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The mission statement of US African Command (AFRICOM), articulated by President George Bush in 2007, declared African underdevelopment and human insecurities as a threat to US national security. Since 10 years have elapsed from the time of AFRICOM’s inauguration, this paper seeks to highlight that the organization has fallen short in realizing its mission statement. This unnerving reality has given credence to intellectuals who adopt an apocalyptic position vis-à-vis the organization. Intellectual skeptics disconcerted with AFRICOM located in the Global South and Global North have come to the conclusion that AFRICOM’s actuality as an organization primarily advanced American economic interest and perceived issues of African development as trivial. In the 21st-century, US security experts discursively shifted Africa from being a politicized issue to a securitized issue thereby constructing the continent as posing an existential threat not only to American geostrategic interest, but also American identity of exceptionalism. By using the work of New Left historian William Appleman Williams and by referencing speech actors with political capital, this paper highlights that the process of securitizing Africa using exceptional speech acts to expand corporate capitalism is not unique to Africa since there are historical discursive parallels between early and current speech acts deliberated during junctures involving US foreign ventures.

Key words: US African Command (AFRICOM), African Union (AU), securitization, speech act, exceptionalism, expansionism, economic-frontier, security-development discourse, US informal empire, William Appleman Williams, apocalyptic-complementary positions.

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America’s stratégie de grandeur during the Cold War has traditionally treated the African continent as a politicized issue rather than a securitized issue. The Anglo-American field of international relations, along with its subfield of security studies, which positions the state as the main referent object being secured, did not
deliberate a speech act that securitized Africa in terms of being a valued strategic frontier and a threat to national security. That is not to say that US hegemony did not covertly influence internal politics in Africa in terms of funding what was then called “anti-communist” guerrilla movements as Africa was stigmatized as the prime example of peoples incapable of modernity (Mamdani, 2004). Newly decolonized countries in Africa were labelled as “Third World” countries because they refused to adhere to the two camp theory of the Cold War and decided to adopt a non-aligned position which was not simply perceived as a “shortcut to suicide” (Prashad, 2009: 82), but also as being on “wrong” side of history because it contested the “natural” epistemological evolution of humankind informing the liberal-capitalist ethos. Motivated thus, the majority of traditional Cold War strategic studies deliberated by the west were mainly concerned with first world issues of bipolarity and nuclear deterrence. Third world issues were only addressed as security issues when they exclusively impacted superpower relations (Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

The peripheral status Africa occupied amongst American defense strategists in IR and security studies, and the neglect that ensued for several decades during the Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the Berlin wall. The period that followed recognized as the “widening and deepening” era of security studies challenged the dominant military-state centric security discourse and demanded that IR scholarship incorporate sectors to be secured other than the state such as the environment, immigration, disease, and development by deepening the referent object being secured from exclusively being the state to the individual (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). At this juncture, in the 1990s, and more so after the Global War on Terror commenced, US foreign policy began discursively speaking of Africa by utilizing a nexus of security-development which allegedly addressed the remedy for African underdevelopment and instability. By the beginning of the millennium, security strategist and military commanders articulated speech acts that spoke of developing a single unified command for Africa (Loveman, 2004). By the year 2006, President George Bush had authorized and approved the Department of Defense’s plan to develop AFRICOM (Schogol, 2006). AFRICOM is the first central command structure to be erected since the end of the Cold War by the United States of America and undoubtedly emphasizes Africa being elevated in significance amongst US international military, political and economic circles.

Prior to AFRICOM, African security issues were discussed and divided amongst three different commands structures: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM), this clearly represented Africa lacking strategic importance amongst US foreign policy makers (Mansbach, 2010). The advent of AFRICOM resulted in a single command structure commanding an area spanning 53 African nations, except Egypt, leading Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Secretary Defense for Policy to emphasize “rather than three different commanders who have Africa as third or fourth priority, there will be one commander that has it as a top priority” (Rozoff, 2010). On October 1st 2007, President George Bush established AFRICOM, directly recognizing Africa’s importance as a geostrategic frontier in promoting, according to him, a more secure and stable global environment. President Bush, a security speech act expert, announced and securitized Africa through the establishment of AFRICOM as following.

“Today, I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to stand up US, Africa Command by the end of the fiscal year 2008. This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa. Consultation will be done with African leaders to seek their thoughts on how Africa Command can respond to security challenges and opportunities in Africa. We will also work closely with our African partners to determine an appropriate location for the new command in Africa (Francis, 2010).

With 10 years elapsing since AFRICOM’s inaugural\(^1\), this manuscript seeks to initiate a scholarly debate that seeks to analyze the consequences of US Grand Strategy fundamentally reorienting its relation with Africa by simply securitizing the continent. The first section of this paper elaborates on the theoretical approach of securitization which informs the conceptual framework of this research. African securitization, as mentioned in the end-note of this manuscript\(^2\), is a process that culminated with the initiation of AFRICOM and is noticed with the increased propensity of speech actors speaking of the continent in terms of threatening national security. Furthermore, Africa was further pushed into the realms of “emergency politics” when speech actors socially constructed Africa as posing an existential threat to the identity of US exceptionalism. The second section seeks to locate the historical contours of securitization by revitalizing the works of historian William Appleman Williams. His work highlights that since the founding, the US has applied the process of securitization by articulating exceptional speech acts thereby justifying US foreign expansionism in the name of securing ideas that emanated from the “city on the hill”, and the belief that the US has a mission to protect these ideas and expand them globally. The third section highlights discursive parallels between early American speech actors and contemporary American speech actors by discussing Africa in a securitization (threatening). This is reflected in US speech actors adopting a language of security-development by socially constructing Africa as
discursively exceptional or a threatening “other”. The fourth section highlights how security experts used Oppositional Discursive binaries to construct Africa as a threat, thus justifying the inauguration of the center and the expansion of the US economic-frontier in Africa. It is in this section that securitization is highlighted as being composed of an unstable mix of exceptionalism and expansionism by highlighting the difference between two opposing AFRICOM scholarly positions known as Complementary and Apocalyptic. The former believes AFRICOM compliments the AU, while the later perceives AFRICOM being detrimental to African development because of its “Heart of Darkness” discourse. The final considers the detrimental results securitization had on African development by recommending AFRICOM policies that could rectify its poor performance in developing and eliminating human insecurities in Africa. One of the several proposed recommendations is suggesting a (de)securitized approach in addressing African issues of security and development. (De-)securitization moves away from the traditional approach to security performed by AFRICOM which is based on a state referent object that prioritizes (realist) military solutions as the means to attain development and security. To produce a synergistic relationship between the AU and AFRICOM, and for a rapprochement to occur between AFRICOM skeptics and appraisers, a development approach that considers African solutions to African problems is recommended, which prioritizes cooperating and consulting African leaders in developing mutual South-North solutions to eliminate the development of underdevelopment.

METHODOLOGY
The modality of securitization forms the conceptual framework of this manuscript. Securitization, according to its developers at the Copenhagen School (Peoples and Williams, 2014), is a new framework for analysis that allows us to judge what is and what is not a security issue (Peoples and Williams, 2014). Buzan and Waever (1998) define securitization - since it is fundamentally concerned about survival - as an issue being represented as an existential threat to the survival of a referent object. Peoples and Williams (2014: 93), Buzan and Waever (1998:36) define a referent object as that “to which one can point and say it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to...” The referent object in this manuscript is denoted as the US informal empire. The threat to its continual survival according to US policymakers is Africa being ungovernable, prone to disease, a hub for terrorists, and a failed continent. To further understand how Africa became securitized with the inception of AFRICOM, it is important to first highlight the process in which securitization occurs thus grasping how Africa shifted from being simply a politicized issue to a securitized issue.

Africa became securitized when it was no longer politicized in terms of requiring minor strategic planning, or minor government decision planning and resource allocations. In other words, it became a security issue that is no longer debated as a political question but is rather a security question that needs to be dealt with in an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Waever argues that speech act is the discursive component which initiates the process of securitization. A speech act is a securitization move articulated by speech actors when an issue not previously thought of as a security threat (threatening a referent object) begins being spoken of as a security issue by an official with high political capital (Peoples and Williams, 2014). It is important to note that a speech act has the power to construct an issue using the contours of security when in reality the issue does not inherently possess any threatening qualities (Waever, 2000). Effective securitization is constituted by an intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient enough to have political repercussions. Securitization requires acceptance between the perpetrator of the speech act and the relevant audience that it is being spoken to. This means that a speech act is not a sufficient component to successfully securitize an issue rather it additionally requires what Waever calls “felicity conditions” (Waever, 2000). These are conditions that increase the likelihood of successful securitization. The first condition as outlined previously is presenting and speaking of an issue in threatening terms which legitimize the use of extraordinary measure. The second condition is the capability of security experts or persons who have political capital and political authority to convince an audience of the existence of an existential threat. The third condition stipulates that an issue has a higher chance of being securitized if it historically connotes threats, danger, harm, and anarchy (Peoples and Williams, 2014).

Adopting the modality of securitization to highlight the performativity of AFRICOM is not suggesting that Africa was an afterthought in American politics until the inception of AFRICOM in 2007. However, this article is highlighting the social-economic ramifications of Africa shifting from being simply a politicized issue to a securitized issue. With AFRICOM activated in 2008, there was an increase in the propensity of security experts, such as the American president, CIA directors, military commanders and think tanks, to characterize Africa as threatening international stability and American national security. Speech acts verbalized Africa as being an existential threat using security-development language. This language compounded with the third felicity condition facilitated African securitization since Africa in American political discourse has historically connoted the “Heart of Darkness” and a continent that is infused with “failed states” because of its ungovernable traditional predispositions. What is noteworthy about the process of African securitization through AFRICOM is that the peoples who proposed to remedy the African “threat” comprised exclusively Global North interlocutors who spoke on behalf of Africa and ignored the African voice.

THE HISTORY OF US EXPANSIONISM USING EXCEPTIONAL DISCOURSE
With the inception of security studies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009) after WWII, the coordinates of the US informal empire that crystallized had a long history that echoed the exceptionalist character that embodied the United States of America. This is not surprising when it was realized that the originating coordinates of empire were coeval with the nation (Anderson, 2015: 3). Unlike any other nation-state that emerged, the US Republic is a geographic continent defended by two oceans, allowing a settler economy free from any Old World feudal characteristics, to develop the purest form of nascent capitalism. Further to the advantage of the republic, two subjective legacies of culture and politics were added: the idea derived from the initial Puritan settlement in the New World of a nation that enjoys divine favour and a sacred calling in proliferating the natural virtues of man; and the belief derived from the
War of Independence that the US Republic is endowed with a constitution of liberty that stands all trials and is a compelling example to all man (Anderson, 2015:3).

The amalgamation of geography and economy, culture and politics developed early in American historiography the ideological repertoire of an American Nationalism that "afforded seamless passage to an American Imperialism, characterized by a complexio oppositum of exceptionalism and universalism" (Anderson, 2015:3). Exceptionalism is understood as the US empire perceiving itself as unique amongst all nation states, because of an idea which resulted in the US becoming a special nation that embraces a mission to expand its virtuous qualities to all persons. An exceptionalist line could be traced in America's cultural DNA from the seventeenth century Puritan social thought, to J. O'Sullivan's eighteenth century Manifest Destiny Doctrine adopted by Andrew Jackson, to Cold War mutual assured destruction, and finally to George W. Bush establishing AFRICOM and Barrack Obama's unilateralism in defining the contours of African security by authorizing the bombing of the Libyan Jamahiriya.

During the founding, the radiance of American exceptionalism has been deliberated in a moral form thereby directly justifying territorial or commercial expansionism. The communiqué between Jefferson and Monroe makes the case by stating that "our present interest may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our multiplication will expand beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern continents, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws" (Anderson, 2015: 4). In another instance in 1813, Adam informs Jefferson that "our pure, virtuous, public-spirited, federative republic will last forever, govern the globe and introduce the perfection of man" (Anderson, 2015: 4). Exceptional speech acts correspondences between executive members following Independence resulted in an associate of Andrew Jackson, John O'Sullivan coining the famous slogan of the US having “the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and possess the whole continent that providence has given us for the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government. A land vigorous and fresh from the hand of God who could doubt the far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American Greatness" (Anderson, 2015: 4). The third largest land acquisition in American history soon followed with half the surface of Mexico being annexed in 1845, followed by the Mexican Cession of 1848 in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which extended the American frontier by usurping land from Mexico (Gray, 2016).

Following the Mexican-American war, US security experts also adopted an exceptionalist discourse that addressed the need to expand the economic-frontier of the republic thus justifying commercial rather than territorial expansion. Secretary of State William H. Seward encouraged Lincoln to notice that "You are already the great continental power of America. But does that content you? I trust it does not. You want the commerce of the world. This must be looked for on the pacific. The nation that draws most from the earth and fabricates most, and sells the most to foreign nations, must be and will be the great power of the earth" (Anderson, 2015: 5). The treaty of Kanagawa soon followed with the United States of America headed by Naval Commodore Matthew Perry threatening to use force if Japan was not to halt its two-century isolationist policies. Similarly, President Theodore Roosevelt believed that Panama needed to be carved out of Colombia because of its commercial prize which linked both seas (Anderson, 2015: 5). China was also dealt with in similar ways following the Opium War with US security experts demanding an Open Door policy. US diplomat John Ward sought to achieve through diplomatic negotiations an exchange of treaty ratifications in 1859. The agreements reached between western powers and China following the Opium Wars came to be known as the "unequal treaties" because in practice they gave the US privileged status and extracted concessions from the Chinese.

It should be noted that some opponents of American expansionism were cognizant of the megalomania of Manifest Destiny, the plunder of Mexico, the seizure of Hawaiian, and the slaughter in the Philippines, by attacking racism and imperialism as a betrayal of the anti-colonial birthright of the Republic (Anderson, 2015: 5). Foreign adventures, whether annexations or interventions, were not a break with national values, but always a possible version of them for the reason that from the beginning of the founding, exceptionalism and expansionism formed a potentially unstable compound. The conviction of the former developed the belief that the US could preserve its unique virtues only by remaining a society apart from a fallen world, and commitment to the later authorized its uniqueness as possessing a messianic mission and activism to redeem "that" world (Anderson, 2015: 6).

The nineteenth century was a critical moment for US expansionism using exceptional discourses because it is at that juncture where the idea of a mission began influencing American foreign policy. The mission was summarized in the 19th century in the Manifest Destiny political program, declaring that US growth and prosperity is dependent on foreign market opportunities and the acquisition of foreign territory. Walt Whitman, a participant in the Young Americans Movement along John O’Sullivan, invoked in the 19th century the idea of an American mission being linked to expansionism by affirming American racial superiority in addressing the Mexican War. He says "what has miserable, inefficient Mexico, with her superstition, her burlesque upon freedom, her actual tyranny by the few over the many, what has she to do with the great mission of peopling the world with a noble race? be it ours, to achieve that mission" (Howe, 2009: 769). From the 19th century onwards, America’s mission began
evoking social Darwinism logic, thereby admitting cultural relativism along with cultural Imperialism (Said, 1994) in the American discourse of exceptionalism. This racialized logic legitimized expansionism in a period that was dubbed by President Polk as the “Era of the American Empire”.

Josiah Strong, a leading clergyman of the 1880’s comprehended American uniqueness by defining its special mission as “God, with infinite wisdom and skill, is training the Anglo-Saxon race for an hour sure to come in the world’s future. The time is coming when the world will enter upon a new stage of history, the final competition of races, for which the Anglo-Saxon is being schooled. And can any one doubt that the results of this competition of races will be the survival of the fittest?” (Ceaser, 2012: 17). A major theme that justified American expansionism was American exceptionalism applying biology to politics, thereby producing “civilizing missions”. Charles Robert Darwin was the prophet who sanctified the American mission. His “natural selection” and “categorization” of races developed an anthropology which rationalized exploitation and imperialism because non-Anglo-Saxon peoples were studied as if they lived in a primitive past or were denied coevalness by anthropological western scholars (Hellwell and Hindess, 2013) who were on a mission “improving lower races” (Ceaser, 2012). The prevalence of socio-political figures Akin to Darwin, Strong, and Fiske points to anthropological racism that some schools of American political thought adopted in justifying their expansionism.

Another foreign venture that reveals racial superiority as pointed by Madsen (1998) is the concept of Manifest Destiny being utilized to justify the United States annexing Mexican territory because “the acquisition of more land, then, was necessary to keep the American experiment in democracy going, this was the visible manifest destiny of the United States” (Madsen, 1998: 89). The unstable compound of exceptionalism and expansionism which upheld a racist logic of expansion had devastating consequences on native Americans, however, it was justified as alluded by Senator John Dix of New York, because “The aboriginal races which occupy a portion of California and New Mexico, must there, as everywhere else, give way before the advancing wave of civilization, either to be overwhelmed by it, or to be driven upon perpetually contracting areas, where, from a diminution of their accustomed source of subsistence, they must ultimately become extinct by force of an invincible law, it is the behest of providence that idleness, and ignorance and barbarism, shall give way to industry, and knowledge and civilization” (Madsen, 1998: 105).

American “New Left” historian, William Appleman Williams, elaborated extensively throughout his career on the historical relationship between US expansionism and exceptionalism (William, 1959, 1961, 1969). He attacked the United States as an imperialist power, deplored the inequalities and alienation bred from corporate capitalism, and advocated socialism. William amongst other American scholars deprecate US exceptionalism because it not only leads to the performance of imperial politics of cultural and social subjugation but taints the legacy of noble patriots who did not believe that acquisition of more external economic-frontiers was necessary to keep the American mission of democracy alive.

Before we delve into the reservations Williams possessed concerning the US considering expansionism necessary for prosperity, it is vital to briefly recall Frederick Jackson Turner's essay entitled, The Significance of the Frontier In American History, presented at the American Historical Association (AHA) in 1893. Turner’s thesis held that throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an ever-extending frontier across the North American continent distinguished the United States from its European counterparts. The American frontier nurtured America’s unique traditions and institutions whereby the East Coast cities harbored the aristocrats and conservatives reminiscent of the Old World. The frontier settlement advanced and carried with it individualism, democracy, and nationalism. The process of self-transformation from corrupted European to perfected American has been central to the New World mythology since the seventeenth century (Madsen, 1998). In this manner, Turner’s thesis “offers historical justification for a concept of the west that is informed by the imperialist assumptions of the ideology of Manifest Destiny (Madsen, 1998: 123). Madsen (1998: 124) espouses Turner’s view in insisting that US academia and media speak today to the continuing powerful imagery of the “civilization of the frontier and the creation of new shining cities upon hills”, while bearing in mind that “the values celebrated in the western include: territorial expansion, liberty, democratic levelling, national identity, racial white superiority, and violence” (Stephanson, 1996). The hero, in this case, the US empire, is often admired and respected by westerners who espouse frontier ideals to celebrate the triumph of civilization over savagery and primitiveness.

William Appleman Williams discerned the vitality of Turner’s frontier thesis in explaining the routine of American foreign policy but also the ambiguity of the term “frontier”. When one ponders the concept of frontier they imagine a limit, however, William rightfully points that the term is misleading because it obscures the “expansionist thrust that acquired the sequence of frontiers throughout American history” (William, 1969: xiii). Thus, the frontier was an ontological double requirement because it espoused that only continued expansionism justified through exceptionalism could “sustain the dynamic relationship between, prosperity, democracy, and domestic well-being and order” (William, 1969: xiv). William also conveys in Roots of the Modern American Empire, that from the late 19th century the American executive elite “applied the frontier-expansionist thesis to the problems of the late nineteenth and twentieth century” thereby extending the “open-door” policy in an attempt to perpetuate American expansion beyond the North
American continent (William, 1969). He argues that since the mid-19th century there has been a perpetuated American ethos that considers national economic well-being directly reliant on the perpetual expansion of international markets. This developed Williams notion of the United States of America being an “informal empire” (William, 1959). US financial and political domination of Cuba and Philippines, China and Central America by the end of World War II, and of the world during the cold war is case in point.

The issue with “informal empire” according to William (1959) is that it assumes an ethos of self-righteousness that perceives economic expansionism of the US as directly producing an atmosphere of freedom, democracy, and self-determination throughout the world. The historical unequal engagement of the US with countries labeled as Third World dictates otherwise. William (1959) elucidates that the tragedy of American diplomacy is that it benefited the developed world at the expense of the exploited majority, resulting in the deterrence of freedom and democracy while fueling internal violence and war in the receiving country. In Contours of American History, William categorized the history of the US in three periods, however, the period pertinent to this manuscript is the period of 1882-1960’s entitled, the age of corporate capitalism, because it is germane to the US securitizing Africa by establishing AFRICOM (more on this below). The connection between all three periods according to William is economic-expansionism; first across the North American continent, then through an ever-extending western frontier, and then throughout the world. The age of corporate capitalism according to Williams developed the American economy at the expense of the suffering of indigenous peoples throughout the world and national communities in the Third World. The domestic ramifications according to William undermine the development of a “true American community” that was once upon a time voiced by the founding fathers*. America’s informal empire has decimated the true ideals of exceptionalism and was displaced by an American capitalism based upon private property, excessive individualism, and corporate profits (Fogo, 1996: 4). Woodrow Wilson personified the contours of American corporate capitalism when he informed Congress in 1916 to “lift your eyes to the horizons of business, and with the inspiration of the thought that you are Americans and are meant to carry liberty and justice and the principles of humanity wherever you go, go out and sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and more happy and convert them to the principles of America” (Anderson, 2015:8). In another address, Wilson states that the American people are “prominently chosen to show the way to the nations of the world and how they shall walk in the paths of liberty”; in 1917, Wilson plunged the US into WWI, a conflict which “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world” (Anderson, 2015:9). Thus, while Tragedy revealed the most important question facing the US in the past and present which is “how to sustain democracy and prosperity without imperial expansion?” (William,1959: 9). In Contours Williams (1969: 488) asserted that the primary objective of the US should be to develop a true American community based on mutual cooperation and coexistence because the United States always had the potential to create the “first truly democratic socialism in the world” (Fogo, 1996: 6).

It is important to note that American entry into WWI highlights the expansion of the US economic/corporate-frontier because the claim was that American goods now required outlets abroad that only Open Door could assure (Anderson, 2015). The rhetoric of exceptionalism naturally accompanied and justified American expansionism which had typically projected markets overseas as if they were essentially an “external frontier” (Anderson, 2015: 10). Similarly, Roosevelt’s New Dealism according to Schurmann’s Logic of World Power was an imperial quest that located fertile ground after WWI to reorganize the world along US lines and to the advantage of the informal empire. Schurmann states that what “Roosevelt sensed and gave visionary expression to was that the world was ripe for one of the most radical experiments in history: the unification of the entire world under a domination centered in America” (Schurmann,1974: 64).

In sum, this section was interested in revealing that what characterizes and justifies US expansionism is the belief that the world should be engineered in its image and that the destiny of the US is to civilize and democratize the world over. Most importantly, this section located the contours of the US informal empire by highlighting historical junctures that accentuate the belief that US exceptional identity can only survive and rejuvenate itself through economic-expansionism. The following section will highlight the securitization of Africa using speech acts, and examine how AFRICOM facilitated the expansion of the US economic-frontier.

THE SECURITIZATION OF AFRICA BY AFRICOM

Speech actors discursively shifting Africa from being a politicized issue to a (securitized) threatening issue

When Africa was discursively a politicized issue, US foreign relations and military engagements with Africa had been characterized through joint military exercises; training programs with African militaries; covert military operations, counter-terrorism operations; peacekeeping; and peace support operation deployments (Francis, 2010: 10). The Department of Defense (DoD), according to Theresa Whelan a former US national intelligence director of Africa between the years 2003 to 2011, has never focussed on Africa in the same level of consistency it has on other regions of the world (Francis, 2010). This is reaffirmed by Robert Putman explicitly stating that
“Despite historic ties with the continent, US policy towards Africa has generally been marked by indifference and neglect” (Francis, 2010: 11) because the dominant theme which characterized “US foreign relations in Africa was driven by US exceptionalism (Francis, 2010: 11). Post-9/11 we begin noticing the repositioning of Africa into the discourse of US strategic national interest. African securitization was acknowledged by explicating to the international community that Africa poses an international security threat to the US in terms of violent wars, armed conflicts, the proliferation of underdevelopment and HIV/AIDS, and finally failed states serving as terrorist havens (Francis, 2010: 12). Thus, in the last six decades, US-African relations have never been dominated by one single security sector. Rather the complexity of the relationship more so after the Cold War and further since the GWOT was marked by “selective engagement, neglect, contradictions and retreat” (Francis, 2010: 12). This labyrinth of complexities was captured in a report released in 2005 by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

“The region [Africa] starkly illustrates both the challenges and the promise of efforts to foster democracy, respect for human rights, poverty alleviation, counterterrorism, regional conflict prevention and peacekeeping, and to curb HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, organized crime, corruption, and instability. Also at stake are rising US. interests in the region’s energy sector, already prominent and set to expand even further in the coming decade. At the same time, many countries in the region are vulnerable to instability and violence, stemming from vast internal disparities in wealth, poor governance, a lack of state capacity, and rising criminality” (Morrison and Goldwyn, 2005).

In the year 2000 President Bush stated that “while Africa may be important, it does not fit into the national strategic interest as far as I can see them” (Francis, 2010: 10). After 9/11, the threat to US energy security and the new scramble for Africa pressed the Bush administration in 2007 to regard African oil resources as a “strategic national interest” (Francis, 2010: 10). It should be noted that the perception of Africa being perceived as a strategic hub for American resources was a “politicized thought process” published in 1997 by AFRICOM which states that the alteration in US interest towards Africa was “the culmination of a ten-year thought process within the Department of Defense” (Keenan, 2010: 113). The year 1997 was a critical year for the US informal empire because it reached the psychological critical 50% resulting in President George Bush uttering a speech act, in the year 2000 during his election campaign making energy security a top priority (Keenan, 2010). This securitization led to the publication of the Cheney Report in 2001 by the National Energy Policy Development Group (Cheney and Powell, 2001). The report forecasted that by 2020 US oil consumption would increase by 32% and that sub-Saharan Africa was the future source of US oil supplies (Cheney and Powell, 2001). The Cheney report (Keenan, 2010: 113) highlighted African oil as a “strategic national interest” thus an “economic-frontier” that the United States might choose military force to control (Volman, 2003). The continuation of AFRICOM’s thought process produced the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG, 2002) which included members such as Don Norland, former US ambassador to Chad, and Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski of the US Air Force who is tied to the DoD African policy unit (all security experts who possess political capital). They published another geostrategic study highlighting Africa’s increased importance entitled “African Oil: A Priority for US National Security and African Development” (Forte, 2012). In 2002, AOPIG weaved military and economic goals by stating that the US required a command structure that is strictly dedicated to the African continent to protect US investments and interests because by 2015 the study postulated, Africa would be the main supplier of US oil imports instead of the Persian Gulf (Forte, 2012). AOPIG not only alluded to the importance of fossil fuels but also the deposits of critically important strategic minerals such as “chromium, uranium, cobalt, titanium, diamonds, gold, bauxite, phosphate, and copper” (African Oil Policy Initiative, 2002: 12; Cope, 2016: 256). The US is imperative in securing strategic minerals in Africa as mentioned by Harry Magdoff (2003: 55) because “the Defense Department operates with a list of strategic and critical minerals as a guide to the stockpiling program. These are the materials which are assumed to be critical to the war potential of the US. We must note that the US depends on 80 to 100% on importing strategic minerals”. Mozambique produces 18% of the supply of columbium; South Africa produces 31% of the supply of chromium, and the Congo produces 60% of the supply of Cobalt (Magdoff, 2003).

Unified protest across Africa took place when President Bush announced in October 2008 the activation of the United Stated African Command (AFRICOM). Firstly, the establishment is a fundamental shift in the way the US engages with Africa on foreign policy terms because for more than four decades the responsibility of the continent was divided amongst two departments: The Department of Defense (DoD) and the US international agency for development (USAID), as well as three separate military commands EUCOM, CENTCOM and Pacom (Francis, 2010). Thus, the establishment of a command center that is specific to the African continent would naturally instigate debates about the motivations and intentions of such structure. Disapproval has been expressed by the African Union (AU) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) by refusing to host the location of AFRICOM on African territory; Liberia was the sole country that expressed interest in hosting AFRICOM (Francis, 2010). This refusal is fueled by the belief that AFRICOM is an extension of the US informal empire which amounts to the militarisation of US foreign policy towards Africa to achieve US strategic economic interest on the continent.
This belief holds veritas when we remember that President Obama stated that US strategy in Africa is linked to benefit and promotion of corporate interests. Forte (2012: 196) reminds us of Obama’s corporate capitalist character when he stated that by expanding “Africa’s capacity to access and benefit from the global markets, promote regional integration, and strengthen economic governance” US corporations, “can and should play a role in this process”. This corporate-expansionist mindset is facilitated through the Young African Leaders Initiative program launched in 2012. The program is dedicated to raising African technocrats and politicians that are more prone in dealing comfortably with US thereby advancing their corporate ventures (Forte, 2012).

AFRICOM, being perceived as a military command structure of the US informal empire which seeks to expand its economic-frontier, possesses currency amongst scholars of security studies. Academics argue that AFRICOM is an attempt to counter-balance China’s relation with the continent which by 2009 had invested over US$100 billion and possessed more than 2000 companies working across the continent (Forte, 2012). Not only that, Africa provides one-third of Chinese crude oil imports, and la pièce de résistance is China providing an alternative bilateral monetary mechanism that provides loans to weak African economies rather than requesting loans from the IMF and the World Bank (Francis, 2010).

Furthermore, critical voices characterize AFRICOM as a strategic attempt to protect the oil and energy security of the United States which according to Swart “is increasingly becoming important to the world energy supplies even as the region remains under threat from lawlessness and piracy” (Francis, 2010: 6). Military command structures have historically been established to intimidate or coerce rival powers and there is not a reason to believe that AFRICOM will alter such perception. Editors (2002) of the Monthly Review stated that US global reach through the projection of foreign bases and command structures are but a means to access, protect, and control US strategic national interests in the world. The quote is a reminder that Williams “age of corporate capitalism” still characterizes American US foreign policy and that military command structures persist in expanding the economic-frontier of the informal empire. The Editor’s note that:

“The projection of US military power into new regions through the establishment of US military bases should not, of course, be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote the economic and political objectives of US capitalism. For example, US corporations and the US government have been eager for some time to build a secure corridor for US-controlled oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. What is clear at present and bears repeating is that such bases are now being acquired in areas where the United States had previously lost much of its “forward presence” such as in the Middle East and Africa. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the last remaining superpower is presently on a course of imperial expansion, as a means of promoting its political and economic interests, and that the present war on terrorism, which is in many ways an indirect product of the projection of US power, is now being used to justify the further projection of that power.”

The securitization of Africa during President Bush and Obama was successful since Africa has historically been associated with all three felicity conditions mentioned earlier. Africa was “othered” in political discourse thereby justifying the establishment of AFRICOM and its mission. The following section will highlight how Africa became fully securitized using exceptional speech acts.

**Realizing US strategic interest in Africa by means of exceptional speech acts**

The aforementioned analysis discussed why the US established a command center strictly dedicated to the African continent. However, to further understand the significance of intersubjectivity in the process of securitization, it is vital to analyze how security experts used oppositional discursive binaries to construct Africa as a threat thus justifying the inauguration of the center and the expansion of the US economic-frontier. According to Doty (1993), if we simply ask why questions to analyze foreign policies, we presuppose a particular subjectivity, in this case, the anarchic African continent which produces a political environment that welcomes AFRICOM indisputably”. By asking how AFRICOM was established and how was it capable of securing the interest of the informal empire, we problematize the simple “why” questions and the “taken for granted discourse” of US security actors. This section is concerned in revealing how the discourse of US exceptionalism “othered” Africa, thereby facilitating the success of the securitization process and US economic expansion.

Richard Gott wrote in January of 2001 that there is a growing belief within the ranks of liberal missionaries in the West that appears to favor the reconquest of Africa even though “no one really suggests how this would come about, nor is there a “plan” available for discussion” (Gott, 2001). He further explicates that “imperial intervention might indeed be welcomed by peoples threatened with mayhem, anarchy, and civil war” (Gott, 2001). This quote is pertinent for several reasons. First, it reveals that intervention in Africa is justified using a speech act entailing humanitarian protection to restore order to a helpless nation. It further expands a discourse of exceptionalism for it retains a suggestion that “intervention may occur simply and only because we believe that our actions are conducted in order to benefit them” (Forte, 2012: 17). The result is a highly Eurocentric foreign policy
for it renews ethnocentric discourses of cultural imperialism (Forte, 2012). It suggests that the developed superior West has the right to intervene in Africa, and Africans should be barred from even intervening in their own affairs (Forte, 2012). Humanitarianism is but another US exceptional myth which is great at producing symbols and ideals of Freedom, Liberty, and Democracy; however, is almost never realized as actual facts on the ground (Forte, 2012). In other words, humanitarianism is always brought about by the West, the “self-appointed messiah that has the right to determine which is the right side of history [using] the American military as savior” (Forte, 2012:237). These myths create further opposing binaries such as the US being the helper because it is independent while Africans are helpless because they are dependent. According to AFRICOM security experts, the organization promises to fulfill the exceptional role of a rite of passage “carrying a society from crisis, through war, and then reintegration into the world system as a newly fashioned object, something that is reborn” (Forte, 2012: 238).

The security of Africa being in the hands of the West is a relationship that has characterized both interlocutors for centuries. The perception of African security issues being dealt with using Western remedies has been prevalent for so long that it is legitimate to describe the situation as one of intellectual hegemony (Chuter, 2010). For instance, Western intellectual hegemony has prescribed Africa as a “continent without history, thus nothing useful could develop without denying Africa’s past” (Chuter, 2010: 146). The belief that Africans can only develop by shedding away their identity is not simply the fault of the west. African intellectuals and nationalist leaders have unfortunately internalized the scientific relativist discourse which demands from Africans the rejection of their past and the adoption of European models of development and governance (that are incompatible with African based political conditions) merely to become labeled as “truly” modern and part of the “democratic international community” (Chuter, 2010). It is for this reason that academics cast the creation of AFRICOM as the imposition of Western discernments always knowing what is best for the African continent. They believe that AFRICOM represents the construction and homogenisation of a particular version of a Liberal security project “whereby African security is now defined and constructed according to Western values, norms, expectations and policy preferences which are embedded in the dominant economic, political, cultural and intellectual preferences and interests” (Francis, 2010: Forte, 2012).

As a result, what we notice, as mentioned in earlier sections, is that there is not one dominant discourse that characterizes the securitization of Africa in US foreign policy but rather a myriad of different discourses. However, as David Chutter declares, these different discourses reveal that it is “arguments among westerners, rather than debates among Africans which determine what Africa’s security priorities are seen to be” (Chuter, 2010: 149). Ironically, the answer to these arguments is provided by Western NGO’s who are on a mission to market their exceptional ideas which are usually resented by locals as mechanisms for indirect US and European influence. NGO’s reinforce “othering” binaries that perceive Africans as waiting for foreigners to identify and solve their problems (Chuter, 2010). Presently, the work of NGO’s in Africa is reminiscent of the discourse of the “white man’s burden” which was taken up by missionary organizations in earlier centuries such as the London Missionary Society of 1795. Similarly, to the Puritan missionaries that proliferated the Manifest Destiny, these organizations embark on a mission to save souls and reform morals situated in African regions. AFRICOM’s organizational paradigm rejuvenates ethnocentric hierarchical discourses which construct Africa as requiring foreign intervention because it is an irrational space. AFRICOM’s mission statement implicitly casts Africans as incompetent in defining their problems, and inept at finding solutions by adopting a discourse that constructs Africa as posing an existential threat to international stability.

It is true that US policy towards Africa has generally been marked by indifference and neglect; however after the events of 9/11, a discourse of security-development emerged from Downing Street in March of 2005 and made its way to Washington following a publication by Prime Minister Blair entitled the Commission for Africa (Keenan, 2010). This commission revives the notion of intellectual hegemony by embracing the ontology of African security being in the hands of the West. The discourse utilized in the commission shifts the discourse from development/humanitarianism to risk and fear, thus casting Africa as an “outside” continent that expands risk and fear to the rest of the international community. The commission securitized Africa by merging development and security agendas into one nexus thereby identifying poverty and underdevelopment as national security threats thus blurring the line between both agendas (Keenan, 2010). This nexus is dangerous because it associates underdevelopment and insecurity as an intrinsic element of African society by using the “failed states” hypothesis to recast Africa as the “Heart of Darkness”. While dangerous, the nexus enables securitization because it stimulates the third felicity condition. Tieku (2010) makes the point clear when he states that AFRICOM’s thinking is driven widely by the “so-called failed state hypothesis” which assumes that Africa is an ungovernable space with disorder everywhere. Tieku (2010) further highlights that over 60 percent of African territories are governed by non-centralized government actors such as chiefs which are less coercive and more peaceful. This fact falsifies the speech act which claims Africa as a threat because it possesses failed states that are a hub for terrorists (Tieku, 2010).

Descriptive statistical work revealed by Tieku (2010) illustrates that terrorist groups do not find territories of
so-called failed states to be safe havens or conducive to their work; however, African states are vulnerable because external powers in the international community “find it easy to set aside the international norm of the territorial integrity of states when it comes to weak states” (Tieku, 2010:136). Ironically, according to Keenan (2010), security experts chose to adopt a security-development discourse instead of terrorism because Africa was not a hub for terrorists. This was a calculated securitization shift in the language since the success of securitization depends on the audience accepting that the threat is real. Unfortunately, prior to the shift in discourse, the US reverted to fabricated terrorist stories50 with the help of the Algerian secret service (DRS) to justify AFRICOM’s military presence across the region (Keenan, 2010).

The security-development discourse adopted by AFRICOM merged traditional US military thinking with humanitarianism and development activities thereby successfully securitizing Africa as a global threat to security and US national interest. The shift in discourse enabled the US military to substitute the aggressive and militaristic image EUCOM displayed towards Africa post/9-11 with a discourse that was more development and humanitarian based (Keenan, 2010). The discourse is exceptional since the US has taken it upon itself to remedy the insecurity and underdevelopment of Africa because disorder and anarchy are assumed to characterize the continent. Also, Africa needing exceptional saving is deliberated in the Economist Magazine in the year 2000 which described it as a “Hopeless Continent” (Francis, 2010). This was also reinforced by PM Blair when he said that Africa is a “scar on the conscience of the world” (Francis, 2010: 16) that needs saving.

The last issue that will be uncovered in this section is US security experts not finding it necessary to engage with the African Union in establishing AFRICOM. This reality is understandable when we remember that the US is exceptional, self-righteous and the only nation that has a God given duty to expand its manifest destiny to the world. An exceptional nation does not take advice or suggestions from other nations. The US gives while the rest of the world is expected to take.

**AFRICOM not consulting or cooperating with the AU**

AFRICOM’s ethnocentrism becomes more conceivable as an embedded organizational structural component when we realize that Africa already possessed a command structure that was dedicated to the security and development of its nations. However in the eyes of US security experts and AFRICOM “how can a hopeless continent, that is destined to failure, succeed without the help of the West?”

Academics and scholars who loathe AFRICOM and perceive it as an instrument that is designed to help expand the US liberal project and economic-frontier by exploiting Africa’s resources have posed the most important question to legitimize their reservations. That question is “what relationships exist between AFRICOM and the African Union (AU) security institutions?” (Tieku, 2010). The protest in Africa towards President Bush announcing the establishment of AFRICOM in 2007 is intrinsically linked to the fact that the US established and designed AFRICOM without the consultation of the AU which already possessed existing proposals51 and developed a continental peace and security paradigm (Francis, 2010). The AU had already established the African Standby Force (ASF) for peacekeeping and conflict management by dividing Africa into five combat-ready deployment sections: NASBRIG for North Africa, EASBRIG for East Africa, ECOBRIG for West Africa, FOMAC for Central Africa, and SADCBRIG for Southern Africa (Francis, 2010). Even though Theresa Whelan stated that AFRICOM would “work in partnership with regional actors” it seems according to Francis that “the development and operations of AFRICOM will not only potentially conflict with the mandate of the ASF but also duplicate their operational activities” (Francis, 2010).

The AU security architecture was established in May of 2001 in order to reflect a shift in the focus of the pan-African project which focused on legitimizing and institutionalizing statehood in Africa. More importantly, the new Pan-African AU ideals sought to deploy indigenous African solutions to challenges facing ordinary Africans and not import remedies or paradigms that are not based on the conditions of African (Tieku, 2010). One of the most important aspects of the AU was Article 4(h) which permitted the continental organization to intervene in member states in order to “prevent war crimes, genocides, and crimes against humanity” (Tieku, 2010: 131). AFRICOM has considered the same mantra by stating that its mission is to “prevent problems from becoming crisis, and crisis from becoming catastrophes” (Francis, 2010: 4). Furthermore, Article 4(h) created space for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) organ in July 2003 at an assembly meeting in Maputo. The PSC was a major accomplishment in the development of an African based security paradigm because it absorbed the work and structures of the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management Resolutions, providing collective security and early-warning arrangement for AU members (Tieku, 2010). The mission statement of PSC, similar to AFRICOM, is concerned with the “promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, the development of a common defense policy, prevention and combating of international terrorism, and promotion of respect for the sanctity of human life and protection of human rights” (Tieku, 2010: 132). When AU policymakers deliberated their security paradigm, they were explicit in stating that they are counting on the support of advanced industrial societies to help them develop various elements located in the security regime of the AU (Tieku, 2010: 132).
Tieku (2010) states that scholars and NGO’s who adopt an “apocalyptic position” oppose the position stating that AFRICOM and the AU are “complementary” organizations. The former position believes that there is no synergy between the AU and AFRICOM because US policymakers have failed to outline how AFRICOM will enhance already-established AU security institutions, in particular, PSC objectives (Tieku, 2010). This belief has led scholars to classify AFRICOM as a continuation of a broader US strategy to militarize its foreign policy in Africa which will directly hinder efforts by AU security institutions to foster defense cooperation among African states. The claim is that if AFRICOM is not about the militarization of the continent then why did the US not reform its development agencies in Africa? Dr. Wafula Okumu from South Africa’s Institute for Strategic Studies rightfully declares “why use the military? why not use other effective methods, like USAID or even the Peace Corps who used to be very effective in winning the heart and minds of the African people” (Tieku, 2010: 135)? The South African Development Community (SADC), according to Tieku (2010: 135), was explicit in aligning itself with the “apocalyptic position” by stating that AFRICOM is an intelligence-gathering facility. In addition, non-complementary scholars argue that the command center will undermine the ability of the AU to engage in a proactive intervention using its own stand-by force. This is a legitimate argument because historically the US including the United Nations in areas like Rwanda not only did not act but evicted their troops from the theater of genocide (Francis, 2010; Forte, 2012)

Three activity areas: counter-terrorism, narcotic trade, and AFRICOM outsourcing its missions to Private Military Contractors (PMCs), will further demonstrate the lack of synergy between both security institutions. Firstly, while the AU defines terrorism similarly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as an act of violence designed to create fear, intimidation, and coerce governments and society in pursuit of political social and ideological goals, the AU explicitly characterizes terrorist groups as sub-national groups rather than global networks (Tieku, 2010). For the AU it is nation-states who fund these “global networks”. This difference might seem meager at first, however, the AU has made it a point to highlight how the lack of synchronization between both institutions in relation to conceptual definitions has complicated security affairs in the region. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (Kaplan and Bloom, 2007), the AU gave support to the Ethiopian government to pursue members of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) who have links with Al-Qaeda and were accused of killing 77 civilian Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers. Members of Congress in the US threatened to impose sanctions on Ethiopia because the administration classified the pursuit as a violation of human rights (Gaerba, 2008). Here, we notice the rhetoric of US exceptionalism which seeks to define how Africa should perceive its security issues in relation to terrorism.

The AU has criticized the bilateral link between AFRICOM and the DoD which left African organizations in the dark when AFRICOM adopted key counter-terrorism programs such as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) (Tieku, 2010). The US unwillingness to work with African organizations further strengthen negative attitudes towards AFRICOM from AU members (Tieku, 2010). AFRICOM replicating work conducted by the AU, and refusing to cooperate and consult African leaders regarding issues of development and security, legitimize the “apocalyptic” position adopted by scholars who believe that AFRICOM was brought into Africa to undermine previously established African security solutions and expand US interests (Tieku, 2010).

Narcotics trade is another activity area where both security institutions should have been synchronized. Africa represents a narcotic corridor that ships over one-quarter of Europe’s cocaine. The UN estimates that at least 50 tons of cocaine are shipped through the West African region every year (Tieku, 2010). The AU has been capable of keeping a consistent number of seizures from 1998 to 2003 at around 600 kg each year; however, by 2006, this number has increased to 30000 kg in West Africa (Tieku, 2010). AU leaders have pursued the AU to use its Pan-African security paradigm to deal with this narcotic corridor; however, AFRICOM is only willing to comply with the Counter Narcotics and Terrorism (CNT) programs which have shown little interest in dealing with African security institutions. The CNT has not been willing to engage with the AU on narcotic issues because the AU counter-narcotic program aims at providing funds to African domestic police to fight drug smugglers rather than incorporating the African narcotic program into a more elaborative bilateral AFRICOM-DoD led program (Tieku, 2010).

The exceptional character of the third activity renders the success of the first two activities bleak. With AFRICOM pledging to implement security and development, cease narcotic trafficking, and eliminating terrorist threats on the African continent, the logical question that follows is to ask how will these operations be conducted? Or more specifically, what type of individuals will engage in rectifying these issues? In 2008, the US House of Representative Subcommittee on Natural Security and Foreign Affairs said that AFRICOM does not have the means to accomplish its mandate and lacks the “appropriate policy framework, the depth, and balance of professional expertise, and the required funding mechanisms to deliver on active security” (Keenan, 2010: 126). The “exceptional” solution provided by the administration to implement security-development programs since 2004 is to outsource EUCOM and AFRICOM’s missions to Private Military Contractors which are known to have a propensity towards corruption and violation of human rights (Keenan, 2010). McFate has rightly argued that the privatization of AFRICOM’s missions is keeping with the US commitment to
neoliberalism and opens Africa to mercenary forces who then turn Africa into a plundered economy (Keenan, 2010). These three activities have all revealed the lack of synergy between the AU and AFRICOM. However, the last activity seems to remind us of colonial subjectivity binaries of (in)capabilities. AFRICOM regards Africans as incapable of safeguarding their nations, therefore, hires mercenaries to do the job.

This section was interested in validating scholarly apocalyptic criticism geared towards AFRICOM. The process of securitization deceptively constructed Africa as a threatening continent that is incapable of governance and development therebyjustifying the expansion of the US economic-frontier. It also alluded to the consequences incurred by AFRICOM continuously ignoring African suggestions and solutions to security and development. The final section is interested in providing policy recommendations to AFRICOM.

CONCLUDING RESULTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO AFRICOM

At this point, it should be clear that US foreign ventures have in most cases always been approached using primarily a process of securitization; although it includes an unstable mix of exceptionalism and expansionism that has detrimental results in eliminating underdevelopment and human security issues. The securitization of Africa through AFRICOM is a case where speech actors constructed (African) subjects in threatening terms followed by the US informal empire expanding its economic-frontier or in the words of William the “age corporate capitalism”. This final section is interested in recommending US security experts, who speak on behalf Africa, policies that seek to produce a rapprochement between both prominent scholarly positions assessing AFRICOM (complementary and apocalyptic), thereby creating synergy between the AU and AFRICOM.

The House of Representatives’ Appropriation Committee (HRAC) stated that AFRICOM’s “traditional US military operations are not an appropriate response to most or many of the challenges facing Africa” (Keenan, 2010: 126) which begs the question, how can AFRICOM win the hearts and minds of Africans thereby becoming a command structure that reflects African conditions of insecurity and underdevelopment? One attempt at this answer would entail the US renouncing its informal empire which at its core retains a belief that it has a mission to proliferate its exceptional character globally. Another answer would entail US security experts speaking of Africa as an equal partner in the international community and seek to cooperate with African organizations on issues of security and development and not perceive African solutions irrelevant a priori. However, the most important realization required to create a harmonious relationship between AFRICOM and Africa is for security experts in Washington to remember that security as an ontology should not exclusively be theorized using a traditional-realist approach to security. African perception of security has historically been flexible in co-opting a “widening and deepening” approach to security depending on the security sector of the issue (Buzan and Waever, 1998).

For instance, traditional security studies scholars reify the military as the means to survive a security threat and deem the state as the main referent object to be secured. African organizations have no trouble broadening or expanding the analytical horizon of the study of security beyond the military sector to encompass all other sectors. They are also reflexive in deepening the referent object of security beyond simply the state to incorporate other actors such as institutions and individuals (Peoples and Williams, 2014). Put simply, US security experts need to (de)securitize the African continent, Buzan and Waever (1998) argue that most issues that are securitized should in most cases be (de)securitized issues. In other words, African security and development should not be placed in the realm of emergency politics but should be dealt with using the normal bargaining process of the political sphere (Peoples and Williams, 2014). (De)securitization according to Buzan and Waever (1998) reminds us that it is not intellectually competent to append the term security to a variety of issues, such as development in the case of Africa, without altering the traditional ontology of security which is traditionally linked to the military.

Africa’s perspective on dealing with (in)security has been historically less militarized than the United States of America because the continent still struggles to manage mere survival as noted in the Millennium Development Goals Report. The report reveals Africa’s real problems are hunger and malnutrition, poverty and infant mortality, and avoidable deaths from remediable diseases (UN Report, 2008). The African perspective of security has had success stories which highlight that Africans have been capable of working out solutions and identifying their “own” human security issues. For instance, the New Partnership In African Development (NEPAD) is an African home-grown initiative that perceives peace and security as part of a “new development conception concerned with human development-cum-human security issues” (Salih, 2010: 85) that seeks to address the issues revealed in the MDG report. Salih (2010) further highlights how the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 adopted a project-based approach which extended the responsibility of specific sectors to each member of the AU (that is, Angola for energy; Mozambique for transport), with the objective of alleviating poverty, enhancing the standard and quality of life, and supporting the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. Also, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was founded in 1996 and set itself as the primary regional organization to achieve “food security and environmental protection,
promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs” (Keenan, 2010: 127).

All regional African organization success stories were made possible because Africa developed its own approach to security in cooperation and coordination with other AU actors which harnessed the promotion of joint development strategies. Coordination and cooperation between AU members is a vital component that contributed to the success of African regional programs. It seems AFRICOM is not yet willing to enhance its relationship with African organisations since it has facilitated the welcoming of British and the French commercial and intelligence endeavours into the continent, British intelligence plays a major role in the TSCTP program and French corporate investors such as Total, Areva, Lafarge, France Telecom, and Vinci entered the continent, without the consultation of the AU (Keenan, 2010). It should also be noted that when a situation demanded a militarized response, the AU did so successfully without the help of EUCOM or Western agencies since the US government and the UN track record in Rwanda failed to prevent genocide and was met with hostility in Somalia (Chuter, 2010). For example, the restoration of peace in the Congo using African forces from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania highlights the success of the African PSC and the African Union’s established security mechanisms. The AMISON mission of the African Union in Somalia was a success story. It not only established a parliament, elected a president, and opened up international embassies, but it also removed the terrorist organization known as Al-Shabab from Mogadishu (Campbell, 2012). AFRICOM’s former General Carter Ham acknowledged the importance of African solutions in dealing with development and civil strife when he stated that “it was not the international community and certainly not the United States, it was regional states making that decision” (Campbell, 2012).

Since the Pentagon perceives Africa as the “battlefield of tomorrow” (Karlin, 2015), the future of AFRICOM will be based on its willingness to adopt and yield to African based solutions and rid itself from “othering” Africa”. Keenan (2010) stresses that the US administration linking terrorism with development issues has rejuvenated a colonial image of Africa being negative, suspicious, and hostile. General Carter Ham is of the opinion that it is time to have a debate about how the issue of counterterrorism in Africa should be a “domestic law enforcement matter rather than a military AFRICOM counter-terror matter” (Campbell, 2012). The US has to be willing to cooperate and coordinate with African organizations in addressing their own individual insecurities by not simply outsourcing security issues to Private Military Contractors which are not accountable to any security organization. AFRICOM needs to trust present African capabilities in securing their own borders.

As of this moment, AFRICOM has not honored its 2007 professed mission statement and has given credence to apocalyptic criticism which states that AFRICOM’s objective is the expansion of the US economic frontier using the rhetoric of exceptionalism. Several authors (Forte, 2012; Boyle, 2013; Vermeiren, 2013; Campbell, 2013) have published literature that highlights AFRICOM being detrimental to African development because it prioritized US national interest and persistently acted without consulting or cooperating with African organizations. For instance, the missions conducted in Libya in 2011 and 2012 in Mali by AFRICOM, have been categorized as “blowback” (Turse, 2015b). Libya has collapsed into a morass of militia fiefdoms which have made their way to Nigeria, Chad, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Togo (Campbell, 2012). Similarly, in Mali, the US conducted a military coup tooust democratically elected President Amadou Touré and placed US trained officer Amadou Sanogo as ruler of Bamako (Turse, 2015c).

The case of Libya is of high importance because it actualizes the argument of AFRICOM ignoring the AU. The UNSC adopted the discourse of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) through information acquired by politicized NGO’s and enacted Article 1970 in February and 1973 in March. This resulted in a No-fly zone and military intervention in Libya while denouncing any alternative solution suggested by the African Union. Not only that, AFRICOM and western news outlets made sure that alternative solutions were not broadcasted on western news outlets further deepening the rhetoric of US exceptionalism knowing what is best for Africans (Forte, 2012). Since the U.N suspended Libya and was barred from pleading its case it was not until June 15th of 2011 that the AU Mediation Committee (AMC) was capable of presenting its case at a meeting with the UNSC (Forte, 2012). The case presented by Uganda’s permanent U.N representative, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, reveals the necessary modifications required by AFRICOM. Rugunda stated explicitly that such meeting “should have happened much earlier because Libya is a founding member of the AU. An attack on Libya or any other member of the African Union without expressed agreement by the AU is a dangerous provocation that should be avoided” (Forte, 2012: 275). He continued by stating that “the U.N is on safer ground if it confines itself to maintaining international peace and deterring war among member states” (Forte, 2012: 275). Rugunda reminded the UNSC that AFRICOM ignoring the dialogue extended by the AU towards solving the Libyan crisis in April 10th 2011 has been “high-handed, arrogant and provocative” because “it is unwise for certain players to be intoxicated with technological superiority and begin to think they alone can alter the course of human history towards freedom for the whole of mankind. Certainly, no constellation of states should think that they can recreate hegemony over Africa” (Forte, 2012: 276). Libya’s revolutionary leader Muammar Al-Ghaddafi was assassinated on October 20th 2011, a week later on October 28th British defense minister Philip Hammond...
met with the National Transitional Council in Tripoli to discuss economic ventures which the AU rejected as the representatives of the Libyan people (Forte, 2012). Hammond urged a delegation of 80 Europeans companies to "pack their suitcases and head to Tripoli" (Shane, 2011) while Trango Special Projects opportunistically stated on their website “are you and your business ready to return to Libya?” (Forte, 2012: 62). These statements reveal that AFRICOM can only benefit Africa if it develops synergy with the AU and decides to abandon its exceptional "corporate capitalist" identity which prioritizes US economic security over African development.

AFRICOM was ostensibly established in 2007 during the same period African leaders were attempting to develop their own continental security paradigm to promote development on the continent. Since then, the continent has been plundered by "Islamic" terrorist groups which were not a feature of the African continent if we are to consider the US Strategic Report published in 2000 which examined the security environment of Africa by making no mention of Islamic extremism or major transnational terrorist threats (Metz, 2000). Furthermore, it seems the DoD’s watchdog agency is accurate in stating that AFRICOM has failed in winning the hearts and minds of Africans because it “did not adequately plan or execute” missions designed to win over Africans deemed vulnerable to the lures of violent extremism (Turse, 2015c). In 2012, General Carter Ham enacted the first step towards winning the hearts and minds of Africans by presenting a speech at the Achebe Colloquium. His speech highlighted how AFRICOM could shift from being viewed as “apocalyptic” to “complementary” organization. His discourse was welcomed by African intellectuals and scholars because the General was entering the space of intellectuals from Africa. He was not dictating remedies to African problems from his ivory tower in western capitals. He praised the patient and consultative mechanism embedded in the African Union and spoke of future coordination and cooperation with African states (Campbell, 2012).

Finally, AFRICOM could win the hearts and minds of Africans when the US ceases to use the organization to rival China in the new scramble for Africa. AFRICOM should adopt the Chinese or Japanese character of performing politics through dialogical rather than exceptional terms as personified in the FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) summit and TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development). These organizations stress the importance of Africa “owning” its development, as well as the importance of perceiving the actors involved as partners instead of securitizing them as threatening subjects. The reason Africa is comfortable with Chinese investment in the continent is founded on China cooperating and coordinating with the AU (Forte, 2012). In More than Humanitarianism published in 2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations, the US and Europe continue to perceive Africa as an economic-frontier to be acquired by stating that Africa “cannot be considered as [our] chasse gardé. The rules are changing as China seeks not only to gain access to resources but also to control resource production and distribution”, Chester Crocker continues by stating that it is “wistfully nostalgic for an era when the United States was the only influence and could pursue its objectives with a free hand” (Lake et al., 2006: 131). AFRICOM can only become perceived as a trusted party in African development and not the extension of the US informal empire once the US redefines its contours which have led to a tragedy in international diplomacy. The US security apparatus needs to redefine its contours by ejecting itself from the “age of corporate capitalism” which as William deliberated, betrays American Founding principles because it is a flawed belief that postulates that the only course to US domestic prosperity is through the US expanding its economic-frontier globally. The US should alter its exceptionalism idea with a belief that performs politics by considering that “the rational and equitable use of its own human and material resources at home, and interdependent cooperation with all other peoples of the world [will develop a] democratic, equitable and straightforward loving community” (William, 1961: 489).

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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End Notes

1 I do not use the term anniversary because AFRICOM has not honored its mission statement.

2 Ole Waever states “What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it [security] something is done. By uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use what-ever means are necessary to block
it”

iii According to William and Peoples (2015) an issue that is politicised is located in the realm of “normal politics” and an issue that is securitised shifts into the realm of “emergency politics”

iv In 1897, President McKinley appointed Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Roosevelt’s enthusiastic support for intervention is revealed when he says “I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one”, this was based on the belief that his generation of young men needed to test their mettle in battle (Anderson, 2015). Roosevelt greatly admired naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan and supported his theory that the United States needed a modern navy to protect its growing interests around the world. Although he served as the Navy’s Assistant Secretary for only a year, Roosevelt was instrumental in preparing the U.S. Navy for a future war with Spain. During his tenure with the Navy, Roosevelt developed contacts with noted naval strategists, planned future strategies for a naval war with Spain, and appointed George Dewey to command the Asiatic Squadron.

v Secretary of State John Hay first articulated the concept of the –Open Door in China in a series of notes in 1899-1900. These Open Door Notes aimed to secure international agreement to the U.S. policy of promoting equal opportunity for international trade and commerce in China, and respect for China’s administrative and territorial integrity. British and American policies toward China had long operated under similar principles, but once Hay put them into writing, the Open Door became the official U.S. policy towards the Far East in the first half of the 20th century.

vi Hay proposed a free, open market and equal trading opportunity for merchants of all nationalities operating in China, based in part on the most favored nation clauses already established in the Treaties of Wangxia and Tianjin. Hay argued that establishing equal access to commerce would benefit American traders and the U.S. economy, and hoped that the Open Door would also prevent disputes between the powers operating in China.

vii Said (1994:4) of Culture and Imperialism states “so influential has been the discourse insisting on American specialness, altruism and opportunity, that imperialism in the United States as a word or ideology has turned up only rarely and recently in accounts of the United States culture, politics and history. But the connection between imperial politics and culture in North America, and in particular in the United States, is astonishingly direct”

viii Helliwell and Hindess (2013) highlight the anthropological racism embedded within western modernity when we analyse the Western anthropologist in dialogue with the non-western. The western interlocutor discusses the non-western using an ‘othering’ tone that is superior in racial terms because the non-western is perceived as not being in the present, but stuck in the past. They are denied coevalness because they are incapable of comprehending the ethos that constructs the logic of western modernity.

ix Turner (1962:35) states that “From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil; and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom — these are the traits of the American frontier.”

x Anderson (2015) states that when peace was reached in 1919 and Wilson deliberated his 14 points, he stated “the stage is set, the destiny disclosed... the hand of God has led us into this way, the Senate was unmoved and was explicitly insinuating that they are not comfortable in an indefinite extension of regenerative intervention into the affairs of the world at large.”

xi Doty (1993:299) states that Explanations for why-questions are incomplete in an important sense. They generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen. They presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves. In contrast to more conventional approaches to the analysis of foreign policy, the approach I take in this article poses a how-possible question. In posing such a question, I examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others. What is explained is not why a particular outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible”

xii Keenan (2010:116) says that “The first attempt to fabricate terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel region was on 18 October 2002, when alleged Islamists, operating under the protection of the DRS, hijacked and abducted four Swiss tourists near Arak (Southern Algeria). The operation, however, was botched. It is inconceivable, in the light of the very close post-Bowman relationship between US and Algerian intelligence services, that the United States could have been unaware of the Arak operation. Why else were two officials from the State Department’s Counterterrorism Office, AF DAC Robert Perry and S/CT Deputy Coordinator Stephanie Kinney, briefing the governments of Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania on the Bush administration planned counter-terrorism Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), at the same time as the botched Arak operation? Indeed, even though the PSI forces were not officially brought into the region until January 2004, US Special Forces, believed to be attached to the P2OG, were operating covertly in the region as early as November 2002. The State Department explained the PSI as a program designed to protect borders, track movement of people, combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation and stability. It is a State-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation. Its goals support two U.S. national security interests in Africa: waging the war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security.”

xiii Forte (2012:200) reveals that an embassy cable (USEF/2009/11/2) transmitted from Tripoli to Washington reveals the frustration Libya possessed as head of the AU because AFRICOM’S TSCT mission duplicated AU security arrangements located in CEN-SAD, PSC, and NASF.

xiv Keenan (2010:126) states that This [PMC] multi-billion dollar industry is looking for the next US-sponsored conflict market once the Iraq and Afghanistan-bubble burst, and they see that market as Africa, a continent of crisis”.


xvi National Security Strategy (2002) outlined a blueprint for military operations in Africa by utilizing a discourse which casted Africa in relative terms to the West. The image of Africa was presented through words such as ’disease, hub for terrorist cells,porous borders,poverty”.. All of these traits were discursively discussed to construct Africa as threatening US (exceptional) values of preserving human dignity.

xvii Tiekku (2010: 132) states that “In the view of a leading US policymaker, AFRICOM complements the desires of the African Union’. The official mission of AFRICOM and the AU security arrangement is to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts on the African continent and advance Africa’s development. The leadership of AFRICOM and the AU security apparatus contend that they envision an Africa that is secure, stable and developed, and that the goal is to use the two security institutions to contribute to the realization of that vision. In the words of the first commander of AFRICOM, in the years to come, people will see an Africa that is secure, stable and developed in ways meaningful to its people and our global society”. Publicly, the two security institutions have adopted similar approaches to resolving problems in Africa. AFRICOM officials appear to concur with the AU mantra that African solutions must be regarded as the primary remedy to dealing with African security and developmental problems. AFRICOM may intervene in a crisis when an African solution fails to resolve the problem or when the AU invokes AFRICOM for help. Thus, AFRICOM would not only first seek African solutions to African problems but, as Ryan Henry, a senior US defense official points out, it will be used primarily to support the indigenous leadership efforts that are currently going on”
Barotseland and the advocacy for statehood: A case entailing the complexities of statehood and state recognition in public international law

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This paper discussed the Barotseland claim for statehood from the republic of Zambia with respect to the Barotseland Agreement (1964) signed between the Northern Rhodesian government and the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) in April 1964. In discussing the Barotseland question, using a qualitative approach, this paper considered the sentiments that fuel the reasons for seeking separate statehood by Barotseland pro-separatists. An analysis based on the criteria of 1933 Montevideo Convention on Statehood was made, and considerations were also made on the viability of these claims (for statehood) with respect to the possible ramifications of the grant for statehood. Self-determination of people is guaranteed and is a principle or right supported by the United Nations (UN) Charter within the rights of groups seeking self-determination. Ergo, statehood is a matter that requires the satisfaction of the criteria necessary for its pursuit. However, as this paper contended, the status of statehood is usually placed outside the domestic confines of where the claim is being made, and into the international realm. It is therefore imperative to consider these questions within the framework of Public International Law and Politics because ultimately, in a highly-globalized world, statehood or recognition of an entity as a state cannot be conferred without the involvement and resolutions of the international community through the auspices of the United Nations - in which case statehood is concretized as this gives a state legal personality. For comparative and illustrative purposes, the paper drew on some famous statehood questions from different parts of the world. This paper concludes that the Barotseland calls for statehood do not satisfy the 1933 Montevideo Convention and that the feasibility of a separate Barotseland is far from possible.

Key words: Barotseland, independence, secession, self-determination, sovereignty, statehood, state recognition, Zambia.

INTRODUCTION

'Barotseland’ is an area in Zambia that largely encompasses what is today referred to as Western province. It is made up of 38 ethnic groups prime among the Lozi who established the Barotseland kingdom. The...
The Barotseland question

The Barotseland Agreement 1964 in effect ended any responsibility that the British government had to the governments of Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland. The Agreement (1964: 1) states in part that:

"all other treaties and other agreements subsisting between her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when Northern Rhodesia becomes an independent sovereign republic and her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom will thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of Northern Rhodesia including Barotseland, and the Litunga of Barotseland to enter into arrangements concerning the position of Barotseland as part of the Republic of Zambia to the place of the treaties and other arrangements hitherto subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen and the Litunga of Barotseland".

The Agreement further reads in part that:

"and where as it is a wish of the government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of Barotseland, his council, and the chiefs and people of Barotseland that Northern Rhodesia should proceed to independence as one country and that all its peoples should become one nation".

The term here is used to refer to the theoretical legal concepts that address statehood and recognition in Public International Law

5 The Northern Rhodesian government was represented by the then Prime Minister, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and Barotseland was represented by Sir Mwanawina Lewanika the Third, the Litunga of Barotseland.

6 Barotseland was a Protectorate of the BSAC
We see from the given statements of the Agreement that the parties concerned with this merger were before the independence of Northern Rhodesia, considerably separate entities. This is not a matter of equivocation. It is a consistent truth that Barotseland existed as an independent nation before the birth of Northern Rhodesia. The preserve of maintaining or disengaging from its attachment to Northern Rhodesia in historical and legal terms remained with the people of Barotseland (Caplan, 1970). Barotseland’s status at the onset of the colonial era differed in many ways from the other regions which were included in Zambia. It is this distinction which made Barotseland the first territory north of the Zambezi River to sign a minerals concession and protectorate agreement with the British South African Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes (Sikayile, 2014: 22). The discussion of the Barotseland question must encompass or rather make recognition of the fact that in pre-colonial Zambia, a very small number of ethnic groups were centrally organized around a chief with functional bureaucracies (Mufalo, 2011: 2). Of the aforementioned ethnic groupings, Barotseland (Lozi Kingdom) was arguably the most politically centralized and so-culturally cohesive, and this is what explains the existence of a sense of national consciousness among the Lozi people (ibid).

In 1969, the then president of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda announced that Barotseland will from that point forward be referred to as the Western Province of Zambia. This in effect was taken to mean - by proponents of secession - that the declaration arrogated the rights conferred to the Litunga under the Barotseland Agreement, which created a semi-autonomous Barotseland. As Namushi (n/d) writes, “in October, the Government of Zambia introduced and passed the Constitution Amendment Act No 36 of 1969 in parliament to cancel the “Barotseland Agreement of 1964” and abolish all rights, obligation and liabilities attached to the agreement. It stated that the Agreement shall on and after the commencement of the constitution amendment Act No 5 of 1969 cease to have effect, and all rights (whether vested or otherwise), liabilities and obligations there under shall thereafter lapse.”

Tensions have arisen over the years mainly due to calls - by those that advocate the creation (or re-establishment) of an independent Barotseland - that the government of Zambia must honour the conditions of the Barotseland Agreement by reinstating it or let Barotseland secede and become an independent state; a call which has become much louder in recent years. As Sikayile (2014: 1) observes, “...the Barotseland question, which, like a bad birthmark, has over the years kept on re-emerging, much to the detriment of Zambia’s national integration project and its sovereign outlook.” In January, 2011, the crescendo of these political tensions was reached in which the calls for the restatement of the Barotseland Agreement were coupled with blatant calls for a separate state (ibid). In 2012, it was resolved by the Barotse National Council (BNC) to accept the repudiation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 to pave the way for the process of territorial separation between Barotseland and the rest of Zambia (BNFA, 2015). The Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) for example, in January, 2015 wrote to the president of the Republic of Zambia and stated in part that, “Since independence, the people of Barotseland have watched with great dismay how successive Zambian regimes violated the Barotseland Agreement 1964; the very fabric of the basis of the unitary state of Zambia thereby leading to its unilateral repudiation in 1969, and, thereafter, continued violations of the human rights of the peoples of Barotseland.

As Sikayile (2014: 2) asserts, “the Barotseland question demonstrates resistance by the people of Barotseland to the hegemonic erosion of the political existence of Barotseland as a pre-colonial nation”. These continued calls for secession are informed by the foregoing ‘abrogation’ of the terms of the Barotseland Agreement and also the seeming general lack of a concrete development agenda, and sentiments of government neglect in the area that forms Western Province (Barotseland). A British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) article on the Barotseland question stated in quoting their reporter in Lusaka, that, “the Barotse royal household has backed the calls for the region to become independent, which have long been made by activists who accuse the government of ignoring the region, which remains one of the poorest in the country”. Even more so, the termination of the Agreement, which has been argued by the BNFA, essentially means that the two united entities seized to exist as one nation and therefore constitutes the right for Barotseland to be self-determined and create or be considered a separate state. They (the BNFA) argue that “without the Barotseland Agreement 1964, there is no unitary state called Zambia. As it were, the Barotseland Agreement 1964 is no more. Barotseland has since taken steps to engage the leaders of Zambia with a view to working out transitional arrangements towards self-determination and self-rule for Barotseland.” Stemming from this could be that the Agreement expressly conferred upon the people of Barotseland all the constitutional rights of the Zambian people, access to judicial and financial responsibility for the administration and economic development of Barotseland on equitable and fair terms as with other parts of Zambia (Barotseland Agreement, 1964).

3 Merger here is used as a principle of territorial acquisition in Public International Law where it is understood that a merger is the coming together of two separate entities – in this case Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland - came together via agreement to form a new independent (from British control) sovereign republic to be called, Zambia.

4 As a matter of fact, Barotseland had long agitated for an independent state from the British. It had become a Protectorate in 1900. For purposes of not wanting to make this a heavily historical account, the author offers that the reader sees: Gerald Caplan (1970) Elites of Barotseland 1878-1969; Political History of Zambia’s western Province, London.

5 Citing Mainga Bull (1969) and Caplan (1970)

6 Citing Roberts (1976)

7 Cited by Mbinji Mufalo (2011) in Re-examining the argument for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement

8 This was deemed contrary to Section 112 of the Constitution of Northern Rhodesia which enshrined the protection of Barotseland against alienation of any part of the kingdom without approval of the Litunga and his council.

9 1969-1970 the Government of Zambia passed the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 47 which had the effect of stripping the Litunga of his powers over land in the province. It vested all land in Barotseland in the President of Zambia as a Reserve within the meaning of and under the Zambia (State lands and Reserves) Orders 1928 -1964.

10This project can be referred to as the ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ which was introduced by Zambia’s first president, Dr Kenneth Kaunda with the aim of uniting the ca. 73 tribes forming the nation.

11Can be found at www.unpo.org/Article17923

12The BNFA are a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) which states that it “is an international, nonviolent, and democratic membership organisation. Its members are indigenous peoples, minorities, and unrecognised or occupied territories who have joined together to protect and promote their human and cultural rights, to preserve their environments, and to find nonviolent solutions to conflicts which affect them.” This demonstrates in some fashion the consideration as ‘separate’ that pro-separatists consider themselves.

13Edgar Chagwa Lungu

14 Can be found at www.unpo.org/Article 17923.

15The administrative capital of the Republic of Zambia


17 The author finds it imperative to paraphrase the Agreement and capture the most salient aspects of the agreement for the purposes of the discussion. Therefore, if necessary, the agreement in its entirety can be found at http://www.barotseland.info/Agreement1964.html for the full scrutiny of those that wish to examine it entirely. This is a matter of transparency and objectivity on the part of the author.
also given control of local matters in Barotseland in as far as they fall within the customary laws of local administration (ibid).\textsuperscript{20}

Namushi (n/d) quoted Litunga Ilute Yeta IV who in 1994 stated that, “secession is a matter of right and is inherent in the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 so that the parties to the said Agreement reserve the right to revert to their original status if the Agreement under which they intended to achieve unity can no longer work. Zambia has no moral right to hold the people of Barotseland in perpetual enslavement on account of an Agreement, which was entered into voluntarily, we cannot be expected to adhere to the terms of the Agreement, which the other party to it does not recognise”.

The question of statehood is a very important one in international relations. Evans and Newnham (1998: 45) state that, “the notion of sovereignty here should be seen as the normative or enabling concept of International Relations through which nation-states assert not only their ultimate authority within their distinct territorial boundaries but also their membership in the international community Amos, (2014).” Many ethnic groups in the world still seek their own statehood separate from the states under which they are considered to be members. This is often a fractious issue because of the various political, economic, social and geographical implications that may emerge as the ramifications of statehood. Many questions of statehood are still unresolved today primarily because of the erstwhile mentioned corollaries.

Statehood, secession and recognition

Discussions of statehood often evoke particular connotations. For the legal traditionalists, the primacy of states in international relations is the forerunner in discourse on statehood and the international system, such that, as primary actors, there is parity among the states in terms of their powers as sovereign entities (Taylor, 1997). The traditional definition of statehood confers legal personality in international law to a state that in declaratory terms satisfies the criteria for statehood (Montevideo Convention, 1933). The Icelandic Human Rights Centre (n/d) states that:

“International law is based on rules made by states for states\textsuperscript{22}. States are sovereign and equal in their relations and can thus voluntarily create or accept to abide by legally binding rules, usually in the form of a treaty or convention”. By signing and ratifying treaties, states willingly enter into legal, contractual relationships with other states to a particular treaty, which observance is normally controlled by the reciprocal effects of non-compliance. The capacity of states to enter into such relationships with other states and to create legally binding rules for themselves, is a result of states international legal personality\textsuperscript{23}, a prerogative attributed to all sovereign states\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{20} Again, here, it is the understanding of the author that a clear distinction is made between the powers of the Litunga in the jurisdiction ‘traditionally’ forming Barotseland and the subsequent powers bestowed or retained by his leadership under customary law. The Agreement makes a distinct demarcation between these customary land powers and the overall control that government of the Republic of Zambia could exercise especially over land matters that fall within national jurisdiction. It further clarifies the necessary cooperation to exist between the government of the Republic of Zambia and the Litunga.

\textsuperscript{21} This is the traditional definition of legal personality. It is employed here for the purposes of specificity in dealing with the subject matter vis-à-vis statehood and recognition. This definition encompasses some of the salient classificatory criteria or aspects that the 1933 Montevideo Convention enumerates. It is therefore employed here deliberately owing to its capture of the relevant aspects informing the criteria for statehood especially with relation to the constitutive theory of statehood.

\textsuperscript{22} A broader and ‘contemporary’ definition of legal personality is given by Gunaratne (2008) by stating that, “States and non-state actors like individuals, international organizations, multinational companies and international non-governmental organizations are regulated by, or subjected to international law. They are called subjects of international law. These subjects have international legal personality. . . They have certain rights and duties under international law and they can exercise these rights and duties”. To be found at: https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com


\textsuperscript{24} The court was asked to determine whether a self-proclaimed republic, referred to as Srpska, was a state whose leadership could be liable for various atrocities carried out by its leaders. It concluded that “Srpska met the definition of a state by noting that it is alleged to control defined territory, control populations within its power, and to have entered agreements with other governments. In Eggers (2007).

\textsuperscript{25} In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ held that there is “no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often . . . for long periods they are not . . .” in N. Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (Federal Republic of Germany. v. Denmark/Netherlands), 1969 ICJ 3, 33, P 46 (Feb. 20).
governance model or style. It must however, expend of its authority effectively. Flowing from this, an effective government is constituted by internal and external governance. Internally, a government must have the ability to effect and maintain order legally through an established legal system. Externally, governance encompasses the ability for a state to act of its own volition. Therefore, it is the establishment of functional, administrative and legislative bodies that generically provide the indication of the presence of strong and effective governance mechanisms within a state (Schoiswohl, 2004). The ability of a state to enter into external or foreign relations is said to be somewhat contestable. The phrasing of this requirement falls short in conveying a clear meaning and has led to debate amongst theorists as to whether it demands ability or capacity to be able to conduct or engage in foreign relations. The American Law institute opines that this criterion specifically refers to a state having the capacity to engage into foreign relations (Brownlie, 1990). The declaratory theory conveys upon its characterisation of the criteria for statehood the fact that statehood is met without the need for the endorsement of the international community (Poore, 2007). In reality however, it is highly probable that a state will remain without the classification as a state or rather will have no rights in the international community absent of international recognition. Resultant here is that, the declaratory theory reduces a state to subjective criteria in which case the international community has the final veto power in conferring statehood. As a result, declaratory theory may simply subject the state to a series of subjective criteria before providing the international community final veto power (Worster, 2010)

The postulations of the constitutive theory assert that the conference of statehood is not satisfied by meeting the criteria of the declaratory theory. The international community needs to recognise an entity if it is to be considered a state (ibid). This theoretical position is drawn from the transition from the natural law to positivist theory in international law which laid emphasis on the centrality of consent as the most important aspect of statehood (Schoiswohl, 2004). Declaratory theory is postulated by most theorists but from a realistic perspective, the constitutive theory is what reflects accurately what transpires in practice. This is given corroborration by the argument that it is only states that make up the UN Security Council and that only states have recourse to the International Court of Justice (Worster, 2010). However, despite the imperative of state recognition, declaratory constitutive theorists do not posit that recognition alone confers statehood (Worster, 1988). According to Lakshman (2013: 2):

"Recognition is often withheld when a new state is seen as illegitimate or has come about in breach of international law. Almost universal non-recognition by the international community of Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus are good examples of this. In the former case, recognition was widely withheld when the white minority seized power and attempted to form a state along the lines of Apartheid South Africa, a move that the United Nations Security Council described as the creation of an "illegal racist minority regime". In the latter case, recognition was widely withheld from a state created in Northern Cyprus on land illegally invaded and occupied by Turkey in 1974. Most sovereign states are states de jure and de facto that is, they exist both in law and in reality".

It is important to note that after an entity achieves recognition, uti possidetis: a doctrine of territory in international law, dictates that newly created states will maintain the borders which determined their territory prior to their independence from a colonial power (Raic, 2002). This served the purpose of maintaining the integrity of international frontiers by limiting the fragmentation that new statehood may create (Poore, 2007). In Africa, in the period of decolonization, it was generally agreed that secession was to be denied (Schoiswohl, 2004). According to Dimitrios (2011), "this intention was emphasized in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity", which affirmed the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence." And, the Cairo Resolution, which reaffirmed that "all the states undertake to respect the boundaries existing at . . . independence".

International boundaries are created and become permanent by way of agreement or Treaty (Raic, 2002). When boundaries are established in the post-colonial life of a state, uti possidetis, is superseded by the notion of territorial integrity. In the post-League of Nations era, the UN Charter stands anathema to the aggression against the territorial integrity of another state by the threat or employment of force (Dimitrios, 2011). Territorial integrity in Africa has been contextually interpreted in manner that rarely condones self-determination (Schoiswohl, 2004). According to Crawford (1979: 274), "secession is the creation of a state by the use of force and without the consent of the former sovereign." Minority groups are not permitted under international law to unilaterally secede, unless there are some attendant special circumstances such as colonial domination. This desire to secede must also collaborate with the desire of the majority. The UN acknowledges that it cannot give membership to a secessionist territory without the allowance of the mother state. This in turn means that secession is subject to the law obtaining in the mother state (Crawford, 2006). Deng (1973: 19) calls this ‘bilateral’ secession. He states that, "in practice, two things can together justify bilateral secession: 'a clear expression of democratic will' by those wishing to secede, and negotiations between the secessionists and the parent country". On the other hand, secession can be termed: remedial. This form of secession is premised on the participatory rights of citizens to take part in the process of deciding on the question of secession (Raic, 2002). However, other than subjugation and being dominated, without the effective means, minorities are mostly economically and politically side-lined from these processes of the state (Buchheit, 1978). From this theoretical position, the exclusion of minorities from taking part in matters of the state gives them impetus to create their own state and govern themselves. Under remedial secession theory, these exclusions from participation in the government enable the minority region to form a state to govern itself (Raic, 2002).

Minorities can call for unilateral secession where they have been deliberately hampered in their pursuit of political, social, cultural and economic development by means of being denied access to the government (Dimitrios, 2011). The concept of remedial secession thus resembles dissolving secession in which case a state may come into being without the express consent of the parent state. As Schoiswohl (2004:50) asserts, "dissolving secession posits that a state may be created without the consent of the former sovereign, which in view of its collapse and lack of effective (central) governance has at least temporarily de facto ceased to exist as a state." Without the foregoing occurring, the territory seeking session may be denied doing so. Further to this, internal colonialism adds another dimension to the remedial secession theoretical approach". Internal colonialism results where an ethnic group in control of government systematically exploits resources of the regions occupied by minority ethnic groups, reducing the development of those regions to dependencies and allocating the members of minorities to specific roles in the social structure on the basis of objective cultural distinctions (Hechter, 1999). This reveals that internal colonialism is conceptualised with close links of territorial disengagement from the parent state under considerations of some particular elements of the traditional conceptualisation of colonialism

26 Now the African Union
27 Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, member states were required to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."
28 UN Charter Art. 2 paragraph 4
(Franck, 1993). With respect to the historical boundaries or ethnic groups, the area in question for secession must be subordinated to the parent state. Subordination of the minority population in such a fashion makes internal colonialism appear like remedial secession. In Public international law, the sequence of remedial secession moves from the protection of individual rights, to minority rights, and terminates with secession as the ultimate outcome. However, the right to self-determination is legitimized by the harshness with which the minority population are treated. It is the severity of the treatment of the minority population that will legitimize the right to self-determination (Buchheit, 1978).

The question of statehood for Barotseland remains a hotly contested issue which has seen violent police crackdowns, arrests and court convictions of those that have tried to protest the seeming government inertia on the issue. Also, it is a very thorny political question that has seen subsequent governing regimes since the signing and repudiation of the Agreement, only raise the issue as a matter of concern mostly in election years. The disillusionment of the people that occupy Barotseland (Western Province), due to what they deem government neglect - feelings buttressed by low levels of development and ethnic affinities - often because the region is deemed a stronghold of, or rather seemingly votes in favour of opposition parties; the calls for the restoration, by the pro-separatists, of the Barotseland Agreement and subsequent secession from Zambia have become stronger over the years. In fact, they have never gone away but are somewhat kept from the public space because of the contentious nature of the matter; which has been typically used for political mileage by competitors in the political market and at the same time thwarted by ruling regimes because of its controversial nature. It is therefore a permutational necessity to discuss the subject matter in light of Public International Law in attempts to establish prospects for statehood as they pertain to the international community vis-à-vis the criteria of the 1933 Montevideo Convention and state recognition. This is also underlined by the fact that pro-separatist groups are calling for secession for the purpose of establishing an independent state.

DISCUSSION

In Public International Law, statehood remains a primary factor in establishing the ability to participate in the international community in a legal and legitimate manner. Statehood is what gives the primary entry point to engaging in international affairs. Even though the number of subjects or actors in Public International Law has widened to include private individuals, International Organizations and Multinational Corporations, states arguably remain the foremost actors and statehood is very central to this.

In discussing the case for statehood of Barotseland, it is proposed here by the author that this is best done by considering the secessionist question historically and in contemporary terms. The reason for this is that the Barotseland agreement should be considered as a bridge between two distinct existential conditions or statuses of Barotseland. Therefore, it is the opinion of the author that the Barotseland land question must from the declaratory pronouncements of the Montevideo Convention on statehood, be divided into the historical state that is, before amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, through the Barotseland Agreement, and after. In reiteration, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and duties of the State (1933), gives the widely-accepted criteria in International Public Law, of statehood. It asserts that the state as an international person should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter relations with other states (Shaw, 2008). Further to this, Shaw (2008: 198) offers that, “the Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia in Opinion No. 1, declared that the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organized political authority, and that such a state is characterised by sovereignty”. Therefore, historically, used here to specifically refer to Barotseland before the amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, is presented with a much more incontrovertible case for or rather status of statehood. As Sikayile (2014: 2) reiterates, “given that Barotseland once existed as an independent national entity long before the creation of Northern Rhodesia, it could be argued that Barotseland’s separatist motives reflect an inviolable entitlement (right) they have held for so long.” Therefore, even though using the Montevideo criteria may be considered ex post facto when applying it to the pre-agreement condition of Barotseland, it does fit the classification provided by the Convention. Barotseland (currently Western Province) had territory which was described by the Geographer (1973) wherein it was stated that “The territory of the Barotse Kingdom was defined as that over which the King of Barotse was paramount ruler on 11th June 1891” (Figure 1 in Appendix). With regards to a permanent population, while this has been classified as not pertaining to a specific number, Barotseland is said to have been constituted by the predominant Lozi ethnic group (5.7% of the Zambian ethnic demographic) whose Litunga consolidated power and brought other tribes under his rulership to constitute Barotseland. To this effect, it is undeniable that Barotseland had a permanent and considerable

31 The author contends that it is still very relevant to place the pre-colonial Barotseland nation-state under this criterion because of the alluded to dichotomous nature of the status of the state before and after the Barotseland Agreement. This is for the purposes of distinctions of the situations.
33 According to the World Fact Book-CIA, Zambia’s ethnic demographic is as follows: Bemba 21%, Tonga 13.6%, Chewa 7.4%, Lozi 5.7%, Nsenga 5.3%, Tumbuka 4.4%, Ngoni 4%, Lala 3.1%, Kaonde 2.9%, Namwanga 2.8%, Lunda (north Western) 2.6%, Mambwe 2.5%, Luvale 2.2%, Lamba 2.1%, Ushi 1.9%, Lenje 1.6%, Bisa 1.6%, Mbanda 1.2%, other 13.8%, unspecified 0.4% (2010 est.). To be found at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html
34 These tribes according to Stokes (1965) co-existed as a coherent polity within an ethnic melange of what was the Barotseland Kingdom
35 Suggesting effective control of territory
population. Gluckman (1965) stated that, "the Lozi are the dominant tribe of Barotseland, and their king rules not only his tribal people but also members of some twenty-five other tribal groups. The Barotse kingdom includes 250,000 to 300,000 people inhabiting some 80,000 square miles in north western Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia)." In terms of a government, Barotseland had an established governance system (Figure 2 in the Appendix for the governance structure of the Barotseland Kingdom).

As Mufalo (2011:2) elaborates:

"The Lozi Kingdom evolved out of a citizen and subject paradigm, where the Aluyi or Luyanas subdued or coerced other groups in most of western Zambia, and created extensive spheres of influence and also posted consuls to other neighbouring ethnic groups. The governance model among the subdued and coerced was based on the political institutional structures of the central authority of the Litunga. Governance inclusiveness was however practiced as all subjects had representation in spiritual, military and judicial roles, although supremacy of aristocratic heredity reigned".

As for the ability to enter relations with other states or entities (Refer to Figure 3 in the Appendix), this can be confirmed, arguably, by the various Treaties that the Litunga was able to sign with the BSAC. This is confirmed by for example, the 1890 Frank Lochner Treaty which was signed between King Lewanika I and the British South Africa Company, making Barotseland a British Protectorate. This was for the purposes of protection of Barotseland against German, Portuguese and Ndebele forays (Mufalo, 2011). While the attempt here is not to cite all the treaties that Barotseland king signed, it is important to view this Treaty-signing ability as confirmation of the independent nature of Barotseland as a separate entity akin to statehood, and reflecting an effective control over territory with relation to dealing with states or forces outside the territory of Barotseland; confirming or characterising this as dealing with national (state) matters with foreign elements; to underscore an ability to engage in foreign relations. It should be kept in mind that pre-colonial Barotseland was a self-governing entity: an independent entity.

As Mainga (2010: 162 ) states, "the external features of the process by which between 1886 and 1911 Bulolo passed form an independent African state to become a protectorate within a protectorate, are now firmly established. It is the history of a series of concessions and agreements signed by Lewanika by which his sovereign rights were whittled away." Ergo, the entering into the Lochner Treaty, although reducing independence must be seen from the point of view of an independent 'state' willingly shedding some of its independence for protection. This is actually buttressed by the other three cited criteria for statehood vis-à-vis the Montevideo Convention on Statehood. It therefore can be concluded with sufficient surety that the pre-Agreement (1964) Barotseland was indeed a state in the classificatory criteria employed here. In fact, relation should be made to the fact that the Barotseland Agreement was entered into by Barotseland as a contracting party, conveying the independence of the Kingdom, and exhibiting its ability to relate with other nations/states, that is, Northern Rhodesia.

The calls for statehood by pro-Barotseland separatists in the contemporary or post-Barotseland Agreement 'era' can be said to be quite obfuscated in how they correspond to the classification criteria of the Montevideo Convention. It is imperative here to also apply the case for statehood under the methods or criteria employed for the pre-Agreement consideration. All things considered, calls for statehood in the post-agreement or rather contemporary times are best interrogated with the acceptance that they are based largely on the pre-agreement considerations of statehood; which have erstwhile established a qualification of statehood on an ex post facto basis. However, this must not distort the concomitance with the criteria of the Montevideo classification. In fact, the claim for statehood is rooted in the historical basis of the status of statehood

37 Barotseland is made up of as many as 38 ethnic groups. In what is considered a state of co-habitation. These groups include among others the Mankoya, Kwanga, Mafwe, Matotela, Mambukushu, Masubiya, Ilumigazi, Matokaleya, Mambunda, Mwankamakoma, Mbowe, Mishilundu, Muenyi, Mahumbe, Makwamulunga, Manyengo, and Simaa (Sikayile, 2014) who offers further direction to: http://www.unpo.org/members/16714#sthash3TQTWGHH.dpuf for more.,

38 Consider this as of 1965 so as to avoid any confusion with Sikayile (2014)'s revision.

39 This is to substantiate the point on permanence of population.

40 This point and the appended example must also be taken to mean the generic classificatory criterion stated as the 'ability to enter into foreign relations.' This could be with other states or other foreign entities whose interaction with the state constitutes foreign relations. In this case, Barotseland signing a treaty to become a protectorate of the BSAC. This point is imperative because it clarifies the obfuscation that may arise from strict adherence to language used. It is necessary to clarify that the ability to enter into foreign relations is not strictly on a state-to-state basis but encompasses the state's ability to engage in other foreign relations with entities that are not states. What is crucial here is that the state in question is able to engage in foreign relations with either other states or entities such as foreign companies or organizations that are independent of the state from which they hail.

41 In this case MNCs or international organizations or other bodies.

42 As Muimui (n/d) puts it, "the early Lozi politics depicted an evolution of a concrete rule which branched throughout their own territory and that of the conquered tribes".

43 Barotseland

44 It should be noted here that the term ex post facto is used just as an operational term for making the distinction between the historical status of Barotseland and the contemporary question vis-à-vis the Barotseland Agreement. This should in no way be construed as inferring the use of the term in matters or cases that involve the contestation of issues at(international) law, and its use in the sense of defence or judgement of cases. In fact, the declaratory and constitutive means of statehood involve no 'court' judgements giving statehood.

45 For a more detailed discussion on the statehood criteria of the contemporary Barotseland see the question at: http://barotselandpost.com/index.php/monarch/itemlist/user/18/editorgeneralafrica/rosetlandpost?start=610 which highlights the aspects of criteria for statehood that are being used by the BNC. Minor changes may be noticed in the territorial classifications elucidated here, but this does not take away from overall classification criteria and the aspects covered. This article expands further on
The only differences however, for which clarity must be sought are: the status of independence or autonomy (post-agreement), the ability to enter relations with other states, and the question of sovereignty on the part of the Zambian government vis-a-vis effective control of territory and territorial integrity. For the two former criteria, it is presumably safe to conclude that the current status of Barotseland (Western Province of Zambia) does not make it autonomous or independent (sovereign) nor does the BRE have the ability to engage in foreign relations akin to a separate/independent entity or state because currently, Barotseland is a province of the Republic of Zambia and the sole responsibility of managing foreign relations lies with the government of the Zambian state.

Furthermore, it can be deduced that the absence of independence or autonomy means that effective control of the claimed Barotseland territory is not under that of the Litunga and is by the nature of Zambia’s sovereignty, under, and is subject to the control of the state. In fact, one is led to the conclusion that a call for reinstatement of the Barotseland Agreement and the further call for statehood, which has gathered much momentum, suggest a desire to reinstate the status quo in which the conditions of the agreement gave autonomy to Barotseland and the Litunga, and the restoration of the pre-colonial independent state of Barotseland, respectively, which may restore its Montevideosque (sic) statehood status as established in the preceding examination of the historic or pre-colonial Barotseland. In this scenario, the author has sufficient reason to concede-with strict6 adherence to the Montevideo classification of statehood—that the contemporary Barotseland separatist movement (considered as a whole) does not qualify for statehood in the way that it historically did, before the Barotseland Agreement.67 The disqualifying factor lies in the fact that a completely complex situation was created by the abrogation or rather the termination of the Agreement in 1969 by the Zambian government, in which case Barotseland had already acquiesced to the unifying and state-forming68 Barotseland Agreement of 1964.

For speculative argumentation, it is worth referencing Distefano and Heche (2014) who state that, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties in Article 2(1)(b) defines state succession as, “the replacement of one state by another in the responsibility of international relations of territory”69. They further state that, “decolonization, unification, and separation are the possible occurrences of state succession. . . . unification of states is the merger of two or more states into a new entity.”60 Therefore, given what this scenario implies, the formation of the Republic of Zambia, and the emergent government, meant that it assumed the responsibility for the new territory of which Barotseland had become a constituting part. It shall be further assumed here, that abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement was made on the consideration that despite the terms of the agreement, with respect to the semi-autonomous nature of the agreement granting local powers to the Litunga, territorially, authority over Zambia (Northern Rhodesia + Barotseland) lay with the Zambian government, and hence the Agreement, it can be argued, was dissolved on this manner of thinking. It must be noted here that this line of argumentation based on the Vienna Convention of 1978 is only made in light of the logic that it applies in matters of state succession, and that this although coming into being later than the date of the termination of the Barotseland Agreement does not necessarily mean the decision to terminate (in 1969) may have not been orchestrated on similar reasoning referent to overall territorial administration, with this sole power vested in the emergent Zambian government. In other words, the author is not implying that termination of the terms of the Barotseland agreement were made based on the Vienna Convention on State Succession (1978).

Moreover, in considering the Barotseland secessionist movement from the perspective of state survival in international relations, where territorial integrity is a necessary pre-requisite for the ability of a nation to operate as a functional unit that allows for it to participate in the global community economically (trade, foreign investments, access to loans and grants etc.), politically (diplomatic relations and membership to International organisations) and culturally, secessionist movements have a tendency to trigger the ‘state survival’ button. Secession in effect means redefining borders and this may have geo-economic consequences that may threaten the survival of the Zambian state as it is. Here the author argues that, the territory that Barotseland (refer to map/figure 1 in Appendix) covers, encompasses mineral-rich areas where mining firms have invested heavily. Mining activities still contribute approximately 70% of Zambia’s national income.53 The secession of Agreement 1964 to form the Republic of Zambia.

In this case Zambia
60 The unification of Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland to form Zambia entailed the falling away of these previous entities.
61 Refer to Article 4 of the Barotseland Agreement available at: http://www.barotseland.info/Agreement1964.html
62 Cultural relations can be facilitated through official diplomatic state to state interaction or the travel of individuals who normally require a passport to travel across state borders. This highlights that even cultural interaction whether at state or individual level requires statehood and the benefits that accrue thereof. This point can be cross-referenced with Figure 3 in the Appendix.
63 According to an analysis by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ten companies contributed approximately 88 percent of total government revenues from the extractive industries sector in 2015, with FQM’s Kansanshi Mining accounting for almost 23.60 percent of the total extractive revenues for the year from mineral royalties, income tax, pay-as-you-earn (PAYE), VAT,
Barotseland as a separate state threatens the survival of Zambia as a state and has the potential to alter its international relations. Ergo, the Barotseland calls or demands for secession pose a threat to the fundamental underpinnings of Zambia’s statehood. Further to this and in keeping with the principle of *uti possidetis*, Barotseland territory extends beyond Zambia’s borders.\(^{54}\) (Refer to map/Figure 1 in Appendix) and into portions of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In this respect, Dr Alex Ngoma’s assertions, a political analyst at the University of Zambia, were quoted in an article that stated that: “the boundaries of the Barotseland go beyond some of Zambia’s borders and has wondered how possible it will be for the people of Western Province to claim the land in such countries.” The principle of *uti possidetis* clearly states that a newly-independent state must maintain its historical/pre-colonial borders in order to protect its territorial integrity. However, this poses a very difficult problem to the Barotseland question because this means that the secessionists are also contesting for territory that now belongs to independent and internationally recognized states whose territorial integrity and sovereignty are protected by the UN Charter. Public International law is very clear about the respect for the territorial integrity of independent states that form the international community: this point will not be over-emphasized here. However, it is imperative that the complexity of the Barotseland question is highlighted here in reflecting that if statehood is sought within the postulations of Public International Law vis-à-vis *uti possidetis*, it becomes a very complex situation to navigate because the independence of Barotseland moves beyond contentions between pro-separatists and the Zambian government, but also brings into the picture the territorial integrity of Zambia’s neighbours as erstwhile enumerated. Ergo, the contention can be made here that the pro-separatists agitations may create tensions between the Zambian government and its affected neighbours. The pro-separatists in this instance have to consider the principle of *uti possidetis* and its attendant implications and keep in mind that a ‘redaction’ of territorial claims to only remain confined within the borders defined as Zambian takes away from sensibility, and in a manner of speaking, violates the principle of *uti possidetis* which is clear on the maintenance of historical/pre-colonial territorial boundaries. Furthermore, the tensions that may result from this pro-separatist position would need a diplomatic solution: a solution to be reached between the Zambian government, as the custodian of international relations pertaining to its territory, and the affected states. This suggests the primacy of the Zambian state in the effective control of territory/borders and management of international relations thereby further demonstrating the weakness in the pro-separatist position and hence highlighting their shortcomings in satisfying the classificatory criteria of the 1933 Montevideo Convention. The lack of a clause in the Barotseland Agreement expressly providing for secession or giving condition that an abrogation of the agreement would (legally) revert to the status of the two unifying parties before their merger in which they retain their status quo as independent/separate entities may have been exploited here (refer to link provided for the entire Barotseland Agreement 1964). Furthermore, the Constitutional amendments of 1969 and the land Acts of 1970\(^{55}\) previously alluded to, may be considered to have corroborated or emboldened the Zambian government’s consideration of the territory of Zambia in sovereign terms to the point of viewing the entire country as a unitary state not beholden to any privileged (semi-autonomous) considerations of the Litunga and Barotseland, which may otherwise corroborate the further demand for secession and subsequent independence. In essence, these constitutional amendments terminated this special consideration and placed the Litunga and the Barotseland under the Zambian presidency. As Sikayile (2014:28) puts it, “these constitutional alterations drastically reduced the Barotseland king’s powers and realigned Barotseland’s legal status to that of other provinces elsewhere in Zambia.” Therefore, it is a conspicuously complex case, the Barotseland question, which must then be further considered in terms of self-determination, secession, statehood and the role of international recognition, with special reference to the structure of the international community vis-à-vis international politics.

The UN Charter in relation to self-determination

Granted that the UN Charter\(^{56}\) provides for the rights of peoples to self-determination, the call for separatists to establish their own state is, by virtue of this recognition by the Charter, a starting point in its own right. Ergo, the desire for independence or statehood is not problematic in this sense. Historically the quest for a return to self-rule in Barotseland dates as far back as 1907 when request was made by King Lewanika for Barotseland to be detached from the Zambian government, as the custodian of international relations pertaining to its territory, and the affected states. This suggests the primacy of the Zambian state in the effective control of territory/borders and management of international relations thereby further demonstrating the weakness in the pro-separatist position and hence highlighting their shortcomings in satisfying the classificatory criteria of the 1933 Montevideo Convention. The lack of a clause in the Barotseland Agreement expressly providing for secession or giving condition that an abrogation of the agreement would (legally) revert to the status of the two unifying parties before their merger in which they retain their status quo as independent/separate entities may have been exploited here (refer to link provided for the entire Barotseland Agreement 1964). Furthermore, the Constitutional amendments of 1969 and the land Acts of 1970\(^{55}\) previously alluded to, may be considered to have corroborated or emboldened the Zambian government’s consideration of the territory of Zambia in sovereign terms to the point of viewing the entire country as a unitary state not beholden to any privileged (semi-autonomous) considerations of the Litunga and Barotseland, which may otherwise corroborate the further demand for secession and subsequent independence. In essence, these constitutional amendments terminated this special consideration and placed the Litunga and the Barotseland under the Zambian presidency. As Sikayile (2014:28) puts it, “these constitutional alterations drastically reduced the Barotseland king’s powers and realigned Barotseland’s legal status to that of other provinces elsewhere in Zambia.” Therefore, it is a conspicuously complex case, the Barotseland question, which must then be further considered in terms of self-determination, secession, statehood and the role of international recognition, with special reference to the structure of the international community vis-à-vis international politics.

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\(^{55}\) (*Author’s re-emphasis of point*)1969-1970 the Government of Zambia passed the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 47 which had the effect of stripping the Litunga of his powers over land in the province. It vested all land in Barotseland in the President of Zambia as a Reserve within the meaning of and under the Zambia (State lands and Reserves) Orders 1928 -1964

\(^{56}\) UN Charter art. 1, para. 2
from North-Western Rhodesia and BSAC rule. In 1921, King Yetta III demanded direct rulership of the imperial government as a protected native state over all the territory referred to as Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia; and the termination of all concessions and agreements between the Litunga and the BSAC (Mufalo, 2011). Demonstrably, Barotseland has been historically on the search for a restoration of their self-governing status or statehood; in a manner of speaking. However, the calls for self-determination themselves fall within a legal paradigm in Public International Law which is itself mired in contradictions. However, calls for the right to self-determination must at least be grounded, for example, in the sentiments of oppression, socio-economic and political marginalization that can be substantiated. As Mufalo (2011: 1) asserts, in light of the Barotseland question “dissent to a sense of belonging to a state has myriad reasons. Dominant of them however are sustenance of a sense of belonging to a traditionally and colonially recognized historically defined nationhood; and a sense of socio-economic and political exclusion (or marginalization) in the post-colonial state….”. In this light, it is essentially a matter of the separatists proving that the government of the Republic of Zambia has denied them their socio-economic, political and other rights; but to whom? This question suffices-to borrow the words of Brilmayer (1991): “because secessionist movements call for international recognition of the states they seek to create, they necessarily concern the world community”; but more importantly this question is asked in order to highlight the inherent complexities of secession in particular, because Public International Law has no provision for a ‘right to secession’. Christakis (2012) observes that, “It is commonly admitted today that, outside the context of decolonization and military occupation, there is no ‘right’ to create an independent state….even though secession is not prohibited, international law disfavours it and creates a presumption against effectiveness and in favour of the territorial integrity of the parent state. Indeed, the final consent or, at least the “resignation” of the parent state and the abandonment of its efforts to reassert its authority seem crucial in permitting the secessionist entity to “normalize” its situation by demonstrating the “ultimate success” of the secession”.

However, secessionist movements borrow from particular Public International Law provisions that support their claims. Much of their focus is on the United Nation’s clear recognition of self-determination, but they do this while ignoring the fact that the Charter holds that self-determination does not supersede a state’s territorial integrity (Brilmayer, 1991). In the case of a minority region, which is “persistently and egregiously denied political and social equality” it is conceivable that international law will define such repression as colonialist in nature. As a result, if repression is recognized as colonialist, the minority region would be given the right of decolonization. Furthermore, as elucidated previously, self-determination and the attendant calls for secession, unilateral or remedial, vis-a-vis colonialism or internal colonialism must produce sufficient evidence showing that the minority group seeking secession have in each defining circumstance been outrightly colonized or treated severely and marginalized based on their ethnicity (internal colonialism) to the effect that they have been denied their economic, political, and socio-cultural rights. This would be a difficult allegation to prove or substantiate considering the Barotseland question and the arguments of the pro-separatists.

It is contended here that, the people of Barotseland are allowed to take part in the political, economic, and socio-cultural processes of the Zambian state as full citizens. For example, they can vote, form and join political parties, work as civil servants, and are not restricted in any fashion or form, from taking part in economic activity such as owning businesses or being employed. Sufficient to say, the current Vice President of Zambia is Inonge Wina; a woman who hails from Barotseland (Western Province). Furthermore, because of the philosophy of ethnic or tribal unity dubbed “One Zambia, One Nation” initiated by the first President of Zambia: Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, citizens from all the 72 tribes/ethnic groups of Zambia, can be found almost in any province of the country. This is so because the national unity philosophy created a situation where members of various ethnic/tribal groups could move to, and even settle in any part of Zambia for work, business and even marriage (inter-tribal) such that the argument for colonization or internal colonization does not suffice, and

57 “historical trajectory”: North-Western Rhodesia/Barotseland was formed in 1889 and North-Eastern Rhodesia was formed in 1900 by what were respective Order-in-Councils which divided territory between these two regions for the purposes of separate administration. However, these two territories were merged in 1911 by the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council which replaced the previous Order-in-Councils (North-Western Barotseland and North-Eastern Rhodesia). Northern Rhodesia came under full control of the British Crown in 1924 after the termination of the BSAC rule. It is important to note here that Barotseland maintained its separate status as a British Protectorate even after the merging of North-Western Rhodesia/ Barotseland and North-Eastern Rhodesia to form Northern Rhodesia. Special Order-in- Councils of 1953 and 1962 were very clear in indicating that Barotseland was a British Protectorate within Northern Rhodesia in which the Litunga’s authority was preserved by earlier treaties and concessions, and that Northern Rhodesia was to be governed separately under the rule of the British crown respectively. A precise account can be found in Muimui’s (n/d) article: The Political history of Barotseland to be found at: http://www.barotseland.info

58 It must be noted that some fervent pro-separatists deem the Barotseland question as one of colonialism/colonization in which case Barotseland is colonized by Zambia or more accurately, Northern Rhodesia. This can be illustrated by the sentiments of the Political Editor of the Barotseland Post who states in part that, “colonisers can build schools, hospitals and roads, but that does not change their character and nature, they still remain colonisers. The Barotzis do not enjoy the freedom of assembly and expression under the colonization of Zambia”. To be found at: http://http://barotselandpost.com/index.php/all-news/barotseland/item/2154-barotseland-and-zambia-will-never-be-one-nation-afumba-mombotwa-to-the-united-nations

59 Others put this figure at 73
in any case, makes the calls for self-determination on these premises difficult to substantiate. The Barotseland question cannot be tendered along the lines of colonization because a Treaty was signed between Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland to form Zambia, a state in which the people of Barotseland have not been denied the rights to participate, and are in fact, citizens of the Republic of Zambia with full rights.

Similarly, internal colonialism cannot suffice in this instance because no evidence premised on the examples given can sufficiently argue that the people of Barotseland have been side-lined as an ethnic group whose resources are being utilized and distributed only on the basis of created dependencies; and are assigned roles in society based on cultural structuration.

Furthermore, because of such socio-cultural things as the intermarriages between the people of ‘Barotseland’ and those of other tribes/ethnic groups in Zambia, it is arguably sufficient that the calls for secession may not have majority support because of the relatively successful tribal/ethnic integration in Zambia in which the majority of people consider themselves Zambian nationalists as opposed to considering themselves as willing to become citizens of a separate Barotseland. Furthermore, the uniformity with respect to demands for secession must be examined or rather interrogated from the perspective of the other ethnic/tribal groups that make up Barotseland. Is there overwhelming consensus in Barotseland that evidences a widespread sentiment for secession from Zambia; where Zambian citizenship is renounced for the establishment of an independent Barotseland and the attendant citizenship this creates? Sikayile (2014: 55) who in his study interviewed members of other ethnic groups in ‘Barotseland’ cited a Chairperson of the Nkoya Royal Council (NRC) who speaking at a press briefing stated that:

We want to state that we will never be part of Barotseland. We are part of Zambia and the issue of seceding does not arise, it is a non-starter. As far as we are concerned, Kaoma and Lukulu districts are not part of their resolutions to break away from Zambia. Our position is very clear; we have said as custodians of the land, we will not be part and parcel of that area. We have nothing to do with Barotseland.60

This reflects the reality that the presentation of the calls for secession as representative of the entire Barotseland population are erroneous and do not account for the underlying politics and stakeholder61 interests in the matter.62 This further adds to the complexities that hinder the justifications for secession. Also, the Lozi who make up the bulk of the population of Barotseland can hardly be considered a minority. According to the Zambia Tourism Board, “About 90% of the population fall into 9 major ethno-linguistic groups: the Nyanja-Chewa; Bemba; Tonga; Tumbuka; Lunda; Luvale; Kaonde; Nkoya; and Lozi”63. Worth considering also is that with regards to internal colonialism, and that is in keeping with the definition, the Zambian government is not dominated by any specific ethnic or tribal group.

The matter deserving determination in this case further falls within the brackets of establishing whether pro-separatists are considered mere ‘rebels’ in which case they constitute a threat to the sovereignty and security of the Zambian state: an argument the Zambian government has made or rather implied with the arrests of pro-separatists and in some instances asserting that pro-separatist sentiments are tantamount to treason. A 2013 article by Peter Wonacott in the Wall Street Journal stated in part that:

“when residents sang and danced in Mongu’s dusty streets in August to celebrate the self-declared birth of their new nation, Zambia’s policed pounced……59 people arrested in the sweep appeared at a court. ... charged with treason. Many were picked up in the past few weeks for their alleged involvement in a ceremony to select a new regional administrator who would organize elections for a newly independent government. It was the latest sign of separatism taking hold in Africa - both peacefully and violently.” Peter, (2013).

The complexity is that, who determines the facts of the status of the behaviour of the separatists in Public international law, if the separatists are not recognised internationally in the sense that their status or cause is not one that has caught any significant attention64 in the international community65. The latter point can be clarified by the examples of the Kurdish question, South

60 These were statements drawn from an Article on www.lusakatimes.com that Sikayile 2014 was citing and not those from one of his direct respondents
61 Calls for secession must reflect the will of the constituent groups that fall under the territory claimed by the secessionists. Consensus must be reached in order for separatism to be reflected as being made with one voice and a uniform desire across all stakeholders.
62 For a more detailed account of the relationship between the pro-separatist Lozi movements and the other ethnic groups of the Barotseland as regards viewpoints on secession and the politics of group dynamics, please see Amos Sikayile (2014). The puzzle of state sovereignty: Discourses of contested statehood; the case of Barotseland in Zambia pages 51-59
63 http://www.zambiatourism.com/about-zambia/people
64 This is no way a denial under international law of the rights to seek self-determination, but is used here to highlight the awareness, interests and perhaps attitudes of the international community to secession movements vis-à-vis the recognition of those movements seeking statehood and the importance of this recognition by the most influential and powerful states in the international community.
65 Also, considering the ‘treatment of themselves as a state’, do the pro-separatists, the BRE included have recourse to International Law under the bodies designated to dispense of state-related disputes? Sufficient to say that it is an established fact that, there was an abrogation on the part of the Zambian government of the Agreement, but under the administration of state to state disputes in international law, the case of breach of contract may be brought under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 to which Zambia is a signatory and not Barotseland. Therefore, this presents another complexity in the Barotseland question. Interestingly, a point to consider here is that the
Sudanese secession and the case of Somaliland.

Barotseland statehood vs the Kurdish question, South Sudanese secession and the case of Somaliland

The Kurdish people who are estimated to amount to approximately 35 million, designated as the largest ethnic group in the world without statehood, have been for years agitating for statehood in the regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Hadji (2015) makes the affirmation that the Kurds formed the autonomous region called the Kurdistan Regional Government or KRG which after the Gulf War of 1991 and the ousting of Sadaam in 2003 has since become a strong autonomous region. The KRG fulfils the criteria of statehood laid out in the Montevideo Convention. Suffice to say that, the Kurdish question is one that has the considerable attention of the international community, which in a sense gives the issue the legitimacy that recognition carries. However, the Kurdish question falls within a much larger international political matrix involving the aforementioned states and their relationships to superpowers. The Kurdish question of self-determination falls well within the paradox of international realpolitik. As Berlin (2009) intimated, while the issues of statehood in Public International Law remain controvertible, de facto statehood conveying upon the concerned state the validity and rights to secede ultimately requires the sanction or rather, recognition of regional and world powers for it is that recognition that allows the said state to be legitimised and indeed function as a state. It then suffices that the states that host Kurds, namely Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran coupled with the United States of America, have vested geopolitical interests that may not accommodate an allowance for an independent Kurdish state.

Unlike the self-determination calls of the Kurds, the Barotseland separatists’ calls do not garner or have not been shown to do so, the interest of the international community in a manner that even implicitly suggests that recognition or claims of statehood are only hampered by the complexity of the geo-political nature of their statehood question, which may satisfy the given declaratory criteria of statehood, but thwarted by the interplay of varying challenges in the relationships of influential states in the international community on which recognition rests heavily. In other words, the importance of influential and powerful states in state recognition can also be viewed from the implied recognition of the state in question; which if not for their vested interests, they would recognize by the official method of admission to the UN, this of course also attendant to the domestic situation. Power politics are extremely crucial in this rather unusual way of discussing state recognition. The thin line between Kurdish and even more so Palestinian statehood for example, are the underlying interests of the international community’s most powerful and influential states, in which case, the question of statehood of the concerned states is already an internationally ‘recognized’ issue by those states that have the power or influence to confer it by the institutional methods of UN membership, save for the status quo.

The author here offers that the Barotseland question does not have as much ‘currency’ or recognition as the Kurdish or Palestinian questions, for example, to the point that regardless of the aspects of Public International Law in terms of statehood that it satisfies, it is of no interest, geo-politically or otherwise, to the states that matter in concretizing statehood, even to the point of symbolic recognition. This is perhaps crude, but is offered here as an explanatory permutation. As Worster (2010) asserts, “. . . the rules of state recognition, although legal rules, are legal vehicles for political choices.” Lauterpacht (1944) states that, “a state may use any criteria when judging if they should give recognition and they have no obligation to use such criteria. Many states may only recognize another state if it is to their advantage”.

The foregoing illustrates the most glaring problem both the declaratory and the constitutive theories seemingly cannot resolve: the problem that Public International Law remains subject to high politics. Whereas recognition itself (flowing from the constitutive theory), treated here as being significantly more effective but not legally superior to the declaratory fact of statehood, can be made by any state (consider the case of the Palestinian-Israeli question), it remains the endorsement of powerful states, and this specifically means a UN Security Council recommendation that is not objected or vetoed by any one permanent member, and hence recognition that seems to confer ‘concrete’ statehood that allows a state to become a member of the international community; used here to mean having legal personality. As Farley (2010: 792) points out, “the question from this perspective is not when a state is a state, but rather to whom is a state a state. That is, a state may be a state internally but not externally.”

The Barotseland question as compared to the South-Sudanese case for example, provides another

66 Refer to bilateral secession
67 For example, Taiwan arguably meets the criteria set forth under the Montevideo Convention, but because of political circumstances, the international community has failed to recognize its statehood. See Worster (2010).
68 The Palestinian-Israeli impasse is a clear-cut example of how high politics can interfere with the concretization of statehood to the point of full participation in the international community as a full state. The impasse in the UN Security Council of ‘official’ Palestinian statehood witnesses the influence of power politics vis-à-vis the veto power. 135 states have recognized Palestine as a state but the refusal of Palestinian statehood lies ultimately with veto power of the 5 permanent members in which case the US has vetoed Palestinian statehood. For example, refer to an article titled Palestinian Statehood bid fails at UN Security Council as US, Australia vote against”. To be found at www.rt.com
noteworthy and further permutational illustration. The secession of South-Sudan was a domestically negotiated and settled solution, but took on an international dimension when the membership to the UN was granted and this gave the new South Sudanese state legitimate or undeniable international statehood, which is ultimately what gives legal personality. What needs specific mention here is that from the domestic standpoint, the Sudan-South Sudan secession agreement was made possible by an internal political process that involved negotiation between the government and the secessionists, and then taken to a national referendum. It is not the object here to give a detailed account of the proceedings, but what needs highlighting is that the willingness to negotiate on the matter meant that, or could be taken to mean that the (North) Sudanese government was willing to forego its claims of sovereignty over the entire Sudanese territory. This is very important. It is suggestive of the fact that the situation or status of a unified Sudan (North and South) was politically untenable such that the Sudanese government perceived it as an eventual solution to grant secession to the South by their willingness to forego claims of sovereignty over the entire Sudanese territory. Part of the defining factor of the situation as untenable is due to the history of Sudan in which slavery was one of the key factors in identity politics and the socio-cultural and economic relations in Sudan. Much of the violent conflict between the North and the South was premised on this historical fact. As Deng (2004: 1) states:

“As both cause and effect, slavery stratified races, ethnicities, religions and cultures, placing some in the category of slave masters and others into that of target populations, denigrated and dehumanized to justify their enslavement. In the Sudanese context, the master race comprised the Sudanese in the North who became assimilated into the Arab-Islamic mold and made to pass as Arabs. . . . . The enslavable groups were the Black Africans, especially those in the non-Arab, non-Muslim South, who practiced indigenous religious beliefs, and were therefore viewed as heathens and infidels”.

This created a situation where South Sudan became an independent state by Sudan’s willingness to subject its sovereignty to an internal political process that yielded the birth of new nation-state in the name of South Sudan. The point of willingness by the (North) Sudanese government to allow secession should be understood by taking into account the view that most African states have of territorial integrity. Sikayile (2014) asserts that the domestication of sovereignty in Africa is considerably a preventive factor in the disintegration of juridical states. It is for this reason that the allowance of secession of the South by the North Sudanese government can amongst other reasons be attributed to the untenable political situation characterized by violent conflict that existed between the two parties; prompting a political solution that however, was due to (North) Sudan’s willingness to concede territory. As Uzor and Okeke (2013: 159) state, “South Sudan is a state created by the approval of the parent state. The mechanism for secession was rooted in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the constitutional arrangement that resulted from this agreement. South Sudan is thus a rare example of a right to independence being exercised under domestic constitutional provisions. Its example further affirms that such constitutional provisions tend to be implemented exceptionally, as a political compromise and an interim solution aimed at peaceful settlement of the contested entity’s legal status”.

However, the statehood of South Sudan was legitimised by its admission to the UN on July 14, 2011. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to consider the Barotseland question in juxtaposition to the South-Sudanese attainment of statehood. The very important reference point here is that, at the domestic level, the Zambian government must have a willingness to ‘compromise’ their sovereignty in considerations of territorial integrity if the Barotseland question is to have a conclusion like that of the Sudanese case: this willingness being an entry point to recognized statehood in the international community for Barotseland. Further following the South-Sudan example, the fundamental difference, adding to the complexity is that the Zambian government does not see the Barotseland question as an untenable political situation. In fact, it is quite difficult to see it as such because of a lack of an extremely volatile standoff between secessionists and the Zambian government. The fact that the Zambian government views any ‘conflictual’ behaviour by secessionists as treasonous or rebellious behaviour confirms the view of the Barotseland question as a matter of national security and public order, which

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69 This point can be cross-referenced with the assertions of Deng (1973) on pg 15
70 Sovereignty premised on territorial integrity is one of the major reasons cited by states as the basis for refusal of secession in most cases.
71 The above point elucidating the untenable nature of relations between the North and South in Sudan was evidenced by the 2 civil wars fought between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005 in which case two underlying issues were sources of tension. After independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956, the Constitution did not settle two crucial Faultlines: whether Sudan should be a secular or Islamist state, and the country’s federal structure. The Arab-led government in the North reneged on promises made to Southerners to create a federal state which led to mutiny by army officers culminating in the first civil war. A failed 1972 peace agreement reached in Addis Ababa led to the second civil war. More detail can be retrieved from: http://www.enoughproject.org in an article titled Sudan: Independence through civil wars, 1956-2005. This point here was employed to accentuate what is meant by “untenable political situation” in which case secession between North and South was deemed as better than seeking to maintain a unitary Sudanese state.
72 Cross reference can be made here to the observations of Christakis (2012) made on page 29.
73 To mean that South Sudan was given legal personality which under Public International Law means that South Sudan now has recognized rights and duties in the international community.
74 This point can be cross-referenced with the description of legal personality by the Icelandic Human Rights Centre on page 10 and the expansion by Gunaratne (2008) at footnote 25 on page 11.
necessitates their resort to the application of Zambian law. In other words, whereas secessionists may see themselves as ‘liberation/freedom’ fighters, the Zambian government views them as rebellious factions threatening internal stability. An example of pro-separatists considering themselves liberation/freedom fighters is captured in the words of Noyoo (2016) who asserts that, “Ironically, the plight of the people of Barotseland, especially its nationalists and freedom fighters, would become extremely dire after Zambia became a multi-party democracy. From 1991 to date, thousands of Barotse nationalists and freedom fighters have been arrested, detained, harassed, physically harmed, tortured, maimed, maligned and killed by Zambia’s security forces of different Zambian political administrations”.

‘Liberation fighters’ connotes conflict and the use of force, which is necessary in so-called fights of liberation which occur under circumstances of occupation by a foreign element or colonization. In Public International law this challenge to authority of the state/government is categorized in three stages of rising intensity and these are designated as rebellion, insurgency and belligerence. Without delving into a detailed discussion, operational explanation of these stages will be made as follows: that rebellion is viewed as intermittent disturbances of public peace in which case the rebels fall completely under the authority of the state. Rebellion is completely domestic and falls within domestic law and the authority of the government. The same can be said of insurgency only that insurgents are seen to have a bit more organization and concentrated in a location within a state and having some measure of control of that particular location. Belligerence on the other hand suggests that a recognized state of conflict exists between two contending parties which in such an instance have the rights and duties of parties to a war (Martin Monograph series, 2004). This qualification of belligerents is according to Schindler (1979) met when:

1. The insurgents had occupied a certain part of the State territory;
2. Established a government which exercised the rights inherent in sovereignty on that part of territory; and
3. If they conducted the hostilities by organized troops kept under military discipline and complying with the laws and customs of war. Thus, insurgents could only be recognized if the hostilities had assumed the attributes of war.

Now, this is very important to note here because the actions of the Zambian government are better understood by the perception that they have of any activities of pro-Barotseland separatists and what categorization there is in Public International Law of these actions and statuses in relation to the parties involved in the ‘secession equation’ that is, the Zambian government and the pro-separatists. This is important because of the recognition that is given by the international community to groups that are ‘fighting’ for self-determination and independence from a state. It is a noteworthy assumption or conclusion that the Zambian government and their attendant response to actions of pro-separatists that are deemed as threatening to the state and its stability suggest a consideration of the pro-separatists as mere rebels. It is necessary to steer the discussion in this direction because any questions of secession and self-determination are connotatively premised on an eventual or potential use of force creating a situation of war where the advocacy for secession does not abate and is not controlled by the state from which secession is sought. Consider for example a letter written in 2013 by Commander General Mwiya James, addressed to the late President of the Republic of Zambia, Michael Chilufya Sata which stated in closing that:

“We demand for the stop and release of all the Barotse Nationals Activists arrested and an apology from the former first Zambian President Dr. Kenneth Kaunda for the abrogated 1964 Barotseland Agreement in 1969 and the currently Zambian President, His Excellency, Mr. Michael Chilufya Sata, for kidnapping, languishing, torturing, Killing, hatred and intimidation of Barotse Nationals. We humbly and firmly demand for full response, failure of which will compel us to no peaceful means but war between Zambia and the Barotse Defence Force (BDF) of the Kingdom of Barotseland”.

Higgins (2014) asserts that:

“Wars of national liberation are armed struggles waged by a people through its liberation movement against the established government to achieve self-determination.

Encompassing all forms of advocacy for independence. Particular to this point is that even if separatists do not take up arms, actions that are deemed as threatening stability, peace and territorial integrity are met with force by the parent state.

This letter titled: Barotse defence force appeals for unconditional release of all ‘Barotse’ citizens and apology from KK can be found at: https://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/08/22/barotse-defence-force-appeals-for-unconditional-release-of-all-barotse-citizens-and-apology-from-kk/. Of interest here is that in this letter are copied the following: United Nations Secretary General, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki Moon; The International Criminal Court, The Hague, Royal Netherlands; The Secretary-General, Commonwealth; The Secretary-General, African Union; The Secretary-General, Amnesty International, UK; The President – International Criminal Court (ICC), Hague the Netherlands; The President -International Court of Justice (ICJ), Hague the Netherlands; The Secretary-General, SADC, Embassies accredited to Zambia. This, highlights firstly, that the pro-separatists consider themselves a state. This point must be cross-referenced with footnote No.70 on page 30. Secondly this warrants the examination of the matter in terms of the interest and awareness of the international community and the pending question of recognition. This point must be cross-referenced with references to the interest or awareness of the international community made on pages 34 and page 46.
While wars of this type have been fought since the foundation of the sovereign state system, the main spate of such conflicts occurred in Africa in the postcolonial era of the mid- to late 20th century. A number of postcolonial self-determination conflicts continue today. National liberation movements and governments have opposing views of wars of national liberation. National liberation movements view their armed challenge to the established government as a “just war”; indeed, they view it as a legitimate exercise of a right to revolution, waged to achieve the right of the people they represent to self-determination. Conversely, governments view challenges to their authority as the acts of terrorists and criminals, seeking to destroy public order and, ultimately, territorial integrity, and, in general, they attempt to deal with such violence under domestic criminal or martial law”.

It suffices to include here that the viewpoint and actions of the Zambian government as concerns the Barotseland pro-separatists may very well be substantiated on the grounds of monopoly of violence, in which case the Barotseland secessionists are viewed merely as Zambian “rebels” citizens or criminal elements subject to the full effects of internal methods of legally managing fractious situations, real or imagined, by the state. Sikayile (2014) offers that instrumentalization of the principles of international sovereignty by the Zambian government is obvious for the purpose of ensuring that the state’s territorial integrity remains intact. What accrues here, especially with regard to the constitutive and declaratory theories is that there are situations of flux in which the pending delineation of legal classifications of statehood matter for very little and only to the state so-willing to consider itself a state. It is perhaps important here to bring forth the example of Somaliland. The latter is in the declaratory sense of the word: an entity with the stark features of statehood. Or more bluntly, as Farley (2010:777) argues:

“The Republic of Somaliland declared its independence in 1991, presenting the international community with the question of whether to recognize it as a state. Since then, the nations of the world have consistently answered that question in the negative. Yet, the Republic of Somaliland has survived to become a relatively stable and democratic state. Its endurance continually renews the question of recognition for Somaliland. Today, that question’s answer must be in the affirmative: Somaliland meets the objective criteria of statehood and its separation from Somalia represents the dissolution of a state in conformity with international norms”.

Farley in fact makes his argument in full cognizance of the importance of state recognition by the international community in concretizing statehood; to mean full participation in the international community with the full rights given to states by International Public Law. He states that, “recognition is more than a mere formality in the contemporary international system. Its denial places real constraints on the capacity to function as a modern state, both domestically and internationally.” He further observes that Somaliland functions as a state, with the ability to enter foreign relations, manage its internal affairs through a government, has a currency, and a defined territory (ibid). With respect to Somaliland’s ability to enter foreign relations, he states that, “as part of a concerted effort to garner recognition, Somaliland has cultivated international relationships, including an agreement with Ethiopia, granting Ethiopia overland access to Somaliland’s port of Berbera. That agreement also formalized trade relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia, and included an agreement to establish customs offices along Somaliland’s border with Ethiopia. Somaliland has opened liaison offices in Ethiopia, Djibouti, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It has hosted delegations from states like Pakistan and from international organizations like the World Bank and the African Union.” This is especially in reference to the traditional statehood criteria of the 1933 Montevideo Convention. The legitimizing importance to statehood of UN membership vis-à-vis state recognition can be extrapolated from again referring to the South Sudan example by citing the words of the UN General Assembly President at the time71, who on 14 July, 2014 said that, “today we are firmly entrenching South Sudan in the community of nations in the same way as other member states with the same rights and responsibilities.”

It is important to note here that membership to the UN although voted by a 2/3 majority of the General Assembly is dependent on UN Security Council recommendation without which membership cannot be granted. As Chen (2001) asserts:

“Article 4(2) of the UN Charter provides: The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Accordingly, the decision-makers, regarding the applications for subsequent membership, are the Security Council, whose recommendation is indispensable, and the General Assembly, whose decision effects an admission. Without the recommendation of the Security Council, because of either a negative vote or inaction, an application cannot go forward to the General Assembly and is “dead” for all practical purposes until the Council again takes it up. Since a negative decision of the Security Council is not subject to review, it is in that sense “final”.

70 As retrieved from: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0072.xml
71 Joseph Deiss
72 Can be found at www.un.org in an article titled UN welcomes South Sudan as 193rd Member State
The institutional power of the veto, has shown itself in the politics of statehood and state recognition vis-à-vis powerful states when we consider the impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian question in the UN Security Council as previously alluded. The foregoing is captured well by Lalos (1979: 800) when he states that, “... existing states merely act as the gatekeepers to ensure that de facto states meet the criteria outlined under the Montevideo Convention. This de facto gatekeeper function makes recognition a political instrument, with powerful states effectively exercising veto power. It also means that until international “personality” is granted, the state is not attributed any rights or duties. Ultimately, in absence of international recognition, a de facto state is unlikely to achieve complete statehood”.

Furthermore, it is necessary to reiterate here that statehood in the sense of attaining legal status in the international community, pursuant to recognition and the confirming act of admission to the UN; where it is not mixed up with geo-political interests of powerful and influential states, on whom this is highly dependent, must overcome the sovereignty and territorial apprehensions of the state from which secession is sought. It is only after impasses so created from the erstwhile stated that a state seeking statehood as a legal person can then arguably, grab the attention of the states with the power to recognize and confirm statehood. The fact that secession is the ‘product of struggle’ has consequences for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is minimal possibility that those seeking secession and contending with a superior parent state, would be able to secede without external help (Gudeleviciute, 2005; Akehurst, 1997). Ergo, it suffices that even the satisfaction of the criteria for statehood (the 1933 Montevideo Convention), despite the obfuscated nature of the qualification itself due to wide legal interpretations of statehood by legal scholars, a state may be a state unto itself in the declaratory sense, and even domestically, which is legally provided for in Public International Law, but the recognition which is ultimately conferred by membership to the UN is of the utmost importance. In this regard, statehood in the case of the Barotseland question, appears to have a very long, frustrating and virtually impossible journey to travel.

**Conclusion**

Far from being about merely satisfying the criteria for statehood, the question of secession and the subsequent statehood are far more complex than they may be understood even by the secessionists themselves. It is a long-drawn battle that has several pitfalls and twists to render it an almost impossible task unless the statehood in question poses no severe consequences to those granting it, internally or externally. The modern international system works in such a fashion that even though Public International Law is steeped in the contradictions of the law itself in terms of the status of statehood and recognition; where a state can be a state unto itself, meeting the legal classificatory (declaratory) criteria and can still not be recognized; but a state that fails in one aspect or the other in satisfying the declaratory criteria for statehood can still be recognized and have legal personality. This is captured accurately by Farley (2010: 791) to reveal the importance of recognition, as well as the role of powerful states in recognizing and concretizing statehood via UN membership when he states that:

“On the other hand, failure to satisfy the Montevideo Convention criteria does not conclusively prevent an entity from achieving statehood. The process of decolonization in Africa resulted in the emergence of several entities recognized as states despite their failure to satisfy one or more of the Montevideo criteria. The former Belgian colony, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, provides the best example of a state emerging from colonial dominion that substantially failed to meet one or more of the Montevideo criteria. For example, at independence, the Congo did not possess an effective government. Instead, the UN and the state's former colonial power propped up the new state. Despite its inability to govern itself and thus its failure to satisfy one of the four Montevideo criteria of statehood, the Congo’s “application for United Nations membership was approved without dissent”

The questions or claims of statehood, though inspired by the usually moralistic undertones of the language of the UN Charter is ultimately decided upon by the political context within which statehood is sought. The dichotomy of the statehood question in the domestic-external construct is so

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53 This point is made to emphasize the role that power politics play in state recognition even at the institutional level of the UN, to which membership as highlighted in this section of the paper, is the surest way of legitimizing statehood.

54 There is a fine line here. External help must be understood here as pertaining to recognition by other states in the international community and not help in the form military or other assistance in the struggle for independence/statehood by the secessionists. The latter type of assistance would be considered a breach of Public International Law because it is expressly prohibited to meddle in the domestic affairs of another state. This is especially critical when the stand-off between secessionists and the parent state is not a liberation struggle constituting a legal status of war between the parent state and secessionists (herein considered belligerents). Therefore, it is important here to note the author’s point stressing that the matter of secession must be first addressed at the domestic level between the parent state and the secessionists in order to avoid the technicalities of breach of international law that may stem from recognizing a state that secedes illegally. However, the fact that statehood is being sought means that the international community vis-à-vis Public International Law cannot be left out of the equation.

55 As is the case between Somalia and Somaliland.

56 The constitutive approach stems largely from a shift from natural law to positivism, which focuses on “consent as the essential element from which obligations under international law derive.” Under positivism, the international community must consent to the admission of a new state because recognition creates additional obligations for existing states. In addition, new states are not bound by international law until consent is given. See Schoiswohl (2004).
fluid that it would not be wrong to consider it cyclical.

The Barotseland question is premised on the principles of self-determination and the feelings of nationhood that inspire a desire for a historical nostalgia of ethnic unity and self-governance that inspires a drive for secession and subsequently: statehood or nationhood. This is an understandable endeavour given that the people of Barotseland were an independent pre-colonial society that demonstrated a high political capacity for the maintenance of their state, in a manner concomitant with the 1933 Montevideo criteria for statehood. However, the dilution of their independence and their eventual loss of autonomy due to the political and economic conditions surrounding the state, has left Barotseland a victim of changing times and the modern classification of statehood; still largely predicated on the Westphalian model which emphasises the sanctity of territorial boundaries. It is perhaps in this light that the Barotseland question vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the Zambian state, may be considered a battle for historicism in a modern world where, as Englebert and Katharine (2008) as cited by Sikayile (2014: 37) state that, "the demand for international recognition of Africa's peripheral and separatist regions is largely constrained by the limited supply of sovereignty in the international system."

The Barotseland secessionists are fighting for statehood in a domestic scenario where Barotseland is a shadow of its independent pre-colonial and semi-autonomous post-colonial self. This is in a situation where the secessionists seek to detach territory from an entity whose statehood is internationally recognised, and by virtue of this, gives definition to Barotseland (now called Western Province) as a constituting component of a fixed territorial space that qualifies it as the (recognized) Republic of Zambia, under Public International Law. It is not difficult for one to draw on the complexity of the situation that Barotseland secessionists find themselves in. As long as the republic of Zambia remains sovereign and insists on this being informant of its territorial integrity, the feasibility of the return to Barotseland semi-autonomy or separate statehood, respectively is not in near sight. The geo-economic, political and socio-cultural impacts of secession threaten the integrity of the Zambian republic. In bargaining for statehood, the Zambian government legally, has a heavier hand by the standards of Public International Law because it is an internationally recognized state, which in this case may be considered as merely seeking to ensure public order and secure its territorial integrity. Suffice to say, internationally, the Barotseland question though provided for in Public International Law in both

matters of the criteria for statehood and the self-determination of peoples entrenched in the UN Charter, requires its accommodation in the much wider political context that is informed by the interest of the most influential and powerful states in the world (herein, referent to the recommendations made by the Security Council devoid of a veto by any permanent member). Here, it is argued that the surest way, especially for secessionists in the modern international system, intending to become new states, can only be achieved through UN membership which most certainly confers upon a new state: legal personality. This however is caught within a matrix of power politics where, if a state so impliedly recognized by the said powers is of geo-strategic or other interest to them, recognition and subsequent UN-based membership is 'prevented'. A reference point is the Palestinian-Israeli question.

On the other hand, if the question of statehood like that of Barotseland finds itself nowhere near any significance to the powers that be, it is most likely to be only hampered by the domestic tussles that secessionists must endure with the government of the state it wishes to secede from before it reaches the walls of the UN for state recognition. Such is the complexity of the Barotseland question; that it is not tenable both domestically at the entry level point, and internationally (exit point) because apart from any interest to the international community, the current status of Barotseland does not even meet the 1933 Montevideo criteria for statehood. This is said with the full cognizance of the fact the Barotseland secessionists though considering themselves as meeting the criteria for statehood, in a historical sense vis-à-vis the pre-colonial Barotseland, Barotseland is not independent or autonomous; the Litunga has no effective control over the territory that constitutes Barotseland, neither can the BRE establish external relations with other states or entities pertaining to the territory of Barotseland, which in actual fact forms what are today called Western, and parts of North-Western, Copperbelt and Southern provinces of Zambia (Refer to map/Figure 1 in the Appendix) and are under the effective control of the government of the Zambian state which is solely responsible for the local/public and international administration of the affairs of 'Barotseland' and Zambia as a whole. Furthermore, in considering the criterion of a permanent population, pursuant to its permanence and ethnic uniformity, it poses great difficulty in identifying the inhabitants of 'Barotseland' along this delineation because it is also populated by people from other tribal/ethnic groups that

77 Vis-à-vis the agreements/concessions between Barotseland and the British Crown, the BSAC and eventually the Barotseland agreement are attendant reasons for the loss of statehood of Barotseland. Ergo, the political and economic conditions here refer to the nature of the agreements which were informed by economic concerns such as mining concessions to the BSAC, and the political issues of protection of Barotseland from foreign forces, as a protectorate of the BSAC, and the eventual signing of the Barotseland Agreement with Northern Rhodesia which created the republic of Zambia.

78 Refer to the UN Charter's emphasis on the sanctity of territorial borders where it is stated that self-determination does not supersede territorial integrity.

79 Even the contemporary aspects of their criteria for statehood are based on the pre-colonial or historical structures.

80 An entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities to do so. See Brownlie (1990).

81 Save for those matters that are customary in nature and are within the Litunga’s jurisdiction.
originate from different provinces in Zambia. These people forming part of the population in 'Barotseland' are considered and consider themselves citizens of the territorial entity called the Republic of Zambia and inhabit 'Barotseland' because of socio-economic matters such as employment, business and marriage. Further to this is the fact that as a Zambian citizen, the freedom of movement is a constitutional right; in this sense, which translates to mean that the Zambian constitution, which is applicable in all ten provinces making up Zambia; of which 'Barotseland' is an integral and indivisible part affords all Zambian citizens the right to work and live in any part of the territory that is by Public International Law designated and recognized as Zambia. Therefore, in this respect, any citizen of Zambia shall not be denied access to any part or region of the Zambian state premised on the consideration of some regions, and in this case Barotseland, as a separate entity or rather state. Also, considering the other 38 ethnic groups that form Barotseland, there is no evidence suggesting consensus that these ethnic groups are in support of or advocating separate statehood as the example of the Nkoya people presents, where separate statehood was blatantly rejected by a representative of the Nkoya Royal Council. Connected to this is also the fact that there is no evidence of agitations for separate statehood in the other provinces (North-Western, Copperbelt and Southern) that Barotseland encompasses as shown in the map/Figure 1 in the Appendix. As it currently sits, the claims for Barotseland statehood are being made, and mainly by members of the historically dominant Lozi ethnic/tribal group, on a pre-colonial status that ceased to exist with signing of the Barotseland Agreement (1964) and the subsequent constitutional amendments made by the Zambian government. Also, the very contentious fact that Barotseland territory, premised on pre-colonial boundaries, goes beyond Zambian borders, and is in conflict with the principle of uti possidetis, makes the call for separate statehood very problematic. Suffice to say, a state may not satisfy all the conditions prescribed by the 1933 Montevideo Convention, as the DRC example provided but the Barotseland question remains elusive because ultimately it is part of an internationally recognized state, under Public International Law, called Zambia and is not or may not be viewed by the international community as a separate state or that the Barotseland question is not of significant international political interest.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Appendix

Figure 1. The Territory of Barotseland. This image demonstrates the territory Barotseland encompassed.
Source: http://unpo.org/downloads/1582.png
Figure 2. Structure of the Barotseland Government.
Source: This image illustrates the existence of a functional government in Barotseland. This structured illustration reveals the nature of the Barotseland royal establishment as characterised by an organized means of managing state affairs. This further suggests an effective control over the territory so designated as Barotseland. It must be noted that this structure remains in the BRE, but the stark difference is that the Litunga's chieftaincy is as that of every other chief in Zambia and presides over matters of customary law as concerns Barotseland and the Lozi people. The Litunga is given no other special status beyond this to infer that Barotseland is an autonomous self-governing territory.
Figure 3. The Queen Mother of Briatin visit to Barotseland in 1960.
Source: http://www.barotseland.info/1960.html
His Majesty King Mwanawina III, with the Queen Mother in 1960. This image illustrates what official state visits imply. In the context of this paper and the criteria for the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Statehood, this visit by the Queen Mother exhibits the ability of Barotseland before the Barotseland Agreement to engage in foreign relations.
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