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The determinants of institutional trust in Botswana’s liberal democracy

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Botswana is considered as a hub of good governance, and one of the least corrupt countries in Africa. Yet empirical evidence based on the Afrobarometer perception surveys from 2008 to 2014 suggests a decline in institutional trust. This study uses the 2014 Afrobarometer survey to explain trust in four political institutions namely the presidency, the ruling party, parliament and local council authorities. Theories of institutional trust suggest that trust is linked to performance of institutions on a number of key factors. But for the purposes of this study, we explain trust by perceptions on corruption, democracy, civic participation, government performance, level of education, age and location. The study finds that the level of education, perceptions on government performance, corruption and satisfaction with democracy are important in explaining trust in political institutions. However, safe for communicating together to raise issues, civic participation is not important in explaining institutional trust. The argument of the study is that even though Batswana do not have a culture of civic engagement, they are critical in government performance, democracy and corruption.

Key words: Botswana, democracy, political institutions, trust.

INTRODUCTION

Botswana is regarded among the best performing African countries in good governance, and rated as Africa’s least corrupt country. The country has recorded the fastest economic growth in the world in the 1980s, and has been a frontrunner in democratic practice on the African continent evidenced by conduct of free and relatively fair elections.

Even though there has yet to be an alternation of power between parties, respect for term limits and smooth transition of power between leaders, albeit of the same party, have been consistent in a continent characterised by unconstitutional transitions and extension of presidential term limits. Botswana continues to attract positive ratings from the Mo Ibrahim Index of Good Governance and has consistently been ranked as Africa’s least corrupt country by Transparency International.

But on the other hand, empirical evidence from the Afrobarometer survey depicts a decline in institutional trust from 2008 to 2014. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine factors that explain trust in political institutions. The study is based on round six of the Afrobarometer perception survey that was conducted in 2014. Although a decline in perceptions of institutional trust is observed from 2008 to 2014, the present study is concerned with modelling the possible determinants of trust in political...
institutions in 2014. Models that explain the declining trends in institutional trust are subjects for the next research.

This study observes that the literature on determinants of institutional trust is acutely lacking in the context of Botswana. So to the best of this study knowledge, the study represents the first attempt to model determinants of institutional trust in Botswana with selected variables. For the purpose of this study, political institutions refer to those institutions that citizens select officials to represent them, namely the presidency, parliament, local government council and the ruling party. The study focuses on these four important institutions because as it is later shown that public confidence is important for the consolidation of democracy.

The study found out that institutional trust is explained by perceptions on government performance in delivery of services, political representatives involved in corruption and satisfaction with democracy. Educated people are less likely to trust political institutions than people without formal education while civic participation does not explain institutional trust. Based on these findings, the central argument of this study is that while Batswana do not have a culture of civic engagement, they are increasingly becoming critical of their government and democracy because of perceived poor government performance, perceived corruption in institutions and their dissatisfaction with democracy.

**Institutional trust**

It has now become generally accepted that institutional trust is an important ingredient for any functioning democracy. Mishler and Rose (2001) plainly state that trust is critical to democracy, and Bianco (1994) similarly points out that trust links ordinary citizens to the institutions that are intended to represent them, thereby enhancing both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government. When people trust their institutions, they have confidence that those institutions perform in accordance with their expectations or at least account in the event of non-performance. This is especially essential for democracies as it is a part of the social contract between elected political representatives and voters.

Catterberg and Moreno (2005) argue that trust is especially important for democratic governments since they cannot rely on coercion to the same extent as other regimes. This implies that there is more support for democracy where citizens have faith in political institutions. A number of studies have also argued that a public’s trust in the actors and institutions of political authority facilitates democratic consolidation in that institutionally-trusting individuals have been found to be more supportive of democratic principles (Seligson and Carrión, 2002). Newton (2001) similarly points out that political trust is essential for democratic and stable political life.

Institutional and cultural theorists trace the origins of trust and offer varying perspectives on this issue. According to cultural theories, trust is exogenous, that it originates outside the sphere of politics in long-standing beliefs about people emanating in cultural norms, learned through process of socialization (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Cultural theorists emphasize that institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust which is learned early in life, and projected into political institutions. So political trust is based on attitudes and values that are learned early in life, and are transmitted from generation to generation (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 2000).

On the other hand, institutional theorists argue that political trust is a result of expectations by people from institutions to perform well. In this vein, Mishler and Rose (2001) posit that “trust in institutions is rationally based; it hinges on citizen evaluations of institutional performance.” For Wuthnow (2002), “institutional trust which is confidence in institutions, points to the fact that much of contemporary life depends less on informal, interpersonal transactions than on the norms and social structures in which these specific transactions are embedded.” From a glance, the two theoretical traditions are mutually reinforcing because trust earned through socialization is indeed later translated into institutional trust. In fact, according to Blind (2006) institutional scholars have come to accept that culture conditions institutional performance. But institutional performance is based on a number of factors which affect and determine people’s confidence on institutions. Before examining these determinants of institutional trust, a brief definitional exercise of the concept of institutional trust is in order. For purposes of this paper, institutional trust is used interchangeably with political trust because the paper is based on trust in political institutions.

Newton (2001) rightly observes that like other concepts, political trust has many synonyms that can be used interchangeably with. Notably, expressions like civic-mindedness and participation, citizenship, political interest and involvement, a concern with the public interest/public good, political tolerance, the ability to compromise, and confidence in political institutions may be interpreted as political trust (Newton, 2001). Newton (2001) makes a distinction between political trust and social trust, where the former is learned indirectly through agents such as the media, and the latter is based upon immediate, first-hand experience of others. Schoon and Cheng (2011) define political trust as the confidence people have in their government and institutions. Institutional or ‘political’ trust is defined as trust in societal institutions, as opposed to ‘generalized’ or ‘social’ trust in other people (Lipset and Schneider 1983).

According to Blind (2006), political trust can be directed towards the political system and its organizations as well as the individual political incumbents. Blind (2006) makes a distinction between diffuse and specific political trust,
where the former refers to citizens’ evaluation of the regime and the political system and the latter refers to assessment of certain political institutions, such as the congress or the local police force. This study examines specific political trust in institutions of presidency, ruling party, parliament, and local council authorities. But first we deal with the determinants of institutional trust below.

**Determinants of institutional trust**

As it has been mentioned, trust-building is critical for democratic consolidation and ensures that those who have been entrusted with the responsibility to govern do not abuse trust conferred on them by citizens. But across many countries of the developed and developing world, research shows a decline in institutional trust (Inglehart, 2007; Putnam, 2000).

Dalton (2005) observes that during the last third of the twentieth century, public trust in government and political institutions eroded in almost all advanced industrial democracies, and in America the decline had to do with political scandals of the 1960s and 1970s. In many advanced democracies, according to Putnam and Goss (2002), there have been changes in the performance of democratic institutions especially the weakening of parties and the decline in public confidence in government. Many governments in industrialized countries have had to deal with harsh economic conditions leading to rise in unemployment and poor delivery of services which ultimately resulted in loss of public confidence.

Africa is not an exception to this trend, as Molomo (2006) points out that “the decline in confidence in the integrity of political institutions and politicians does not emerge in a social vacuum; it is a result of trying social and economic realities in Africa.” Armah-Attoh et al. (2007) makes a similar point that in Africa, “political, performance and economic factors (that is, corruption, unfavourable social policy performance, and unfavourable assessments of the general economic and personal living conditions) are the main drivers of institutional trust ratings.”

A number of studies have actually found that institutional performance is closely connected to trust in institutions. Bratton et al. (2005) observe that, “where government is associated with economic growth, there is more trust in political institutions, because growth implies effective government.” Accordingly, people make rational evaluations of how institutions perform and this impact on their trust in such institutions. In developed nations, trust is often low when citizens feel that their governments do not take care of their needs (Blind, 2006).

In the same vein, Miller (1974) concludes that the perception a government has for its citizens that does not function well is associated with distrust. On this basis, the first hypothesis is derived thus: there is a relationship between people’s perceptions of government performance and their evaluation of institutional trust. Citizens who negatively assess government performance are less likely to trust political institutions than those who positively assess government performance.

Theories of social capital found that there is a relationship between political trust and civic engagement or participation in voluntary organizations, even though there is disagreement among scholars on this. According to Van der Meer (2003), most authors using the social capital concept assume that civic engagement and generalised trust influence each other, and that jointly influence the functioning of democracy and therefore trust in political institutions. The concept of social capital has attracted a lot of attention and scholarly interest since the publication of Robert Putnam’s seminal book on Making Democracy Work in which he compared the performance of regional governments in Italy.

Putnam (1993) and Mishler and Rose (1999) emphasizes the importance of citizens’ embeddedness in a civic community which he defines as dense horizontal networks of associations, which also are typically linked to social structure. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as features of social organization such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions. According to Putnam (1993), he found that Northern Italy is much more efficient thanks to the cooperative and strongly rooted civic culture compared to the South. He concluded that in a civic community, citizens develop attitudes that enhance cooperation as they are “helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another”.

In this regard, voluntary organizations serve an important role of creating bonds of social solidarity that are the basis for civil society and democracy (Newton, 2001). However, be that as it may, across many nations there is weak evidence of institutional trust by membership of voluntary organizations. As Newton (2001) observes, “There is an association between voluntary activity and social and political trust in some countries, but it is not consistent across nations, and not strong in any”. The reason is that too often people spend time either at work, school or with families than they do in voluntary organizations and the cause-effect relationship of civic engagement and trust is difficult to establish. The strongest path is probably that people trust first then join organizations (Newton, 2001). According to Van der Meer (2003) just as much as generalised trust and civic engagement have a reciprocal relationship, it can be assumed that the relation between social capital and trust in political institutions is also reciprocal.

The study second hypothesis states that there is a relationship between civic engagement and people’s evaluation of institutional trust: Citizens who are not active in civic organizations are less likely to trust political institutions than those who are active. Studies have found that institutional trust is related to attitudes on satisfaction with democracy. Newman (2001) posits that “political trust is important because democracies are based on institutional mechanisms that are supposed to ensure that politicians behave in a trustworthy manner.” More
fundamentally, the worry is that if people do not trust political institutions, which suggests a lack of trust in the manner in which democracy works, and if this happens over an extended period of time, then they may be “disillusioned with democracy as an ideal” (Norris, 1999).

In their study of political trust in new and established democracies, Catterberg and Moreno (2005) argue that in many countries, transition to democracy motivated aspirations of civil, political, and economic rights which placed higher standards for evaluating governmental performance with emergence of democracy. Christensen and Lægreid (2005) note that trust in government generally increases according to the level of satisfaction with democracy, importance of politics in life, interest in politics, membership of political parties and affiliation with the left end of the political spectrum. Therefore, the expectation is that disaffection with democracy reduces trust in political institutions. Bratton and Gymah-Boadi (2016) succinctly state that “in a democracy, for example, citizens ought to be able to reasonably expect that public officials will govern on their behalf. If, however, government officials are perceived to violate the public’s trust, then people will feel justified in withholding their voluntary compliance” Therefore the study third hypothesis is that there a relationship between people’s satisfaction with democracy and their evaluation of institutional trust. Citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy are less likely to trust political institutions than those who are satisfied with democracy.

Moreover, Institutional trust is bound to be volatile in corruption ridden political systems. Where people perceive corruption in politics, then their perceptions of institutional trust are adversely affected (Job, 2005). Maladministration fosters mistrust among citizens as well as doubts as to the effective enjoyment of legally sanctioned rights (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1997). High levels of corruption undermine both interpersonal and government trust and this has an effect of preventing collective action and the development of civic behavior (Mishler and Rose, 2001). According to Anderson and Tverdova (2003), citizens of countries with high levels of corruption place less value on political institutions and are less confident in their political system. In the same vein, Uslaner (2003) argues that the most corrupt countries have the least trusting citizens. Accordingly, the fourth hypothesis is that citizens who perceive political institutions to be involved in corruption are more likely to mistrust political institutions than those who do not perceive political institutions to be involved in corruption.

Political trust may vary according to certain demographic variables, notably age, education and gender. According to Mishler and Rose (2001), “analysis of political trust emerges from micro-level cultural theories that emphasize that socialization into a culturally homogenous society nonetheless allows substantial variation among individuals based on gender, family background, education, and so forth.” A number of studies have actually arrived at different conclusions on the effect of education on institutional trust. For instance Anderson and Singer (2008) show that education tends to boost trust while Seglison (2002) found that the effect of education on trust is negative. But others went further to explore the interactive effect of education with government performance and corruption.

In their comparative study of European countries, Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) concluded that in countries with comparatively high levels of corruption, education reduces political trust whereas in countries with low levels of corruption, education actually boosts political trust. But the effect of corruption on institutional trust varies with educational attainment because citizens with the lowest levels of education are unresponsive to the effects of corruption but as for other citizens, the effects of corruption on political trust tend to increase with education (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012).

Because Botswana is rated the least corrupt African country, the expectation is that generally citizens would trust institutions irrespective of the level of education. But more specifically, the fifth hypothesis is that citizens with low levels of education are likely to trust institutions than people with high level of education.

Construction of the variables

The study dependant variable is built based on the following question in the Afrobarometer survey: “How much do you trust each of the following institutions, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” The article considers the answers given regarding the political institutions (president, parliament, local government and ruling party). The relationship between trust and corruption, government performance, satisfaction with democracy and civic participation with other covariates is controlled for. First, a set of demographic variables such as age, gender, level of education and location is introduced. Age could be an important explanatory element of trust in political institutions. Older people are expected to exhibit greater institutional trust because they associate political institutions with the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, which enjoys sentimental attachment to the founding leader Sir Seretse Khama.  

RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample surveys are the conventional social-science method for obtaining data about individual attitudes and behaviour. Sample surveys can and do ask individuals to report whether they trust political institutions. In this study analyze the sixth-round Afrobarometer survey conducted in Botswana in 2014 as it is the most recent survey with all the indicators required to test the above hypotheses. In this survey, a nationally representative sample of 1200 Batswana was interviewed. The design is therefore cross-sectional. The model of what explains trust in political institutions stipulates that the likelihood of a person doing so is a function of their spatial location, their evaluation of government performance, satisfaction with political system, social inclusion or
exclusion, and corruption. The level of analysis will be individual Batswana who are of voting age (18 years+).

**RESULTS**

To examine the reliability of the questions on corruption and government performance as measuring a latent variable, factor analysis was also conducted, whereas Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha_{Cr} > 0.6$) was used as a criterion for the reliability of the extracted factors. Factor analysis of the variable (Q53a-j) on corruption resulted in a one-dimensional factor solution (FACT1_1). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.939 whilst the Bartlett’s test of sphericity gave a chi-square value of 10330.823 with $p=0.000$. The KMO statistic is close to 1 whilst test of sphericity is highly significant. A measure of the reliability of Q53a-j as measuring a latent variable ‘corruption’, gave a Cronbach’s alpha = 0.947 which is highly reliable. Cronbach’s alpha determines the internal consistency or average correlation of items in a survey instrument to gauge its reliability. The analysis of variable Q66a-m on government delivery resulted in a two-dimensional factor solution. A measure of the reliability of Q66a-m gave a Cronbach’s alpha = 0.904. Factor 1 (FACT1_1) covers the provision of basic necessities like water, improving basic health services, addressing education needs etc. The second factor (FACT2_2) can be generalised to cover managing the economy like creating jobs, keeping prices down etc. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.922 whilst the Bartlett’s test of sphericity gave a chi-square value of 6262.212 with $p=0.000$ suggesting that the $R$-matrix is not an identity matrix. The KMO statistic is close to 1 indicating that factor analysis will yield distinct and reliable factors.

Table 1. Pearson’s correlation coefficient between dependent and independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Local government council</th>
<th>Ruling party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
<td>0.105**</td>
<td>0.092**</td>
<td>0.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.103**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of respondent</td>
<td>0.141**</td>
<td>0.065*</td>
<td>0.098**</td>
<td>0.117**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.280**</td>
<td>-0.144**</td>
<td>-0.185**</td>
<td>-0.268**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>.398**</td>
<td>0.317**</td>
<td>0.246**</td>
<td>0.361**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19a. Member of religious group</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.063*</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19b. Member of voluntary association or</td>
<td>0.097**</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20a. Attend a community meeting</td>
<td>0.127**</td>
<td>0.095**</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
<td>0.108**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20b. Join others to raise an issue</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-R factor score 1 for analysis 1</td>
<td>0.088**</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-R factor score 1 for analysis 2</td>
<td>.379**</td>
<td>.327**</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>.361**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-R factor score 2 for analysis 2</td>
<td>-.395**</td>
<td>-.341**</td>
<td>-.302**</td>
<td>-.394**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of corruption</td>
<td>-.334**</td>
<td>-.246**</td>
<td>-.171**</td>
<td>-.266**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.005 level (2-tailed).

In Table 1, the study conducts a preliminary analysis to ascertain the strength of the relationship (if any) between trust in political institutions (president, parliament, local government council and ruling party) and each of the independent variables. The results of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient show that almost all the independent variables are significantly correlated the dependent variables at 5% level of significance. The study observation is that the variable gender is not significantly correlated with trust in the president, Parliament and local government council. Gender is however significantly correlated with trust in the ruling party. On civic participation, we observe that joining others to raise an issue is also not significantly correlated with trust in the political institutions under consideration. Membership of a religious group is also not significantly correlated with trust in the president, parliament and ruling party. It is however significantly correlated at 5% significance level with local government council. Education and factor 2 (managing the economy) and level of corruption are significantly negatively correlated with the dependent variable.

In Table 2, a chi-square analysis of each of the dependent variables with the independent variables to assess association is conducted. The chi-square test of association between trust in political institutions and the independent variables show significant association for most variables except gender of respondent and attending community meetings. The variable gender is however only significantly associated with trust in the ruling party with $p=0.01$.

**Regression analysis**

The theoretical hypotheses set out earlier can be linked in a simple model. To test these hypotheses, the study
dependent variable is based on a question ‘How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? The dependent variable trust in political institution was re-coded into a binary one (Appendix 1 and 2). A binary logistic regression model was therefore fitted to the data.

**Perception of trust in the president**

Prior to fitting a logistic model to predict the likelihood to trust the president shows that gender, an evaluation of the

---

**Table 2. Chi-square test of association.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Local government</th>
<th>Ruling party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban or rural primary sampling unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q101. Gender of respondent</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1. Age</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97. Education of respondent</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19a. Member of religious group</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19b. Member of voluntary association or community group</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20a. Attend a community meeting</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20b. Join others to raise an issue</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q41. Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Chi-square is significant at the 0.01 level (2-sided); * Chi-square is significant at the 0.05 level (2-sided).

**Table 3. Significance of variables not in the model.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
<td>15.700</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
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<td>0.301</td>
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<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>10.934</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
<td>1.959</td>
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<td>location</td>
<td>12.338</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Gender(1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE(1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
<td>68.695</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
<td>5.706</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.017</td>
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<td>0.102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.750</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC1_2</td>
<td>102.095</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC2_2</td>
<td>132.966</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
<td>0.929</td>
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<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
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<td>0.013</td>
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<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>11.721</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
<td>4.344</td>
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<td>0.037</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>143.387</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

284.771 1 0.000 -

The significance of the independent variables was carried out. Table 3 shows that the residual chi-square statistic is 284.771, which is significant at $p=0.000$ (labelled overall statistics). This statistics tell us that the coefficients for the variables not in the model are significantly different from zero; in other words, that the addition of one or more of these variables to the model will significantly affect its predictive power.

The remainder of the results in Table 3 lists each of the predictors in turn with a value of Roa’s efficient score statistics for each one (column labelled score). In large, samples when the null hypothesis is true, the score statistics is identical to the Wald statistics and the likelihood ratio statistic. It is used at this stage of the analysis because it is computationally less intensive than the Wald statistic. Roa’s score statistic has a specific distribution from which statistical significance can be obtained. In this table, Q97_R(2), Q97_R(4), Gender(1), FAC1_1, Q19B_R(1) do not look likely to be good predictors because their score statistics are non-significant $p>0.05$, whilst the rest of the predictors have significant score statistic at $p<0.01$.

The binary logistic regression model of trust in the president in Table 4 shows that education, level of corruption, government handling of important matters (two factors), joining others to raise an issue and satisfaction with democracy are highly significant explanatory variables in predicting the likelihood to trust in the president. The odds ratio for the independent variable education shows that individuals with informal education are 7.457 times more likely to trust in the president than those with no education; 9.112 times for those with primary education; 5.8 times for individuals with secondary education; 3.588 times for those with post-secondary other than university and 2.572 times for those with university education and above. The odds ratios are much higher for individuals with lower level of education hence disproving the hypothesis that more educated are more likely to trust than the less educated.

Individuals who perceive the level of corruption to have stayed the same are significantly more likely to trust the
Table 4. Logistic regression model of perceptions of trust in the president.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
<td>2.009</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>7.457</td>
<td>3.175 - 17.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
<td>2.210</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>9.112</td>
<td>1.118 - 74.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>1.676</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>5.343</td>
<td>2.634 - 10.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.588</td>
<td>1.928 - 6.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(5)</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>2.572</td>
<td>1.310 - 5.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location(1)</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>0.605 - 1.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>0.845 - 1.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE(1)</td>
<td>-0.299</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>0.323 - 1.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
<td>1.165</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.205</td>
<td>2.090 - 4.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>2.045</td>
<td>1.280 - 3.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC1_1</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Government delivery</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC1_2</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC2_2</td>
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<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic participation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>1.325</td>
<td>0.844 - 2.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.607 - 1.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.601 - 1.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.323</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.490 - 1.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction with democracy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.302</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R square = 0.397; -2 log likelihood = 932.091.

The results in Table 5 suggest that Q97_R(1), Q97_R(2), Q97_R(4), Gender(1), AGE(1), Q54_R(2), FAC1_1, Q19B_R(1), Q19A_R(1) and Q20B_R(1) do not look likely to be good predictors because their score statistics are non-significant p>0.05, whilst the rest of the predictors have significant score statistic at p<0.01.

The logistic model of trust in parliament in Table 6 shows that the first factor on government delivery (FAC1_2) is not significant at p=0.000 showing that the coefficients for the variables not in the model are significantly different from zero and therefore, the addition of one or more of these variables to the model will significantly affect its predictive power.

Perception of trust in parliament

The residual chi-square statistic (labelled overall statistics) is 168.077, is significant at p=0.000 showing that the level has decreased somewhat or a lot (odds ratio = 3.205). The two factors on government performance, FAC1_2 (provision of basic necessities) and FAC2_2 (managing the economy) are highly significant factors in predicting the likelihood to trust the president. Satisfaction with democracy is a highly significant (p=0.000) factor in explaining the likelihood to trust the president.
Table 5. Significance of variables not in the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Q97_R</td>
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<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>4.727</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(5)</td>
<td>3.982</td>
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<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location(1)</td>
<td>8.803</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
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<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
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<td>0.147</td>
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<td>0.926</td>
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<td>FAC1_2</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>FAC2_2</td>
<td>86.164</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
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<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
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<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
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<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>168.077</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</table>

Table 6. Logistic regression model of perceptions of trust in parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>1.229</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
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<td>0.296</td>
<td>1.388</td>
<td>0.750</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.962</td>
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<td>0.586</td>
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<td>0.642</td>
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<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.319</td>
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<td>Q54_R</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
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<td>1.295</td>
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<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
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<td>0.972</td>
<td>2.200</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption index</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC1_1</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.752</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.139</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC2_2</td>
<td>-0.423</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</table>
Table 6. Contd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic participation</th>
<th>Q19B_R(1)</th>
<th>0.098</th>
<th>0.202</th>
<th>0.626</th>
<th>1.104</th>
<th>0.742</th>
<th>1.640</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>1.353</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>1.238</td>
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<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
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<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>1.202</td>
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</table>

Satisfaction with democracy

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.859</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R square = 0.230; -2 log likelihood = 1152.548.

Table 7. Significance of variables not in the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R</td>
<td>25.257</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
<td>11.144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
<td>1.362</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.728</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q97_R(5)</td>
<td>9.490</td>
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<tr>
<td>location(1)</td>
<td>8.477</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE(1)</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
<td>22.692</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
<td>21.684</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC1_1</td>
<td>3.442</td>
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<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
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<td>FAC1_2</td>
<td>42.140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC2_2</td>
<td>61.140</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
<td>8.341</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
<td>1.660</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>6.954</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
<td>8.750</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>56.535</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120.919</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perceptions of trust in the local government council

Variables that are found to be not significant prior to fitting a logistics model of trust in the local government council are Q97_R(2), Q97_R(3), Q97_R(4), gender (1), age (1), Q54_R(2) and Q19B_R(1). The remaining variables are all significant.

In Table 7, the results show that residual chi-square statistic (labelled Overall Statistics) is 120.919, and is significant at p=0.000 showing that the coefficients for the variables not in the model are significantly different from zero and therefore, the addition of one or more of these variables to the model will significantly affect its predictive power.

We observe that Q97_R(2), Q97_R(3), Q97_R(4), gender(1), AGE(1), Q54_R(2) and Q19B_R(1) do not look likely to be good predictors because their score statistics are non-significant p>0.05, whilst the rest of the predictors have significant score statistic at p<0.01.

The results in Table 8 show that the different levels of education are not significant factors in predicting the likelihood to trust in local government council except informal education which is significant with p=0.01. Individuals who perceive the level of corruption to have decreased somewhat or a lot does not show significant relationship with likelihood of trust in local government council (p>0.05) as well as corruption index. The other non-significant factors (p>0.05) are Q20B_R(1) and age. The second factor on government performance (FAC2_2) and satisfaction with democracy are highly significant with p=<0.001.

The odds ratios show individuals who have informal level of education are more likely (2.561 times) to trust the local government council than somebody with no education. Individuals who perceive the level of corruption to have decreased somewhat or a lot are more likely to trust the local government council (odds ratio = 1.372).

Perceptions of trust in the ruling party

The results on Table 9 show the significance level of the variables prior to fitting a logistic model. In Table 9, the
Table 8. Logistic regression model of perceptions of trust in local government council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>2.561</td>
<td>1.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>2.742</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>1.437</td>
<td>0.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>1.204</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location(1)</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>0.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.924</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>0.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE(1)</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>1.726</td>
<td>0.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>1.372</td>
<td>0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.871</td>
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<td>0.650</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption index</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC1_1</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government delivery</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC1_2</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.215</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC2_2</td>
<td>-0.342</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic participation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.499</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td>0.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.327</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction with democracy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.288</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R square = 0.168; -2 log likelihood = 1200.567.

Results show that residual chi-square statistic (labelled overall statistics) is 262.731, is significant at p=0.000 showing that the coefficients for the variables not in the model are significantly different from zero and therefore, the addition of one or more of these variables to the model will significantly affect its predictive power.

The observation made is that Q97_R(4), gender(1), AGE(1), Q54_R(2), FAC1_1, Q19A_R(1) and Q19B_R(1) do not look likely to be good predictors because their score statistics are non-significant p>0.05, whilst the rest of the predictors have significant score statistic at p<0.01.

The results in Table 10 show that the higher levels of education are not significant in predicting the likelihood to trust the ruling party compared to someone with no education. Social inclusion (demographic) variables of location and gender are not significant as well. The logistic regression on trust in the ruling party in Table 10 shows that individuals with informal education are significantly more likely (6.733 times more likely) to trust the ruling party than an individual with no education. For individuals with primary education, the likelihood is increased at 27.201 times more than an individual with no education.

At secondary school level, the likelihood is at 2.763 times an individual with no education. Perceptions of level of corruption are also a significant predictor: individuals who perceive level of corruption to have decreased
Table 9. Significance of variables not in the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Q97_R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
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<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>10.661</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(5)</td>
<td>24.642</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location(1)</td>
<td>11.659</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>3.475</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE(1)</td>
<td>4.354</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>FAC1_2</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>FAC2_2</td>
<td>127.956</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
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<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>4.186</td>
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<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
<td>5.005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>132.985</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

262.731  18  0.000  -

Table 10. Logistic regression model of perceptions of trust in the ruling party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(1)</td>
<td>1.907</td>
<td>0.416</td>
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<td>6.733</td>
<td>2.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(2)</td>
<td>3.303</td>
<td>1.569</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>27.201</td>
<td>1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(3)</td>
<td>1.016</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>2.763</td>
<td>1.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(4)</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97_R(5)</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>0.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location(1)</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>0.922</td>
<td>0.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>0.633</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age(1)</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>2.241</td>
<td>1.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(1)</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.459</td>
<td>1.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54_R(2)</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>1.277</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Corruption index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC1_1</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government delivery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC1_2</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
somewhat or a lot are significantly (2.459 times) to trust the ruling party. Factors on government performance, FAC1_2 and FAC2_2, are also significant predictors. Satisfaction with democracy and joining others to raise an issue will significantly reduce the likelihood of trust in the local government council.

DISCUSSION

The findings confirm the fifth hypothesis that citizens with lower levels of education tend to trust political institutions. Specifically, less educated Batswana trust the president, ruling party and local government authorities. This may be due to the visibility of the president, and by extension the ruling party as well as the proximity of local government councils to such people, who in most cases reside in rural areas. The president's walkabouts in villages and sitting around the fire with elderly people to share dinner has endeared him to the rural people. However, the level of education is not a predictor of the likelihood to trust parliament partly because parliament is often viewed to be detached from the electorates and confined to the capital city. Batswana often decry that members of parliament are only visible during elections campaigns and after being voted they forget about the electorate.

In terms of government performance, provision of basic necessities (FAC1_2) is a significant factor in predicting the likelihood to trust the president, parliament and the ruling party, but not for local government council. This confirms the first hypothesis that citizens who are content with government performance trust institutions. It appears that Batswana attach the provision of such services to the president, parliament and ruling party since central government has since centralised most of the basic services including health, water and sanitation and basic education in 2008. In particular, services such as primary health care and primary education used to fall under the purview of councils but have since been centralised. It is not surprising therefore, that Batswana’s perceptions of trust in councils are not a function of provision of basic necessities. Managing the economy (FAC2_2) is a significant predictor of the likelihood to trust political institutions.

The results also indicate that individuals who perceive the level of corruption to have stayed the same/decreased somewhat or a lot are more likely to trust the president, parliament, local government and ruling party. The inverse relationship between perceptions of level of corruption and trust could explain the declining level of trust in political institutions since 2008. Satisfaction with democracy is a highly significant factor that shapes Batswana’s perceptions of trust in political institutions. With this in mind, the period between 2008 and 2014 has witnessed a decline in Botswana’s democracy particularly media freedom, allegations of extra judicial killings and violation of minority rights.

In terms of civic engagement, the hypothesis finds support when people get together to raise an issue than their membership to religious groups and voluntary association. This is not surprising because communities raise issues that affect them with political leadership in most instances through the Kgotala platform. Political leaders especially of the BDP prefer to address issues raised by communities in the Kgotala meetings, due to the cultural importance of the institution which grants legitimacy to decisions reached. But besides, political leaders use the kgotla platform for political convenience.

The data confirms the literature that the relationship between membership of voluntary organizations and political trust is not strong. Although Batswana are religious and affiliated to various church denominations, religion still remains a private matter and it is not influential in politics. In short, Botswana is a secular state, where the state remains neutral in matters of religion. The implications of these results are that more work on this area has to be conducted to even investigate reasons that account for a decline in institutional trust. To this end, there

Table 10. Contd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAC2_2</th>
<th>-0.594</th>
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<th>0.000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic participation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19B_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>1.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19A_R(1)</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1.406</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>1.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20A_R(1)</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>1.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20B_R(1)</td>
<td>-0.394</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.853</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R square = 0.364; 2 log likelihood = 1019.168.
still remains a yawning gap in the literature on this subject.

**Conclusion**

This study has examined factors that influence trust in political institutions. It has revealed that although Botswana is widely acclaimed for performing well in good governance relative to other African countries, the citizens are increasingly becoming weary of political institutions and losing trust in them. This, the paper establishes, has got to do with the disaffection with democracy and government performance in delivery of essential services. The level of education is important because people of lower education tend to trust political institutions particularly the president, the ruling party and local government council. But this is not true for parliament which is viewed as detached from the electorates. The paper has argued that Batswana are critical of their institutions irrespective of their seeming lack of civic engagement. The implication of this study results is that political institutions may have to deal with critical citizens who would demand answers for poor performance more than ever before.

**CONFLICT OF INTERESTS**

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

**REFERENCES**


Appendix 1. Source: Botswana | 2008 – 2014: Question. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?

Appendix 2. List of variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Values and construction notes range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust any</td>
<td>0.1 0 not at a, just a little; 1 somewhat, alot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1 1 female; 0 male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.1 1 if rural; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary, no university; 5 some university, post graduate</td>
<td>0 to 5 none; 1 informal; 2 primary; 3 secondary; 4 post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age: 50+</td>
<td>0.1 1 if 50+ years old; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A religious group</td>
<td>0.1 1 if official leader; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary association or community group</td>
<td>0.1 1 if official leader; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend community meeting</td>
<td>0.1 1 if yes; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got together, raise an issue</td>
<td>0.1 1 if yes; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government delivery</td>
<td>Factor analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political system</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>0.4 0 the country is not a democracy; 1 not at all satisfied; 2 not very satisfied; 3 fairly satisfied; 4 very satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived corruption</td>
<td>Factor analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived level of corruption</td>
<td>1-3 1 if decreased somewhat, a lot; 2 stayed the same; 3 increased somewhat, alot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dennis Kucinich and expansion of the chief executive’s war power: A unique legacy of checking the commander in chief

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Since the Second World War, many analysts agree that the influence and power of the United States’ commander in chief has grown substantially. This trend of presidential empowerment continues in the Post-Cold War presidency and into the aftermath of the terrorist strikes on September 11, 2001, as commanders in chief have continued to assert wide and nearly unilateral war authority. Few members of congress have challenged this movement, and in fact, a number have worked to advance an even more empowered chief executive. Standing apart from this trend is former member of Congress Dennis Kucinich (D-Oh.), who served in Congress from 1997 to 2013. Over the course of his sixteen years in the House of Representatives, Kucinich, in a non-partisan fashion, challenged his commanders in chief and called upon members of Congress to assert their constitutional war powers to check presidents in their military actions. This article examines Congressman Kucinich’s legacy related to war powers, and argues that Kucinich consistently made the case for an actively engaged Congress on all decisions related to the use of force abroad. Indeed, since Kucinich’s departure, the Obama administration has waged its own new war in the Middle East, striking hundreds of targets on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Senior congressional leaders continue to find reasons not to bring a war resolution up for a vote.

Key words: American foreign policy, military force, war powers.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Second World War, many analysts agree that the influence and power of the United States’ commander in chief has grown substantially (Fisher, 2013; Griffin, 2013; Zeisberg, 2013). Despite the Constitution’s provision that the U.S. Congress shall be the branch to declare war, the decision to use American military forces abroad has increasingly rested with the president alone (Moss, 2008; Silverstein, 1997; Hart Ely, 1990; Koh, 1990). In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in an effort to restore some constitutional balance, though most analysts agree that this effort resulted in another expansion of the president’s influence as commander in chief, relegating Congress to a bystander in war-making decisions (Burgin, 2014; Corn,
and Barack Obama all utilized military action as a foreign policy tool to seek political objectives. Across all of these major operations and presidencies, Kucinich took clear, consistent non-partisan positions that reflected his belief in the necessity in checking the commander in chief. In this analysis, we examined four different conflicts across three presidencies to examine the extent to which Kucinich challenged the commander in chief. These brief cases include President Clinton’s military action against Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in 1999, President George W. Bush’s movement to use force against Iran in 2006, and President Obama’s use of drone warfare and his war in Libya.

Kosovo

On March 24, 1999, with an explicit endorsement from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Clinton administration joined with its NATO allies to conduct a 78 day military campaign aimed at Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic had actively suppressed the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo during the entirety of his leadership tenure, and had been using Serbian militias to actively punish independence movements beginning in 1998 (Judah, 2000). As a body, Congress did not authorize this military operation, despite President Clinton’s request for legislative approval to act.¹

As the bombing operation proceeded, the lead voice who challenged the constitutionality of the president’s military actions was Congressman Thomas Campbell (R-Ca.), who had been actively engaged in war powers challenges against the president before. Campbell maintained that Clinton was acting without constitutional authority in this conflict, and that Congress was failing to fulfill its constitutional duty to check the commander in chief. Campbell’s efforts culminated when he requested a vote to withdraw all military forces from the conflict, which failed to pass. He then requested a vote to declare war on Milosevic, which also failed. In effect, Congress voted to continue American participation in the war, but failed to openly endorse or authorize it (Hendrickson, 2002: 95-98, 130-133). Campbell followed by leading a court challenge against the president, similarly argued that Clinton’s military actions were unconstitutional, which initially garnered the support of 17 members of the House of Representatives (Bessonette, 1999). An amendment of the suit later included a total of 31 members of the House, including three House Democrats.²

Among those who supported Campbell’s efforts was Dennis Kucinich, one of our four democrats to sign onto the court challenge, which provided an early indication that Kucinich in his congressional career was committed to protecting Congress’s war powers. Though the case was eventually dismissed, Kucinich demonstrated a non-

² 203 F.3d 19.
partisan commitment to protecting Congress’s war powers (Boylan, 2000; Hahn, 2001).

When speaking openly about the Clinton administration’s use of force, Kucinich’s views were consistent and direct. For example, he noted: “The Constitution put that war power in the hands of the people to avoid an abuse of power” (Federal News Service, 1999; Sievert, 2001). More explicitly, Kucinich stated: The United States involved in the participation of NATO is an illegal war, and that in fact, the constitution provides for Congress alone to have the power to declare war. The War Powers Act is significant because it requires the president to terminate war which he would prosecute without congressional consent (Federal News Service, 1999). Kucinich followed these remarks with equally clear criticisms of Clinton’s constitutional claims to use force in Yugoslavia.  

After the conflict, Kucinich (2000) spoke at the Loyola Law School of Loyola Marymount University on the constitutionality of use of force and war powers, which was later published as an essay in their law journal. In doing so, Kucinich (2000, 63-64) made a vigorous case that Congress must protect its constitutional war powers, which in his view, squared closely with the founding fathers’ intent, as well as Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Kucinich (2000, 65) also made the case that the War Powers Resolution, whose intent was to check the commander in chief, actually ended up empowering the executive branch by allowing the president to wage war for 60 days without congressional approval. At the same time, he also noted that even though it does have flaws, it remains the law, and that presidents are not permitted to use force without congressional approval after 60 days (Kucinich, 2000, 66). Moreover, Kucinich (2000, 67-67) lamented that Congress failed to make a clear vote on Kosovo, and that the House of Representatives never fully voted to authorize the war. Across the essay, his views are unequivocal in advancing the argument that Congress must exercise its war powers, which is a theme he reiterated for the duration of his tenure in the House of Representatives.

**Iran**

In 2006, journalist, Seymour M. Hersh published an essay in the *New Yorker*, which brought to light the George W. Bush administration’s military plans for a possible strike on Iran (Hersh, 2006). The article, which generated national attention, alleged that the Pentagon was engaged in extensive and comprehensive military planning for such a military incursion, which entailed the deployment of covert operatives in Iran in an effort to locate strategic targets (Baker et al., 2006; Schmitt, 2006).

Among those who spoke out against President Bush’s foreign policy direction toward Iran, as well as on the potential for Bush’s military strikes on Iran, Kucinich was clear in asserting Congress’s authority to check the commander in chief. He made similar points on another occasion, when he noted: “We must not allow the President to remain unchallenged while he continues to use the media to create a pretext for an illegal war. Congress must insist the President come to the full Congress for permission to take any action against Iran.”  

Kucinich continued to advance this view on another occasion, when he maintained: “This House cannot avoid its constitutionally authorized responsibility to restrain the abuse of executive power. The administration has been preparing for an aggressive war against Iran…This administration has openly threatened aggression against Iran in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the U.N. Charter.”

Near the end of 2007, Congressman Kucinich made a brief statement on this issue, arguing that President Bush’s administration had mislead Congress on Iran throughout the year, noting: “It is time for diplomatic relations, but it is also time for Congress to hold this administration accountable for trying to lead us into a war against Iran.” Thus, Kucinich’s views on Congress’s constitutional war powers authority and oversight on Iran were consistent and sustained, and again made clear his view that Congress has the constitutional duty to check the commander in chief.

**DRONE WARFARE**

Over the entirety of the Obama administration, drone warfare became a staple of military and political options, which had been previously initiated in the administration of George W. Bush (Sanger, 2012). By the end of Obama’s first term in office, which coincided with Kucinich’s final term in the House of Representatives, the Obama administration had carried out some 337 drone strikes on Pakistan and Yemen. The use of air power and drone warfare persisted in Obama’s second administration in the same areas, and expanded with the use of force against ISIL targets. By March 19, 2015, the United States had conducted 2,320 airstrikes on ISIL, and had deployed 2,875 troops to Iraq as part of this mission (Pellerin, 2015). Despite this rapid expansion of military air power, a number of analysts have argued that Congress played a minimal oversight and checking role of the commander, especially with regard to the use of drones, and has thus far failed to authorize or vote on military operations against ISIL (Benen, 2015; Starks, 2013; Zenko, 2013).

Despite the general trend of Congress’s acquiescence

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3 See also Congressional Record (1999): H3611.
4 Congressional Record (1999): H4018.
7 Congressional Record (2007): H2042.
to the president and overall abdication of its war powers to the commander in chief, Kucinich was one of the few members of Congress who consistently challenged Obama's constitutional authority to wage war. On the use of drone and missile strikes, as well as covert special operations, Kucinich complained about "little to no oversight from Congress."

He also argued that Obama was carrying out "unrestricted use of drones that has taken us into undeclared wars in Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and who knows where else." His views were unabashedly clear when he noted: "The drone program has thus far been conducted with no oversight from Congress or any judicial body.

In a final constitutional challenge to both the executive branch and his colleagues in Congress, Kucinich joined with Congressman Ron Paul (R-Texas) to challenge Obama. This partnership is quite interesting, given that Ron Paul represented the libertarian/Tea Party arm of the Republican party, while Kucinich often sided with the most liberal members of the Democratic party. However, Paul, like Kucinich, has a sustained record of challenging the commander in chief's stated authority to wage war. Both called upon then Attorney General Eric Holder to release any executive branch documents related to Obama's legal authority to conduct drone strikes. Kucinich and Paul, then both retiring members of Congress also appealed to the House Judiciary Committee as a forum for advancing their issue vis-à-vis the Obama administration (Hendrickson, 2015: 36). Their efforts, however, failed as Judiciary Committee members of both parties felt that they were already actively engaged in such oversight, and thus Kucinich and Paul's efforts were unnecessary (Wolverton, 2012).

In sum, Kucinich was often a lonely voice in calling for greater congressional oversight on drone military operations, but nonetheless demonstrated, again, his non-partisan commitment to the exercise of Congress's war powers. As drone military operations expanded, so too did his concern for the constitutionality of such conduct, which also entailed direct challenges to his colleagues in the Congress to become more assertive on this issue. His advocacy for similar positions was also evident in the military strikes in Libya.

Obama's strikes on Libya

On March 19, 2011, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom began a bombing operation in Libya, aimed at limiting Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi from wantonly killing citizens who were protesting his rule. At the onset of the strikes, President Obama made the case that through his authority as commander in chief, he was authorized to conduct this operation without Congress's approval (The White House, 2011). As the operation progressed, his administration made the case that the War Powers Resolution did not apply in this case, and thus did not require explicit approval from Congress after the Resolution's 60 day window to use force without explicit congressional approval (Krass, 2011). Obama officials made the argument that they were not at war, and at the same time were using force to protect America's "national interests, and therefore not subject to the requirements of the War Powers Resolution" (Krass, 2011, 12-13). The argument has been made that these executive branch claims stretched considerably the basic principle of checks and balances in favor or a nearly omnipotent commander in chief (Hendrickson, 2015; Fisher, 2012).

Much like he did with the wars in previous military operations, Congressman Kucinich again provided critical leadership in Congress in challenging President Obama's stated authority to use force in Libya. These stands were significant in that Kucinich established himself as the lead voice in Congress in challenging the commander in chief, but also challenged the president of his own political party. His set of challenges to the commander in chief essentially came in three forms; his initial verbal opposition to the president, his legislative activism, and then his utilization of the federal courts.

Kucinich's concerns with the abuse of power and the need to check the commander in chief were expressed at the onset of the strikes, in which he was viewed as a leading opposition voice to Obama's asserted war power (Berman, 2011). Kucinich, noting his long history in challenging the abuse of commanders in chief who go to war without congress's approval, stated: I am making a principled challenge to the actions of the administration, and I can't tell you that I'm doing it with any enthusiasm because it's not easy to challenge individuals who you otherwise have an affection for....I was active in challenging what I felt was an abuse of war powers by the Clinton administration... It's not as though I've taken a partisan approach to this (Brady, 2011).

In the weeks that followed, and certainly as the 60 Day War Powers Resolution deadline approached, which was May 20, 2011, Kucinich's opposition remained so strong that he carried in his pocket a quote from then-Senator Barack Obama, who stated in 2007 that the president may not enter war unilaterally (Fahrenthold, 2011). His efforts culminated with his proposed legislation that called upon the President to remove all American military forces from the Libya operation within 15 days of the legislation's passing. In the days that preceded this vote, considerable momentum built for it, as a mix of liberal democrats and tea-party, oriented members of Congress had coalesced around Kucinich's proposal, so much so that Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-Oh) received strong signals that the legislation may in fact pass. When the bill was finally advanced for a vote on the House floor, Boehner took the unusual step of advancing his own legislation on Libya, which clearly challenged the president to explain.

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10 Congressional Record (2011): H6326.
12 Congressional Record (2012): H6377.
the mission and its costs, but otherwise had none of the strong policy implications akin to Kucinich’s efforts (Fahrenthold, 2011). Kucinich’s proposal lost 148 to 265, which generated meaningful bipartisan backing, though came nowhere near the 268 to 148 vote Boehner gathered, which has been interpreted as a very successful legislative effort to co-opt Kucinich’s proposal (Steinhauer, 2011). In effect, Congress managed to criticize Obama, without taking political or constitutional responsibility for the operation.

Upon the failure of Kucinich’s legislative effort, he and nine other members of Congress turned to the federal district court, arguing that Obama’s actions represented a violation of the Constitution’s war power clause and that Obama had not complied with the War Powers Resolution. This case was eventually dismissed by Federal District Court Judge in the District of Columbia, Reggie Walton, who argued that the case had no standing. Though Kucinich was again on the losing side, he demonstrated a consistent pattern of challenging a commander in chief and leading another effort in congress against a president who was carrying out a military operation absent congressional approval (Fisher, 2012, 176-189).

Why Kucinich matters

Since Dennis Kucinich has left office, President Obama’s war against ISIL has again showed that the United States’ commander in chief exercises a great deal of political and military leverage, absent meaningful oversight from the legislative branch. Indeed, while there are some members of Congress, including Senator Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Congressman Adam Schick (D-Ca.) who have called upon Congress to formally debate and vote on this war, these members have not exercised a similar degree of constitutional and political influence that Kucinich had while in the House of Representatives (Williams, 2014; Schiff, 2014). As was demonstrated above, Kucinich used a variety of political and legal tactics, which included the use of the federal courts, direct challenges to congressional committees, and in his closest effort to end a war led a bipartisan effort on the House floor to reign in President Obama and his war in Libya. Kucinich exercised leadership on war powers that few others have matched in their legislative careers. His assertions of Congress’s war powers were non-partisan, but always on the side of the legislative branch, which the founding fathers would quite likely concur (Alder, 1988; Lofgren, 1972).

Kucinich’s efforts did not fundamentally impact the use of American force abroad, nor did his actions significantly alter the current imbalance of power weighted in favor of the commander in chief. The courts have largely proven to be a poor route for providing a judicial remedy to this imbalance: courts have often ruled against intervening in these issues, which are often deemed “political” rather than “legal,” and thus defer to the political branches to resolve these debates, which clearly favors the commander in chief. Moreover, Congress’s senior leaders, in bipartisan fashion, have often feigned interest in exercising substantial checking authority, much preferring to abdicate all of the political and constitutional responsibility for the use of force with the president (Hendrickson, 2015). In 2008, partly in response to the debacle in Iraq, former secretaries of state, James Baker and Warren Christopher called upon Congress to act upon this imbalance of power, which generated some legislative attention to war powers, though their actual proposal did little to rectify Congress’s back seat role (Fisher, 2009; Wolfensberger, 2008, 8-9). Although, public opinion polls indicate that the American public wants Congress to exercise its war powers authority, at the same time, the electorate also seems to prefer presidents and presidential candidates who assert and then exercise increasingly broad authority as commander in chief (Baker and Christopher, 2008). Thus, it is difficult to envision a political climate that will generate a heightened legislative role in the decision to use force abroad. Increased public attention to this issue, and knowledge of the risk of this power imbalance is needed in order to generate additional political pressure on Congress’s senior leaders to accept their constitutional duty and lead Congress in checking the commander in chief.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Kucinich was a voice for legislative checks on presidential military actions abroad, and at times was a leader who could marshal significant minorities against the president and Congress’s senior leaders who preferred to abdicate their authority to the commander in chief. Though it is impossible to know what kind of impact Kucinich would have on the current Congress and its lack of constitutional debate over President Obama’s war on ISIL, there is little doubt that he would have been pressing the legislative branch to check the commander in chief as the United States’ military actions only increase in Iraq and Syria: his presence is sorely missed. As Fisher (2013: 310) maintains, it is essential for Congress to play this checking and oversight role of the commander in chief, who cannot be permitted to act as a unilateral decision maker for American military matters.

Kucinich’s views may be increasingly relevant in a Trump presidency, which based upon campaign promises, suggests a more hawkish foreign policy orientation than President Obama (Friedman, 2016). In this respect, Kucinich’s actions may serve as a historical guide for efforts to check the commander in chief. Though Kucinich did not necessarily shift the foreign policy direction of the president, it is clear that he did manage to build legislative collations, especially against Obama’s use of force in

13 The other members of Congress involved in this suit were Howard Coble (R-N.C.), John Duncan (R-Tn), Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), Walter Jones (R-N.C.), Ron Paul (R-Tx) Tim Johnson (R-Ill), Dan Burton (R-In.) John Conyers (D-Mich) and Michael Capuano (D-Mass.)

14 821 F. Supp 2d 110 (October 20, 2011).
Libya. Though members of Congress are often unwilling to vote on war powers legislation, the Trump presidency certainly invites new levels of activism, and in this respect, Kucinich may serve as a model for current activism rather than as an outlier in American history.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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The Struggle for Hegemony in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa Relations in Perspectives, 1999-2014

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This article examines Nigeria-South Africa relations with emphasis on political, trade and economic engagements. It investigates the consistencies and changing patterns in Nigeria and South Africa relations that are partly linked to the failure of Nigeria to diversify its economy and South Africa’s unwillingness to provide enabling environment for Nigerians in its economic domain. It argues that Nigeria and South Africa have de-prioritized the key objectives of leading economic growth and economic development in Africa, and resorted to competitive pursuit of regional hegemonic status. This article emphasizes increased cooperation between the leading regional powers and pursuit of bi-relations on the bases of autonomous state structures rather than the personalities of the governing elite. The work relies on secondary sources of data such as journal articles, newspapers and policy briefs to discuss aspects of Nigeria-South Africa relations. It concludes that Nigeria and South Africa should shift from competitive relations to cordial relations with a view to leading the envisaged economic growth, economic development and political renewal in Africa.

Key words: Hegemony, competitive, cooperation, economic development, diversify, economic growth.

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria and South Africa are, respectively, the first and second largest economies in the African region. These countries are viewed as forerunners of continental development and epitomes of regional diplomatic links in West Africa and Southern Africa respectively. Nigeria and South Africa had made concerted efforts to position the region as a critical global actor in international political and economic relations. The relations of the major African powers had been strengthened by the need to resuscitate Africa’s ailing economy and mediate the consequences of imperialism. The Nigerian state became pre-occupied with decolonization in Africa. The decolonization process assumed a defining context of its Afro-centric foreign policy, which was partly meant to engage the horrendous system of apartheid in South Africa. Nigeria’s confrontational and hostile engagement of South Africa began in the 1960s amid apartheid enclave status of the pariah state. The country was diametrically opposed to the apartheid system and it led the campaigns that culminated in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961 after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960.

The inauguration of South Africa’s democracy in 1995 vitiates its status as a pariah state and enhanced its re-
admission into the global community. It assumed a leadership role in African affairs as exemplified in its membership of the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the struggle for resources in the Africa. The new South African posture ineluctably pitched it against Nigeria that asserts itself as the Giant of Africa. The claim of South Africa as a de facto giant in the region gained currency with its demand for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria during the tenure of Late General Sani Abacha. The democratic deficit in Nigeria offered Pretoria to assert itself in Africa despite its claim of not competing with Abuja’s leadership role in the region (Banjo, 2010: 83). The execution of Ken-Saro Wiwa, the Ogoni rights activist and the ‘Ogoni Eight’ compelled South Africa to sustain international campaigns, which led to the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations.

The restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria on the 29th May 1999 signified the “fons et origo” for building strategic partnerships between the two states with the launch of the Bi-National Commission, BNC, in October 1999 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD, in 2001. The bi-lateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa largely improved between 1999 and 2008 when the volume of trade increased to 22.8 billion South African Rand from 174,000,000 million (Otto, 2012). The bi-lateral relations suffered setbacks in the tenures of Presidents Goodluck Jonathan and Jacob Zuma as a result of the xenophobic attacks on African migrants and the refusal of Nigeria to support the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa for the Chair of the African Union, AU.

The relations between Nigeria and South Africa have been omnium-gatherum of good and evil. It assumes a zigzag dimension with periodic oscillation that scholars describe as love-hate relationship (Agbu, 2010: 437). The Nigeria and South Africa relations have equally been described as unspoken rivalry (Games 2013b: 1); and the struggle for Africa’s leadership role that is not predicated on conscious and explicit plan to offer direction to the region. The struggle is rather defined by the Afro-centric philosophical foundations of Nigeria and South African foreign policies.

This article discusses the bi-relations trade, economic and political relations between the contending African regional powers and account for the inconsistencies in these areas. The study period is 1999 – 2014 with a view to underscore Nigeria’s return to civil rule and its implications for Nigeria and South Africa relations. The article examines options to deepen existing relations in a sense that promotes economic growth, economic development and political renewal in Africa.

**Theoretical Framework**

The notion of hegemony is a significant analytic concept that expands our understanding of states’ interaction and the dynamics of power relations in international politics. The word hegemony is an Anglicized expression of the Greek term, hegemonia, which means leadership. It traditionally connotes the dominant state that has the capacity to wield unchallenged influence and power on other states within the system of states. This concept owes its theorization to Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, in his pre-prison writings before 1923 (Adamson, 1980). It expresses a condition of asymmetric relationship among states in which there is power disequilibrium in the international system through the most powerful state that can exert its leadership on the international system.

In the ancient Greek, it was used to describe the relations between city-states as Bach (2000) argues that it is hinged on respect for autonomy of coalition partners as a factor that distinguishes hegemony from imperial domination based on coercion. This notion that a hegemon is imperialist power that imposes her will on other states have been refuted by Gilpin (2001) as “erroneous assumption”. Gilpin posits that hegemony is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of a liberal international economy. He notes, however, that the presence of a hegemon enhances the feasibility of cooperation in the international system.

Scholars such as Robert Gilpin, Robert Baldwin, Bruno Frey and Robert Mundell have pointed at the importance of hegemony for a progressive order in the international system. Kindleberger (1973) argues on the essentiality of hegemony hinged on a stabilized state for the stabilization of world economy. To Mansfield (1992), hegemony is the holding by one state of preponderance power in the international system or a regional sub-system to the extent it single-handedly dominates the rules and arrangements through which international and regional political systems are organized.

Gramsci (1971) posits that power does not depend solely on coercion or force, but thrives on consent. To Gramsci (1971), the leadership status is predicated on ideological persuasion as the basis for the relative consolidation of political authority in capitalist democracies despite the presence of crises and depression. He sees hegemony as the dominant position of a specific state among others and its unchallenged leadership role through the popularization and universalization of its interests as the interest of each tendency. To him, this is achievable through the instrumentality of ideology or a dominant view as symbol of legitimacy. Gramsci posits that hegemony is the receding of the coercive face of power amid the ascendancy of the consensual face.

The concept of hegemony assumed unprecedented usage with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole world power within a somewhat uni-polar world order. The disintegration of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the cold war that characterized international politics at the
end of the 2nd World War. The cold war phase was laced with the military and ideological rivalry between the Western and Eastern ideological blocs. The notion of super powers emerged within the context of the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. The notion of hegemony surfaced with the collapse of the East bloc, Communist regimes, Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact. The United States assumed hegemony status amid the prevalence of neo-liberal, capitalist ideology.

Since the end of the cold war, the emergence of new powerful states; China, Russia and India, has called to question the orthodox conceptions of hegemony. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that it is not possible to have a country that would be designated with hegemonic status considering the hegemon is the single powerful state that possesses the wherewithal–military, economic, political–without the existence of other great powers.

Consequent on the critique of global hegemony as a result of the proliferation of multi-polar powers, the concept has been analyzed by scholars within regional context. Wright (1978) and Landsberg (2007) argue that the regional hegemon is the “pivotal state”, or the “middle power state” in the hierarchy of global power. Landsberg (2007) asserts that a pivotal state is in comparison to its neighbors a powerful state. The relative power it possesses confers the ability to influence other states, regions and trajectories of events. The pivotal state is influential in a region to the extent that its position confers positive and negative influence in terms of development, he posits. To Landsberg (2007), the regional hegemon is a powerful state that rules through domination. This pivotal state acts in the interest of the region with the cooperation of other states and build partnerships with and among its neighbor. It is instrumental in the construction of regional societies, he submits.

This article adopts Gramscian (1971) and Landsberg’s (2007) conception of hegemony to interrogate the regularities and inconsistencies in Nigeria and South Africa relations. The concept of hegemony is used in this context as connoting a regional leadership that is able to propagate an ideological basis, either through implicit or explicit consensus, for other countries within its sphere of influence, and possesses the capacity to maintain peace and cooperation through legitimate means. It is, however, noteworthy that the Nigeria-South Africa relations have been predicated on identifying the country that is capable of donning the status of Africa’s hegemon.

**Historical backdrops of Nigeria-South Africa relations**

Nigeria began relations with South Africa in the early 1960s against the background of the struggle to emancipate colonized African states especially in Southern Africa; Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The African orientation of Nigeria’s foreign policy is evident in the declaration of the former Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Jaja Wachukwu, in 1961 that ‘colonialism and all its manifestations must be ended and that Nigeria would be failing in its duty if it did not use its full resources, intellectual, moral and material, in the struggle for the emancipation of the rest of Africa’ (Agbu et al., 2013: 1).

The apartheid question was a pre-occupation of Bawela’s foreign policy; the state-sponsored massacre in Sharpeville on 21st March 1960 that led to the killing of seventy two blacks and several wounded by the white minority police offered the Nigerian government a leverage to officially intervene in the apartheid enclave. The Nigerian government intervened through the ban on the importation of South African goods into the country (Agbu, 2010:439), and it became a leading voice on sanctions on South Africa in the international community. The expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961; expulsion of South African Dutch Reform Church from Nigeria and the cancellation of contracts awarded to South African companies demonstrated the Nigerian government despised the inhuman apartheid regime (Agbu et al., 2013:1).

Nigeria chaired the United Nations Security Council during the apartheid period till the collapse of the obnoxious economic and political system in 1994. The Nigeria state was committed to the South African question to the extent it became a member of the Frontline States despite its geographical distance to South Africa (Olanrewaju, 2013:51). The apartheid system repressed blacks and socially disaggregated the society into White, Black or Bantu and colored people with mixed descent. The Asians, Indians and Pakistanis were later added as the fourth group. The expropriation of land owned by the black majority, its appropriation by White minority through institutionalized white supremacist policy was a critical aspect of apartheid’s political economy. The African National Congress (ANC), Pan-African Congress (PAC), and South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRC) emerged within the context of this segregation policy.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian Civil War offered a context for South Africa’s subtle intervention in its affairs. Gabon, Ivory Coast, Zambia, and Tanzania recognized the state of Biafra contrary to the OAU’s position on non-interference. This recognition was hinged on the military backups offered to Nigeria by the Soviet Union, which was despised for its Communist ideology. The perception of Communist ideology by Presidents Houphet Boigny and Omar Bongo fostered collaboration with, and assistance from South Africa to realize the independence of Biafra. The South African President Pieter W Botha assisted Ivory Coast and Gabon with US$1.4 million and “more or less 200 tons of unspecified weapons of ammunition” (Pfister, 2005: 52 cited in Ogunnubi, 2013: 214).

The military administration of Murtala Muhammed sustained the struggle against apartheid and offered
support to revolutionary parties in South Africa albeit Pretoria’s infiltration of some African states; the ANC, PAC, and SAYRC got permissions of the Nigerian government to establish offices in Lagos. Nigeria assisted the ANC with $32,000 in 1975 (Agbu et al, 2013:2) and spent over $61,000,000 million on the struggle against anti-apartheid (Ngwenya, 2010). It created the Southern African Relief Fund, (SARF), in December 1976 to manage deductions from the salaries of Nigerian workers and mandatory contributions of students (Olanrewaju, 2013: 51). The fund offered medical and other supplies to the liberation movements and granted hundreds of scholarships to black South African students in Nigeria’s tertiary institutions.

The Nigerian state exploited sports to achieve political ends; it mobilized 26 African countries to boycott the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada. The boycott was occasioned by the participation of South Africa and reluctance of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), to impose embargo on New Zealand for its sport links to the apartheid enclave. The military administration of Olusegun Obasanjo further radicalized the anti-apartheid struggle when the British Petroleum (BP), and Barclays Bank were nationalized for Britain’s support to the apartheid regime in South Africa (Ochanja, Esebonu and Ayabam, 2013:78). The British Petroleum also violated international economic and trade sanctions on apartheid South Africa when it supplied oil to South Africa. The relatively strong oil economy of Nigeria gave it leverage to pursue the concrete economic and sport based measures against Pretoria.

The military administration of Ibrahim Babangida emphasized economic diplomacy as response to declining economic conditions and the imperative of economic reforms. The implementation of twin political and economic reforms further underscored greater emphases on domestic and foreign economic issues than foreign political policy. Nigeria betrayed its anti-apartheid posture when it invited the President of South Africa, Fredrick De Klerk to Nigeria in 1992. It nonetheless sustained financial and moral support to the ANC and PAC; and called for unity of the revolutionary parties. The invitation of De Klerk did not prevent the Nigerian state and 32 Commonwealth members boycotting the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, Scotland to protest the refusal of Britain to effect comprehensive sanctions on apartheid South Africa.

The sustained global economic and political pressures on Pretoria and the preference of De Klerk for dialogue aided the collapse of apartheid regime. The unbanning of revolutionary parties, release of Nelson Mandela, convening of Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Conference for Democratic South Africa (CODESA), and multi-party elections set the backdrops to a post-apartheid South Africa. The inauguration of a constitutional democracy in South Africa in 1994 raised Nigeria’s expectation that the thawed bi-lateral relations would reach a détente, but the authoritarian and despotic style of Abacha nipped this in the bud.

The Nigerian military dictator, Abacha, was recalcitrant on the release of Moshood Abiola, the winner of the 12th June 1993 Presidential Elections despite official and unofficial pressures by the South African emissaries. The Nobel Peace Laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former South African Vice-President, Thabo Mbeki made unsuccessful pleas for his release. The extra-judicial killing of minority right activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and other eight Ogoni men heightened the disquiet between Nigeria and South Africa. Pretoria insisted the execution of the right activists violated human rights and its outrage expedited the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations on 11th November 1995. The suspension of Nigeria led to contradictory realities for Nigeria and South Africa; the political and diplomatic isolation of Nigeria coincided with the increasing role of South Africa in regional affairs.

The Nigerian despot, General Sanni Abacha, withdrew the Super Eagles from the African Cup of Nations held in South Africa, thereby drawing the suspension of the Confederation of African Football (CAF). The Nigeria and South Africa relations deteriorated with the verbal tirades between General Abacha and former President Mandela. The 1999 political transition in Nigeria offered the context for the restoration of civil rule and renewal of relations with South Africa. The next sub-heading reviews extant literature on Nigeria, South Africa relations with a view to delineate dominant themes, perspectives and changing patterns.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The discourse on Nigeria-South Africa relations centers on what Landsberg (2012: 2) describes as volatility and tension in asserting their leadership roles. The literatures written prior to 1999 emphasized on Nigeria’s indispensable roles in dismantling the apartheid system in South Africa; and how the post-apartheid state would recompense what Nigeria had done. Literatures from 1999 till date had been pre-occupied with the analyses of how to reach a détente, revive the sickening economies, and unveiling the love-hate relationship that is a recurrent decimal in Nigeria-South Africa relations.

Games (2013a) identified the prevalent features of Nigeria and South Africa relations as co-operation and competition. He posits that the type and level of bi-lateral relations have been defined by leadership issues and the differences in the countries’ strategies in approaching continental problems. He cited the democratic attitude of Nelson Mandela and the despotic disposition of General Sani Abacha as the reason for the unfriendly engagement between 1995 and 1999; the efforts and established friendship of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo as the factors responsible for cordial relations in post-1999. To Games, bi-lateral relations in the Jonathan and Zuma administrations almost crumbled due to the domestic
policy emphasis of Nigeria and the South Africa’s pre-occupation with international issues beyond Africa. Games posits that despite the often conflict nature of Nigeria and South Africa relations, there is a certain degree of cooperation on African issues. He perceives Nigeria and South Africa as powerful and emerging markets whose active participation at the levels of G-20 and BRICS would engender development. He advocates for cooperation of the powers and discouraged the promotion of self-seeking ambitions on the probable greatest power in the region. Games attributes Nigeria’s inability to measure to South Africa in the economic realm to the local issues of the lack of institutions, poor infrastructure, and the heavy dependence on crude oil as the major import into South Africa.

Games’ submissions are laden with subjective assertions that appear to be in defense of the impenetrable nature of the South African economy. He justifies the rigid nature of South Africa’s economy as a function of the naivety of Nigerians to understand and compete favorably in the business and market domains in South Africa. The author placed little emphasis on the attitude of white dominated South African bureaucracy that has been reluctant to promote relations with black Nigerians (Agbu, 2010: 44)—a factor that hinders a level playing ground for Nigerian business players. He did not demonstrate in substantial terms the implications of xenophobic attacks in South Africa on the capacity of Nigerians to effectively penetrate the South African market.

Ngwenya (2010) and Obi (2015) agree that the relations between Nigeria and South Africa improved dramatically with the creation of the BNC as a mechanism for re-invigorating the inactive engagement. Obi reiterates South Africa’s position in global economic governance; and how the development of Africa is predicated on South Africa’s strategic partnership with Nigeria, which is the single continental economic power without BRICS. He insists Nigeria and South Africa should co-operate and avoid competing with a view to attain regional development aspirations. More so, Obi avers that the Nigerian state is a significant partner of South Africa in ‘projecting a meaningful African agenda for engaging with global powers’. He attributes the diplomatic setbacks in Nigeria-South Africa relations to the failure of leaderships to build relations that would endure. Obi (2015) agrees with Otto (2012) that the relations maintained by Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo was built on personalities rather than independent foreign policy structures and institutions. To Otto, the relations have been cordial in trade and investment relations; but it has suffered at the political level. Obi and Otto cohere that the unstable political relation explains the inability of Nigeria and South Africa to sustain cordial relations beyond a few years of Obasanjo and Mbeki’s tenure. Otto reasons that despite the problems in the bi-lateral engagement of the continental giants, the development of the region can be achieved when the states go ‘beyond contest and rise above petty rivalry and unhealthy competition’. He canvasses for the implementation of developmental policies and prioritization of mutual interests for their citizens and region.

Amuwo (2014) illustrates the dwindling influence of Nigeria in continental affairs amid South Africa’s strides in the economic realm, governance and infrastructure. He argues that the Nigerian governing elite are preoccupied with domestic issues at the expense of African policy. Amuwo avers that bi-relations have been marred by conflict citing the struggle for the chair of African Union, and the seizure of Nigeria’s $15 million (ZAR 164.6 million) meant for arms purchase by the South African government. Agbu (2010) examines the prospect of future relations and interrogates domestic obstacles to healthy bi-lateral relations. He asserts the South African bureaucracy is largely occupied by whites who are less willing to forge relations with the most populous Black Country in the region.

Conversely, the Nigerian infrastructural base problem, inadequate power supply and poor road networks are major impediments to its growth. The Nigeria-South Africa relations have been described by Agbu (2010) as bumpy albeit cordial political relations. He argues, however, that the rivalry and competition between Nigeria and South Africa should not justify the fragile relations; and prescribe a strategic partnership in different aspects of relations.

Banjo (2010) relies on the collision between Nigeria’s former Head of State, Abacha and South African’s icon, Mandela to discuss the contradictions inherent in Nigeria and South Africa relations. He observes, however, that the Bi-National Commission (BNC) aided diplomatic rapprochements in Obasanjo and Mbeki’s tenure. He insists on the actualisation of African potentials and the need to give credence to the probable impact of foreign relations on ordinary citizens. He avers that the strengthening of BNC is critical to improving bi-lateral economic relations and achieving synergy through the convergence of resources.

Sega and Lekaba (2014) appraise Nigeria-South Africa relations amid the rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP in April 2014. The scholars examine the competitive and cooperative pattern of existing bi-lateral relations and the likely future gains at bi-lateral and regional level. In their view, the economic growth recorded by Nigeria as shown in the rebasing of its GDP signpost the likely gains of flourishing intra-African trade. Sega and Lekaba (2014) contend that the economic growth in Nigeria cannot be disconnected from the huge investment of South African companies in the Nigerian economy. South Africa is, therefore, rated by these scholars as a major player in the expanded and liberalized Nigerian economy. To Sega and Lekaba (2014), the economic growth in Nigeria has been achieved through the co-operation of Nigeria and South Africa albeit the domestic challenges and
contradictions that confront the respective national economies. The scholars argue these problems, particularly the Boko Haram challenge, could be contained through a collaborative effort relying on South Africa’s strong military base rather than solicit external intelligence that derides Africa’s intelligence. The authors insist the Nigerian state cannot be a regional leader as a result of its internal challenges, specifically the inability to recover the abducted Chibok girls from the Boko Haram Sect. This argument is faulty and ignores the global nature of terrorism, which makes counter-terrorism measures difficult. This article concedes that Nigeria’s security architecture was not at its best when the school girls were abducted, but it is not sufficient to undermine the country’s regional status and influence.

Adekeye and Landsberg (2003:171-204) appraise the rivalry in Nigeria-South Africa relations to fill the hegemonic lacunae in the region. These scholars contend the role of Nigeria and South Africa as hegemons would likely induce anti-hegemonic alliances and deepen regional rivalries. Olaitan (Nigerian Tribune, 29 April, 2003) shares the view of Adekeye and Landsberg (2003) when he compared leadership roles of Nigeria and South Africa. He describes Nigeria’s leadership role as mirage and predicates his submission on the predatory nature of power politics of the political class in Nigeria as against the engagement of young generations in the governance of South Africa. Olaitan (Nigerian Tribune, 2003) insists there is no competition in a real sense and argues the most populous country is chasing the shadow of leadership without popular recognition.

The foregoing analyses capture the periodic rivalry and competition in Nigeria and South Africa relations, which are based on the pursuit of conflicting national interests. The Nigeria and South Africa relations should respond to national strategic interests and regional imperatives in order to lead the region’s development strives. The next sub-heading discusses the dimensions of Nigeria-South Africa relations.

**Nigeria-South Africa Relations: the Analytic Assessment, 1999-2014**

The restoration of democracy in Nigeria on the 29th May, 1999 renewed hope for its growth and the continent. It was envisaged that Nigeria has a crucial role in the renewal, growth and development of Africa. Similarly, the South African state is perceived as a major state actor in Africa’s international political and economic relations. The former South African president, Thabo Mbeki and former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo had been instrumental to the strategic partnership of these states as means to mediate development deficit in Africa and attenuate recurring diplomatic tension. This strategic partnership had been dubbed ‘the golden age’ within the context of the mal-development and social deficit that characterize the region (Games, 2013a:12). The initiative has shown potential to redefine the status of Africa in the new millennium; it however has its shortcomings on defined goals and expected outcomes.

This section discusses specific aspects of the Nigeria and South Africa relations between 1999 and 2014; these include trade and investment relations, political engagements and multi-lateral relations.

**The Bi-lateral Trade and Investment Relations**

The Nigerian state has a population of 160 million people and its Gross Domestic Products (GDP) is $509.9 billion since the rebasing exercise in April 2014, thereby making it the largest economy in Africa. South Africa has a population of 51.19 million people and a GDP of $384.3 billion thereby making it the second largest economy in Africa (The Guardian Newspaper, 07 April, 2014: 1a). Meanwhile, the BNC, constituted the context for strategic partnerships to enhance bi-lateral relations and redeem Africa’s economy. It is noteworthy that negotiations held in October 1999 and April 2000 on the avoidance of taxation on income and capital gains, reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, co-operation in the fields of mining, geology, exploration, and energy (Banjo, 2010: 9). Nigeria and South Africa signed agreements that attracted hundred South African companies into the Nigerian economy (Bello and Hengari, 2013). The South African firms operating in Nigeria include the Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN), with 55.4 million subscribers in 2014 (MTN Group Limited, 30 September, 2014). Shoprite, Stanbic Bank and Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) are equally strategic South African businesses in the Nigerian economy. Similarly, the Dangote Group of Companies with headquarters in Nigeria have investment portfolio of nearly $400 million in cement production in South Africa; and Nigeria’s Oando Oil Company is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

Oil represents over 95 percent of Nigeria’s exports to South Africa (Nagar and Paterson, 2012: 4). The South African government in October 2000 raised the volume of crude oil import from Nigeria, thereby suggesting increase in economic relations (Ogboegbulem, 2000). The bi-lateral volume of trade increased from ZAR 174 million in 1998 to ZAR 22.8 billion in 2008, thereby accounting for nearly a quarter of South Africa’s total African trade in 2008 (Otto, 2012). South Africa’s exports to Nigeria increased from ZAR 505 million to ZAR 7.1 billion and Nigeria’s exports to South Africa increased from ZAR 15.7 billion to ZAR 123.6 billion in the same period (Otto, 2012.). South Africa’s exports to Nigeria in 2010 stood at ZAR 4.38 billion and Nigeria’s exports to South Africa stood at ZAR 16.08 billion with the total trade amounting to ZAR 20.46 billion. The aggregate trade figures experienced a leap in 2014 with a cumulative of ZAR...
Table 1. The trade transactions between Nigeria and South Africa from 1999-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nigeria’s imports from S.A</th>
<th>Nigeria’s exports to S.A</th>
<th>Total trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ZAR 514m</td>
<td>ZAR 1.23bn</td>
<td>ZAR 1.74bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>ZAR 709m</td>
<td>ZAR 1.26bn</td>
<td>ZAR 1.97bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ZAR 1.6bn</td>
<td>ZAR 1.66bn</td>
<td>ZAR 3.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ZAR 2.7bn</td>
<td>ZAR3.6bn</td>
<td>ZAR 6.3bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ZAR 2.9bn</td>
<td>ZAR 5.1bn</td>
<td>ZAR 8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>ZAR 3.4bn</td>
<td>ZAR 4.2bn</td>
<td>ZAR 7.6bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>ZAR 4,62bn</td>
<td>ZAR 12,48bn</td>
<td>ZAR 17,10bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ZAR 7,12bn</td>
<td>ZAR 15,74bn</td>
<td>ZAR 22,86bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>ZAR 5,41bn</td>
<td>ZAR 15,60bn</td>
<td>ZAR 20,01bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ZAR 4,38bn</td>
<td>ZAR 16,08bn</td>
<td>ZAR 20,46bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>ZAR 5,7bn</td>
<td>ZAR 12,27bn</td>
<td>ZAR 28,4bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ZAR 6,4bn</td>
<td>ZAR 30,5bn</td>
<td>ZAR 36,9bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>ZAR 7,8bn</td>
<td>ZAR 34,9bn</td>
<td>ZAR 42,7bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ZAR 10,5bn</td>
<td>ZAR 55,7bn</td>
<td>ZAR 66,2bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


66.2 billion; this period had exports to Nigeria from South Africa standing at ZAR 10.5 billion while the Nigeria’s exports to South Africa skyrocketed to ZAR 55.7 billion (See Table 1 in supplementary files showing the trade transactions and the items of trade between Nigeria and South Africa from 1999-2014. NB: There are constraints in gathering data on the items of trade, but the available data are captured in the appendix).

The foregoing suggests trade surplus in favor of Nigeria, but the state has failed to diversify its economy and expand production base. Nigeria heavily relies on export of oil and human resources to South Africa and South Africa’s exports to Nigeria include electrical equipment, machinery, wood, paper, foodstuff, beverages, spirit, tobacco, rubber, and plastics. The diversified nature of South Africa’s investment portfolio has raised question on the country’s interest in Nigeria. More so, it has been difficult for Nigerian firms to penetrate the South African economy, thereby raising fear of South Africa likely dominance in Nigeria. Ironically, the South African firms’ record significant contribution to Nigeria’s GDP, the end users rarely benefit as Nigeria’s GDP per capita is $ 2,688 in relation to South Africa’s GDP per capita of $ 7,336 (Langalanga, 2014). These asymmetric relations raise question on the strategic partnership and expected role of Nigeria within.

The Bi-lateral Political Engagements

The Obasanjo and Mbeki era inherited a debt ridden Africa with its implications for stability, security and development. The Obasanjo and Mbeki administrations opted for economic diplomacy and African renaissance respectively to mediate development concerns in their countries. These leaders sought to place Africa as an indispensable actor in global development by bridging the gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries in Africa. Nigeria and South Africa advocated for debt cancelation and the transfer of technology from the developed economies to Africa. Obasanjo, Mbeki, and the Algerian leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika attended the G-8 meeting in Japan in April 2000, and strongly canvassed for the forgiveness of Africa’s debts.

In 1999-2008, the negotiations on the platform of BNC led to 20 key agreements to improve bi-lateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa. The relations turned edgy in 2008 with the xenophobic attack on Nigerians that raised questions on the historic friendship between the countries. South Africans became suspicious of Nigerians as aiding crimes such as drug-trafficking, robbery, prostitution among others in their homelands. This lack of trust was betrayed in 2004, when a Johannesburg radio presenter humorously insulted the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who was in South Africa for Mbeki’s inauguration, that he probably ‘carried cocaine in his luggage’ (Games, 2013a: 23). There was no full session of the BNC meeting since 2008 till the meeting held in May 2012 in Cape Town; the latter meetings scheduled for the 10th anniversary of the commission did not hold.

The South African government conferred award on a Nigerian diplomat, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, in 2012 for his role as the last chairman of the UN Special Committee against apartheid. The Nigeria and South Africa relations, however, wobbled as a result of the
deportation of about one hundred and twenty five
Nigerians from South Africa for non-possession of
genuine yellow fever certificates (Agwuchi, 2012). The
Nigerian government reacted to this development with
the deportation of 131 South Africans (Alechenu, 2012).
Pretoria, however, tendered apology when its envoy, Mrs.
Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nkqakula led a delegation to former
President Goodluck Jonathan on the deportation saga
(Fadeye, 2012).

The non-recognition of Nigeria at Mandela’s memorial
service spurred criticisms of South Africa by the civil
society, media and intellectuals who opined that South
Africa was ‘repaying good with evil’ (Olanrewaju, 2013:
51). The arm scandal between Nigeria and South Africa
in 2014 where the Pretoria seized about $ 15 million from
the Nigerian government almost crumbled their
relationship. The seizure of $ 5.7 million that was found in
two suitcases in a Nigerian private jet and the confiscation
of $ 9.3 million nearly threatened their engagement as
Nigerians asked its government to summon the South
Africa’s ambassador to Nigeria. It is imperative to
enhance these relations in the light of the political and
economic status of Nigeria and South Africa in the region.
The nature of relations between Abuja and Pretoria will
likely have implications for the trajectories of Africa’s
growth and development.

Multi-lateral Dimensions of Nigeria and South Africa
Relations

Nigeria and South Africa have maintained somewhat
viable multi-lateral relations since the Obasanjo and
Mbeki administrations. The commitment of these
countries to international organizations such as the
African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) enhanced their relations. Both countries facilitated
effective cooperation through the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern
African Development Commission (SADC). In 2002,
Obasanjo and Mbeki were nominated to work hand-in-
hand as part of the Commonwealth troika with the
Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, to monitor the
post-electoral events in Zimbabwe after it was suspended
from the Commonwealth of Nations in 2002 due to
alleged rigged elections won by its President, Robert
Mugabe.

The multi-lateral relations began to wane when the
Russian President, Vladimir Putin invited the South
Africa’s President, Thabo Mbeki, to the G-8 summit in
Moscow in 2006. The invitation of Mbeki raised suspicion
of former President Obasanjo and other African leaders
that the region’s leadership position may have been
implicitly conferred on South Africa. Meanwhile, the
struggle for African permanent representation on the UN
Security Council, which started in 2005, placed the
African triumvirate, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt on
competitive relations. The ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ that
called for at least two permanent positions (with veto
power) and five rotating positions for Africa in the UN
Security Council inadvertently led to diplomatic strife
between Abuja and Pretoria. Nigeria claimed it was
qualified for the seat in the light of its historic role in
maintaining international peace and security amid its
status as the most populous black nation in Africa.
South Africa equally claims it is qualified for the seat
citing its economic strength.

The political quagmire in Ivory Coast in 2011 created
diplomatic tension between Nigeria and South Africa.
Nigeria was opposed to the government of former
President, Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to abdicate
power on his defeat at election. Nigeria mobilized the
West African forces to displace Gbagbo from power,
which contradicted the preference of South Africa for a
political negotiation. The position of South Africa on the
crisis in Ivory Coast was perceived as interference in a
sub-regional issue, and attempt to foster its African
leadership agenda. The Nigerian government preferred
military action to displace former Libyan leader,
Maommar Ghaddafi, elicited contrary positions by South
Africa. The AU, however, excluded Nigeria from the ad
hoc committee on Libya and appointed Zuma as the
chairman. Nigeria’s preference for a National Transition
Council (NTC), to replace the Ghaddafi leadership was
perceived by South Africa as a unilateral recognition of
the NTC in Libya (Agbu et al., 2013: 9).

The contest for the AU chair position in 2012 recreated
the rivalry when the Nigeria government opposed the
nomination of South Africa Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and supported the incumbent
chairperson, Jean Ping. The South African quest for the
position was conceived as violation of an unwritten
understanding reached among the Africa’s main financial
contributors to the AU; Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and
South Africa, to avoid contest for the chair position in the
AU Commission (Agbu et al., 2013). The ECOWAS
states supported the former foreign minister of Gabon,
Jean Ping and the SADC supported Dlamini-Zuma who
later emerged as the chair. The emergence of Dlamini-
Zuma created the perceptions that South Africa’s leading
role had been reinforced and the capacity of Nigeria
diminished. The Nigerian government, however, argued that
it supported a joint decision of ECOWAS and did not
contest for the position of AU chairperson. The Nigerian
government had contested for the seat of Commissioner
for Political Affairs, which it won.

The South Africa’s membership of BRICS and G-20
raised anxiety in Abuja on Nigeria’s leadership of the
region. South Africa was likely perceived as a relatively
strong economy with a large industrial base in Africa; and
on the contrary, the Nigeria’s economy has been
predicated on low industrial and weak economic base.
South Africa’s improved relations with Angola in 2008
created anxiety that Pretoria was de-emphasizing
relations with Nigeria. Angola is a major crude oil
producer in the Gulf of Guinea and likely source of crude
oil supply to South Africa. The multi-lateral relations are
characterized by intense rivalries and competitiveness
that are not healthy for the growth of intra Africa trade,
economic and political relations.

Bi-lateral Citizens’ Relations

The liberalization policy of Obasanjo administration
encouraged South Africans into Nigeria for trade and
investment opportunities. Similarly, the Nigerian experts
and business class increasingly sought and explored
opportunities in South Africa. There are numerous
thriving businesses owned by Nigerians in South Africa;
and its intellectuals are quite visible in the academia
(Olupohunda, 2013: 24). Since 2008, there has been
increasingly hostility and suspicion of foreigners in South
Africa. The foreigners including Nigerians are linked to
drug trafficking, prostitution, and armed robbery.

The deficit dimension in bi-lateral citizens’ relations has
shown in the series of coordinated xenophobic attacks on
Nigerians and other Africans. There is the perception that
foreign workers largely occupy jobs meant for South
Africans. The mining and retail sectors are somewhat
populated by foreign migrants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria. Meanwhile,
the racist and apartheid policies created social divisions
between the white minority and black majority
populations. The land dispossession of majority black
population and its transfer to white farmers created the
land question; while the Bantustan education and
segregated residences are major sign posts of expropriation policy of the apartheid regime. The post-
apartheid phase, however, held promise of social change
in the socio-economic conditions of the black populace.
The perception of receding expectations occasioned by
the preponderance of slum residences, continuous land
dispossession and high level of unemployment among
the black population; and the increasing entry of foreign
migrants who compete with South Africans for jobs
underscore the xenophobic attacks.

There were incidences of xenophobic related attacks in
2015, which led to the death of eight foreigners. The
Nigerian media reported physical attacks and looting of
retail businesses of Nigerians especially in the province
of Johannesburg. This development led to the withdrawal
of Nigeria’s Ambassador in South Africa and the plan to
relocate its nationals. The recall of Nigeria’s Ambassador
provoked responses in the Nigerian media on its
appropriateness; the media considered the decisions of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as ill thought and clumsy. It
argued that the recall of its Ambassador further exposed
Nigerians to xenophobic attacks. The media insisted the crises demanded the presence of a high level diplomat to
respond to the travails of Nigerians in South Africa; and
relate to Pretoria on the mechanisms to deal with the
fallouts. More so, the South African government
condemned the xenophobic attacks and promised tough
measures against its perpetrators. Pretoria, however,
responded to the withdrawal of Nigerian envoy citing the
death of 38 South African nationals in a collapsed
building at the Synagogue church in Ikotun, Lagos. The
South African government recalled that the deaths did not
elicit harsh reactions by state officials and the populace.

The killing of popular South African music icon, Lucky
Dube, in 2009 increased hostility at bi-lateral citizens’
level. The assassination of the reggae icon was
influenced by the perception of his nationality amidst the
stereotyping of Nigerians in South Africa as rich, living in
opulence and owning flashy cars through crime related
activities (Games, 2013a: 23). The issuance of visa
raised issues on Nigeria-South Africa relations. Nigerians
on initial visit to South Africa were required to deposit
monies to offset the cost of a possible repatriation
from South Africa. The South African government denied visa
to several Nigerians who applied for visa during the 2010
FIFA World Cup without official reasons (Olanrewaju,
2013: 51). The delay in issuance of visa to Nigerian
business men had resulted in cancellation of contracts
due to their inability to meet business schedules. The
South Africa declined to sign a non-visa regime pact with
Nigeria which it earlier agreed (Agbu, 2010: 444). The
Nigerian Nobel winner, Professor Wole Soyinka was
delayed at the airport in 2005 despite his invitation to
deliver lecture at Nelson Mandela’s birthday. He was
allowed entry at the intervention of Mandela’s wife,
Gracia Mandela (Olanrewaju, 2013: 51). The experience
of Soyinka heightened the perception among Nigerians
that South Africa has least respect for the country’s
intellectual class and business class; and other citizens.

Conclusion

The Nigeria-South Africa relations have been a potpourri
of co-operation and conflict; there is hardly consistent
peaceful co-existence that would deepen relations. The
development of Africa is, however, contingent on cordial
relations between Nigeria and South Africa since these
states are the major economies, and largely impact on
economic growth trajectories in the continent. The
countries have deviated from the core objective of
leading economic growth and development within the
African continent; this agendum should be pursued
doggedly with a view to alter the status of the continent
as under developed and peripheral. Both states resort to
rivalry on leadership status; which creates setback since
the Obasanjo and Mbeki administrations. Recurring
conflicts equally affect bi-lateral relations; it is imperative
to create effective conflict management mechanisms to
respond to, and resolve crises without adverse
implications.
Nigeria and South Africa should create enabling environment for foreign investment and remove trade restrictions in order to address trade imbalances. Foreign investment, however, should complement the deliberate and sustained national drives to develop indigenous capital formation. The capacity of the region to develop local capital is germane; and central to the realization of economic and political autonomy. Furthermore, the diversification of Nigerian economy and expansion of its manufacturing base would likely increase the articles of trade and deepen terms of trade. Nigeria’s trade surplus has not been qualitatively enhanced by its dependence on crude oil export and relatively weak industrial base. The foreign policy actors in Nigeria especially, should give priority to BNC in order to identify new frontiers of cooperation and sustain existing trade, economic, and political relations. The BNC would not likely impact on bilateral relations amidst rivalry, mutual suspicion and distrust. The nearly moribund commission should be revived as strategic and advisory organs; and the raison d’être of bilateral relations would be better served when the states give priority to regional imperatives.

The xenophobic attacks on foreigners in South Africa would likely renew hostile relations except it is concretely dealt with. The withdrawal of Nigerian Ambassador amid the 2015 xenophobic attacks had raised new debates on the capacity of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to manage the country’s international relations and South Africa’s perception of Nigeria and its populace. The withdrawal of Nigeria’s Ambassador was hasty in the light of the significant presence of Nigerians in South Africa. The recurring xenophobic attacks have drawn severe criticism of South Africa in Nigeria especially in the light of Nigeria’s front line status in the anti-apartheid struggle. The capacity of Pretoria to mediate this phenomenon would likely affect its perception by other states and impact on her bilateral relations. Nigeria and South Africa relations would likely be hurt when Pretoria fails to address the social questions that led to xenophobic attacks on foreigners and their economic interests.

There should be formalized mechanism in the AU to determine African representation in international organizations and the mode of rotation among the states in the region. This proposal is imperative to avert the recurring rift and rivalry among the leading states on representation in sub-regional, regional and global bodies. The face-off among African states on the chair of the African Union was needless and should be avoided in future relations. Again, there is compelling need to prioritize Nigeria and South Africa relations in order to foster economic growth and ramifying development in the continent. The economic strengths of Nigeria and South Africa situate the economies to play catalyst roles in Africa’s development process. The exemplar roles would likely endure in the absence of hegemonic politics and overtly assertive tendencies. The relevance of Egypt, Kenya, and Angola in the African discourse should, however, not be underestimated.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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CITATIONS


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