Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) has been a sovereign state since the 1960s and has experienced series of political turmoil including the traditional incidences of coups and counters coups that characterized the African and Latin American power equation in the last two decades. A major one—coup—was the one that occurred in March 2003, when François Bozizé seized power. The president at the time, Ange-Félix Patassé, had won multi-party elections in 1993 and 1999. The few presidential elections prior to that had largely fallen short of free and fair. Bozizé had achieved power in the same manner as two former Central African presidents: Jean-Bédél Bokassa and André Kolingba. Bokassa and Kolingba had one thing in common besides being former chiefs of staff of the Central African armed forces: they had both overthrown David Dacko (Campbell, 2006; Meredith, 2011).

It is instructive to mention that a common reason advanced for the execution of most coup d'état on the continent has been ascribed to the dual challenge of poverty and the development problematic that has characterized the evolutionary narrative of the continent since independence. To establish the connection between most African conflicts and the poverty index, the

development narrative –with specific regards to the CAR–has maintained that;

None of CAR's presidents who have been ousted in coups has been killed, and all have fared considerably better than those Central Africans not fortunate enough to serve as head of state. The landlocked country of 623,000 square km (somewhat larger than Portugal and Spain combined) remains substantially undeveloped. CAR's 3.9 million citizens, comprising some 80 ethnic groups, are among the poorest in the world, earning on average significantly less than a dollar a day. According to a 2003 UN report, CAR had the highest rate of maternal mortality during childbirth, an increasing HIV/AIDS rate, and a population that was largely unschooled (UN OCHA, 2003). The 2006 Human Development Index, which measures a series of socio-economic indicators from 177 countries, ranks CAR sixth from last (UNDP, 2006: 286). The pre-independence experience of the country certainly contributed to its present-day challenges. It fared particularly badly as a French colony and also from the Arab slave trade. As a part of Afrique Equatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa, AEF), Ubangi-Shari, as CAR was known from 1910 to 1958, received less attention and resources than the other AEF territories, which are today known as the Republic of the Congo (RoC), Gabon, and Chad.

Over a sustained period of over half a Century, the CAR has remained firmly locked in the firm grip of socio-economic and political instability. For instance, during the remainder of the decades of the 1980s right into the early 1990s, the CAR continued in the infamous and traditional experiences of military overthrow of governments; thus, a significant number of attempted coups, suspected coup attempts, and relatively small-scale violence involving dissatisfied factions and the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) (Pierre, 1992). 'The situation deteriorated sharply in 1996, however, when elements of the army mutinied. In all, there were three separate uprisings that year. The third mutiny culminated in the looting of the country's arms depot at the Kassaï barracks in Bangui (McFarlane and Malan, 1998: 48-58). In 1997, following the overthrow of Zairian (later the DRC) President Mobutu Sese Seko, thousands more weapons flooded into the Central African Republic (CAR)'.

Two rebel groups are at the center of the security problem in the Central Africa Republic; these are the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR) in the northeast of the CAR, and *l'Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* (APRD) that have location in the northwest. Although conflicts in Darfur and Chad have exacerbated the current political instability and its devastating implications on the country, the rebellion, in this case the overthrow of Françoise Bozize was ignited by the dire conditions of political, economic, and security

concerns that have deep roots in the established fragility of the state and its institutions.

At the peak of the rebellion, it was clear that President Francois Bozize's government had little authority outside the nation's capital city, Bangui while extreme poverty and a lack of both strong government institutions and economic development have contributed to declining support for the government among CAR citizens'. Some commentators have maintained that, there are some indications that the Government of Sudan (GOS) supports rebel forces in CAR. 'However, the Bozize government may overemphasize the role of Sudan in an effort to minimize the importance of CAR's internal problems and shift blame for the conflict to an external actor'. Other commentators that are considered moderates in their analysis have opined that, the GOS seems willing to ignore local Sudanese support to CAR rebels, such as the provision of safe havens, weapons, and logistical support (Meredith, 2011).

Unfortunately, this support by Chad and Sudan has completely altered the trend and dynamic of what was ordinarily a popular movement with the economy and marginalization as motivation to a highly destructive religious war between the Saleka and the Anti Balaka groups that are in the engagement on the basis of their religion. Of course, this same challenge has found its livewire in the illicit arms flow to the CAR (Meredith, 2011).

THE MECHANISM INSTITUTED TO REGULATE ARMS FLOW INTO AFRICA

The international political economy will ensure that the powerful nations of the earth that have the wherewithal and upon whom the moral burden to check arms proliferation and its gruesome implication on nations and their people will not show the needed commitment towards this. These strong countries like the US, China, Iran, the Russian Federation and Pakistan will always block the approval of measures dear to Africa in the sense of instituting the measures that will check arms proliferation³⁰. The implication of the above is that an international approach to arms control will not be achieved because most of the weapons used to execute African conflicts are not endogenous to the continent essentially due to limited capacity. This informs the basis for sourcing the weapons from established military industrial complexes with headquarters in Europe, America and Asia. This is more so when viewed from the point of view of the fact that the Kalashnikov rifles, 'the darling' of African conflicts which are supplied by the above mentioned continents find easy access into countries of Africa due to the porosity of contiguous national and international borders, poor regulation of the intra-regional circulation of arms left over from conflicts during the Cold War, conflicts throughout the 1990s and

afterwards and the unregulated activity of arms brokers.

This reality has necessitated the resolve to explore the possibility of using regional mechanism in checking the proliferation of SALW within the continent. Thus, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Eastern African States are aggressively moving towards a regional “approach to tackling the scourge of small arms proliferation and have thus enacted legally binding instruments in this regard³².”

These sub regions have successfully constructed functionally active instruments variously aimed at achieving the common goal of preventing arms proliferation and by implication employed a strategy that also aims at violent conflict prevention. For instance within the East African sub region—the CAR, the Great Lakes Region (GLR), and the Horn of Africa (HoA), the agenda aims at reversing the proliferation of the SALW through the following legal and political mechanism;

- The negotiation of the politically binding Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms by the Ministers of foreign Affairs of the countries of the GLR and the HoA signed in 2000.
- The creation of the Nairobi secretariat on SALW to coordinate the action by each member country's national focal point on SALW in the GLR and the HoA.
- The third is the evolution of the Nairobi declaration into a parallel legally binding instrument, the Nairobi protocol for the prevention, Control, and Reduction of SALW in the GLR and the HoA, adopted in April, 2004.

As a result, the secretariat was elevated to the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

With regards to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiative at arms control generally called the SADC protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and related materials; it basically aims at the creation of a regional control over trafficking and arms possession. A related organization within the SADC is the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO). This proactive organization was conceived in 1995 with the goal of tackling cross border criminal activity. However, the SARPCCO's operations specifically prioritize reduction in arms trafficking and their use in crime.

In addition, the SADC protocol has as major goal the “prevention, combating and the eradication of illicit arms—guns and ammunition-- manufacturing and other related materials, as well as their excessive and destabilizing uses, trafficking and possession” (Garcia, 2009). It further continues that:

The protocols also seek to regulate the import and export of legal small arms and thus curb the transit of these weapons into and within the region. In addition, it aims for

the harmonization of national legislations across member states on the manufacture and ownership of small arms and light weapons. Thus, the SADC protocols marks a significant development in the efforts of the states of Southern Africa to tackle the scourge of small arms and light weapons (Stott, 2001).

Despite the visionary thrust sustaining the creation of a legal and political framework with a view to eliminating the menace of SALW on the Southern African sub region, certain key encumbrances have reared their heads and limited the capacity of the SADC to achieve any reasonable success in this noble fight. Chief amongst these are the extant porosity of the borders delineating these countries; the dilemma of obsolete national legislation, the precariousness of regional peace processes; the lack of capacity on the parts of both government and the civil society to effectively monitor the legal and illegal movements of firearms and most importantly, the lack of data from which to assess the improvements that may result from the effective implementation of the SADC protocols (Garcia, 2009).

The commendable aspect of the existing protocols operational within the African geographical space is easily located in its inclusion of stockpile management. Specifically, the SADC protocol has strongly maintained in its provisions that “surplus, redundant or obsolete arms and ammunitions and other instruments of war and violent conflicts must be securely stored, destroyed or disposed of in a way that prevents them from entering into the illicit firearms market or flowing into the regions in conflict or to any other destination in a way that is not fully consistent with agreed criteria for restraint” (Garcia, 2009).

Conversely, the control of illicit SALWs proliferation in West Africa has remained a collective endeavor of the member states of ECOWAS since 1998 with the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa by the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Abuja on 31 October 1998 (Agneketom, 2008: 13-29). The Moratorium, even though a non-legally binding instrument, was emphatic on total ban to importation and exportation of SALWs to the sub-region, with a high level of commitment by member states for compliance. This was demonstrated with the adoption on 10th December 1999 of a Code of Conduct for the operationalization and monitoring of the level of implementation of the Moratorium and Decision A/DEC.13/10/99 establishing the National Commissions at the member state level to combat SALWs proliferation. Instructively, Article 4 of the Code of Conduct assigned the National Commissions (NATCOMs) the responsibility of promoting, ensuring and coordinating concrete measures for effective implementation of the Moratorium. Therefore, it was expected to serve as the institutional platform that will assist competent national authorities in

devising, developing and implementing national policies to combat SALWs proliferation (Agneketom, 2008). At the same time, the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was developed and carried out between 1999 and 2004 to support the implementation of the Moratorium. This process of building institutional capacity to combat the scourge in West Africa equally witnessed the establishment of the West African Action Network against Small Arms (WAANSA) in May 2002 as the civil society component to ensure a holistic framework. And within the ECOWAS Commission, the Small Arms Unit was established in September 2005 in line with the decision of the Council of Ministers adopted in 2003 in Accra, Ghana.

The adoption of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and other Related Materials on 14 June, 2006 became the cornerstone for combating the menace of SALWs proliferation in the Sub-region and showcased the high level of political vision of the Heads of State and Government. The objectives of the Convention (ECOWAS Convention, 2006) are:

- To prevent and combat the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS;
- To continue the efforts for the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS;
- To consolidate the gains of the Declaration of the Moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and its Code of Conduct;
- To promote trust between the Member States through concerted and transparent action on the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS;
- To build institutional and operational capacities of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the Member States in the efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and other related materials; and
- To provide the exchange of information and cooperation among the Member States.

The main thrust of the Convention that makes it exceptional from most of other international instruments on combating SALWs proliferation is its emphasis on prohibition of transfer of SALWs into, through and from the territories of member states (Article 3) The Convention allows for exemption for Member States to import SALWs to enable them meet legitimate national defence and security needs, although the granting of the exemptions requires adequate notice and approval of other member states and the ECOWAS Commission. It further enshrined a complete ban, without exception, transfer of SALWs to non-state actors that are not explicitly authorized by the importing Member State.

However, these various laudable initiatives that have been in place in the West Africa sub-region have not

deterred the influx of illicit SALWs and their indiscriminate use in violent conflicts and to commit human rights violation. In fact, the terrain continuously remains fertile for the proliferation of SALWs as a result of many factors including poor governance, porosity of borders, ineffective and inefficient institutions as well as corruption. As a result of the high level of insecurity and violent conflicts, sustained by the availability of SALWs, there is lack of progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in West Africa. Succinctly, Ayissi (2008) noted that this lack of progress on the MDGs is an emerging regional trend in West Africa as half of the states in the sub-region are either in post-conflict recovery phase or greatly weakened by creeping or endemic crisis situation. This assertion was further buttressed with the MDG-1-reducing extreme poverty by half, by 2015, of the proportion of the people who suffer from hunger in the world. In West Africa, where greater percentage of the population are poor and fall within that category of extreme poverty, it will require concerted efforts to promote agriculture in order to meet the MDG-1. Regrettably, one basic feature common in all the conflict zones in West Africa is the insecurity that grips much of the countryside and rural areas. Major roads that are used in transporting agricultural produce are also deliberately targeted, thereby destroying farming which predominantly occurs in the rural areas and a direct causative factor in food insecurity. Therefore, effective control of SALWs in the sub-region will not only reduce the spate and recycling of armed violence but will usher in a more secure environment, where development will be assured.

Unfortunately, this is not the case in the region. It has been established that one of the most important source(s) of illicit weapons apart from importation is from the national stockpiles; whether as stolen goods or racketeered by the custodians of these weapons due to high level of corruption. Sometimes these materials are 'hired' to interested parties willing to pay for the weapons. Again, this is possible because of the non existence of a functional data base to monitor the collected/retrieved excess arms and ammunition. This incapacity has encouraged the perpetration of this illicit activity. With regards the question of corruption in the arms procurement narrative, Ikelegbe (2014) during the recently concluded Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons organised open Forum has maintained that; "There may be complicity of senior state security officers in the smuggling of SALWs at the airports, ports, highways and borders. The compromising of military and police officers is responsible for the leakages of arms from state armories to illegal users".

Conclusion

The following conclusion is devoted to reflections on core issues that have prominently featured as central themes

in this essay. These include issues that bound on the relations between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the continent and the sub region in particular and the outbreak of violent conflagrations and wars. Pursuant to this, we equally made attempt at weaving the whole perspectives raised around the precarious phenomenon of poverty plaguing an already beleaguered people. By way of recommendations, the paper has unequivocally advocated the restoration of a sound legal regime that will ensure the construction of a sound criminal justice system that will criminalize criminality and give access to a justice order to the vulnerable in civil society, without which the incidences of SALW proliferation will continue with its attendant orchestration of violent conflicts. In addition, the paper advocates an increased accountability in public governance and trust between government and the citizens as they collectively strive towards the actualization of the social contract they had entered into. We believe if these recommendations are adapted and strictly adhered to, actors resident within the state will not have any justification to carry arms against the state and its non-belligerent people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Specific topics that will receive attention in this context are government transparency and accountability, decentralisation and participation of civil society, the role of traditional leaders and the media, protection and inclusion of minorities, and promoting dialogue between conflicting groups.

1. There is need for concerted and collective efforts among stakeholders at all levels of the society to curtail illicit SALWs proliferation. Hence, capacities of stakeholders should be enhanced to ensure effective implementation of result-oriented programs and formulation of evidence-based policies;
2. There is need for an improved border management mechanism using modern and sophisticated detection equipment to discourage arms trafficking through the borders. Also, effective strategies should be deployed to police the numerous unauthorized entry/exit routes on the continent, recognizing the need to enlist the support and cooperation of border communities;
3. There is need for a review of the Firearms Act with stringent penalties in order to address the current challenges associated with SALWs proliferation. The Executive Arm of government, with the support of other stakeholders which include the CSOs, should engage the Legislature to ensure that the review of the obsolete Firearms Act remains in the fore-front of legislative deliberation. In this respect, the CSOs could prevail on the legislature to make laws pertaining to the manufacture, importation, storage and even the possessions of firearms especially with specific regards to our frequently mentioned Small Arms and Light weapons;

4. There is need to domesticate into national laws, the international instruments that have been signed and ratified by these countries in order to make them conform with international best practices in tackling illicit SALWs proliferation;
5. There is need to establish and strengthen institutional frameworks for the control of illicit SALWs proliferation to ensure an effective, coordinated and consistent implementation of arms control programs on the continent;
6. There is need for all the Military, Security and LEAs to improve on stockpile management of arms in their possession using modern techniques. Furthermore, the agencies should be encouraged to maintain a functional and integrated electronic database of their stockpiles as a prelude to establishing a National Database on Firearms; There is need to leverage on the various International Arms Control Instruments and international cooperation to ensure that seized weapons in armed conflict zones and crime scenes in the country are traced. This will assist in understanding important dynamics of SALWs proliferation especially trafficking routes, countries of origin and manufacturers of the arms, the brokers;
7. Finally, we advocate the rebuilding of public infrastructure/services and the promotion socio-economic development and the promotion of the mechanisms for peaceful settlement of conflict in society.

Conflict of Interest

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Agneketom PC (2008). 'Political and Institutional Dynamics of the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa'. J. Disarmament Forum, Volume 4.
- Ayissi A, Poulton ER (2006). 'Peace-building and Practical Disarmament: Beyond States, with Civil Society'. In Ayissi .A and Poulton .E R (Eds.) *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*. Switzerland: A United Nations Publication.
- Ayissi A (2008). 'Peace, Security and the Millennium Development Goals in West Africa,' *Disarmament Forum* 4, <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2834.pdf>.
- Barman E (2004). "Trends and Dynamics of illicit Arms Proliferation in Nigeria: A Small Arms Survey Perspective", presented at the National Consultative Forum on Proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria, Abuja 2-4 June.
- Conference of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2006). *Their Ammunition and other Related Materials*, Abuja: ECOWAS Commission.
- Dube A (2014). "Containing Gun Culture, Terrorism and Armed Violence: Sharing Experiences from South Africa, United States and Israel", a paper presented at a 3-day National Consultative Forum on the Proliferation of SALWs, Abuja, 2-4 June.
- Garcia D (2009). 'Developing Indicators for Evaluating the National Implementation of Regional Law on Arms in Africa'. *Afr. Secur. Rev.* 18:1.
- Ikelegbe A (2014). "Trends and Dynamics of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Armed Violence in the South-South Nigeria". Presented at the National Consultative Forum on the proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria, Abuja, 2-4 June.
- Ikoku EAU (1976). *African Development with a Human Face*, London: Africa Books.

- Pierre K (1992). *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*. New Jersey: Scarecrow Press.
- McFarlane F, Malan M (1998). 'Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: A New Trend in African Peacekeeping?' *Afr Secur. Rev.* 7:2.
- Meredith M (2011). *The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence*. London: Simon and Schuster.
- McKay V (1963). *Africa in World Politics*. USA: Harper & Row.
- Nwosu BU (2010). "Oil Conflicts and Security in the Niger Delta: Exploring the Dynamics of Conflicts and Search for Peace: A Review Article". *Nig. J. Int. Aff.* 36:1.
- Rodney W (1976). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Dar-es-alam: Tanzania Publishing.
- Rajagopal B (2000). 'Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography', *Third World Legal Stud.* 15:1.
- Schnabel A (2008). *The Human Security Approach to Direct and Structural Violence*. In *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security*. Stockholm: Oxford University Press.
- Smith A (1982). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics Ltd.
- Stott N (2001). *Implementing the Southern Africa Firearms Protocols: Identifying Challenges and Priorities*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- The South Commission Report (1983). New York: UN Publication.
- UN OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2003). 'Flash Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to the Central African Republic.' 8 May. <<http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-64CUF8>>
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2006). *Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*. Human Development Report, November 2006. New York.

Print and Electronic References

- Akinola GA (2014). "Prayer and the Prosperity Hustle (2)" in the *Nation Newspaper* on Sunday, June 8th.
- Oyedepo D (2014). "On the State of the Nigerian Nation" in the *Nation Newspaper* on Sunday, 9th June. *Voice of America (VOA)*, 19th May, 2014
- Al jeazeera News, 4th June, 2014
- International Peace and Security Institute, (online publication), stayinformed@ipsinstitute.org, accessed 7th August, 2014.

Online Publications

- Campbell K (2006). 'Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan Triangle of Instability'. www.usip.org/.../central-african-republic-chad-and-sudan-triangle-of-instability. Accessed in August, 2014.

Review

The fallacy behind the role of civil society in transitional democracies: The case of Kenyan ethno-political conflicts

Mark Okowa

Political Sociology, Maseno University, Kenya.

Received 5 September, 2013; Accepted 7 February, 2015

The belief in the centrality of the role of civil society in democracy promotion should be re-evaluated especially in the context of transitional societies like Kenya. Contrary to the widely held view that Civil society is a platform for citizen engagement with government and other state and non state actors, there is reason to believe that civil society has become an avenue for simmering hatred and the promotion of divisive schemes by the political class. In Kenya just like many South eastern European countries, ethnic, cultural and other social differences have become major factors of political instability. Today every aspect of development plans, appointments to government or public offices and or opposition to any government plans and actions are interpreted in ethnic, cultural and or regional dimensions. Civil society institutions including the religious groups have taken sides in the political landscape with ideological support or opposition to the actions of the political class emanating from the same civil society albeit based on regional or ethnic affiliations. This is manifesting a bigger sociological problem than the salient issue of ethnicization of politics rendering civil society as part of the problem and in need of capacity building.

Key words: Civil society, democracy, ethno-political conflicts.

INTRODUCTION

The post-independence era in Africa has seen several cases of internal conflicts in many countries with varied reasons being fronted as possible causes. Furley, (1995: 3) attributes these conflicts to ethnicity challenges overlooked at the time of independence. However, ethno-political conflicts are not unilateral to Africa parse but rather a global problem particularly to transitional democracies. While disputing the assumption that ethnic violence erupts primarily as a result of the differences

between varied ethnicities, prehistoric hatreds and or cultural feuds several centuries old, Lake and Rothchild (1996: 41) argue that extreme ethnic conflicts are most habitually caused by collective uncertainties for the future. As groups usually monolithic ethnicities begin to fear for their safety; precarious and difficult-to-resolve strategic predicaments arise that contain within them the potential for terrific violence. Usually such conditions are created consciously or unconsciously through propaganda

E-mail: okowa2003@yahoo.com; Tel. +254 724 606759.

Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

by the elites in society, through structured and unstructured institutions that form the civil society. Take for instance the 2004 Rwanda Genocide where the Hutus were made to believe that Tutsis intended to enslave them and so it was incumbent upon them to rise up in arms albeit in self-defence. The civil society and the media were used to spread hate messages within respective ethnicities. The result was genocide where near a million people were killed, majority being Tutsis.

In contemporary democratic systems, most ethnicity oriented groupings pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels (Newland, 1993: 161). This however, is as far as the systems are regarded as fair to the groups in question. When ethnic origin translates to access or otherwise of the socio-economic and political opportunities and by extension – national resources and other means of production, then an acute social uncertainty emerges. In such circumstances, ethnic identity is redefined mirroring a history of conflict and fear of what the future might bring. In Kenya, for decades there are particular positions that one could only get depending on his or her ethnic identity. For example, for ten years of former president Mwai Kibaki's regime, the ministry of finance was always headed by a member of his ethnic group, Kikuyu and by extension, more than 50% of the employees in the ministry were Kikuyus sending messages of cronyism and favouritism within the state treasury.

The 2007 post election violence following the disputed presidential elections in Kenya surprised both the Kenyan people and the international community alike. This was in part a contrast to the popularly held view of Kenya as a *model of stability* in the turbulent Eastern African region that hosts Somalia widely regarded as failed state and the war ravaged Sudan (Now divided into Sudan and South Sudan), Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. In a report to the US based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Barkan (2011) stated that the post-election violence challenged the conceited view of the international community that Kenya was not “a country to worry about”. The perceived stolen presidential election results in December 2007 quickly transformed to a mass protest against Mwai Kibaki's government and his Kikuyu tribe. The retaliation by the police and the Kikuyu militia resulted to an all-out ethnic civil war pitting the incumbent president Kibaki's ethnic group against those that had coalesced to support the opposition candidate, Mr. Raila Odinga. The historical, deep rooted ethnic animosities erupted leaving the country on a steep – and thus on a free fall – to anarchy. What was even more conspicuous at the time was the missing voice of the civil society. Somehow, the vocal advocacy groups and institutions had been absorbed by the factional crisis in the country. The 2013 elections saw the enactment of a different script, yet one most Kenyans have experienced before.

The ethnic alliances were redrafted with Kikuyus and Kalenjins coming together to fight politically with the rest

of the country. The Civil Society was polarised, the media divided creating uncertainty and fear in the fragile country just smarting out of a contested election in 2007.

THE THEORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society refers to an informal sphere of engagement that is real and active but unstructured by virtue of being independent from the establishments – governments and or the private sector. In established democracies, civil society is considered as an integral part of governance by virtue of being open and public spirited, thus able to keep the democratic system under check (Paris, 2004). However, unlike the private sector, civil society is regarded as objective and aims at common ground with features of integrative and collaborative action for and in the interest of the common good. As Barber (1995) puts it, civil society is “public without being coercive, voluntary without being private”.

Pollock (2001) refers to civil society theory as the contemporary production of the ideological discussion that crafts a political rhetoric of “banal state nationalism”. This in simple terms refers to the promotion of patriotism as opposed to distinctive nationalist ideologies which tend to enhance the promotion of identities based on shared attributes like religion, ethnicity and cultural practices up to and including the socio-economic and or political factors.

One major question that civil society theorists may have overlooked is whether public engagement in polarised societies still counts for a civil society. In such cases, ideally civil society is a mirror of the simmering division in government and or in the political arena. Newton (2009) states that Civil society theory provides that solid linkage of the public and governance organizations help to sustain community relations in a way that produces trust and collaboration between citizens and a high level of civic engagement and participation. However, the recent events in most transitional societies have rendered this view problematic. In Kenya for instance, the public engagement through the civil society is tricky since rather than propagate common citizen interest in governance, civil society has become a breeding ground for ethnic politicization that has led to social conflict and failures in enculturation of democracy (Weber, 2009). This is particularly a challenge to assumptions of the liberal peace thesis which views the independence of civil society as key to the development of democracy through conscious and structured engagements between the political class and the masses (Paris, 2004).

Civil society problem

In liberalizing societies – like Kenya and most other African states – the belief in the centrality of the role of

civil society in democracy promotion should be re-evaluated. A reflection on the EU enlargement framework – where civil society is taken to be problematic and equally in need of regulation – within the parameters of statebuilding for Southeastern Europe (Chandler 2010), governance reforms in Kenya and other transitional societies, especially in Africa should pursue that line. Given the conflictive nature of society in most of the Southeastern European societies, almost synonymous with the situation in Africa – where ethnic, cultural and other social differences are major factors of state instability – civil society is seen as part of the problem and in need of capacity building. Unfortunately in the case of Kenya, the problematic component of the civil society has not been taken into consideration by the many reforms aimed at managing the ethnic diversities in the country. In fact, it is also important to note that elections alone do not enhance integration if the divergent views within the civil society are not taken into consideration beforehand. As was the case with the US sanctioned elections in Bosnia in 1996 which was meant to put in place a democratic system through integration of the varied nationalistic polities, ethnic and other sectarian interests only led to separatist ideologies because of the already very much polarised civil society (Paris, 2004).

The politicians in Kenya have taken full advantage of the conflicts within the civil society itself to even further propagate ethnic politicization. Political salinity to ethnicity in Kenya can be associated to increased ethnic favouritism vis à vis marginalization within government which in turn have led to low inter-ethnic collaboration at the local level even outside political circles (Miguel, 2004 in Weber, 2009). In fact, the differences within the civil society in Kenya are so deeply entrenched that even the religious sector – often regarded as a voice of reason in the society – have equally been polarised. For instance, following the post-election violence after the 2007 disputed presidential election results, the religious community were caught in the middle of the conflict with religious groups aligned to the incumbent president championing ‘*peace*’ while those aligned to the opposition candidate advocating for ‘*justice*’ (Ashforth, 2009). This was particularly a symbolic attribute to the ideological diversity in the context of the political situation in Kenya, where the opposition was arguing that there could be no peace without a just result in an electoral process while the pro government group argued that there could only be justice in the courts of law in a peaceful environment – even though the Judiciary was under the influence of the executive.

As Weber (2009) argued, countries with a few large ethnic groups – or just two or three major dominant ethnic groups – are seen to be naturally endowed with support groups large enough to win a majority in elections through politics premised on the mobilization of ethnic identities, and thereby, ethnicity emerges as a salient political identity. Such ethnic consciousness becomes

pronounced even within the public and private sectors with corporations synonymous with the identities/ethnicities of the owners or those in senior positions. In Kenya it is a common argument in the political and social spheres to attribute the ethnicity of the major directors and managers of main parastatals with the identity of the president. In such situations, the competencies and or qualifications of the individuals become insignificant because it is seen that the political process yields pleasantries of such kinds – positions of power. In the process of crafting political alliances on ethnic lines, politicians make it public that the government positions would be shared between varied ethnicities in some ways, leading to further polarisation should honouring such promises prove problematic or are just be ignored as was the case with the (National Rainbow Coalition) NARC government in 2008.

Politicization of civil society

In spite of the fresh wave of popular democracies in the 1990s in Africa, there were few objective juries. The new proscriptive democracies habitually failed to bring liberty and prosperity to their people. In Kenya, freedom of expression, association and of the press have not played to strengthen democracy but have made it more problematic since ethnic and other sectarian consciousness have become more apparent. For most African countries, democracy often resulted in “hyper-nationalism and ethnic/identity conflict” (Zakaria 1997).

Marshall and Gurr (2003) affirms Zakaris’ assertions by pointing out that the incidence of violent ethnic/identity conflict is much higher in democratizing or semi-democratic states than in either autocracies or consolidated democracies. These arguments are in line with the incidences of intra and inter-communal violence and/or discrimination that escalated in post socialist Africa – following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. As much as these incidences were sometimes due in part to the militarization of African states that Cold War politics enabled, the emergence or resurgence of strong ethnic and religious differences that were formerly contained or camouflaged under socialism has raised questions on the ability of democratic regimes to manage ethnic tensions (Pitcher and Askew, 2006).

While referring to African ethnicities as a new part of complex responses to colonial modernity, Berman (2010: 2) argues that in the pre-colonial world the most remarkable characteristic of African identities and societies were their “fluidity and heterogeneity”, a blend of communities, cultural and linguistic exchanges. He states further that both ethno-political movements and “territorial nationalism” in Africa are equally of recent historical origins majorly as responses to the colonial introduction of the institutions of modernity in the African state and market. So the post-colonial events in Africa

can very well be attributed to the failure by the leadership and the civil society in general to take into consideration the complexities of the contemporary state which is very much a contrast to the historical background of the African societal understanding. As Hume's Civil Society theory argues, the distinction between the interests of society and those of governments and their leaders must be the overarching basis for social harmony (Finlay, 2004: 380). However, in the context of the Kenyan society and indeed those of many other African societies, the interests of the governments are dictated by the ethnic identities of the leaders who in turn manipulate the interest of society, thus the problematic nature of the civil society in these polities and states.

Conclusion

The African nation-states same as other transition states are incomplete ventures since for a long time statehood have been regarded as legacies of the colonial regimes. Ethnic conflicts in post independent Africa have been as violent and ferocious as those in other parts of the world, remotely grounded on acts of atavism and historical identities. The democratic – albeit transitional – regimes of the current African states have equally faced ethnic violence focused on protecting or gaining control of the state within a nation just as was the case in the construction of European nation states. The democratization processes demonstrate the continuing reality of African nationalistic society both within for citizens struggling to reconstruct the impartial states within government and civil society, and externally for the international community with the consciousness of globalization (ibid).

The worrying correlation between democratization and ethnic violence, increasingly expressed in the bitter conflicts of autochthony, reveals the growing politicization of ethnicity at the expense of state centered citizenship in Kenya. The repeated efforts to rewrite national constitutions and the perennial quest for reforms in major state sectors like the judiciary, legislatures and Electoral bodies demonstrate the continuing political energy of nationalistic ideologies in the wider civil society where priority is given to ethnic relations thus compromising deeply the practicality of a participatory democracy. In view of these realities, it would be better for the reforms in Kenya to focus on the top-down approach as is the case with the EU system where the civil society is marginalized in the reform processes because of the simmering differences within it.

Conflict of Interest

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Ashforth A (2009). Ethnic Violence and the Prospects for Democracy in the Aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan Elections; Duke University Press; doi: 10.1215/08992363-2008-018; Available online <http://publicculture.dukejournals.org/content/21/1/9.short> [Accessed on 17/08/2013]. Public Culture 2009 Volume 21, Number 1: 9-19
- Barber B (1995). Rebuilding Civil Society Civic renewal movement; Electronic Publishing Group; A Symposium from The New Democrat, volume 7, number 2 March/April 1995; Available online <http://www.cpn.org/parties/search.html> [Accessed on 20/08/2013].
- Barkan JD (2011). Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability: A report of the CSIS Africa Program; Center for Strategic and International Studies; ISBN 978-0-89206-641-4; Available online http://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdf [Accessed on 11/08/2013]
- Chandler D (2010). International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance; London and New York; Routledge, 2010; ISBN 978-0-415-42118-8
- Finlay CJ (2004). Hume's Theory of Civil Society; October 2004. Available online <http://ept.sagepub.com/content/3/4/369.abstract> [Accessed on 26/07/2013] European J. Polit. Theory, 3:4369-4391.
- Furley O (1995). Conflict in Africa; Tauris Academic Studies; New York; ISBN 1-85043-690-8.
- Lake AD, Rothchild D (1996: 41). Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict; (Article) Published by The MIT Press. International Security, 21(2):41-75
- Marshall MG, Gurr TR (2003). A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy; Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR); University of Maryland, College Park, MD; Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research; Available online <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/ Acrobat/stm103%20articles/cid cm%20Peace%20and%20Conflict%202003.pdf> [Accessed on 27/07/2013]
- Newland K (1993). Ethnic Conflict and Refugees; in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1993, p. 161.
- Newton K (2009). Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy; Available online http://www.lead.colmex.mx/docs/s4/02_sociedad%20civil%20y%200 NG/NEWTON_trust%20social%20capital%20civil%20society.pdf; Accessed on [09/07/2013] Int. Polit. Sci. Rev. (2001), 22(2):201-214.
- Paris R (2004). At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; ISBN-10 0-521-54197-2
- Pitcher MA, Askew KM (2006). African Socialisms and Post socialisms; Available online <http://www.questia.com/read/1G1-147874964/african-socialisms-and-postsocialisms> [Accessed on 27/07/2013]. Academic journal article from Africa, 76:1.
- Pollock G (2001) Civil Society Theory and Euro-Nationalism; Studies In Social & Political Thought; Issue 4; March 2001; Available online <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/cspt/documents/issue4-3.pdf> [Accessed on 27/07/2013]
- Weber A (2009). The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania; Working paper No. 47; Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) and University of Zurich; Available online http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1643450; Accessed on [10/07/2013]
- Zakaria F (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy; Available online <http://www.tfasinternational.org/iipes/academics/politicaconomy2011/foreignaffairs2011.pdf> [Accessed on 27/07/2013]. Foreign Affairs; 76(6):22-43.

Review

Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequence of insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited

USMAN Solomon Ayegba

Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Received 29 July, 2014; Accepted 4 February, 2015

Central to the discussion in this paper is the issue of the crisis of unemployment and extreme poverty prevailing in Nigeria, particularly in the Northern region where it is endemic. It is the contention of this paper that contrary to expectations and dreams nourished by many that the country's abundant resources will help alleviate poverty from among the citizenry, lack of judicious utilization of these resources by the country's leadership has undoubtedly created a vicious circle of poverty among Nigerian masses. More importantly, the expectations of the citizens in 1999 that democracy will afford them good job opportunities with improved standard of living has been proved unrealistic. Rather, the gap between the rich and the poor widens as the level of official corrupt practices exacerbated. Although, while it is unarguable that unemployment and poverty are not sufficient variables in explaining heightened insecurity in Nigeria vis-à-vis Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of the country, this paper establishes that there exists a strong connection in unemployment, poverty and prevailing insecurity in the region. The experience of Muhammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010 arising from unemployment which later sparked popular uprising in Arab world dubbed 'the Arab Spring', confirms the position of this paper that there is a nexus between poverty, unemployment and widespread discontent. Therefore, the paper adopts the combination of Marxist, Relative-Deprivation and Frustration-Aggression theoretical frameworks for analysis.

Key words: Unemployment, poverty, Boko Haram, insecurity/terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

Today, unemployment and poverty constitute major challenges facing mankind across known boundaries including the most developed societies like Western Europe and America. However, it remains much more endemic among the Third World countries and parti-

cularly Africa with the worst case in Nigeria. According to the United Nations publications (Borode, 2011: 149), over one billion people in the world today live in unacceptable conditions of poverty, mostly in developing countries, particularly in rural areas of low income countries in

E-mail: usmansolomon998@gmail.com. Tel: +2348062936356.

Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Africa. The most tragic is the fact that youths within the age bracket of 14 to 50 year old are the worst hit (Ajaegbu, 2012). This makes it more dangerous because this vulnerable group is susceptible to committing and/or perpetrating all sorts of crimes like terrorism, kidnapping, armed robbery, assassination, thuggery, prostitution, drug and human trafficking and so on. Also, most violent protests, demonstrations and revolutions and several mob actions leading to outbreak of wanton destruction of lives and properties including lawlessness in many societies as we are witnessing in the Arab world and elsewhere today are triggered by this same group of people, the youths. In other words, most prevailing violent conflicts involving youths in Africa and indeed Nigeria are intricately linked to unemployment and poverty. In his thesis, Ikejiaku (2009: 15) described the absolute poverty in Africa with what he called 'poverty qua poverty', the term used in describing the real poverty in Africa where majority of people find life excruciatingly agonizing due largely to difficulty in meeting or satisfying their basic needs like food, clothing, shelter and qualitative education. Writing from the same premise, Schaefer (2005: 2) wrote that "worse, the continent [of Africa] on average has grown poorer over the past two decades despite enormous aid disbursements and substantial gains in technology and trade that have helped boost growth in other regions", particularly on the Asian continent.

On the crisis of unemployment in Nigeria, Ajufo (2013: 307) contended that "unemployment has become a major problem bedevilling the lives of Nigerian youths, causing increased militancy, violent crimes, kidnappings, restiveness and socially delinquent behaviour. Youth unemployment is devastating to both the individual and the society as a whole both psychologically and economically". Accordingly, it is apposite to argue that a society bedevilled with the problem of endemic rate of unemployment and poverty especially among its productive segment of the population as it is currently the case in Nigeria, will have its peace and stability endangered with dire consequence of retrogression instead of progress. As noted by World Bank Development Report of 1984 in Washington on Africa, (Onimode, 1988), the paradox of the deepening crisis of mass poverty in Africa and the enormous wealth of the continent is very painful.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This paper adopts three theories to explain the existing nexus among unemployment, poverty and insecurity in the country. Undoubtedly, these frameworks explain the interrelatedness between and among the three variables. While unemployment reinforces poverty, violent conflict and extremist desirability is often times spurred by endemic and vicious poverty level.

Theoretically, Marxism originates from the philosophical view of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel, including other

socialist writers. The origin of this theory dates back to 1848. The theory was later reinforced by the works of several Marx-inspired scholars particularly the Underdevelopment and Dependency theorists like Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallenstein, Dos Santo and Paul Baran to mention these few (Fanon, 1963; Santos, 1970; Frank, 1972; Rodney, 1972; Amin, 1974; Wallenstein, 1974; Amin, 1976; Ferraro, 1996).

The theory arose out of concern over the unequal ownership and distribution of the means of production that bifurcated society into two antagonistic classes – the class of 'haves' and 'have-nots', the pauperized and the wealthy, the working class/proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Thus, the Marxist theory exposes the exploitative tendencies and appropriation of the supposed commonwealth to the few at the detriment of the masses. According to this theory, conflict, insecurity and instability such that depicts Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria arises out of the life and death struggle between two dominant socio-economic classes. On one hand is the class of those who control the means of production vis-à-vis the state power and on the other, those who rely on their labour for survival – the bourgeoisie and the proletariat or poor masses. Hence, Marxist conflict theory concludes that since the relations of production based on equality, moral affection and absence of classes collapsed, class antagonism will continue to prevail in the society. Marx therefore predicted that conflict in their different permutations and manifestations will cease only when an ideal communist stage of social progression where state will disappear is attained and equality of all is actualized. According to this theory, this can only be achieved through inevitable overthrow of the exploitative (capitalist) system in a bloody revolution (Machel, 1977: 5; Appadorai, 1975: 117-118).

The relevance of this theory in explaining the wave of insurgency in Northern Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. While it is true that few wealthy people like the former Commissioner for Religious Affairs in Borno State, Usman Dirkwa (see Daily Trust, October 14, 2014, p. 1), including the former Governor of the state, Ali-Modu Sherriff, have been identified of having links with the Islamic sect (the claim which has not been confirmed by any court of law in Nigeria), it is the contention of this paper that quite significant number of Boko Haram members are drawn from those within the lower rung of the society. This point is reinforced by Danjibo (cited in Obiyan and Usman, 2013) who, held the view that the Boko Haram crises broke out due to failure of governance in Nigeria to halt extreme poverty especially among the youths of Northern extraction. Buttressing this point, Mallam Hussaini Salisu, an Islamic cleric, cautioned that "the level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for activities of such groups; their conduct is totally un-Islamic but the

whole problem boils down to the failure of government at all levels to make the welfare of the citizenry a priority. A nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people seek relief in religion" (Tell, August 10, 2009, p. 38); hence, the relevance of this theory in explaining the prevailing insurgency in northern Nigeria.

On the other hand, explaining relative deprivation theory, Ted Robert Gurr in his book, *Why Men Rebel* (Gurr, 1970) pointedly explicated that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare leads men to discontent and eventual violence. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves. He argues that relative deprivation is the term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence". This gap between an individual's expected and achieved welfare results in collective discontent.

To Gurr (ibid), violence and extremism like the Boko Haram insurgency in the North is as a result of collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation by the young people who contrary to believe that democracy will improve their living conditions worsened it off. In his assertion, Obi (2008: 7) noted that "the high expectations of the people that democracy would reverse decades of poverty, corruption and underdevelopment have hardly been met by the new democrats". This ultimately created feelings of deprivation and impulse to form a rebel group and undertake senseless terror attacks on both the innocent citizens and government.

Historically, the concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece. For example, Aristotle (Gurr, 1970 cited in Richardson, 2011) articulated the idea that revolution and other actions such as terrorism are driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than a natural instinct. In other words, the impulse to attack or desire terrorism by (young) people stems from a discrepancy between what people perceived are theirs or considered to be legitimately theirs but are deprived of getting by others. Invariably, Gurr believes that this perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is what leads to discontent rather than seeing instinct to become violent as a natural reaction. Hence, relative deprivation theory is illustrated this way: Mr A feels deprived of object X, Mr A does not have X but wants to have it. Mr A knows of other people who have object X and believes obtaining X is realistic only that it he or she was deprived of it by a person or group of persons. This deprivation engenders frustration that eventually leads to aggression in form of terrorism and other violent conflicts.

In Gurr's analysis (Gurr, op. cit.), the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism; the anger induced by

frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities. This view was supported by Dollard et al. (1939) who postulated that frustration leads men to act aggressively. Therefore, Richardson (op. cit.) argued that while frustration is caused by relative deprivation, the resulting aggression is manifested as terrorism. He linked high unemployment rates and poverty with terrorism. To him,

When a large group of highly educated individuals enter the work force and levels of unemployment are high, the individuals may feel over-qualified and disappointed relative to what they expected to gain from their education. Presumably individuals pursue higher education with the expectation that additional studies or training will help them find better jobs. As a result, well-educated individuals may feel greater discontent from unemployment than those who did not expect such grand employment opportunities. This socioeconomic discontent, in turn, may result in political violence (p. 7).

Accordingly, frustration-aggression theory which is an off-shoot of relative deprivation theory explains that prevailing events such as terrorism and wave of violent extremism in Africa and particularly Nigeria are products of frustration and aggression. The fundamental thesis of this theory as formulated originally by John Dollard et al (cited in Fawole, 1994: 12 – 13) is that "the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise that the existence of frustration leads to some form of aggression". According to the analysis offered by Ted (1970), the potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents among members of a society and the degree to which such shared discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents. The fundamental point here is that, discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participants in collective violence with relative deprivation defined as the perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and value capabilities. These value expectations, according to Gurr, represent the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightly entitled while value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining and maintaining, given the social means available to them.

Similarly, Feierabend and Nesvold (1971) said that, "systemic frustration leads to aggression, that is, the frustration collectively experienced by the members of a polity and which is caused by the political system under which they live induces the tendency to resort to political aggression". According to this theory, if group of individuals experience any frustration collectively, and this is perceived to result from the policies and actions of the government, it may likely induce them to challenge and perhaps remove the source of discontent. In this light, the contention of Feinberg (1973) cited in Ojo (2010: 45) who said "a world with equal rights is a more just world. It is also a less dangerous world, generally,

and one with a more elevated and civilized tone” resonate.

The adoption and adaptability of these theories for this paper is apt considering the fact that majority of those who engage in the Boko Haram insurgency are mostly people within the youth age bracket who have no job and decent means of livelihood. One of the Nigerian national dailies; the *Nigerian Tribune* (Monday, August 10, 2009, p. 17) put it more succinctly when it reported that:

In some other more serious climes, the recent mayhem in the North should be an opportunity for the state as represented by federal, state and local governments in Nigeria to put some commitment in their statutory responsibility of protecting life and property. Such will of course include creating an enabling environment for individuals to have access to good life and be able to actualise themselves. This is the first step towards security of life and property. To neglect to do this is to give rein to violence, anarchy, even anomie in whatever guise or disguise. The insensitivity of the government and the resentment of the citizenry are the recipe for an avoidable and eventual conflagration.

From the foregoing, there is a sense in arguing that unemployment and poverty coupled with government indifference to tackle them head-on provide fertile grounds for terrorism with its accompanied security implications to thrive in the country. More worrisome is the fact that the affected persons are those whose agility, youthfulness, viability and exuberance are predisposed to be hijacked by merchants of terror with dire consequences for the nation’s security.

BOKO HARAM AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

Admittedly, several factors are responsible for prevailing level of insecurity that has permeated the entire country especially the unrelenting Boko Haram insurgency since 2009. Particularly, scholars and analysts have adopted several causative factors and reasons to discuss the origins, philosophy and motivations of the dreaded Boko Haram. Some of the reasons that easily sufficed include but not limited to, one, the quest of core north to Islamize Nigeria since the era of Jihad by Usman Dan Fodio in 1804; two, increased poverty and unemployment rate especially in the northern region, and three, the recruitment of hungry street beggars called the ‘Almajiris’ who are the alienated ones in the society by the political elites in the north for selfish/sectional and parochial ends. Another reason is the disapproval of some northern political elites about the emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan during the 2011 general elections. Others include inadequate and ineffective policing of Nigeria’s porous borders that encourages influx of many unacknowledged foreigners into the country as well as the expansion of the frontier of global terror network on no-border basis as part of the globalization drive and so

on (Hodgkin, 1975; Adetoro, 1982; Falola, 1998; Adetoro, 2010; Onuoha, 2010; Adesoji, 2010; Marchal, 2011; Suleiman 2011; Adenrele, 2012; Usigbe, 2012).

While all these reasons and many others provide profound explanations about Boko Haram and insecurity in the country, this paper adopts the unemployment and poverty variables.

According to Piazza (2006: 159), “terrorism and other forms of political violence are a product of poverty”. He argues that since the events of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. by al-Qaeda group, the presumed link between material want and terrorist activity has been cited by political figures from across the political spectrum and has found its way into mainstream economic development and international security policy discussions. For example, at the November 2001 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, forty-one Heads of State and Government in attendance urged the world body to address the issues of poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment which they believed are major factors precipitating international terrorism.

Thus, in his address to the General Assembly, the then United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan proclaimed: “No one in this world can be comfortable or safe when so many people are suffering and deprived” (ibid). While describing terrorism as the “dark side of globalization” and noting that one-half of the world’s population survives on less than \$2 per day, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, in a January 2002 speech, urged American policymakers to promote national security by easing the growing international disparities in wealth (Teresa, 2002). Also, even though the IMF and World Bank through their imposed policies, encouraged underdevelopment and consequent dependency of Third World economies with attendant poverty, the statement credited to the former Vice President for Private Sector Development, Infrastructure and Guarantees at the World Bank, Nemat Shafik is apt. To Shafik, he asserted that the legacies of economic stagnation, high levels of unemployment, and uneven economic development among the Third World countries provide “fertile ground on which terrorist seeds can flourish”. During December 2001 gathering of Nobel Peace Prize laureates in Oslo, Norway, Desmond Tutu, Kim Dae-Jung and Oscar Arias Sanchez concurred that the causes of terrorism lied in poverty, inequality, and the absence of social justice in the developing world. Agreeing with them, the then United States President George W. Bush, at the Monterey Development Summit in March of 2002 said: “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Kreisler, 2001; Jai, 2001; Blustein, 2002).

Contrary to common belief that always limits the reasons for eruption of sectarian violence in Nigeria to issues of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism, ethnic and tribal diversities; youth unemployment and poverty are major causes and therefore provide explanation for understanding such. As noted by Danjibo (n. d: 15 - 16),

A large army of unemployed vagabonds roam around the streets paying the dues of discipleship by begging and scavenging. These are ready to get involved and even perpetrate violence for a token. I visited a Catholic hospital in Kaduna shortly after one of the religious crises occurred. I met some admitted Almajiri who had been seriously injured during the crisis. One of them who had lost his limb was in deep pain and was crying with the words: "why should this happen to me? Now I have lost my life because of N200". Upon further inquiry, the victim revealed that a large number of them (the Almajiri) were given some money to go perpetrate violence.

According to *Aljazeera* report cited by Danjibo (ibid), it was stated that the eruption of Boko Haram violence extremism is fuelled by the fact that Nigeria, one of the largest producers of oil in the world has its vast bulk of the population live below the poverty line of one U.S. Dollar a day. While the paper maintained earlier that poverty and unemployment have the entire country in their firm grips, it is apt to argue that Northern Nigeria, the enclave of dreaded Islamic sect called Boko Haram, is the worst hit. Again, former governor of the CBN, Charles Soludo, made no pretence about this when his statistics revealed that whereas the North-Central recorded 67% of people living below the poverty line, the North-West and the North-East recorded 71.1 and 72.2% respectively (ibid).

Instructively, while the tearing of certificates and renunciation of studentship from tertiary institutions by some graduates and students of University of Maiduguri, Ramat and Federal Polytechnics in Borno and Yobe states respectively (Onuoha, 2010; Danjibo, n .d) to join Boko Haram could be attributable to brainwashing of the affected people by extremists, the failure of Nigerian government to provide employment to many graduates among them who were (and are still) roaming the streets in search of unavailable job opportunities provide justification for this action. Although, there is extent to which one can emphasize the point on poverty and unemployment as reasons terrorist tendencies become attractive to many. This is because, there have been reported cases of those from wealthy background like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab yielding to terrorist inclination. The emergence of Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria could also be as a result of alleged age-long quest of core Northern Nigeria to Islamize the entire Nigerian state. This line of argument was supported by Adesoji (2010) who remarked that the Boko Haram uprising was a manifestation of ambition of certain conservative elements in the core northern region of the country to achieve Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. He specifically said that "the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state" (p. 95). This revival was fuelled by escalation of extremism of similar terror groups

as been currently witnessed by Sunni Arabs in the Middle East and the Maghreb like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Shabab operating in Somalia and Kenya.

Nonetheless, it is not unlikely that those educated youths who tore their university degree certificates and withdrew from institutions of higher learning to demonstrate their loyalty to the sect, could have done that out of frustration. Supporting this line of thinking, Danjibo (n. d) observed that,

One can imagine the frustration for a young man or woman who had graduated from the university and could not secure job years after graduation. For such a person, Western education will ever remain valueless. As a matter of fact, such youths live in a country where education is treated with much disdain and where the educated are insignificant, but where uneducated political bandits are assigned status privilege.

Corroborating Danjibo's viewpoint, Wright (2006: 123), writing on incidence of rising extremism in the Arab world, argued that,

Radicalism usually prospers in the gap between rising expectations and declining opportunities. This is especially true where the population is young, idle, and bored; where art is impoverished; where entertainment – movies, theatre, music – is policed or absent altogether; and where young men are set apart from the consoling and socializing presence of women. Adult illiteracy remained the norm in many Arab countries. Unemployment was among the highest in the developing world. Anger, resentment, and humiliation spurred young Arabs to search for dramatic remedies.

Today, considering the vast number of educated graduates roaming the streets in the country, education which hitherto promised greater future and opportunities to many has lost its relevance because to them, it failed to provide jobs to them. In this regard, the argument of Teshome (2008 cited in Ucha op. cit.) who contended that "education, once seen as the surest, undisputed gateway to employment, no longer looks so certain" juxtaposes this thinking. Arguing from this premise, Ucha (2010: 127) noted that:

The fact that you are an educated Nigerian is no guarantee that you will be employed...Unemployment-induced poverty tends to increase the crime rate and violence in the country. Most unemployed youths resort to crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom, internet fraud and other forms of fraudulent activities. The reservation wage they get from these activities is typically barely enough to take care of their basic necessities.

Perhaps, the above reasons explain the terrorist attraction to many young people in the Northern part of the

country. It is no doubt that unemployment and poverty are conspicuous in Nigeria especially in the northern region. To this end, Ucha (ibid) argued that “in Nigeria, widespread and severe poverty is a reality. It is a reality that depicts a lack of food, clothes, education and other basic amenities. Severely poor people lack the most basic necessities of life to a degree that it can be wondered how they manage to survive” (p. 128). He went further to posit that,

Many graduates in Nigeria wander the streets without anything reasonable to do for a living. The government is capable but unwilling to provide jobs for them. Employment in Nigeria is usually not based on merit but depends on how connected you are with people that have power. This leaves many highly qualified people in poverty as seemingly no one cares to know what they are capable of achieving. These people are missing out on the income they would have got if they were employed. The number of quality jobs in the economy is low and many government resources are misallocated (p. 128).

In his submission on the susceptibility of northern Nigeria to the garb of religious extremism and fanaticism, Usman cited in Danjibo (op. cit.), averred that economic hardship and denial of basic necessities triggered by bad governance are responsible. Commenting on the resort of the young people to terrorist persuasion, Salisu reasoned that,

The level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for activities of such groups (like Boko Haram)... [T]heir conduct is totally un-Islamic but the whole problem boils down to the failure of government at all levels to make the welfare of the citizenry a priority... A nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people seek relief in religion (Tell, August 10, 2009, p. 38).

NIGERIA AND THE CRISIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY

Several studies have shown that there is linkage between poverty, unemployment and terrorist motive among youths on a global scale. Ucha (2010: 51) poignantly put it that “unemployment is a major factor contributing to poverty in Nigeria. When people are unemployed, their source of livelihood depletes over time. The cost of living becomes high and the standard of living goes down. There are many people in Nigeria who lack the opportunity of being employed”.

The situation of poverty and unemployment in Nigeria can be appropriately described using the epitaph of Onimode’s ‘paradox of wealth and mass poverty’. Nothing explains the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in Nigeria than what Onimode (ibid), writing on Africa, argued that “in contrast to the cynicism of the

vicious-circle-of-poverty theorists that a country is poor because it is poor”, Africa (and particularly Nigeria) is poor not because it is not richly endowed with resources but due to poor management of these resources by its political leaders. Put it differently, the abundant resources, materials and human that the country is blessed with ironically underpin the basis of profound misery of the vast majority of the populace.

Specifically, for a country like Nigeria that parades high deposits of material and mineral resources which range from its famous oil and natural gas to substantial reserves of coal, iron ore, zinc, tin, limestone, lead and niobium (used for superconductors) and many untapped ones including a significant proportion of arable land, approximately 90 per cent, has no business to populate poor citizens. Coincidentally, Nigeria’s vast resource availability complements its large population. While the population of the country as at 2006 was 140 million, it was estimated to have reached 164.75 million by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see NPC Report, 2006 and Oxford Business Group Report, 2012). According to the said report of the Oxford Business Group (OBG), adolescents and youths constitute considerable per cent of the country’s population. The findings of the United States Statistics Division (UNSD) in 2010 (OBG Report, 2012), indicated that “with a growth rate of 3.2%, Nigeria has a relatively young population, with 42.4% aged between 0-14 years, and only around 5% over the age of 65”. Nigeria has a vibrant youth population of 80 million, representing about 50 – 60 per cent of the total nation’s population with annual entrant into labour market of over 1.8 million between 2006 and 2011. Despite this, majority of them remain either unemployed or underemployed (Ajaegbu, 2012 and The Punch, August 8, 2013). Thus, Awogbenle and Iwuamadi (2010) contended that during this period, overall unemployment experienced quantum leap from 12.3% of labour force to 23.9%. In fact, Ajaegbu (op. cit.) averred that the situation became more critical in 2011 when Nigerians aged 15 – 24 (37.7%) and those between ages 25 – 44 (22.4%) were willing to work but did not get jobs. Therefore, in BLG Report in 2011 (cited in ibid), on average, youth unemployment rate in Nigeria is 46.5% in 2011 and most affected are educated male youths who are supposed to be breadwinners for their families (Okafor, 2011).

In a recent survey result conducted by the Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Polls (NOI Polls), a country-specific polling services named after its initiator, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (NOI), unemployment and poverty were identified as the major causes of drug and substance abuse by teenagers and young adults in Nigeria and by implication, terrorism and involvement in other nefarious activities. Although there is no agreeable per cent rate of youth unemployment in the country but as noted by Adawo et al (2012: 389), notwithstanding the doubtful unemployment rates posted by Central Bank of Nigeria in 2002, it is observable

that unemployment rate in Nigeria has reached unacceptable dimension. He went further to assert that “indeed, the labour market in Nigeria is dangerously close to saturation”. This claim was supported by Ajaegbu (2012: 315) who argued that

Violent crimes such as murder, armed robbery, kidnapping and terrorism are the most inhumane crimes that continue to plague Nigeria. Lately, kidnappings for ransom and terrorism have taken the centre stage leading to bloodshed and economic set-backs. The causes are not farfetched as studies have associated rising youth unemployment to the increase in violent crimes.

Furthermore, Ajufo (2013: 307, 308) corroborated this assertion when she said,

Unemployment has become a major problem bedevilling the lives of Nigerian youth, causing increased militancy, violent crimes, kidnappings, restiveness and socially delinquent behaviour. Youth unemployment is devastating to both the individual and the society as a whole both psychologically and economically (as it is) causing frustration, dejection and dependency on family members and friends, who also have their own problems to contend with. The high rate of unemployment among the youths in Nigeria has contributed to the high rate of poverty and insecurity in the country.

Or succinctly put, massive unemployment has made youths in the country to become elements of destabilisation and threat to socio-economic peace as more youths are now used by unscrupulous politicians to cause havoc in the country. While the Federal Government of Nigeria puts the unemployment and youth unemployment rates at 23 and 40 per cent respectively, it is believed that over 70 per cent of youth population in the country is unemployed (The Punch, op. cit.). Reporting the reaction to alarmingly increasing rate of unemployment rate in Nigeria, the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (see *ibid*), said that the spate of unemployment in Nigeria has remained a source of concern to the Nigerian government. Accordingly, she was reported to have said,

According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), each year, about 1.8 million young Nigerians enter into our labour market and we need to ensure that our economy provides jobs for them (NBS, 2012). In fact, some people ask, ‘What keeps you awake at night, with regard to this economy?’ I say it is the issue of job creation. And I know this is what keeps Mr President (Goodluck Jonathan) awake at night as well.

Ironically, the north in particular that has laid claim to federal power particularly the presidency for substantial period of Nigeria’s nationhood since 1960 continues to occupy the lower level of human development index

compare to the south as regional poverty is always widespread and even more severe there. This made Professor Charles Soludo, the then governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria to observe in July 2008 that persistent high levels of poverty in the country had become “a northern phenomenon” (see International Crisis Group Report, 2010). In this report, it was revealed that of the ten states with the highest incidence of poverty, eight were in the far northern zone. These include Jigawa which topped the list, with 95 per cent of its people classified as living in poverty. Jigawa State was followed by Kebbi, 89.7 per cent; Kogi, 88.6 per cent; Bauchi, 86.3 per cent; Kwara, 85.2 per cent; Yobe, 83.3 per cent; Zamfara, 80.9 per cent; Gombe, 77 per cent; Sokoto, 76.8 per cent; and Adamawa, 71.7 per cent (for details on this see Emeka Mamah, “High Poverty is Northern Phenomenon – Soludo”, *Vanguard*, 19 July 2008 cited in *ibid*). In his view, Shehu Sani (Sani, 2009: 3) found that as many as 76 per cent of northerners are “earning a daily income of less than the equivalent of one American dollar”.

Consequently, it is convenient to say that when a particular segment of a nation’s population especially the productive youths has no jobs and decent living, the tendency is that they become easy preys to terrorism and other vices. This clearly expresses the current situation the country is facing. In a society like Nigeria where those who loot the commonwealth of the people are flaunting them about freely in the face of extreme poverty and hunger, temptation to extremism and violent behaviour naturally become irresistible and attractive to those without any form of consolation and safety-net. In their writing, Piazza and Hippel (n. d: 34) noted that,

The notion that poverty is a root cause of terrorist violence is widely asserted... This assertion is not surprising considering how well it fits with basic liberal economic theory, which pre-supposes that individuals are motivated primarily by material well-being. Those who have opportunities to sustain and better themselves will likely accept the system in which they live and behave peacefully. By contrast, those confronting socioeconomic distress and deprivation are more likely to be drawn to radical and possibly violent movements, including terrorist movements.

The above quotation is supported by several submissions of those who believe that extremism and security challenges it posed to 21st century civilization is reinforced by poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and ignorance. For instance, while commenting on the rapidity with which terrorism was taking on America and the rest of the international community in 1994, Bill Clinton, the then American president said that “the forces of terror and extremism... feed on disillusionment, on poverty, on despair”. Thus, in his view, containing and ending terrorism is to “spread prosperity and security to

all". Again, the al-Qaeda-led attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, further bolstered the poverty-terrorism thesis. According to former president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, while reacting to September 11 attacks on the U.S. remarked in December 2002 that "this war is viewed in terms of the face of bin Laden, the terrorism of al-Qaeda, the rubble of World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, but these are just symptoms. The disease is the discontent seething in Islam, and more generally, the world of poor". This was supported by the position of the then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who in 2002 concurred by saying that "I fully believe that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hopes in their lives" (for details on comments of Bill Clinton, James Wolfensohn and Colin Powell, see Piazza and Hippel, *ibid*).

Though not totally dislodged, the foregoing, with all intents and purposes, dismisses the assumption that tends to remove poverty as source of discontent and terror enticements. It laid bare the sophistry surrounding the argument that most terrorists come from backgrounds more privileged than that of the average member of their national or regional population; and that rather than poverty and despair being root causes of terrorism, privilege, education and opportunity are contributory factors (Pipes, 2001; Kreuger and Jitka, 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004; McDermott, 2005).

This is true particularly in Nigeria because, in contrast to popular expectation that the advent of democratic governance in 1999 will reverse the long years of suffering, poverty, inequality and alienation of the mass of the people to era of prosperity, leadership at all levels of governance failed the people. Their expectation and hope were dampened as their situations and conditions deteriorated and exacerbated with increased unemployment rate, illiteracy, low income and hunger. This led to spontaneous formation of several ethnic-based armed groups and sporadic search for tribal identity. This led to militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, kidnapping and robbery in the East and West; and series of religious violence including the prevailing extremism vis-à-vis Boko Haram in the North.

Even though poverty and unemployment alone do not provide exhaustive explanations regarding the causes of terror in the land, there however furnish considerable and reliable excuse and justification because, poor people especially youths who lack economic opportunities are naturally resentful about their socio-economic status and thus, view themselves as having been alienated from mainstream society. In particular, this smouldering resentment is worsened by the large and growing mismatch or gaps in living standards among rich and poor people whom in the description of Frantz Fanon (Fanon, 1963), are called "the wretched of the earth", which result in intense feelings among this group that

they are being unfairly deprived of proper living conditions, what Ted Gurr would call the "relative deprivation" and linked to likelihood of terrorist desire. As clearly pointed out by Piazza and Hippel (*op. cit.*: 37 – 38),

In this state of rage and hopelessness, the poor are more susceptible to the lures of political extremism. Ordinary law-abiding citizens who are placed under economic distress or who are confronted with opulence while they struggle to make ends meet become primed to the anti-status quo message that is part and parcel of many terrorist group ideologies, and therefore, they are more likely to sympathize with terrorists. This sympathy can even lead them to aid, shelter and provide information to terrorists, to refuse to cooperate with government agents fighting terrorism, and to be more likely to join terrorist groups themselves.

When Hillary Clinton, the immediate past U.S. Secretary of State visited Nigeria in August 2009, she squarely blamed the leadership and governance failure in the country as a source of disconnect and discontent that encourage violence embrace by the youths. In her words, (quoted in *The Nation*, Friday, August 14, 2009, p.1), she remarked that:

The most immediate source of disconnect between Nigeria's wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels.... Lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state".

Undoubtedly, Clinton's assertion is a validation of Chinua Achebe's (Achebe, 1983) who strongly blamed leadership for 'the trouble with Nigeria', the caption that was coincidentally chosen as the title of his book. Therefore, to Achebe,

The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are (sic) the hallmarks of true leadership...

He went further to say,

Nigeria is a nation favoured by providence... The vast human and material wealth with which she is endowed bestows on her a role in Africa and the world which no one else can assume or fulfil. The fear that should nightly haunt our leaders (but does not) is that they may already have betrayed irretrievably Nigeria's high destiny. The

countless billions that a generous providence poured into our national coffers;...would have been enough to launch this nation into the middle-rank of developed nations and transformed the lives of our poor and needy. But what have we done with it? Stolen and salted away by people in power and their accomplices...

Therefore, it is the argument of the paper that high incidence of poverty rate as well as unemployment coupled with sharp practices by the political elites underscored the prevailing insecurity dotting the entire landscape in the country as orchestrated by Boko Haram group in Northern region.

Conclusion

The paper x-rayed the interconnectedness between terrorism and poverty in Nigeria with focus on the activities of Boko Haram sect in the north. Having identified issues of neglect, poverty, alienation, underdevelopment and youth unemployment in the region as temptations to radicalism, government at all levels – the federal, state and local – must as a matter of urgency embark on sincere programmes and policies targeting this group nationwide and particularly the affected region by opening up more job opportunities for the teeming youths, establish schools for sound education to combat illiteracy and ignorance, provide skill acquisition centres that will spur small and medium scale enterprises and reform the electoral and governance systems that will respect the choice of the people in election and democratic process amongst others. In fairness to the government especially the federal government, its previous efforts in the area of provision of access to basic education like the Universal Primary Education (UPE), later Universal Basic Education (UBE) and recent introduction of Almajiri School programme by both the Federal Military Government of General Olusegun Obasanjo and President Goodluck Jonathan respectively must be commended. Despite their challenges and limitations, if vigorously pursued and sustained, especially the Almajiri School programme, it will go a long way in re-orientating vast majority of children in core northern states. This will help minimize attraction to religious fanaticism vis-à-vis the vulnerability to be brainwashed by those who use religion as veneer to perpetuate terror. Also, this should be complemented with creating jobs and reviving the agricultural sector that was hitherto the predominant occupation in the north, and major driver of the nation's economy. When these are put in place, the feeling of deprivation and alienation that breeds discontent among them will be removed and the country will be better for it.

Conflict of Interest

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

- Achebe C (1983). *The Trouble with Nigeria*: Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu.
- Adawo MA (2012). "Is Nigeria's Unemployment Problem Unsolvable?" in *Current Res. J. Soc. Sci.* 4:6
- Adenrele AR (2012). "Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a Symptom of Poverty and Political Alienation" (November – December) in *J. Hum. Soc. Sci. (JHSS)* 3:5.
- Adesoji A (2010). "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria" in *Africa Spectrum*, 45:2.
- Adetoro RA (1982). *The Impact of Jalumi War (1878) on the People of Ikirun*. Being a Long Essay submitted in partial fulfillment of the award for the Nigerian Certificate in Education (NCE) to the Department of History, Oyo (now Osun) State College of Education, Ila-Orangun, Nigeria
- Adetoro RA (2010). "The Almajiri Syndrome as a Potential Threat to Nigeria National Security: The Role of Social Studies Education" in *Nigerian J. Soc. Stud.* 13(1,2).
- Ajaebu OO (2012). "Rising Youth Unemployment and Violent Crime in Nigeria" (September) in *Am. J. Soc. Issues Hum.* 2:5.
- Ajufo BI (2013). "Challenges of Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: Effective Career Guidance as a Panacea" January. *An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia, Afr. Res. Rev.* 7(1):28.
- Amin S (1974). *Accumulation on a World Scale*: Monthly Review Press, New York
- Amin S (1976). "Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism", in *Monthly Review Press*, New York
- Appadorai A (1975). *The Substance of Politics*: Oxford University Press, London
- Awogbenle AC, Iwuamadi KC (2010). "Youth Unemployment: Entrepreneurship Development Programme as an Intervention Mechanism" in *Afr. J. Bus. Manage.* 4:6.
- Blustein P (2002). "Bush Seeks Foreign Aid Boost: Plan Counters Overseas Critics" in *Washington Post*, March 15
- Borode M (2011). "Higher Education and Poverty Reduction Among Youth in the Sub-Saharan Africa", *Ozean Publication*. Available at http://www.ozelacademy.com/ejes_v3n1/EJES_v3n1_15.pdf. Accessed on 28/01/2015. *European J. Educ. Stud.* 3:1.
- Daily Trust (2014). Tuesday, October 14, Available at <http://dailytrust.com.ng/daily/news/36754-borno-ex-commissioner-denies-link-with-boko-haram>. Accessed on 28/01/2015
- Danjibo ND. (n. d). *Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The "Maitatsine" and "Boko Haram" Crises in Northern Nigeria*, Ibadan: Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan
- Falola T (1998). *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*: University of Rochester, New York.
- Fawole WA (1994). "The Military and the Future of Democracy in Africa", in Omoruyi, Omo, Dirk Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo and Ada Okwuosa (eds.); *Democratization in Africa*: Hima & Hima Limited, Benin City. African Perspective Volume Two.
- Feierabend IK, Nesvold B (1971). "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-national Patterns", Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.); *Political Development and Social Change*: Wiley.
- Fanon F (1963). *The Wretched of the Earth*: Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England
- Gurr TR (1970). *Why Men Rebel*: Centre of International Studies, Princeton University Press, New Jersey
- Hodgkin T (1975). *Nigeria in Perspective (An Historical Anthology)*, 2nd Edition: Oxford University Press, London
- Ikejaku BV (2009). "The Relationship between Poverty, Conflict and Development" (March). in *J. Sustainable Dev.* 2:1.
- International Crisis Group Report (2010). "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict", December 20, *Africa Report* p.168.
- Jai JL (2001). "Getting at the Roots of Terrorism," in *Christian Science Monitor*, December 10
- Kreisler H (2001). "The World Bank and Private Sector Development: A Conversation with Nemat Shafik" in *Conversations with History Series*: Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, November 13
- Kreuger A, Jitka M (2002). "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" in *New*

- Republic, June 24
- Machel S (1977). *Establishing People's Power to Serve the Masses*: Tanzania Publishing House, Dares Salaam, Tanzania.
- Marchal R (2011). "Boko Haram and the Resilience of Militant Islam in Northern Nigeria", Norwegian Peace-Building Centre, NOREF, June.
- McDermott T (2005). *Perfect Soldiers*: Harper Colins, New York.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012). *Labour Force Statistics*. Retrieved from www.nigerianstat.gov.ng on 20/08/2013.
- National Population Commission (NPC) Report (2006). Abuja.
- Nigerian Tribune (2009). Lagos, Monday, August 10.
- Obi Cl (2008). "No Choice, But Democracy: Prising the People Out of Politics in Africa?", Uppsala. in Claude Ake Memorial Papers p.2.
- Obiyani AS, Usman SA (2013). "Terrorism in Nigeria and Its Implications for National Integration, Development and Security" (December). *Lapai Int. J. Polit. (LIJOPOL)*. 1:2.
- Ojo EO (2010). "Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extra-Judicial State" Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, Pennsylvania. *J. Sustainable Dev. Afr.* 12:2.
- Okafor EE (2011). "Youth Unemployment and Implications for Stability of Democracy in Nigeria" in *J. Sustainable Dev. Afr.* 13:1.
- Onimode B (1988). *Economy of the African Crisis*: Institute for African Alternatives and Zed Books Limited, London.
- Onuoha FC (2010), "The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained" in *African Security Review, Vol. 19, No. 2*.
- Oxford Business Group Report (2012). Nigeria.
- Piazza JA (2006). *Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages: Terrorism and Political Violence*: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, North Carolina.
- Piazza JA, Karin von Hippel (n.d). Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?" in Stuart Gottlieb (ed.); *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts and Responses*: CQ Press, Washington, D.C.
- Pipes D (2001). "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" in *National Interest*, Winter 2001/2002.
- Richardson C (2011). "Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher Education and Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism" in Senior Honours Thesis: New York University, April 1.
- Rodney W (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, London and Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salam
- Sani S (2009). *Poverty in Northern Nigeria*: Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan.
- Santos DT (1970). "The Structure of Dependence", in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (eds.); *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, Boston: Porter Sergeant.
- Schaefer BD (2005). *How the Scope of Government Shapes the Wealth of Nation: Heritage Lectures Delivered December 1 p.925*.
- Suleiman T (2011). "Living in the Shadows of Boko Haram" in *Tell Magazine*, November 21
- Tell, August 10, 2009.
- Teresa W (2002). "Clinton Says U.S. Must Give More to End Terrorism" in *Los Angeles Times*, January 15.
- The Nation (2009). Friday, August 14.
- The Punch, Lagos, August 8, (2013).
- The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Norton, New York.
- Ucha C (2010). "Poverty in Nigeria: Some Dimensions and Contributing Factors" (June). *Global Majority E-Journal*, 1:1.
- United States Embassy in Nigeria (2012). *Nigerian Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from <http://nigeria.usembassy.gov> on 18/08/2013.
- Usigbe L (2012). "Embrace Islam or Resign, Boko Haram tells Jonathan" in *Nigerian Tribune*, Monday, August 6.
- Wallenstein I (1974). *The Modern World System*: Academic Press, New York.
- Wright L (2006). *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*: Vintage Books, New York.

Full Length Research Paper

Corruption and voting in Senegal: Evidence from experimental and survey research

Kris Inman^{1*} and Josephine T. Andrews²

¹National Intelligence University, United States.

²University of California, Davis.

Received 27 April, 2014; Accepted 29 January, 2015

In Senegal, as in other emerging African democracies, political corruption remains rampant. While all experts on Africa acknowledge the profound impact of widespread corruption on politics, there is disagreement on the role corruption plays on average citizens' behavior. Does corruption affect participation in Africa, and if so, does it do so because powerful patrons compel or bribe Africans to vote? Or, are Africans motivated to vote because they dislike corruption and want to punish or remove corrupt leaders? Using a field based experiment set in Senegal, we study the effect of perceptions of national-level corruption on political participation. We find that as perceived corruption increases, subjects are more likely to vote. We replicate these findings with Round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey.

Key words: Corruption, voting, turnout, ethnicity, participation.

INTRODUCTION

Why do Africans vote? They are among the world's poorest and least educated citizens (Easterly and Levine, 1997; World Bank Development Report, 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty), and research on citizens in the world's advanced industrialized democracies has consistently found that poverty and lack of education decrease the likelihood of voting (Brady et al., 1995; Verba and Nie; 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). In addition, African countries are plagued by extremely high levels of corruption (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002), which a number of studies suggest should lower citizens' perceptions of government competence and legitimacy (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), with negative implications for turnout. Indeed, a recent multi-country aggregate level study finds that the higher the level of corruption in a particular

country the lower the aggregate level of turnout (Stockemer et al., 2013). Taken together, these two bodies of research imply that turnout in Africa should be low. In fact, turnout in Africa is surprisingly high.¹ How can we explain this puzzle?

Work on predictors of turnout in Africa does not support the standard socio-economic model of voting. In a comprehensive analysis of the predictors of aggregate levels of turnout in 32 Sub-Saharan African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright find that neither level of economic development nor economic performance affects levels of turnout (2007).

Bratton and van de Walle (1992, 1997) suggest that for Africans perceptions of corruption may be a more salient indicator of government performance than economic

*Corresponding author. E-mail: kristie.inman@dodiis.mil.

conditions and so a more influential factor in citizens' decisions to participate. Manzetti and Wilson argue that in the context of developing democracies, neither economic condition nor corruption alone is sufficient to explain political attitudes; instead, one must account for the interaction of these two variables on attitudes toward government (2006, 133). Extending Manzetti and Wilson's study, we explore how perceptions of corruption and economic conditions interact to affect political participation, specifically turnout.

As we demonstrate, in the context of Senegal, neither the direct effects of economic conditions nor corruption are sufficient to capture the effect that both factors have on voting. Following Manzetti and Wilson, we expect that corruption motivates citizens to vote and this effect increases as economic conditions worsen. Even under good economic conditions, we expect perceptions of government corruption to increase the likelihood of voting. However, in the absence of high levels of perceived corruption, we expect those in good economic conditions to be more likely to vote than those in poor economic conditions.

We implement our experiment on a sample of university students in Senegal, a developing country classified by Freedom House as 'free' or 'partly free' from 2001 to 2008.ⁱⁱ Given that our experimental design required us to select one country as the site for the experiment, there were two primary reasons for selecting Senegal. First, Senegal is representative of many emerging democracies in Africa in several ways. Voting is meaningful in Senegal.ⁱⁱⁱ Senegal meets the criteria for our theory: It has had high levels of corruption along with very low levels of economic growth and development. Low levels of economic growth and development mean that many Senegalese citizens are living in poverty. According to World Bank estimates, 48.3% of Senegalese lived below the poverty line in 2005.^{iv} Furthermore, in 2007 (the year prior to implementation of our experiment) economic growth was 5% and GDP per capita (PPP) was \$1,745.^v Our theory depends on economic conditions being salient, if not paramount, to citizens in order to affect their vote choice; this makes Senegal an excellent test-case. Additionally, our theory depends on government corruption being rampant and highly salient. In 2007, Senegal received 3.6 on the Transparency International Corruption Index, which makes it an excellent candidate to test our theory.^{vi} Second, although ethnic identity is an important predictor of political participation in many African countries, in Senegal ethnicity plays little or no role in politics (Fatton, 1986; Erdmann, 2007).^{vii} In order to establish the effect that corruption has on participation, it is useful to conduct the basic experiment in a country in which ethnicity is not a factor. In this way, Senegal may be the prototypical case for other democracies in Africa as democratic institutions may erode ethnic voting over time (Lynch and Crawford, 2011). For our survey analysis, we use data

from Round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey of Senegal, chosen because it was conducted at about the same time as the experiment.

To investigate the direct and interactive effects of economic conditions and corruption on decisions to vote in Senegal we use two methodologies, a structured experiment and survey analysis. Experiments are commonly used to study the micro-foundations underlying individual decisions to participate in both developed (Cover and Brumberg, 1982; Gerber and Green, 2000) and developing democracies (Brader and Tucker, 2006; Wantchekon, 2003; Henrich et al., 2001). Given that most studies of turnout in developing countries rely on aggregate level data, our study provides insight into how key factors impact individuals' decision to vote. Thus, we use a structured field-based experiment as our primary method, which we implemented in June and July 2007 on a convenience sample of university students in Senegal. This experiment allows us to assess the impact on subjects' predisposition to vote when their economic circumstances as well as perceptions of corruption are jointly manipulated; thus, the experiment is an internally valid method used to test the direct as well as interactive effects of economic conditions and corruption on subjects' decisions to vote (McDermott, 2002). To test for external validity of our experimental results, we conduct analysis on Round 4 Afrobarometer survey data, was conducted in Senegal between May and June 2008. By using both experimental and survey methods, we are able to blend the benefits of two micro-level methodologies in such a way as to provide a rich analysis of the impact of perceptions of corruption and economic conditions on turnout in Senegal.

In the next section, we discuss the literature and theory pertaining to the direct and potentially interactive effects of corruption and economic conditions on voters' turnout. Next, we discuss the design and implementation of our experiment. Following the explication of our experimental results, we report the results of regression analyses of the effects of perceptions of corruption and economic conditions on turnout in Senegal. In both the experiment and survey, we find that subjects who identify leaders as corrupt are more likely to vote than those who do not view leaders as corrupt. Those who experience good economic conditions are more likely to vote than those that experience bad economic conditions. And finally, the positive effect of perceived corruption on likelihood of voting is particularly strong for those living in bad economic conditions.

Predicting voters' turnout in Africa

Economic conditions. According to existing research, economic conditions may impact political participation differently in developing as opposed to developed economies, although results are not conclusive. Classic

work on the predictors of individual-level voting consistently find that good economic conditions positively affect citizens' likelihood of voting in advanced industrialized democracies (Brady et al., 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, Verba et al., 1995), findings corroborated by studies of turnout at the aggregate level (Powell, 1982; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998).^{viii} In Rosenstone's words (1982), poor economic circumstances dampen participation because "when a person experiences economic adversity his scarce resources are spent on holding body and soul together – surviving – not on remote concerns like politics" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, Hirschman, 1970). On the other hand, Radcliff (1992) argues that citizens facing economic hardships may engage in political activity as a means of seeking redress for their grievances (pg. 446). He finds that although economic downturns demobilize electorates in developed countries, they mobilize electorates in developing countries (Pacek and Radcliff, 1995).^{ix} Norris finds that income does not consistently predict likelihood of voting across developing democracies (2002).

In general, studies of the impact of socioeconomic variables on turnout in Africa report results are inconsistent with those found in developed democracies. In a multi-country study using aggregate data, Kuenzi and Lambright find that neither level of economic development nor economic performance affects levels of turnout in sub-Saharan elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007). Work based on individual-level data tends to support this null finding. Using data from surveys of three African countries (Ghana, Zambia and South Africa), Bratton and Mattes find that respondents' economic conditions have little or no impact on perceptions of government legitimacy, and, by implication, may have little impact on participation (2001). Kramon finds that neither income nor education impact voting in Kenya (2013).

On the other hand, in their recent study of individual-level predictors of voting, Kuenzi and Lambright (2011) provide convincing evidence that in Africa poor economic conditions actually increase the likelihood of voting. Analyzing data from Afrobarometer Round 1 surveys of ten African countries, they find that a number of variables highlighted in the literature on turnout significantly increase the likelihood that an individual will vote (e.g. partisanship, membership in voluntary organizations, age and education). However, in contrast to results found in developed democracies, Kuenzi and Lambright find that the lower one's economic status the greater one's likelihood of voting, and rural residents are more likely to vote than urban residents. In a related inquiry, Lindberg (2012) finds that when citizens evaluate the national economy as improving, they are more likely to support the incumbent.

Inconsistency of results on impact of economic con-

ditions on turnout in Africa suggests that context matters and, just as Bratton and others have argued, factors other than their own and their country's economic situation may be impacting Africans' evaluations of their governments' performance and so turnout. Corruption is a major contextual factor distinguishing developed from developing countries, an explanatory variable that is generally missing from analyses of turnout in developing countries.

Corruption.^x Most contemporary studies suggest that perceived corruption leads to worsening confidence in government (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Tavits, 2008; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Redlawsk and McCann, 2005; Manzetti and Wilson, 2006). Classic studies on turnout in American politics conclude that when voters' trust and confidence in government decline, they will be less likely to vote (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Southwell, 1985; Powell, 1986). A recent multi-country aggregate level study (including six countries in Africa) of the impact of level of corruption (as measured by the Political Risk Services' International Country Risk Guide) on aggregate turnout finds a significant negative relationship—corruption dampens turnout (Stockemer et al., 2013). However, these researchers do not distinguish effects across developed and developing democracies, and regional studies provide mixed support for these findings. For example, Stockemer and Calca (2013) find that corruption increases turnout in municipal elections in Portugal. At the micro-level, Kostadinova (2009) finds a weakly positive effect of corruption on turnout in her study of eight post-communist democracies in Eastern Europe. Similarly, Shi (1999) finds that voters in China are prompted to turn out in local elections in order to punish corrupt officials. Although Davis et al. (2004) find that perceptions of corruption decrease the likelihood of voting in three Latin American democracies (McCann and Dominguez, 1998), the preponderance of evidence collected to date suggests that in developing democracies where corruption is typically a widely recognized and acute problem, perceptions of governmental corruption may increase the likelihood of voting because citizens who view corruption as a reflection of governmental incompetence and illegitimacy may be motivated to remove incumbents and hence may be more likely to participate (Gamson, 1968; Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003).

Experts have long cited corruption as one of the most important factors affecting attitudes toward government in Africa (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Mbaku, 2007), and according to Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index* corruption in Africa is among the worst in the World.^{xi} Yet, the impact of corruption on turnout in Africa has not yet been addressed. Work on Africans' trust, confidence and satisfaction with their government

finds that political evaluations, including perceptions of governmental corruption, are highly relevant (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Mattes and Bratton, 2007). Bratton et al (2005) find that perceptions of corruption decrease citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Literature that links corruption to poor economic performance (Mauro, 1995, 1997a, 1997b) shows that high levels of corruption negatively affect economic conditions. From the perspective of the public's opinion of their elected representatives, research suggests that the combination of high corruption and bad economic conditions ought to significantly increase citizens' motivation to "throw the rascals out".

Do Perceptions of Government Corruption Condition the Effects of Economic Circumstances on Participation?

There are empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that perceptions of corruption may condition the effect of economic circumstances on turnout. As Manzetti and Wilson (2006) argue, in developing democracies, neither economic performance nor corruption alone is sufficient to explain political attitudes, and by extension political participation. In their analysis of political attitudes in Argentina, Manzetti and Wilson (2006) find that citizens' attitudes toward government depend interactively on both their perceptions of government corruption as well as their own economic situation. Among those who perceive a high level of governmental corruption, those who are also economically disadvantaged are less likely to have confidence in their government than those who are doing well. Participation may result from such an interaction. When economic conditions are improving, but corruption is high, the positive impact of improving economic conditions on turnout may be dampened by perceptions of corruption. On the other hand, when economic conditions are improving and corruption is perceived to be low better economic conditions may increase the likelihood of voting. Speaking generally, Mishler and Rose theorize that "The effects of macro-political and economic performance on trust are indirect and mediated at the micro level by individuals' value-laden perceptions. Although individuals are unlikely to overlook either runaway inflation or gross corruption, they may discount the importance of one in favor of the other depending on their individual circumstances" (2001, pg. 55).

In Africa, where scholars have found inconsistent empirical support for the positive impact of economic conditions on turnout, it may be that in the face of consistently poor economic performance citizens gauge the performance of their political representatives based on other criteria, in particular corruption. Thus, we expect to find that those who perceive a high level of corruption are particularly motivated to vote, and this effect is augmented when their own economic circumstances are poor. We investigate the possibility that to understand the

impact of economic conditions and corruption on turnout, we must account for their interactive effects.^{xii}

In both the experiment and survey, participants were asked about their past or future voting behavior, the dependent variable in each analysis. In each case, the 2007 Senegalese presidential election would have served as the empirical referent; therefore, it is worth noting that during this important election, both economic conditions and corruption were highly salient to voters. Although voters had witnessed increased infrastructure development, including a new coastal highway in Dakar and promises of a new airport and university, employment remained low and prices for commodities were soaring. President Wade was having trouble keeping the lights on for his citizens. As one voter explained, "What the old man promised us, he didn't do ... I need a real job, not a nice road. Not an airport. As soon as I save enough money, I will take the boat, even if it means losing my life" (Callimachi, 2007). Infrastructure projects are often perceived to be wasteful and corrupt in Senegal; therefore, it is not surprising that in addition to poor economic conditions, governmental corruption remained a top issue in 2007 (USAID, 2007; Freedom House's Senegal Country Report, 2007^{xiii}). Villalón notes that "Popular discourse regularly derides such projects as prestige expenditures for Wade and as opportunities for corruption and enrichment for his inner circle. A series of corruption scandals has fed the perception that a select few are becoming extremely wealthy at public expense, while life remains hard for the vast majority" (Villalón, 2011).

Participation in Senegal: Evidence from a field-based experiment

We conducted our experiment at the University of Dakar, Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD). Two hundred and eight students from the university participated in the experiment.^{xiv} Our purpose was to test whether subjects who were informed about national-level corruption were more or less likely to vote and whether or not this relationship was conditioned by the subjects' economic circumstances. We also tested for the direct effect of economic circumstances on voting. As discussed above, the experiment provides a test of internal validity for our theory.

By its nature, the sample of university students used in the experiment was not representative; clearly, they are more educated, younger, and more male^{xv} than the general Senegalese population, which is why we replicate our findings using the representative survey sample from the Afrobarometer. We were fortunate that the survey was carried out at about the same time as our experiment. As can be seen in Table 1, those who

Table 1. Profile of the experimental and survey populations.

Experiment/survey questions	Experiment	Survey
Vote Survey: Voted in last election; Experiment: Intent to vote in next election (Scale for both: 0=no; 1=yes)	Mean = .78	Mean = .79
Partisanship (Percentage who identify with incumbent's party – the PDS)	38%	54%
Gender (Scale: 0=female; 1=male)	Mean = .78	Mean = .50
Education Experiment: Level of father's education and level of mother's education (Scale: 1-7, 1=no education; 7=doctoral degree); Survey: Level of education; (Scale: 0-9, 0=no formal schooling; 9=post-graduate degree)	Mean = 2.11; Mean = 1.47; N/A	NA; NA; Mean = 2.01
Do you have family working in government: (Scale: 0=no; 1=yes)	Mean = 0.25	N/A
Economic conditions Experiment: Self placement on poverty scale (Scale: 0-9, where 0=poorest; 9=richest); Survey: Evaluation of own economic conditions as being worse or not worse than others(Survey Scale: 0=worse; 1=not worse)	Mean = 3.25; N/A	N/A; Mean = .41
Do you receive a scholarship? (Scale: 1-5, where 1=full scholarship; 5=do not receive a scholarship. Over 40% of the students in the experiment received a full scholarship).	Mean = 3.4	N/A

Table 2. Experimental treatment groups.

	Low corruption	High corruption
Good Economic Conditions	(Cell 1)	(Cell 3)
	Scholarships increased 10%	Scholarships increased 10%
	No corruption mentioned	Corruption in Ministry of Education
	N=50	N=52
Bad Economic Conditions	(Cell 2)	(Cell 4)
	Scholarships decreased 10%	Scholarships decreased 10%
	No corruption mentioned	Corruption in Ministry of Education
	N=51	N=52

Each group was characterized by an economic and corruption treatment. There were four unique groups with 50-52 participants in each.

participated in our experiment and those surveyed by the Afrobarometer were equally likely to vote. Furthermore, although the scales used on the two samples differ, participants in the experiment ranked their family's economic conditions as being about 36% of the relevant scale (which ranged from 0 to 9) and participants in the survey ranked their own economic conditions as being about 41% of the relevant scale (captured by a 0 for worse or 1 for not worse); thus, both samples had comparable perceptions of their own or their family's level of poverty.^{xvi} Finally, although the students sampled in the experiment were more educated than their parents, when we compare the education level of students' parents with the education level of survey respondents, we find that students' parents had an average education comparable to those surveyed (completed primary education). Thus, the student sample came from a comparably educated and no richer socio-demographic group. The most important difference between our student and survey sample was level of partisanship; the younger, student sample was less partisan (38%) than the survey sample (54%).

EXPERIMENT DESIGN

Procedure: We recruited students by posting flyers in common areas around the university campus. The flyers described the study as a survey about students' perceptions of university conditions (the cover story). Upon entering the laboratory, the cover story was repeated to the subjects to minimize characteristic demands, such as subject hypothesis guessing. Next, each participant was given a survey packet, containing a pretest questionnaire, a newspaper article corresponding to the assigned treatment, and a posttest questionnaire (these items are available upon request). Students were randomly assigned to one of the four treatments, consisting of a newspaper article containing combinations of our economic and corruption treatments:

(1) good economic conditions, no corruption, (2) bad economic conditions, no corruption, (3) good economic conditions, corruption, and (4) bad economic conditions, corruption (Table 2). There were 50 to 52 participants in each treatment, for a total of just over 200 students.^{xvii} The pretest questionnaire included a battery of socio-demographic questions. The posttest questionnaire contained questions about participants' intentions to engage in political participation (our dependent variables). After completing the packet, subjects were compensated^{xviii} and debriefed.^{xix}

Independent Variables (i.e. Treatments): Our treatments consisted

of notional newspaper articles.^{xx} The baseline story in each article reported on classroom conditions at the university, specifically, over-crowding:

“The Ministry of Education was told last September that student scholarships must be cut if UCAD is to improve poor classroom conditions. Topping a list of classroom problems are over-crowded classrooms and a shortage of qualified teachers.”

Following the baseline story, a combination of economic and corruption conditions were presented in each article. The articles were made to look as though they were clipped from a national newspaper and copied to paper. Using random assignment, subjects were placed in one of the four treatments (Table 2).

We constructed our corruption treatment to elicit a change in perceptions of governmental corruption. Subjects in the corruption treatment were told that the Ministry of Education was facing allegations of having paid wages to family members who were not employed by the Ministry. Nepotism of this sort is a form of national-level corruption commonly found in African countries (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Mbaku, 2007; Meredith, 2005), and it is particularly relevant to the population from which we drew our participants. Subjects in the “low corruption” treatments received articles that did not mention corruption in the Ministry of Education.

We constructed our economic treatment to elicit a change in subjects’ perceptions of their own well-being. Traditionally, *income* has been the preferred means of capturing personal economic conditions (Kinder, 1981; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Radcliff, 1992). However, in Senegal, where poverty and unemployment persists, manipulating income is not likely to elicit feelings of personal relevance among the general population. Further, our subjects are drawn from a student population that is unlikely to be employed. Following work by Darke and Chaiken (2005), who stress the importance of crafting experimental treatments that are relevant to the sample, we use change in scholarship funding as a relevant, valid, and reliable measure of personal economic experience for university students. Most students at the University of Dakar receive scholarships or financial aid from the government in order to attend the University.^{xxi} Among our student sample, 43% of students receive full scholarships (merit-based); 21% receive partial scholarships; 2% receive partial scholarships with financial aid; 19% finance their education with financial aid; and 19% pay their own tuition (for general statistics on our student and survey samples, see Table 1). Therefore, our “economic conditions” treatment is an increase or decrease in student scholarships, where an increase in scholarships of 10% is intended to elicit positive perceptions of economic conditions, while a decrease of 10% elicits negative perceptions.^{xxii}

Dependent Variable: The posttest questionnaire contained questions about intentions to vote (as well as attitudes toward/evaluations of political elites). The dependent variable *vote* is simply the posttest question that asked: “Do you intend to vote in the next national election”. It is coded “1” if the respondent did intend to vote and “0” otherwise.

Analysis: In order to analyze the impact of our treatments on voting behavior, we first ensured that the subjects were randomly and evenly distributed on key individual characteristics across the treatments. Random and even assignment across the four treatments holds constant all of the other factors that may impact participation, thus ensuring that only the treatment effects are driving the results. For example, imagine that attachment to the President’s party (which, at the time of the study was the Senegalese Democratic Party, or PDS) impacts participation. If we

ensure that all of the subjects who identify with the PDS are evenly assigned across the four treatment groups, then any impact that attachment to the PDS has on participation will be distributed equally among the treatment groups. Thus, any difference we observe in participation between the treatment groups will be due to the treatment, not partisanship. We verified that subjects were evenly assigned to the treatments by examining the frequency and chi-squared distributions for potential indicators across the treatment groups. For example, the range in frequency across treatment groups for subjects who identify with the PDS is 21 – 28%, and the chi-squared is 0.9, which means that in none of the treatment groups is there a (statistically) significantly larger (or smaller) number of partisans. We used the responses from the pretest questionnaire to test for random and even assignment across several other potential predictors, including: gender, previous voting behavior, level of family income, interest in politics, religion, religious attendance, level of scholarship recipient, father’s and mother’s education, economic evaluations (regarding personal predicaments and national predicaments), and whether or not subjects had family working in the government. None of the chi-squared tests were significant for these variables across the treatment groups. Thus, the only explanatory variables in our experiment are the treatments. This enables us to use difference of means tests to analyze the data rather than a regression analysis where we would need to control for factors that were not randomly distributed across the treatments.^{xxiii}

EXPERIMENT RESULTS

To interpret the experimental results, we compare the mean response for intention to vote (0, 1) between and across treatment groups. To determine the independent effect of economic conditions on voting, we compare the mean intention to *vote* for Row 1 (Table 2, Cells 1 and 3) with the mean intention to *vote* for Row 2 (Table 2, Cells 2 and 4). To determine the independent effect of corruption on voting, we compare the mean intention to *vote* for Column 1 (Table 2, Cells 1 and 2) with the mean intention to *vote* for Column 2 (Table 2, Cells 3 and 4).

In Table 3, we present the independent effects of economic conditions and corruption on *vote*. The two rows of Table 3 report differences in means for *vote*. The mean for good economic conditions is higher than the mean for bad economic conditions; the mean difference is 0.10 and is significant at 0.04, which indicates that, all else equal, those in the bad economic conditions treatment are less likely to vote. This is consistent with the argument that when subjects face economic adversity, they turn their attention away from politics, the effect of which is a decrease in voting (Rosenstone, 1982). In rows 3 and 4 of Table 3, we see that the mean of high corruption is larger than for low corruption, with a mean difference of 0.11 (p -value=0.03). This suggests that individuals are more likely to turn out when they perceive governmental corruption. To summarize: When considered independently, worsening corruption – i.e. an increase in perceived corruption – increases the likelihood of voting; whereas worsening economic conditions decrease the likelihood of voting.

Table 3. Difference of means test for independent and conditional effects of economic conditions and perceived corruption on vote (one-tailed t-tests reported).

Row		Vote (0 = will not vote, 1 = will vote)	Mean difference p-value
1	Good Economic Conditions	Mean = 0.84	P = 0.04
2	Bad Economic Conditions	Mean = 0.74	
3	Low Corruption	Mean = 0.74	P = 0.03
4	High Corruption	Mean = 0.85	
5	Good Economic Conditions X Low Corruption	Mean = 0.80	P = 0.06
6	Bad Economic Conditions X Low Corruption	Mean = 0.67	
7	Good Economic Conditions X Low Corruption	Mean = 0.80	P = 0.15
8	Good Economic Conditions X High Corruption	Mean = 0.88	
9	Good Economic Conditions X Low Corruption	Mean = 0.80	P = 0.48
10	Bad Economic Conditions X High Corruption	Mean = 0.81	
11	Bad Economic Conditions X Low Corruption	Mean = 0.67	P = 0.01
12	Good Economic Conditions X High Corruption	Mean = 0.88	
13	Bad Economic Conditions X Low Corruption	Mean = 0.67	P = 0.05
14	Bad Economic Conditions X High Corruption	Mean = 0.81	
15	Good Economic Conditions X High Corruption	Mean = 0.88	P = 0.16
16	Bad Economic Conditions X High Corruption	Mean = 0.81	

Following Manzetti and Wilson (2006), we are also interested in the combined (or interactive) effects of the economic and corruption treatments, which we obtain by comparing each of the treatments (rows 5 to 16 in Table 3). If we compare rows 5 and 6, we see that subjects in a low corruption treatment are more likely to vote if their economic conditions are good (row 5, mean=0.80) rather than bad (row 6, mean=0.67), and this difference is significant (p -value=0.06).^{xxiv} In other words, when perceived corruption is low, bad economic conditions continue to suppress voter turnout. However, when perceived corruption is high, economic conditions have no effect on the likelihood of voting (difference in means between rows 15 and 16 is not significant). Likewise, when economic conditions are good, an increase in perceived corruption does not significantly increase the likelihood of voting (compare rows 7 and 8), but when economic conditions are bad, an increase in perceived corruption significantly increases the likelihood of voting (compare rows 13 and 14). These results tell us that corruption has a strong positive effect on participation when economic conditions are bad, and good economic conditions increase likelihood of voting when perceived corruption is low. Thus, analysis of the impact of economic conditions on turnout will be inconsistent and misleading so long as the interaction between economic circumstances and perceived corruption is not taken into account.

In summary, the experimental results show that corruption increases the intent to vote. This suggests that in addition to having a negative impact on political attitudes

(as shown in the studies of Anderson and Tverdova, 2003 and Manzetti and Wilson, 2006 and 2007), exposure to corruption increased the intention of these African students to become active in politics. These results may be surprising to some, who might expect corruption to decrease citizens' expectations of governmental responsiveness. If corruption *did* decrease expectations of responsiveness, then citizens in the treatments for high corruption would have been less likely to vote. The evidence, however, shows that they are *more* likely to vote. In addition, results strongly support the conclusion that Africans use corruption as an indicator of government performance, and so when economic conditions are bad, perceptions of corruption motivate them to vote the rascals out. Our results also suggest that in Senegal, a country with pervasive and high corruption, corruption is a highly salient factor in citizens' participatory calculus. This was perhaps an especially salient issue during the time frame of the study, when tension between the opposition parties and PDP were escalating.

Participation in Senegal: Evidence from the 2008 Afrobarometer Survey

To test the external validity of our experimental findings, we analyze the 2008 Round 4 Afrobarometer survey of Senegal, the timing of which corresponded as closely as possible to the timing of our experiment. Mean values and coding scales of our dependent and independent

Table 4. Perceptions of corruption: President and officials in his office.

	Value	Percent of respondents
None	0	8.30
Don't know	1	38.39
Some	2	26.13
Most	3	19.33
All	4	7.86

variables are summarized in Table 1.

Dependent variables

To measure our dependent variable, we use a simple dichotomous measure of self-reported participation in the last election before the survey was conducted (the presidential election occurred in February of 2007, about a year before the survey was conducted in Senegal). The variable is based on Question Q23D from the Round 4 Afrobarometer survey, and is coded 1 if the respondent reports having voted, 0 otherwise.^{xxv}

Explanatory variables

Perceptions of corruption: In our experiment, we primed our subjects to think about the corruption of national-level political figures in the Ministry of Education. In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents are not asked about particular ministries; however, they are given the opportunity to assess the corruption of different national-level officials, including the office of the president. Among elected officials in Senegal, the president is highly visible and relevant, and in every competitive election so far, the president’s party has also won an overwhelming majority of the seats in parliament; hence, the president dominates by reputation and in fact. (For example, turnout for the 2007 presidential election was about 70%, whereas turnout for the 2007 parliamentary election was about 34%).^{xxvi} Perceptions of presidential corruption are by far the most relevant to national level participation and the only form of corruption we found to be associated with a respondent’s decision to vote, and so we use respondents’ perceptions of corruption of the president’s office as our measure of perceived corruption (Table 4).

In the survey, respondents were asked to assess the extent to which the president and officials in the president’s office are corrupt (Question Q50A). The measure is a four-point scale ranging from “none” to “all of them”. The percentage of people who believe that “none” of the officials in the president’s office are corrupt is the same as the percentage that believe all are corrupt,

8%. Approximately 26% believe that some are corrupt, and 19% believe that most are corrupt. A sizeable proportion of respondents (about 39%) responded “don’t know”. As discussed in Mattes and Bratton, there are several options when a large number of responses fall into the “don’t know” category (2007, see Appendix C). The least appealing is to drop these responses – in our case, this would eliminate close to 40% of respondents. The most appealing option is to recode the ‘don’t know’ responses to some “theoretically defensible spot on the response scale” (p. 207). In the case of the corruption variable, one could argue that respondents who ‘don’t know’ if members of the president’s office are corrupt are having trouble assessing whether some or none of them are corrupt. To create the adjusted scale for the corruption variable, we rescaled the original variable to create an additional category between ‘none’ and ‘some’, and we recoded the ‘don’t know’ responses to fall into this category. The new variable ranges from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates the respondent thinks none of the officials are corrupt, 1 that the respondent doesn’t know if officials are corrupt, 2 that some are corrupt and so on (see Table 4).^{xxvii}

Economic conditions^{xxviii}: In our experiment, we expressly designed our economic treatment to be relevant to our students’ personal economic situation, and results of the experiment demonstrate differences in voting behavior between those in good versus poor economic conditions. Our primary measure of personal economic conditions is based on question Q5, which asks respondents to assess their present living conditions as compared to those of others in Senegal. We use this measure to identify those respondents who consider their personal living conditions to be worse than those of others. While there are many possible measures of personal economic conditions in the Afrobarometer survey, only this question asks respondents to evaluate their living conditions relative to those of others. For example, the number of respondents who rate their relative living conditions as worse or much worse than other Senegalese is 427 out of 1,185, as opposed to the 813 respondents who, when asked simply to rate their living conditions, answered ‘bad’ or ‘fairly bad’, a number that includes well over half the sample. To capture the group of respondents who consider their living conditions to be worse than those of others in Senegal, we created a dummy variable coded 1 for those who responded to Question Q5 with the answer “worse” or “much worse”, and 0 otherwise.

Although our primary measure of economic conditions is the self-assessment of relative economic status (Question Q5), we include employment status and having had to go without food as a means to control for objective conditions not captured by the self-assessment. Obviously, being employed is related to a respondent’s

economic situation, although the correlation between being employed and the comparative measure of living conditions is only .14. More importantly, being employed captures key features of a respondent's social environment. Research suggests that citizens who are employed in a job with regular working hours and a regular working location are more likely to be interested and engaged in political activity, even if they are not members of a union. Thus, we expect being employed to have a positive and significant effect on likelihood of voting. The measure of employment status is coded 0 if the respondent is unemployed, 1 otherwise. Of the 1,197 respondents who answer the Afrobarometer question (Q94), only 142 were employed, and those only part time. We also include a control for objective level of poverty; we use Question Q8A, which asks respondents how often they have had to go without enough food. The correlation between the self-assessment of relative economic condition and the variable 'Gone Without Food' is .34. This measure ranges from 0, which indicates that the respondent has never gone without enough food, to 4, which indicates that the respondent always has to go without enough food.

Control variables

Social characteristics: Respondents' level of education is a ten-category variable ranging from no formal schooling through post-graduate education. Age is measured in years. Gender is coded 0 for males and 1 for females.

Political interest: To capture the effect of political interest on participation, we include two measures. The first is based on a question from the Afrobarometer survey that asks respondents about their interest in public affairs (Q13). This question ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 corresponds to "not at all interested" and 3 corresponds to "very interested". The second is based on the question in the Afrobarometer survey that asks respondents if they feel close to a political party (Q85). In general, we expect partisans to be more likely to vote than non-partisans, since partisanship taps into overall commitment and interest in politics as well as support for a particular political party.^{xxix}

Interaction of perceptions of corruption and economic conditions

Recall that in our experiment, we found that for those in the bad economic circumstances treatment groups, high corruption significantly increased the likelihood that they would vote. Therefore, we use the survey data to explore the possible interactive effect of corruption and economic conditions on voting. We create an interaction between

perceptions of presidential corruption and the dummy variable capturing those who consider their personal economic conditions to be worse than others. The interaction will take on the value of 0 when conditions are good and the value of the perceptions of corruption variable when conditions are bad.

In the following section, we discuss the results of the basic model of voting as well as the interactive model.

Predictors of voting

We report the results of regression analyses of predictors of voting in Table 5. Our dependent variable, *vote*, is dichotomous. We report the results of logit regression for Models 1 and 2 in Table 5, including log odds estimates as well as predicted probability of voting based on these estimates.

In Table 5 Model 1, we report the results of our basic model, which captures the direct effects of economic conditions and perceived corruption only.

Perceptions of corruption: As we found in the experiment, perceptions of corruption increase the likelihood of voting. Respondents who perceive the president and his office to be corrupt are more likely to vote than those who do not. Holding all other explanatory variables constant at their means, the average marginal effect of a one unit increase in the five point scale measuring perceptions of presidential corruption is to increase the probability of voting by 2%, and this effect is significant at the .05 level.

Economic conditions: In our analysis of survey data, the primary measure tapping into respondents' personal economic situation – respondents' relative assessment of their own living conditions – has a negative and significant impact on the probability of voting, mirroring the relationship uncovered in our experiment. The average marginal effect of perceiving oneself to be living in bad economic conditions is to reduce the probability of voting by 5%, and this is significant at the .05 level. Going without food increases the likelihood of voting, but the effect is not significant. Being employed, which captures more than merely economic conditions, has a significantly positive effect, with an average marginal effect on the probability of voting of 8%.

Age, gender, education and employment status: As expected, the older the respondent, the more likely he or she is to have voted. Surprisingly, women are more likely to vote than men. Also surprising, education does not affect voting behavior.

Political interest. As expected, those who are engaged in politics, who are interested or feel close to a political

Table 5. Effect of perceptions of corruption on likelihood of voting.

	Model 1 Log odds	Model 1 predicted probabilities	Model 2 Log odds	Model 2 predicted probabilities
Age	.05** (.01)	.01** (.001)	.05** (.01)	.01** (.001)
Gender	.39** (.16)	.06**(.02)	.40** (.16)	.06**(.02)
Education	-.05 (.05)	-.01(.01)	-.04 (.05)	-.01(.01)
Employed	.55** (.14)	.08**(.02)	.52** (.14)	.08**(.02)
Gone Without Food	.09 (.06)	.01(.01)	.10 (.06)	.01*(.01)
Interest in Politics	.17** (.07)	.03**(.01)	.16** (.07)	.02**(.01)
Feels Close to Political Party	.44** (.16)	.06**(.02)	.43** (.16)	.06**(.02)
Considers own economic condition to be worse than others	-.33* (.17)	-.05*(.03)	-.98** (.30)	-.17**(.06)
Perception of presidential corruption	.14 (.07)	.02*(.01)	-.01 (.09)	-.001(.01)
Interaction: Economic conditions and perception of corruption			.37** (.14)	.05**(.02)
Intercept	-1.62** (.36)		-1.39** (.37)	
Observations	1133	1133	1133	1133
Log-Likelihood	-516.34		-513.31	
Pseudo-R2	.1094		.1146	

Regressions were estimated using logit regression. Results presented as log odds and predicted probabilities, (Robust standard errors in parentheses.) **p>.05, *p>.1.

party, are more likely to vote. A one unit increase on the scale of political interest increases the probability of voting by 3%, and partisans are 6% more likely to vote than non-partisans, and these effects are significant.

In general, our effort to replicate our experimental findings using an alternative source of data, one that captures variation in the entire Senegalese population rather than in a small, student-based, subsample, has been successful, providing important external validation of the experimental findings.

Interactive effects

Our final analysis concerns the interaction of perceptions of corruption and economic conditions on probability of voting (Kam and Franzese, 2007). In Model 2, in addition to the variables included in Model 1, we include the interaction of the variable capturing those who consider their economic conditions to be worse than others (coded 1 for those who consider their situation to be worse) and

the variable capturing perceptions of presidential corruption (scaled 0 to 4) because we are interested in whether perceptions of government corruption mitigate the negative impact of bad economic conditions on turnout.

In our interpretation of the results reported in Model 2, we note first that the effects of the control variables on voting are unchanged with the inclusion of the interaction. Once the interaction is added to the model, the coefficient on the perceptions of corruption variable tells us the effect of perceptions of corruption on the voting behavior of those in good economic conditions. As can be seen, the effect is positive but not significant, coinciding with our experimental results: When economic conditions are good, increased perceived corruption does not significantly increase likelihood of voting. The coefficient on the variable capturing bad economic conditions is large, negative, and significant; this coefficient captures the effect of bad economic conditions on voting for respondents who perceive no presidential corruption. Thus, for respondents living in bad economic circumstances who believe that the president and his administration are

not corrupt, poor living conditions lowers their likelihood of voting (from those in good economic circumstances who do not think the president is corrupt) by 17%, and this effect is significant. Once we control for the interactive effect of economic conditions and perceptions of corruption, we find that the dampening effect of feeling that one is economically worse off than others on voting actually increases.

Finally, the positive coefficient on the interaction of economic conditions and perception of corruption shows that, as we found in the experiment, for respondents' who perceive their economic conditions to be worse than that of others, the probability that they will vote increases as their perception of governmental corruption increases. Again, the impact of perceptions of corruption on voting is augmented by inclusion of the interaction.

DISCUSSION

As discussed, studies of the impact of economic conditions and of corruption on voter turnout are inconclusive, especially in developing democracies, and we theorize that lack of definitive findings may be due to the fact that these studies do not account for the impact of individuals' economic conditions on the salience of perceptions of corruption for voting behavior. To correct this, we extend Manzetti and Wilson (2006) to investigate whether or not this interaction impacts individuals' behavior, in this case, decisions to vote. In Senegal, as in other emerging African democracies, governmental corruption remains a serious threat to the country's development both economically and politically. If citizens connect corruption with poor economic circumstances (as research by economists, such as Mauro, suggests), we ought to find that corruption is particularly salient to voters who perceive their economic conditions to be bad. Indeed, our findings confirm these expectations.

We implemented a field based experiment designed expressly to uncover the ways in which the interaction between corruption and economic conditions affects citizens' decisions to vote. In the experiment, we find independent effects for economic conditions and perceptions of corruption: Both good economic conditions and perceptions of corruption increase the likelihood of voting. Our finding that good economic conditions increase the likelihood of voting contradicts literature that examines the effects of economic conditions on voting; our finding that corruption increases the likelihood of voting lends support to research in Portugal (Stockemer and Calca, 2013), Eastern Europe (Kostadinova, 2009), and China (Shi, 1999), but contradicts findings of the opposite in Latin America (Davis et al., 2004) and globally (Stockemer et al., 2013).

Importantly, we also find an interactive relationship between corruption and economic conditions. Specifi-

cally, corruption has a particularly strong positive effect on the likelihood of voting when economic conditions are poor. Our analysis of survey data from Senegal supports the experimental findings. Absent perceived corruption, respondents living in bad economic conditions are significantly less likely to turn out to vote than respondents living in good economic circumstances. However, respondents who are aware of political corruption – in our case corruption of the office of president – especially if they are living in bad economic conditions are motivated to vote. Indeed, the greater the perceived corruption of the president's office, the more likely the respondent is to vote, and this effect is significant for each increase in perceived corruption. The survey data provide external validation of the experimental findings.

Our findings are important for moving scholarship forward in two key ways. Theoretically, our study suggests that individual motivations to go to the polls in Senegal are affected by an interaction between perceptions of corruption and poor economic conditions. Thus, in a country like Senegal, where corruption is high and economic conditions are generally bad relative to developed countries, perceptions of corruption may serve to motivate citizens to vote in higher numbers than traditional explanations of participation would predict. This finding contributes to a small literature on the interactive effects of economic conditions and corruption on political outcomes (Manzetti and Wilson, 2006). While Manzetti and Wilson demonstrate an interactive effect on attitudes, we demonstrate a similar effect on voting behavior. Second, the fact that we were able to replicate the basic relationships in the analysis of survey data collected at a slightly different time and by an independent source lends external validity to our results. Despite poverty and widespread corruption, in Senegal, the conditions and stakes of political engagement change dramatically once democratization has begun in earnest. Both the students in our experiment and the citizens surveyed respond to corruption and poor economic conditions with increased participation in elections. This innovative research design leverages the best of two methods in order to maximize the power of the analysis of voter turnout.

Our study is limited in that it pertains to one developing democracy in Africa: Senegal. We chose Senegal precisely because we believe it to be a representative case of other developing democracies, characterized by relatively poor economic conditions and corruption, but where citizens nevertheless vote in large numbers. In so doing, we control variables that are relevant to the Senegalese case, but may be less relevant for other countries (and other countries may need controls that we do not account for here, for example ethnicity). Future research can extend our theoretical and methodological contribution in this study by examining other contexts in

Africa, for example in Ghana, where ethnic cleavages are politically salient, or in Kenya, which is somewhat less democratic than is Senegal but where corruption is an important political issue (e.g. the 2002 election that ousted the decade-long leader Daniel arap Moi and ushered in the Rainbow Coalition led by Mwai Kibaki). As with all uses of the experimental design, no one study can be conclusive, thus, the study can be extended to cross-national designs that incorporate variation along the key variables in this study: economic conditions, corruption, and voting behavior.

Conflict of Interest

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its components.

REFERENCES

- Abramson PR, Aldrich J (1982). The Decline of electoral Participation in America. *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 76:502-521.
- Anderson CJ, Tverdova YV (2003). Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies. *Am. J. Pol. Sci.* 47(1):91-109.
- Blais A, Dobrzynska A (1998). Turnout in Electoral Democracies. *European J. Polit. Res.* 33(2):239-262.
- Brader T, Tucker JA (2006). Reflective and Unreflective Partisans? Experimental Evidence on the Links Between Information, Opinion, and Party Identification. Unpublished manuscript.
- Brady HE, Verba S, Scholzman KL (1995). Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 89:271-294.
- Bratton M, van de Walle N (1992). Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa. *Comp. Pol.* 24(4):419-442.
- Bratton M, van de Walle N (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge/United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton M, Mattes R (2001). Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental? *Brit. J. Pol. Sci.*, 31:447-474.
- Bratton M, Mattes R, Gyiman-Boadi E (2005). *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*, Cambridge/United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowler S, Karp JA (2004). Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government. *Political Behavior*, 26(3):271-287.
- Callimachi R (2007). "Senegal's High Unemployment is Top Election Issue," *The Washington Post* February 24.
- Chabal P, Daloz JP (1999). *Africa Works*, Bloomington: The International African Institute in association with Indiana University Press.
- Coan TG, Merolla JL, Stephenson LB, Zechmeister EJ (2008). It's Not Easy Being Green: Minor Party Labels as Heuristic Aids. *Pol. Psy.*, 29(3):389-405.
- Conroy-Krutz J, Logan C (2013). Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan Election: Did the Money Matter?, in: Michael Bratton (ed), *Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa*, Boulder/Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Cover AD, Brumberg BS (1982). Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 76(2):347-59.
- Darke P, Chaiken S (2005). The Pursuit of Self-Interest: Self-Interest Bias in Attitude Judgment and Persuasion. *J. Person. and Soc. Psy.* 89(6):864-883.
- Davis CL, Camp RA, Coleman KM (2004). The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America. *Comp. Pol. Stud.* 37:677-703.
- Dunning T, Harrison L (2010). Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 104(1):21-39.
- Easterly W, Levine R (1997). Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. November. *Q. J. Econ.* 112:1203-1250.
- Erdmann G (2007). The Cleavage Model, Ethnicity and voter alignment in Africa: Conceptual and methodological problems revisited, GIGA working papers 63.
- Farrar C, Green DP, Green JE, Nickerson DW, Shewfelt S (2009). Does Discussion Group Composition Affect Policy Preferences? Results from three randomized experiments. *Pol. Psy.* 30(4):615-647.
- Fatton RJ (1986). Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal. *Afri. Stud. Rev.* 29 (4):61-78.
- Gamson WA (1968). *Power and Discontent*, Homewood: The Dorsey Press.
- Gerber AS, Green DP (2000). The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A field experiment. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 94(3):653-63.
- Gurr TR (1993). Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945. *Int. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 14:161-201.
- Gyimah-Brempong K (2002). Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in Africa. *Econ. Gov.* 3:183-209.
- Henrich J, Boyd R, Bowles S, Camerer C, Fehr E, Gintis H, McElreath R (2001). In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 91:73-78.
- Hibbing JA, Alford J (2004). Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as wary cooperators. *Amer. J. Pol. Sci.*, 48:62-76.
- Hirschman AO (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Hope KR, Chikulo BC (2000). *Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies*, New York City/New York: Palgrave.
- Kam CD, Franzese R (2007). *Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis*, Ann Arbor/Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Kam C, Wilking JR, Zechmeister EJ (2007). Beyond the 'Narrow Data Base': Another Convenience Sample for Experimental Research. *Pol. Beh.* 20(4):163-82.
- Kinder D (1981). Presidents, Prosperity, and Public Opinion. *Pub. Opin. Quart.*, 45(1):1-21.
- Kinder D, Palfry T (1993). On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science, in: Donald Kinder and Thomas Palfry (eds), *Experimental Foundations of Political Science*, Ann Arbor/Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Kostadinova T (2009). Abstain or Rebel: Corruption perceptions and voting in East European elections. *Pol. Policy*, 37:691-714.
- Kramon E (2013). Vote Buying and Electoral Turnout in Kenya, in: Michael Bratton (ed), *Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa*, Boulder/Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Kuenzi M, Lambright GMS (2007). Voter Turnout in Africa's Multiparty Regimes. *Comp. Pol. Stud.* 40:665-690.
- Kuenzi M, Lambright GMS (2011). Who Votes in Africa? An Examination of Electoral Participation in 10 African Countries. *Party Pol.* 17:767-799.
- Lemarchand R, Legg K (1972). Political Clientelism and Development: A preliminary Analysis. *Comp. Pol.* 4(2):149-178.
- Lindberg SI (2012). Have the Cake and Eat It: The rational voter in Africa. November. *Party Pol.* 19:945-961.
- Lynch G, Crawford G (2011). Democratization in Africa 1990-2010: an

- assessment. *Democratization*, 18(2):275-310.
- Manzetti L, Wilson CJ (2006). Corruption, Economic Satisfaction, and Confidence in Government: Evidence from Argentina. *The Lat. Am.* 49(2):131-139.
- Mauro P (1995). Corruption and Growth. *Q. J. Econ.* 110(3):681-712.
- Mauro P (1997a). The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A cross-country analysis, in: KA Elliot, Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Mauro P (1997b). Why Worry about Corruption? *Econ. Iss.*, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Mattes R, Bratton M (2007). Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience. *Am. J. Pol. Sci.* 51(1):192-217.
- Mbaku JM (2007). Corruption in Africa: Causes, consequences, and cleanups, Boulder/Colorado: Lexington Books.
- McCann JA, Dominguez JI (1998). Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: an assessment of public opinion and voting behavior. *Elec. Stud.* 17:483-503.
- McDermott R (2002). Experimental Methods in Political Science. *Annu. Rev. Pol. Sci.* 5:31-61.
- Meredith M (2005). *The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, New York City/New York: Public Affairs.
- Merolla JL, Stephenson LB, Zechmeister EJ (2008). Can Canadians Take a Hint? The (in)effectiveness of party labels as information shortcuts in Canada. *Canad. J. Pol. Sci.* 41(3):673-96.
- Mishler W, Rose R (2001). What Are the Origins of Political Trust? *Comp. Pol. Stud.* 34(1):30-62.
- Norris P (2002). *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*, Cambridge/United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Pacek A, Radcliff B (1995). Economic Voting and the Welfare State: A Cross-National Analysis. *J. Pol.* 57(1):44-61.
- Powell GB (1982). *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Powell GB (1986). American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 80:17-43.
- Radcliff B (1992). The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A comparative analysis. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 86(2):444-454.
- Redlawsk DP, McCann JA (2005). Popular Interpretations of "corruption" and their Partisan Consequences. *Pol. Behav.* 27(3):261-83.
- Rosenstone SJ (1982). Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout. *Am. J. Pol. Sci.* 26(1):25-46.
- Rosenstone SJ, Hansen JM (1993). *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*, New York City/New York: Macmillan.
- Sandholtz W, Koetzle W (2000). Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade. *Int. Stud. Q.* 44(1):31-50.
- Seligson ME (2002). The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A comparative study of four Latin American countries. *J. Pol.* 64(2):408-433.
- Shi T (1999). Voting and Nonvoting in China: Voting behavior in plebiscitary and limited-choice elections. *J. Pol.* 61:1115-1139.
- Southwell PL (1985). Alienation and Nonvoting in the United States: A refined operationalization. *West. Pol. Q.* 38:663-674.
- Stockemer D, LaMontagne B, Scruggs L (2013). Bribes and Ballots: The Impact of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Democracies. *Int. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 34:74-90.
- Stockemer D, Calca P (2013). Corruption and Turnout in Portugal – A Municipal Level Study. *Crime Law Soc Change* 60:535-548.
- Tavits M (2008). Representation, Corruption, and Subjective Well-Being. *Comp. Pol. Stud.* 41(12):1607-1630.
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2007). *Corruption Assessment: Senegal*. Washington, DC.
- Verba S, Nie N (1987). *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*, Chicago/Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- Verba S, Schlozman KL, Brady HE (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*, Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Villalón LA (2011). Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability. *Cent. for Strat. Int. Stud. Afr. Prog.*
- Wantchekon L (2003). Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin. *World Pol.* 55:399-422.
- Wolfinger R, Rosenstone S (1980). *Who Votes?*, New Haven/Connecticut: Yale University Press.

ⁱ Average turnout in the most recent elections in six democracies (Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa) is 77%, with lowest reported turnout in Senegal (57%) and highest in Namibia (84%). Turnout figures are based on the proportion of the voting age population that participated in the last presidential election (or parliamentary election in Botswana and South Africa). Data were taken from the IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) web site. In those elections where two rounds were held, we used turnout for Round 1. Turnout figures were: Benin 84.82%, Botswana 76.71%, Ghana 80.15%, Namibia 84.81%, Senegal 57.12%, South Africa 77.30%. Because turnout was not reported for the Namibian 2009 presidential election, we report results for 2004.

ⁱⁱ We used Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972 – 2008, published by Freedom House and available online at www.freedomhouse.org. From 2009 through 2012, Senegal slipped to partially free on the index, due to increasingly authoritarian behavior by then-incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade. Wade lost his bid for reelection in the 2012 presidential elections and in 2013, Senegal regained status as a free country, according to the Freedom House metric.

ⁱⁱⁱ As evidenced by two peaceful transitions of power at the Presidential level: the first instance occurring when Abdoulaye Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) ousted the Socialist Party, which had held power since Independence and the second more recent instance when Macky Sall's Alliance for the Republic ousted President Wade and the PDS in 2012.

^{iv} See World Bank "Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population), available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/SN?display=graph>, accessed October 14, 2014.

^v GDP data are from World Bank Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org>.

^{vi} Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain and measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among a country's public officials and politicians. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranges from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (squeaky clean). Transparency International considers 5.0 to be the borderline score distinguishing countries that do and do not have a serious corruption problem.

^{vii} Senegal is relatively homogenous. About 50 percent of citizens are Wolof with a handful of smaller ethnicities. 90 percent of citizens speak one or both of the national languages (French and Wolof). 95 percent of the population is Muslim.

^{viii} Scholars argue that the aggregate relationship between economic development and turnout is due to a relationship between economic development and levels of education and income (Lipset 1959). Further, economic performance is associated with more political trust and support (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, pg. 102).

^{ix} A similar argument has been posited by the *relative deprivation* literature that predicts greater magnitudes of civil strife as deprivation intensifies (Gurr 1993).

^x By corruption we refer to "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Sandholtz and Koetzel 2000).

^{xi} For comparisons of corruption in countries around the world, see Corruption Perceptions Index, published annually by Transparency International (TI), available online at www.transparency.org. This index shows that levels of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa are among the worst in the world.

^{xii} We are interested in how individuals' perceptions of the extent of government corruption impact their likelihood of voting. Thus, we are not studying the impact of corrupt behavior, such as vote buying, on turnout (e.g. Fatton 1986, Lemarchand and Legg 1972, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2013, Kramon 2013).

^{xiii} Available at FreedomHouse.org, <https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/senegal#.VLQC5nsYPf0>, accessed January 12, 2015.

^{xiv} Students are commonly used in experimental work in political science and other social sciences (see Kinder and Palfrey 1993 for a rigorous defense of the use of students in experimental work; also see Kam et al. 2007 for an analysis of subject types within and across a variety of political science journals). We follow this tradition because we needed a literate sample for the experiment.

^{xv} For cultural reasons, it was difficult to recruit women to the study; thus, the experimental sample included 78% males and 22% females.

^{xvi} Only 25% of the sample had family working in the government. 71% had mothers with no formal education; 49% had fathers with no formal education. On the poverty self-placement scale, 27 of the students characterized their personal predicament as "0", i.e. the poorest measure, while only 1 respondent selected "9", i.e. the wealthiest measure. Excluding the 43 students who replied "don't know", 64% of students answered in categories 0-4 on the poverty scale, while only 35% answered in categories 5-9 (mean=3.20). Overall, students in the sample evaluated themselves as "poor" and were worried about their personal financial situations; 25% of respondents were extremely worried about their financial situations, whereas only 15% were not worried.

^{xvii} Samples of this size are common in experimental work (for examples, see Merolla et al. 2008, Farrar et al. 2009, Coan et al. 2008).

^{xviii} Subjects were compensated 1,000 F cfa for their participation. This is approximately equivalent to U.S. \$2.00.

^{xix} Debriefing was a critical element of the design for three reasons. First, we wanted to assure the subjects that their confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. Second, because corruption was a treatment in two of the four conditions, it was necessary that participants knew that the newspaper articles were fictitious, i.e. that the Ministry of Education was not actually corrupt in the way the treatment suggests. Third, because the study took place over a two week period, participants were instructed not to discuss the experiment with anyone.

^{xx} All of the items were written in French, one of the official languages in Senegal.

^{xxi} This fact was determined upon personal communication between the authors and the Dean of Social Sciences and Humanities at UCAD, Professor Saliou Ndiaye.

^{xxii} Based on interviews with University officials, we determined at 10% increase or decrease in scholarships to be a realistic amount for the economic conditions treatment.

^{xxiii} For specific examples of the use of differences in means in posttest-only designs, see the study of cross-cutting cleavages in Mali by Dunning and Harrison (2010). Also, Hibbing and Alford (2004) use difference of means analysis in their experiment to study perceptions of legitimacy and acceptance of authoritarian decision makers. This method is justified when random assignment across the treatments is verified and is recommended as the simplest appropriate interpretation of experimental results. Because we are interested in differences across treatment groups, analysis of posttest results is most appropriate (see Dunning and Harrison (2010) and Hibbing and Alford (2004)).

^{xxiv} We consider significance at the 0.10 level or lower. This is standard for experimental work of this kind.

^{xxv} The Afrobarometer includes only one question on voting behavior – whether or not the respondent voted in the last election. Fortunately, the last election referenced in the question occurred in 2007, the year in which we carried out our experiment. Thus, the predictors of participation should be as comparable as possible across our two methodologies.

^{xxvi} Data were taken from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) website, www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm.

^{xxvii} The most commonly chosen solution when the researcher is faced with a large number of 'don't know' responses is to set these responses to the mean; however, this has the potential to increase artificially the fit of the overall regression model. Further, when considering responses to questions about perceptions (not facts), 'not knowing' is meaningful. In this case, a 'don't know' response suggests that the respondent is having a very hard time evaluating the presence or absence of governmental corruption, and this falls meaningfully between a response of 'none' and 'some'. The correlation between the two alternative approaches – setting 'don't knows' to the mean or rescaling – is .79. To ensure that our choice of coding strategy is not driving our results, we ran our models with each alternative, setting 'don't know' responses to the mean value for each of the three corruption variables, or rescaling 'don't know' responses to fall between 'none' and 'some' on the original scale. Substantively, our results do not depend on coding strategy, but like Mattes and Bratton (2007), for theoretical reasons, we find the rescaled variable most appealing.

^{xxviii} For all variables capturing economic conditions, we coded 'don't know' answers to the mean response of those who answered the question.

^{xxix} In fact, when we include dummy variables to capture whether or not respondents feel close to the president's party or an opposition party, we find that the effect of both variables is positive and highly statistically significant. Although the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior is interesting and important, this complex question demands much more attention and space than we can devote to it in this paper. Therefore, we control not for particular partisan affiliations, but simply for being a partisan.



African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Related Journals Published by Academic Journals

- Journal of Geography and Regional Planning
- Journal of Economics and International Finance
- Journal of Hospitality Management and Tourism
- International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology
- Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research
- African Journal of Marketing Management

academicJournals