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Political trust in Botswana’s executive presidency: The Khama era
Batlang Seabo, Wilford Molefe and Mpho Molomo

Analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial bureaucracy of Buganda: The major milestones in its development
Hizaamu Ramadhan
Political trust in Botswana’s executive presidency: The Khama era

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This article examines political trust in the institution of the presidency. It focuses on the Khama era and aims to find out the underlying motivations to trust the president. Using the Afrobarometer surveys, the paper finds that Batswana are more likely to distrust the president if they perceive high levels of corruption, poor government performance and are dissatisfied with democracy. Partisanship is important in trust for president and the most significant finding is that supporters of the Botswana Democratic Party have lost confidence in the president.

Key words: Botswana, political trust, institutions, presidency, attitudes.

INTRODUCTION

Botswana’s political system is widely regarded as a Westminster parliamentary system but in reality it operates a fusion of parliamentary and presidential systems. The presidential candidate of a party that returns more Members of Parliament (MPs) stands duly elected as President. In applying the strict parlance of the parliamentary system such a candidate would be elected as prime minister. In the independence elections of 1965, Seretse Khama was elected as prime minister; the Constitution was amended later on that the head of government be called president. Although the president is not directly elected by the people, as is the case in presidential systems, the Constitution of Botswana empowers the office of the president with extensive executive powers. The president is not only the head of state and government, he is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The president is also adorned with wide ranging executive powers, as provided in section47 of the Constitution. Whilst recognizing the extensive executive powers the presidency enjoys in Botswana, this article seeks to establish the trust the president and institution are accorded by Batswana.

This article departs from the basic premise that political trust is an important “indicator of political legitimacy” and a functioning representative democracy (Turper and Aarts, 2015: 1) Various studies on political trust (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, 2016; Hutchison, 2011; Lavallée et al., 2008; Armah-Attoh et al., 2007) observe that lower levels of political trust lead to low levels of civic engagement and political participation. Studies in industrialized countries (Inglehart, 2007; Hetherington, 2005) and third world countries (Diamond, 2007;
Armah-Attah et al., 2007) observe a general trend in decline in trust in political institutions. An article by Seabo and Molefe (2017) on “The Determinants of Institutional Trust in Botswana’s Liberal Democracy” concludes that citizens’ underlying attitudes on corruption, satisfaction with democracy and the level of education are significant predictors of the likelihood to trust political institutions. This article seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate on political trust by focusing on Botswana’s executive presidency. A study of Botswana’s executive presidency is an important milestone in African politics because Botswana is considered Africa’s long serving multi-party democracy.

In using regression analysis, this article models trust in public institutions over an interval of three rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2008, 2012 and 2014. The findings of these surveys indicate that political trust has been on a decline in institutions of parliament, presidency and the ruling party. However, for purposes of this article, analysis will focus on declining trends in citizens’ trust in the institution of presidency during the era of President Ian Khama (Figure 2). Measurement of political trust during the presidency of Ian Khama is significant because he is not only the son of the founding president of the republic of Botswana but was also brought into politics as a panacea to revive the ruling party that was plagued by factional fights. Khama, having served an illustrious career in the military, being a paramount chief of the most populous ethnic group, Bangwato, was seen as a figure that would inspire political trust across the political divide, especially within the ruling party. In a more substantive way, this article postulates that declining trust in the presidency is explained by attitudes on democracy, corruption, economic performance and education.

The article is structured as follows; the first section provides the contextual framework of understanding the executive presidency in Botswana. Second, it delves into a theoretical framework that explains the basis for political trust. This article draws heavily from the social capital theory, which explains interpersonal trust and political trust. Third, the methodology explains the dependent and independent variables that are used to measure political trust in the executive presidency. Fourth, it presents the findings and analysis of results, which are followed by conclusions. This article proceeds to address trust in the presidency, first by proving the political and economic context of understanding the executive presidency in Botswana.

CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

Before independence Bechuanaland, as Botswana was called then, together with the other High Commission Territories of Basutholand and Swaziland, were considered “economic hostages of South Africa” (Halpern, 1965) and there was a strong lobby to incorporate them into the Union of South Africa. Such incorporation was highly resisted given that South Africa was a pariah state based on racial discrimination and domination. At independence in 1966, Botswana had to overcome all odds; of not only being one of the poorest countries in the world but also of creating a viable state in a region dominated by white settler colonialism and racial dictatorships. Botswana defied the odds to become the longest serving multi-party democracy in Africa (Holm and ad Molutsi, 1989) and also an economic success story (Samatar, 1999).

At independence, the dominant economic activity in the country was farming, especially livestock farming. Although this sector was destabilized by periodic droughts, it remained the mainstay of the economy and was a means of livelihood for Botswana. The advent of the borehole technology in the 1950s that led to the sinking of boreholes in the hinterland opened more areas for cattle farming (Peters, 1984). The establishment of the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) in 1954 made cattle farming a lucrative industry and facilitated the emergence of a cattle owning class drawn from the traditional Tswana aristocracy comprising of chiefs, subchiefs and headmen (Tsie, 1996).

After independence, the technocratic-bureaucratic approach of a non-partisan civil service guided national development planning and defined the path of capital accumulation (Parson, 1983). The basic thrust of government policy was rural development that cultivated a strong link between the State, the cattle owning class and the rural peasantry. Arising from government programs and subsidies, there was a convergence of interests between the ruling elite (mostly farmers and small businessmen) and the rural peasantry (Parsons, 1981; Peters, 1984; Picard, 1980). They developed programmes that assisted the livestock sector. Besides, President Seretse Khama, Quett Masire and a significant numbers of Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament were renowned cattle farmers. Civil servants who were not allowed by their conditions of service to operate businesses could engage in farming, as it was considered a traditional and cultural undertaking. As a result, the interests of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) support by a strong bureaucratic arm were congruent with those of the cattle owning elite and the rural peasantry. To use the analogy of Gramsci (1971) and Poulantzas (1968), the cattle owning elite was the hegemonic fraction of the ruling class. One would extrapolate that the synergy between the political and economic elite would generate high levels of political trust. This assertion would be supported by the fact that during those years, the BDP was returned to power every election period by overwhelming majorities.

After the discovery and exploitation of minerals, Botswana experienced an unprecedented growth where in some instances she surpassed the East Asian Tigers. Botswana’s
development trajectory changed when cattle receded as the mainstay of the economy, and gave way to minerals, especially diamonds. As a result of the "new wealth" (Parsons, 1983) accrued from diamonds, new power relations emerged in Botswana’s political economy. Unlike cattle farming that was largely based on national capital, even though the BMC sold beef to the European Union, the influence of international capital on the local market was negligible. It was diamond mining through Debswana, which is a partnership between De Beers and Botswana government, that Botswana got immersed into the dictates of international capital. It is in the public domain that De Beers played a significant role in facilitating the smooth retirement of President Masire in 1989.

Diamonds transformed Botswana from being one of the poorest countries in the world at independence like Bangladesh to become an economic success story (Leith, 2000). Today, according to Manatsha and Maharjan (as cited in Sebudubudu and Bothomilwe, 2012: 116). Botswana is classified as an Upper Middle Income country, with a GDP per capita of US$ 17,779 ... It is the largest producer of diamonds by value in the whole world. It is also ranked the top least corrupt countries and investor friendly by the World Bank.

On the political front, the country has been described as a shining example of democracy for consistently conducting regular free and relatively fair elections. This is despite the fact that only a single party, the BDP, has dominated elections and there has yet to be an alternation of power. Albeit with a decreasing popular vote, the BDP’s electoral success has in part been due to a polarized and fragmented opposition.

Although Botswana smart partnership with De Beers was able to get good returns from diamonds and accrue substantial foreign reserves, this did not leverage the economy in international capital markets. Instead, the country depended more on a single export commodity, which made it extremely vulnerable to global financial markets, as was experienced in the 2008 global financial meltdown. Even though the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) has been relocated from London to Gaborone, diamond trade is still dominated by external sight holders. The external linkages of the Botswana economy are further strengthened by the tourism industry, which is largely foreign owned and dominated. The industry is dominated by Wilderness Safari that is largely owned by foreign investors. As a result, the weak linkages between the tourism industry and the domestic market mean that it marginally contributes to sustainable economic development. Even though it is projected as an alternative engine of economic growth, in a situation where about 70% of the proceeds are remitted outside the country, it contributes very little to micro economic stability. Moreover, the low volume high cost nature of the industry makes it an elite enclave that is patronized by a national and foreign elite. Ordinary Batswana have a limited stake in it.

Since Khama ascended to the presidency there has been a significant shift in power relations within the BDP, and the distribution of power between the state and the people. Khama’s presidency has had an impact on the already declining popularity of the BDP and Botswana’s democratic credentials. Co-opted into politics from the military, Ian Khama was tipped as a possible unifying factor in the deeply fractionalized BDP that was facing a concerted challenge from the opposition. Perhaps his biggest undoing was the historic split of the party he was roped into politics to safe from self-destruction. Until 2010, the BDP was a stable political outfit that had survived harsh political torrents since its establishment in 1962, outcompeting opposition parties in every election and consolidating uninterrupted state power. Its dominance is well documented and has been attributed to the “First Past the Post Electoral System” (Molomo, 2000a:b), “fragmentation of the party system, and obstacles to strategic voting behavior” (Poteete, 2012: 75); lack of organizational capability and inadequate financial resources (Osei-Hwedie 2001); and opposition’s internal stability (Maundeni and Lotshwao, 2012). Although the BDP’s popularity had been waning even before the advent of Khama, the supposed savior of the party led it to destruction through his sheer disdain for dissent and criticism. For instance, in early 2010, following a bitterly contested BDP congress election in 2009, in which President Khama’s preferred candidates lost, a faction that had stood against his preferred candidates complained of its members being “systematically persecuted and marginalized” (Makgala and Bothomilwe, 2017: 15).

Moreover, under Khama, democratic gains have been reversed, as instanced by onslaught on media freedoms, judicial independence and extra judicial killings. For instance, as Good (2016: 12) wrote, “Khama is known for his strong aversion for meeting the press in unscripted, open conference.” In 2009, Freedom House downgraded Botswana’s political rights rating as a result of “decreased transparency and accountability in the executive branch under President Seretse Khama Ian Khama’s administration” (Freedom House, 2015a). The extrajudicial killing of John Kalafatis in 2009 by security agencies was a severe blow to Botswana’s democratic credentials. Irrespective of the circumstances that led to his demise, in a democracy the rule of the law should always be the norm.

It is perhaps under the presidency of Ian Khama that it is fitting to describe Botswana according to Good’s (1996) assertion that it is an authoritarian liberal state where there is an erosion of the country’s democratic probity and people experience shrinking political space. A characteristic feature of Khama’s presidency is that he adopted a militaristic approach of rule through decrees and directives, undermining governance through consultation and consensus. Taking over the reign of power from Festus Mogae in 2008, Khama exercised...
executive power enshrined in the constitution (see section 47 of Botswana Constitution on executive powers) to the fullest extent. ‘General Khama’s more overt autocracy was founded upon established presidential power’ (Good, 2016: 5). For De Jager and Sebudubudu (2016: 9), “Botswana has a towering or domineering executive that dwarfs all the other institutions”. Democratic consolidation in Botswana requires strong institutions and not strongmen. Instead of building institutions, president Khama swallowed institutions. For instance, during the 2011 industrial strike instead of allowing the Bargaining Council to conclude negotiations between government and labour unions respecting salary increases, President Khama unilaterally told a Kgotsi meeting that he would not accede to salary increases (Molomo, 2014: 167). The intransigence of the BDP government led to an unprecedented industrial strike lasting eight weeks resulting in collusion between opposition parties and Botswana Federation of Public Sector Unions (BOFEPUSU) calling for regime change.

In his personalized rule, drawing from military discipline and personal authority deriving from traditional authority, he personifies himself as the embodiment of democratic rule. Moreover, Khama embraced populist politics by centralizing political and distributive power around himself and his office. Khama’s leadership style presents an interesting paradox of frugal spending on others but opulence and luxury when it comes to him; his retirement package that entitles him to boats and aircrafts tells the story. In what would characterize him as a “benevolent despot”, he endears himself to the less privileged through various humanitarian gestures, charity work, distributes hampers, blankets and radios. A noble gesture given the needs of the poor but two questions arise from it. First, are these gestures sustainable? Second, do they have the potential to lift people out of poverty? A further comment on these gestures is that they colour the political landscape and lead to political patronage.

In a paternalistic fashion, he prefers to engage with a submissive, uncritical and less inquisitive constituency in rural areas, especially by sitting around the fire with old men - Kenneth Good, (2016) calls it ‘bonfire democracy’. Another notable feature of Khama’s presidency is that instead of interacting with his peers at fora such as the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN), he would rather attend a conservation meeting in some corner of the globe. The autocracy that characterized the Khama administration has rendered service delivery very weak. Characteristic of Khama’s personalized rule, programmes are not considered government programmes but mananeo a ga raetsho (the President’s programmes). These are programmes, include among others, backyard gardens, poverty eradication programmes and the presidents housing appeal. So, when these programmes fail, like backyard gardens, the presidency has failed. Political trust is enhanced when institutions function and deliver on their mandate of providing goods and services. Political trust is further eroded when there are intrigues and machinations in the political system.

Unfolding events in Botswana’s political landscape are complex and checkered, they border on intrigue and political manipulation. The most recent autocratic gesture by former president Khama is the bid to have an indirect third term despite having stepped-down as state president. In an unprecedented manner, Khama has been operating behind the scenes by influencing the outcomes of the Botswana Democratic Party primary elections. In his usual intrigues, as a military strategist and political schemer, the former president seeks to have control of BDP candidates for the 2019 elections in order to protect and entrench the political influence of the Khama dynasty. Worst still, Khama is using the tribal card to lure voters in the Central district where he is paramount chief to maintain hegemonic influence in the party and government. More disturbing are allegations in the media of attempts to preempt the judicial process bent on prosecuting people around him on allegations of corruption and money laundering (Sunday Standard, 2018; The Botswana gazette, 2018).

However, the most significant development during the Khama era is the convergence of interests between big business, the military and the ruling elite. Since Khama assumed the presidency in 2008, there has been a significant increase in the number of military personnel in positions normally performed by civilians. When Khama took the presidency as a retired army general, his vice President was a former commander Lt Gen Mompati Merafe, whom Khama deputized when he was in the army. Some retired military generals made it into partisan politics and others into diplomatic postings. However, some few retired brigadiers and Generals have also joined the ranks of the opposition. The high spending in the military as evidenced by the much debated intend to spend 16 billion dollars in buying Gripon Jet fighters shows a strong congruence between the military and the political elite.

President Khama took over the reigns of power in 2008, when the performance of the economy was at its lowest. However, other factors could explain the waning political trust in Botswana’s political institutions, in particular the presidency. First, there are changing population demographics that do not favour the ruling BDP. It is a known fact that the BDP support base is in the rural areas, and now as a result of urbanization and population movements, 64% of the population lives in urban and peri-urban areas. Figure 1 shows that since

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1. Headlines in the Sunday Standard read 26 August 2018 – 01 September 2018 “Kgosi to be Charged in two weeks”; “Khami implicated in Kgosi’s alleged corruption”; “Kgosi employs scorched earth tactics against Magosi”; “Former president likely to be called in as witness” “Kalafats’ ghost haunts campaign to prosecute Kgosi”; “DCEC impounded Kebonang and Kadiwa’s vehicles in money laundering case” . And headlines in the The Botswana Gazette 29 August – 04 september 2018 read: “And the winner is…A Khama victory that could split BDP”; “Masisi faces Khama back push”; “Khama invokes tribal loyalty to gain support”; “Khama has the support to sustain Vote of no Confidence in BDP Government”; “ Where to next? BDP at Crossroads”; “The culmination of Bulela ditswe has widened the rift between Masisi and Khama”.

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the mid-1990s the profile of the Botswana voter has changed dramatically; more and more people resided in urban and per-urban areas thus thinning the BDP support base. Urbanization has not only exposed workers to the perils of a wage economy but has also mobilized them into unions that engage in collective bargaining for better wages and working conditions. The collective bargaining process has pitted government against labour unions. The unprecedented civil servants strike of 2011 that lasted for 8 weeks that cost the country millions of pula in terms of lost production is a case in point. Through this tussle, the BDP government alienated professional and workers. All this changed the electoral fortunes of the BDP and the unrelenting posture of President Khama exposed his military style of leadership.

Second, Botswana faces a dilemma of a bulging youth population that is disenchanted by high levels of unemployment. Figures from Statistics Botswana indicate that unemployment stands at 17.8%. This disenchantment partly accounts for the reduced poll of the BDP in the 2014 elections. Moreover the media, especially the private media, plays an important watch-dog function in a democracy. With the advent of the private media, which is more critical of government procedures and processes, leaders are scrutinized to be more transparent and accountable. The level of public scrutiny has intensified with the proliferation of social media. All these factors do not favour the BDP as the ruling party, and Khama as party and state president could not escape negative appraisal on the performance of government and the economy.

In the run-up to the October 2014 elections, three opposition political parties, namely the Botswana National Front (BNF), Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) coalesced into the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). The Botswana Congress Party (BCP) was the only opposition party that did not join the umbrella. Out of the 57 seats that were contested, the UDC won seventeen (17) seats making a combined poll of the opposition 20 seats. Clearly, more than any other election year, the opposition was within striking distance to capturing state power. The 2014 elections were a reflection of the situation in the country and should not be taken as a fluke that could be corrected by introducing cosmetic changes. They were a reflection of deep seated fundamental demographic, social, political and economic changes in Botswana. The BDP government, especially the leadership, is seen by many in the new middle class, the youth and working class as non-responsive to their plight, needs and aspirations.

According to the Independent Electoral Commission (2014) election report, a head count during the 2014 elections shows that the BDP polled a total of 320 647 votes whilst its closest rival the UDC got 207 113 votes. By every account, an overall margin of 113 534 votes is significant and a comfortable win. However, if when disaggregating the data and focusing on specific constituencies, a different picture emerges. Overall, 16

constituencies could be said to be marginally won, that is by a margin of less than 500 votes. 11 of these were won by the BDP\(^2\) and 5 by the combined opposition\(^3\). The BDP victory in the 2014 elections was based on a margin of only 2,538 votes.

The decline on the levels of trust is not just a random occurrence; it is a result of underlying socio-economic challenges and political realities in the country. More fundamentally, this decline comes at a time when the incumbent government of the long time ruling BDP is grappling with growing citizen disaffection over ‘bread and butter’ issues as well as a dwindling popularity and a resurgent opposition that threatens to dislodge it from power in 2019. Besides, during the period under review, there were notable and unprecedented political dynamics such as the historic split of the BDP, a nationwide industrial strike and deterioration of media freedoms. Also significant is the BDP’s worst showing at the 2014 general elections in which the party emerged as a minority government in the face of a resurgent opposition collective.

The decline in the ability of government to deliver on political goods leads to the erosion of trust between the people and government, especially the presidency. The distributive politics that characterized earlier regimes is no more. In the past, civil servants knew that they benefitted handsomely on salaries review. During the Khama administration, the power of collective bargaining was eroded and civil servants suffered erosion of their earnings from inflation let alone the rising standard of living. Botswana being one of the most unequal economies in the region means that poverty is a factor that influences people’s perception against the presidency. In the past, government could spend itself out of political trouble, now with a reduced national cake every spending is an opportunity cost, and government is often constrained on public spending.

Botswana has failed to broaden the economic base. In the past farmers were sure of their sales to the BMC. Now BMC, which is a cooperative of farmers, does not only face the threat of being privatized by a tiny white cattle owning elite, it is no longer a cash cow it was historically acclaimed to be. It is a big setback that the BMC, which was established in 1954, is still faltering and not diversified to take advantage of the many livestock by-products. Government has not succeeded to broaden the economic base, the economy is essentially government-driven, and governments are well-known for their inefficiency in service delivery. In the past few years, Botswana has suffered severe erosion compounded by power and water shortages. The narrow economic base where the state is the main investor, employer and distributor for economic goods makes contestation for political power a matter of life and death. Political intrigues and posturing have become the order of the day. Political parties, mainly the BDP, as the party in

\(^2\) These are Ngami, 48; Francistown East, 245; Bobonong, 120; Selebi Phikwe East, 242; Boteti West241, Gaborone South, 243; Takatokwane, 130; Kanye North, 72; Kgalagadi North, 238; Nata Gweta 470; and Lobatse.

\(^3\) Mogoditshane, 334; Gabane-Mankgodi, 322; Molepolole South, 387; Kanye South, 361; Ghanzi North and 314.
government, appear to be captured by business interests. The award of tenders and procurements need further scrutiny and research in light of allegation of impropriety that damage the good name of the country. The misappropriation of the National Petroleum funds going into millions, which is before the courts and the linkages arising from it is likely to expose acts of corruption, which could make accolades that Botswana is the least corrupt country in Sub-Saharan Africa by the World Bank misplaced. The next section focuses on the theoretical framework that underscores the theoretical foundation of political trust.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Often measured in public perception surveys, trust is a fundamental component of mass beliefs on a wide array of issues including performance of public officials, state and political institutions alike. Welzel and Inglehart (2003) argue that mass beliefs are thus the intervening variable between social structure and collective action and ignoring this, democratization processes cannot be adequately understood. Harold Lasswell (as cited in Welzel and Inglehart, 2008) posits that whether democratic regimes emerge and survive largely depends on mass beliefs. Studies in trust have become increasingly important in recent years due to the significance of trust in the development of societies. Simmel (as cited in Delhey and Newton, 2003: 93) states that trust was “one of the most important synthetic forces within society”. This is because trust forms the basis of understanding society in terms of social capital, extent of civic engagement and even more fundamentally the way people perceive their political system and leaders. The origins of trust may be located at two levels, the social level and the institutional level. Trust stems from personal predispositions and concrete experiences of trustworthiness in social interaction as well as experience and evaluation of a situation and performance (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). At a social level, for people to cooperate through social groups, societies or clubs, trust is the basis of which such cooperation can be achieved.

On the political sphere, trust emerges from people’s expectations that political representatives as well as institutions would perform insofar as service delivery is concerned. But more importantly this paper deals with political trust on institutions as opposed to social or interpersonal trust which is built on social relations.

Trust is an abstract and broad term that to date no theory best explains why and how people tend to trust others in society. As a result attempts to explain trust have yielded different interpretations and meanings from which to understand why people trust, first other people, leadership and institutions. Generally trust is thought of as faith or confidence that people in a community or society have towards one another or towards leaders and institutions. In this sense, Newton (2001) distinguishes between social trust in society and political trust which relates to the political realm particularly political leaders and institutions. Both early life socialization and contemporary performance evaluations influence levels of trust (Mishler and Rose, 1997). Trust is a form of a relationship that is based on a conviction that a trustee would not fail the client in a transaction. Studies have shown that for societies to achieve their collective goals in the process of development, governments need citizens to have trust in their public institutions (Landmark, 2016). More fundamentally, institutional trust is an essential ingredient of democracy because democracy functions when among other factors citizens have trust in public institutions (Harold Lasswell, 1951, Christensen and Lægreid, 2005; Bratton and Gymah-Boadi, 2016).

Newton (2001) writes that political trust is related to political capital just as much as social capital is related to social trust and both are key to the functioning of democracy. A trustworthy government and public institutions are vital for the development and sustenance of a democracy and guarantees an engaged and involved citizenry. The result is increased legitimacy of government and a more obedient populace. Newton (2001) points out that political trust is essential for democratic and stable political life. The net effect of institutional trust is increased legitimacy for a government as citizens feel that their needs are addressed (Jamil and Askvik, 2015).

Cultural and institutional approaches have so far been reliable and used widely in the literature of trust. Cultural theories put emphasis on social norms and societal beliefs that are acquired early in life through socialization. These norms and beliefs are the basis for social trust at the level of a community but they are assumed to later extend to trust in institutions. According to Mishler and Rose (2001), cultural theories hypothesize that trust in political institutions is exogenous, meaning that it starts from outside political institutions and is a result of long standing cultural norms that are learned through the process of socialization and later projected onto political institutions. Social and cultural trust is a more generalized form of trust in the social sphere (Newton, 2001), which implies that it is built among individual peers, neighbors and social groups. Mishler and Rose (2001) aptly posit that cultural theories emphasize the importance and durability of pre-political or early-life socialization reflecting individuals’ experiences with kin, peer group, and community. The classic view is that a society that is well founded upon a large and varied range of voluntary associations and organizations is likely to generate high levels of social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003:5).

On the other hand, trust in institutions is performance-based, implying that institutions are evaluated on the extent to which they meet expectations and preferences of people. This is in line with Mishler and Rose’s argument that political trust is a consequence of institutional performance which is evaluated on both
the economic and political dimensions (2001). People trust institutions based on their assessment or evaluation of how well they deliver on their mandate or promises made. The assumption is that people are rational when they evaluate political institutions and determine whether they trust them or not based on their performance in areas of economic growth, corruption, democracy, civic participation and access to social amenities. As noted before, institutional trust gives legitimacy to political institutions and the absence of trust breeds disaffection with institutions or the political system. Institutional trust is generated when institutions deliver upon promises made. It is the simple campaign promises and ethical expectations of professional conduct upon which a decision to trust institutions of parliament, presidency, courts of law and parties is made. Failure by government to create employment, fight corruption, and deliver services such as health care and education risks withdrawal of support by people. Rational choice thinking suggests that trust is likely to be high for institutions that perform well but when institutions are perceived not to perform in accordance with what is expected of them, trust level is likely to drop.

Hypotheses

Political trust can be directed towards the political system and its organizations as well as the individual political incumbents (Blind, 2006). Political trust happens when citizens appraise the government and its institutions, policy-making in general and/or the individual political leaders as promise-keeping, efficient, fair and honest (ibid). Political trust can be measured by looking at a number of variables including political interest, civic engagement, voter turn-out, tax payment, participation, political tolerance and confidence in the President, Parliament and other public institutions (Newton, 2001).

Trust is related to attitudes on democracy, where low levels of satisfaction with democracy would result in low trust and high contentment with democracy leads to high trust levels. Seligson et al. (2002) observe that studies found that a public’s trust in the actors and institutions of political authority facilitates democratic consolidation in that institutionally-trusting individuals have been found to be more supportive of democratic principles. Accordingly, trust in government generally increases according to the level of satisfaction with democracy, importance of politics in life, interest in politics, membership of political parties and affiliation with the left end of the political spectrum (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005). Norris (1999) is of the view that if people do not trust institutions, they would not trust the way democracy works as a whole and ultimately be disillusioned with democracy as an ideal. Botswana’s democracy under the leadership of president Khama has come under a spotlight as a result of his authoritarian style of leadership, circumventing established institutions and using directives. Under the Khama regime, private media has had to operate in an environment that is not free and incidents of journalists’ arrests have become commonplace in Botswana’s democracy. In 2015, Freedom House downgraded Botswana’s rating from completely free to partial free while the 2016 Mo Ibrahim Index of Governance listed Botswana as one of the top ten that have deteriorated along with Ghana and South Africa.

H2: We expect negative attitudes on corruption in the presidency.

Moreover, perceptions on corruption are related to institutional trust because corruption affects institutional performance. Uslaner (2003) maintains that the most corrupt countries have the least trusting citizens. Citizens of countries with high levels of corruption place less value on political institutions and are less confident in their political system (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). If individuals perceive corruption in politics, then their trust in institutions gets adversely affected Job (2005). Blind (2006) discusses two essential considerations on the relationship between corruption and trust and political legitimacy. The first consideration is that according to Warren (as cited in Blind, 2006), public officials do not have to just fight corruption but they should also not appear to be involved in it. Secondly, people can still trust government (and leaders) even when there is perceived corruption for so long as bonds of trust established through social capital are strong. Though corruption in Botswana has not been as pervasive as in other African countries, in the recent past there have been allegations of misuse of public funds involving the construction of an airport strip in the president’s private property and construction of retirement home at tax payer’s expense. In recent years, however, the country’s CPI score has declined (Transparency International, 2015) and while these developments may not in the main have tarnished Botswana’s reputation as a least corrupt African country, there are likely effects on the confidence of people towards leaders. Makgala and Bothomilwe (2017:8) remind us that “while elite corruption persists in Botswana, at a much reduced scale when compared to other African countries, a 2014 Afrobarometer survey demonstrated a sudden upsurge in Batswana’s perception of corruption in government.” The same survey revealed that a majority (81%) of Batswana think that government officials are involved in corruption and 70% of Batswana think the president and officials in his office are involved in corruption (ibid).

H1: We expect low attitudes on satisfaction with democracy to decrease trust in the presidency.

Institutions are trusted or distrusted to the extent that they produce desired economic outcomes. (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Following the performance based theory, people lose confidence on institutions that do not meet their
needs and whose performance is evaluated negatively. Geert Bouckaert and Steven Van de Walle (2001:3) state that “performance theory has a number of aspects: what should government do according to citizens, how does the concept of ‘government’ figure in citizen’s minds, and how correct are the perceptions of performance? This applies to both micro-performance (service delivery) and macro-performance (economic situation, unemployment...).” But more fundamentally, how well government delivers basic amenities such as water, health care, infrastructural developments and employment is important in the generation of institutional trust.

Essentially, as asserted by Blind (2006:17) “increasing social and political trust through the implementation of sound economic policies is also crucial for good and effective governance”. Nevertheless, the perception that a government “does not function for [the citizens]” is associated with distrust (Miller, 1974: 951). As noted elsewhere in the article, under Khama the standard of government performance in service delivery in terms of creation of employment opportunities and provision of basic amenities such as portable water has dropped. The downward trend in government effectiveness is attributed to the deterioration of the quality of public services, of the civil service, of government policies and implementation capacity (Deléchat, and Gearth, 2008). The government’s effectiveness is currently below the standards of upper-middle income countries which Botswana is part of. Good (1999:50) argues that Botswana’s political system is characterized by “elitism, centralized political power and weak executive accountability”. In an earlier formulation he had said that the political elite are “accountable to themselves” (Good, 1999: 5-47).

H3. We expect negative attitudes on government performance to decrease the likelihood to trust the president.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample surveys are the conventional social-science method for obtaining data about opinions, attitudes and behaviour of objects. Sample surveys can and do ask individuals to report their perceptions of trust in political institutions. In this paper we analyse 4th round (2008), 5th round (2012) and 6th round (2014) of the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Botswana to test the above hypotheses. In each of these surveys, a cross-sectional nationally representative sample of 1200 Batswana of voting age was interviewed.

The model of what explains trust in the presidency stipulates that the likelihood of a person doing so is a function of their spatial location, their evaluation of government performance, satisfaction with political system, social inclusion or exclusion, and perceived corruption. The level of analysis will be individual Batswana who are of voting age, that is, Batswana who are at least 18 years of age.

Regression analysis

The theoretical hypotheses set out above can be linked in a simple model. The Afrobarometer surveys use the measurement; “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” The scale for this measurement is the likert scale; “0=Not at all”, “1=Just a little”, “2=somewhat”, “3=A lot”, “9=don’t know/ haven’t heard”.

Regression analysis is a form of predictive modelling technique which investigates the relationship between a dependent (variable of interest) and independent variable(s) or explanatory variable(s). Regression analysis estimates the relationship between two or more variables. The dependent variable trust in political institution was re-coded into a binary one (Appendix Table 1). A binary logistic regression model was therefore fitted to the data. Agresti (2002) defined logistic regression as a method which models the relationship between a set of independent variable X (can either be dichotomous, categorical or continuous) and the dichotomous dependent variable Y. This variable Y has a Bernoulli distribution and can be denoted by:

For binary response models, the response, Yi, of an individual i can take on one of two possible values, denoted for convenience by 1 and 0 (for example, Yi = 1 if a disease is present, otherwise Yi = 0). Suppose X is a vector of explanatory variables and \( \pi_i = \Pr(Y_i = 1|X) \) is the response probability to be modeled. The linear logistic model has the form

\[
\logit(\pi_i) = \log \left( \frac{\pi_i}{1-\pi_i} \right) = \alpha + \beta^T X
\]

where \( \alpha \) is the intercept parameter and \( \beta \) is the vector of slope parameters.

The quantity to the left of the equal sign is called a logit. It is the log of the odds that an event occurs (the odds that an event occurs is the ratio of the number of people who experience the event to the number of people who do not). This is what one gets when they divide the probability that the event occurs by the probability that the event does not occur, since both probabilities have the same denominator and it cancels, leaving the number of events divided by the number of non-events). The coefficients in the logistic regression model tell you how much the logit changes based on the values of the predictor variables.

To fit a binary logistic regression model, you estimate a set of regression coefficients that predict the probability of the outcome of interest. Logistic regression modeling has applications in many areas, including clinical studies, epidemiology, data mining, social sciences, marketing, and engineering. It has proved to be reliable for both prospective analyzes (such as designed experiments or clinical trials) and retrospective analyzes (such as found data or case-control studies). If your response variable can take only two values (the event and the non-event), then the conditions for linear regression are not met; in particular, your errors are binary and not normally distributed. Binary logistic regression was developed to handle this case. Instead of modeling the response itself, you use logistic regression to model the probabilities of events.

RESULTS

To examine the reliability of the questions on corruption and government performance as measuring a latent variable, factor analysis was also conducted, whereas Cronbach’s alpha (\( \alpha_{Cr} > 0.6 \)) was used as a criterion for the reliability of the extracted factors. Cronbach’s alpha is a statistic which is generally used as a measure of internal consistency or reliability of a psychometric instrument. In other words, it measures how well a set of
Table 1. Results of factor analysis of the questions measuring perceptions of corruption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>0.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett’s test of sphericity</td>
<td>10330.823</td>
<td>3833.128</td>
<td>8399.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors extracted</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Results of factor analysis of the questions measuring perceptions of government performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett’s test of sphericity</td>
<td>5143.713</td>
<td>1982.572</td>
<td>2318.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors extracted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. The extracted factors and the items included are given for the year 2008, 2012 and 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handling keeping prices down</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling creating jobs</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling narrowing income gaps</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling improving living standards of the poor</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling managing the economy</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling improving basic health services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling addressing educational needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling providing water and sanitation services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling reducing crime</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling fighting corruption</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling ensuring enough to eat</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ indicated with items are included in a factor.

Factor analysis of the variable measuring perceptions of corruption (Q53a-j for round 6; Q65a-k for round 5 and Q57a-k for round 4) was used on government delivery resulting in a two-dimensional factor solution in 2014 and 2008 whilst in 2012 we obtained 3 factors. A measure of the reliability of gave a Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.6. The factors extracted from the analysis can be summarised as a factor covering the provision of basic necessities like water, improving basic health services, addressing education needs etc. The other factor can be generalised to cover managing the economy such as creating jobs, keeping prices down etc. A summary of the results of the factor analysis are given in Table 2. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy is close to one whilst the Bartlett’s test of sphericity gave a chi-square value which is highly significant suggesting that the $R$-matrix is not an identity matrix.

In Table 3 the extracted factors and the items included are given for the year 2008, 2012 and 2014. The two extracted factors in 2008 and 2014 could be classified as measuring provision of necessities (bread and butter variables or items measures a single, one-dimensional latent aspect of individuals. Factor analysis of the variable measuring perceptions of corruption (Q53a-j for round 6; Q65a-k for round 5 and Q57a-k for round 4) was used to extract factors. Table 1 shows that only one factor was extracted for perceptions of corruption in the three surveys. A measure of the reliability gave a Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.6. A measure of the reliability of the items measuring a latent variable ‘corruption’ gave a Cronbach’s alpha close to one which implies reliability. Cronbach’s alpha determines the internal consistency or average correlation of items in a survey instrument to gauge its reliability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was recorded as well as the Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The KMO statistic is close to 1 whilst test of sphericity is highly significant.

Factor analysis of variable measuring government delivery (Q66a-m for round 6; Q60a-f for round 5 and Q50a-h for round 4) was used on government delivery resulted in a two-dimensional factor solution in 2014 and 2008 whilst in 2012 we obtained 3 factors. A measure of the reliability of gave a Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.6. The factors extracted from the analysis can be summarised as a factor covering the provision of basic necessities like water, improving basic health services, addressing education needs etc. The other factor can be generalised to cover managing the economy such as creating jobs, keeping prices down etc. A summary of the results of the factor analysis are given in Table 2. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy is close to one whilst the Bartlett’s test of sphericity gave a chi-square value which is highly significant suggesting that the $R$-matrix is not an identity matrix.

In Table 3 the extracted factors and the items included are given for the year 2008, 2012 and 2014. The two extracted factors in 2008 and 2014 could be classified as measuring provision of necessities (bread and butter
issues with exception of the last item which is 'handling ensuring enough to eat) or micro-level issues (FAC1_1). In 2008 however, this item of handling ensuring enough to eat is included in the necessities factor. The second factor could be thought of as a macro-level issue measuring overall management of the economy.

In 2012 however, three factors are extracted. The first and second factors still measures provision of necessities and overall management of economy, respectively. The third factor is made up of handling improving living standard of the poor; providing water and sanitation services and ensuring enough to eat. On the surface of it, these are bread and butter issues and essential human needs that it is not surprising for them to be lumped into a similar category.

Perception of trust in the president

Prior to fitting a logistic model to predict the likelihood to trust the president shows that gender, an evaluation of the significance of the independent variables was carried out. The residual chi-square statistic is highly significant at $p=0.000$ (labelled Overall Statistics) for the years under consideration. This statistics shows that the coefficients for the variables not in the model are significantly different from zero; in other words, that the addition of one or more of these variables to the model will significantly affect its predictive power. The remainder of the results in this table lists each of the predictors in turn with a value of Roa's efficient score statistics for each one (column labelled Score). In large samples when the null hypothesis is true, the score statistics is identical to the Wald statistics and the likelihood ratio statistic. It is used at this stage of the analysis because it is computationally less intensive than the Wald statistic. Roa's score statistic has a specific distribution from which statistical significance can be obtained.

The binary logistic regression model of trust in the president in Table 4 shows that the education variable was a significant factor in explaining the likelihood to trust in the president in 2014. Individuals with higher levels of education are much more likely to trust the president than individuals with no education. However, the odds ratios are much higher for individuals with lower level of education in hence lending support to the hypothesis that more educated are less likely to trust than the less educated.

Perceived corruption in the country is not a significant factor in predicting likelihood to trust the president in 2008 and 2012. However, in 2014 this is a highly significant factor ($p$-value=0.011). This is not a coincidence because of the increased perceived corruption in the country particularly in state institutions. Similarly, in 2014 majority (51%) of Batswana believed that corruption has increased over the past year (Molomo et al, 2015). Perhaps even more denting on Botswana is the fact that Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indices indicate that public sector corruption is on the rise. According to Diepo (2014) in 2012 Botswana scored 65%, dropped to 64% in 2013 and further declined to 63% in 2014.

Social inclusion variables like location, gender, age and civic engagement are not significant factors in the models, indicating that the level of trust is not dependent on these demographic variables. Government’s handling of important matters (two factors) for 2008 and 2014 and three factors in 2012; satisfactions with democracy are highly significant explanatory variables in predicting the likelihood to trust the president. The first factor on government performance; FAC1_2 (provision of basic necessities) is highly significant in predicting likelihood to trust in the president for all the years. The second factor on government performance, FAC2_2 (managing the economy) is highly significant factor in predicting the likelihood to trust the president in 2008 and 2014 only. The third factor on government performance (FAC3_1) in 2012 is highly significant factor ($p$-value<0.01).

Respondents were asked if they feel close to any particular political party. This variable 'closeness to a political party' is a highly significant factor ($p$<0.01) for all the years under consideration with an odds ratio of 2.921 which is greater than 1 in 2008. This implies that respondents who identify themselves as being close to the ruling party are almost three times more likely to trust the president than respondents who identify with the opposition. In 2012 and 2014 however, the odds ratios are less than 1. This implies that respondents who identify themselves as being close to the ruling party are less likely to trust the president than respondents who identify with the opposition. This is quite a striking finding, which begs the question whether BDP supporters have lost confidence in the president. The BDP under Khama has indeed been rocked by instability to a point where the party experienced an unprecedented split in 2010.

Conclusion

In spite of his seeming unifying attributes for which Khama was roped into politics, the trust in the presidency under his reign is on the wane. This article has found that attitudes on corruption, government performance and democracy underlie political trust in the presidency of Ian Khama. Trust in the president is also a function of one's party identification and BDP followers have increasingly become distrustful of the president. These results do not come as a surprise, given the events characterizing the presidency of Ian Khama, the highlight of which was the historic split of the BDP.

However these results should be taken with caution in generalizing them beyond Botswana because of contextual differences with other countries. Nonetheless, it can be postulated that elsewhere views on increasing corruption, dissatisfaction with democracy and poor
Table 4. Binary logistic regression models of trust in the presidency (2008 - 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>6.629</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education(1)</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>5.339</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>1.047</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>19.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education(2)</td>
<td>1.664</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>5.278</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>2.051</td>
<td>0.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education(3)</td>
<td>1.465</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.328</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>1.485</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education(4)</td>
<td>1.282</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>3.603</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location(1)</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location(2)</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>1.183</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender(1)</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>1.135</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>-0.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups(1)</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>-0.470</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>-0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-R factor score 1 for analysis 1</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>1.117</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>1.308</td>
<td>0.319</td>
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<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.829</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>0.361</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-R factor score 1 for analysis 3</td>
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<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1.565</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>1.353</td>
<td>0.082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of voluntary association or community group(1)</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>1.181</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>-0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of religious group(1)</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>0.237</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attend a community meeting(1)</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>1.117</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join others to raise an issue(1)</td>
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<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>1.125</td>
<td>0.424</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy(1)</td>
<td>-0.651</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>-23.102</td>
<td>26046.154</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>23.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy(2)</td>
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<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>-2.167</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>-1.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy(3)</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>-1.452</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>-1.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy(4)</td>
<td>-1.054</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>-0.710</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>-0.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to which party(1)</td>
<td>-0.773</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>-0.517</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>1.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.495</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>4.459</td>
<td>2.433</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>11.390</td>
<td>1.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sig. = significance level; Exp(B) = exponentiated coefficient.
government performance can affect institutional trust. Theoretically, the implication of these results is that mass beliefs have become important considerations even in dominant party systems such as Botswana.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Droit de l'habitation, 1989, Gaborone. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/botswana.


Appendix

Table 1. List of variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Values and range</th>
<th>Construction notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust any</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>0 Not at all, just a little; 1 somewhat, a lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 female; 0 male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 if rural; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>0 none; 1 informal; 2 primary; 3 secondary; 4 post-secondary, no university; 5 some university, post graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age (50+)</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 if 50+ years old; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic engagements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A religious group</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 if official leader; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary association or community group</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 if official leader; 0 otherwise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attend community meeting</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 if yes; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got together, raise an issue</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>1 if yes; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to a party</td>
<td>0, 1</td>
<td>0 if opposition, 1 ruling party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government delivery</td>
<td></td>
<td>Factor analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Factor analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1 if decreased a lot; 2 if decreased somewhat; 3 if stayed the same; 4 if increased somewhat; 5 if increased a lot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial bureaucracy of Buganda: The major milestones in its development

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Bureaucracy in Buganda polity transcended the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial era. During each era, the principles which underpin the Weberian bureaucracy manifested variously. Pre-colonial bureaucracy manifested as a strong chain of command through the hierarchical kingdom structure; and centralized control by the King through the chiefs. During the colonial times, bureaucracy had duality in the chain of command and allegiance where chiefs served both the King and colonial administrators. Unlike the pre-colonial era, laws were written and some employees directly under the colonial administration were recruited due to their technical competences and served with impersonality. The post-colonial bureaucracy was an extension of the colonial bureaucracy albeit with more of the Weberian form. Buganda wanted to operate as a state within a state where the King held political and executive powers of Uganda as a state but at the same time retain the position of the head of the monarch (Buganda) within Uganda. Abolition of monarchies created a lull in the late 1960s to early 1980s. Coming into power of the NRM regime reinstated the monarch albeit with more cultural mandate than political and administrative clout. The bureaucratic machinery remained in the Kingdom administrative hierarchy without the powers it enjoyed during the pre-colonial and colonial era. This article provides historical development of Buganda monarch during the different eras. It chronological highlighted the growth; peaking and anticlimax of bureaucracy in the Buganda. Whether the bureaucracy in Buganda will regain its original form under the current government remains to be seen.

Key words: Bureaucracy; polity; government, pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial.

INTRODUCTION

The historical bureaucratic transformation Buganda as a polity transcends the different forms of rule from pre-colonial, colonial and the independence or post colonial era. Any attempt to analyze these segments in the context of bureaucracy will hinge on the extent of their legitimacy from the basic governance framework that served the purpose at their times. To this end, an understanding of bureaucracy and its characteristics

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situated in Buganda polity will provide the basis for the discourse in this paper.

This paper gives an account of the historical development of bureaucracy in Buganda polity. It begins by defining bureaucracy and elaborating its characteristics in a polity. It further defines Buganda as a polity and the concept of government then delves into analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial bureaucracy in Buganda with the characteristic bureaucratic milestones that pertained at the different times.

The paper concludes by looking at the fading hope of re-establishing the much demanded bureaucracy in Buganda under the current NRM government.

METHODOLOGY

This is a literature review grounded article which according to Amin (2004) is a credible approach to scientific research that uses secondary data. In this article, major milestones in the bureaucratic development in Buganda as a polity are highlighted to illustrate the growth and decline of bureaucracy given the political climatic changes in Uganda as a country.

DISCUSSION

Understanding bureaucracy and its characteristics in a polity

Raadschelders (1998) noted that since the terminology bureaucracy was coined, it has had negative connotations where bureaucracies are viewed as complex, inefficient and rigid individuals. The 19th-century definition referred to a system of governance in which offices were held by unelected career officials and in this sense "bureaucracy" was seen as a distinct form of government, often subservient to a monarchy. In the 1920s, the definition was expanded by Max (1887) to include any system of administration conducted by trained professionals according to fixed rules. Weber saw the bureaucracy as a relatively positive development.

According to Max (ibid), bureaucracy is the formal system of organization and administration designed to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. The features of bureaucracy sharply distinguish it from other types of organization based on nonlegal forms of authority. In essence, it is an institution; which is socially grounded and through which publicly provided services are publicly produced. The alternative to bureaucratic supply of public service is the purchase of such services from private firms. The bureaucratic form is so common that most people accept it as the normal way of organizing almost any endeavour. People in bureaucratic organizations generally blame the ugly side effects of bureaucracy on management, or the founders, or the owners, without awareness that the real cause is the organizing form. The Austrian economist Ludwig VM (1944) noted that the term bureaucracy was "always applied with an opprobrious connotation," and the American sociologist Robert M (1957) stressed that the term "bureaucrat" had become an epithet. Bureaucratic organization can be found in both public and private institutions. One can therefore, in an attempt to conceptualize bureaucracy, posit that it aims at creating order through control mechanisms of people within a set of hierarchical arrangement of an organization or state with the view of improving functional efficiency. At this juncture, it is important to point out the defining constituents of bureaucracy as a concept.

Characteristics of bureaucracy

Max (ibid) brings out six principles of bureaucratic theory which focus on job specialization where jobs are divided into simple, routine and fixed category based on competence and functional specialization. Bureaucracy also stresses authority hierarchy in which officers are organized in a hierarchy in which higher officer controls lower position holders i.e. superior controls subordinates and their performance of subordinates and lower staff could be controlled. There is formal selection of all organizational members on the basis of technical qualifications and competence demonstrated by training, education or formal examination. A bureaucracy has formal rules and regulations aimed at ensuring uniformity and to regulating actions of employees, managers must depend heavily upon formal organizational rules and regulations. Thus, rules of law lead to impersonality in interpersonal relations. Rules and controls are applied uniformly, avoiding involvement with personalities and preferences of employees. Nepotism and favoritism are not preferred. In addition, career building opportunity is offered highly. Lifelong employment and adequate protection of individuals against arbitrary dismissal is guaranteed. Here managers are professional officials rather than owners of units they manage. They work for a fixed salaries and pursue their career within the organization. Up to now, bureaucracy still finds space in the modern public administration as well as the private sector given the principles upon which it is grounded.

Any attempt to analyse bureaucracy in the pre colonial, colonial and post colonial era in the context of Buganda as polity will take into account the inherent weaknesses in the bureaucracy theory which include its inability to consider the informal relationships between individuals working in the establishment; the context under which bureaucracy was conceived have suffered the effects of time lapse and my not necessarily apply wholly in the contemporary environment and; its deficiency in resolving differences and conflicts arising between functional groups (Barry, 2007). In examining and explaining the major milestones regarding the development of bureaucracy in Buganda, it is essential to first understand what constitutes a polity within which the principles of
bureaucracy are housed.

Defining Buganda as a polity

Attempts by scholars to define the concept of a polity also referred to as the “state” sets grounds for an ideological conflict, because different definitions lead to different theories of state function, and as a result validate different political strategies. There is no academic consensus on the most appropriate definition of the state; however, the most commonly used definition is that of Max W as quoted by Dubreuil B (2010), Gordon S (2002), Hay C (2001) and Donovan JC (1993), where a state is described as a compulsory political organization with a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain geographical territory. Woodrow W (1887) also defined a state as a people organized for law within a definite territory. In all cases, the general categories of state institutions include administrative bureaucracies, legal systems and military or religious organizations (Earle T 1997) within which the discourse in this paper will be bounded. The common factors in all definitions hinge on the people who constitute the population within a given territory where government is the agency with the mandate for stewardship of the state and having sovereignty where it is able to exchange its relations with other states and agencies or organizations both national and internationally. This is in comparison to the stone age situation where the hunter gatherers lived in ‘stateless societies’, as though their social lives were somehow lacking or unfinished, waiting to be completed by the evolutionary development of a state apparatus. Rather, the principal of their sociality was fundamentally against the state.

It can be concluded that the state is thus a supreme corporate entity because it is not incorporated into any other entity, even though it might be subordinate to other powers (such as another state or an empire). One state is distinguished from another by its having its own independent structure of political authority, and an attachment to separate physical territories. Government and the state are not however, the same thing. States can exist without governments and frequently exist with many governments. Not all governments have states. The United States, Canada, Germany and India are just a few of the many countries with many governments. States that have, for at least a time, operated without governments (or at least a central government) include Somalia from 1991 to 2000 and Iraq from 2003 to 2004. Many governments are clearly governments of units within federal states. But there can also be governments where there are no states: the Palestinian Authority is one example. A state in distinguishable from a government given its identifiable characteristics and mandate as discusses hereunder.

The concept of government

At this juncture, the concept of the government will be examined prior to delving into analysis of pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial bureaucracy in Buganda. According to Bealey (1999), a government is the agent, or instrument, of the political society which consists of public institutions which have the authority to make and enforce decisions which are binding on the whole society and all of its members. Other scholars define government as a particular group of people, the administrative bureaucracy that controls the state apparatus at a given time. From the above definitions, one can aver that governments are the means through which state power is employed. States are served by a continuous succession of different governments. According to Bealey (Ibid), each successive government is composed of a specialized and privileged body of individuals, who monopolize political decision-making, and are separated by status and organization from the population as a whole. Their function is to enforce existing laws, legislate new ones, and arbitrate conflicts. In some societies, this group is often a self-perpetuating or hereditary class. In other societies, such as democracies, the political roles remain, but there is frequent turnover of the people actually filling the positions.

One can conclude that for government to come into being there must exist a population of people who accept willingly or otherwise the authority of some person or persons to address matters of public concern. Public concerns can include but not limited to provision of security and defense against external enemies, administration of justice, and provision of public goods such as education, health and infrastructure as examples.

While a lot has been written about the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial history of Buganda (Mbabazi and Taylor 2005; Osei-Hwedie, 2001; Hirst, 2003) limited analysis does exist on the significant milestones of bureaucracy in these eras which define the contributions made in reflecting the country’s status in the new public management order. This paper will bring out the salient landmarks which characterized the transition of bureaucracy from pre-colonial, colonial and post independent history of Buganda as a continuum. Efforts will be made to analyze with concrete examples of the major milestones regarding the development of that bureaucracy. The paper will end with a roundup of the future of bureaucracy in Buganda Kingdom.

Analysis of the pre-colonial bureaucracy in Buganda

Reflecting on the pre Weberian understanding of bureaucracy, the 19th-century definition referred to a system of governance in which offices were held by unelected career officials and in this sense “bureaucracy”
was seen as a distinct form of government. During this era, Uganda displayed considerable variety of pre-colonial institutions within its borders characterized by the more organized kingdoms and the fragmented ethnic groupings. According to Nicola G (2006), the South and the West of the country covered the territory of the pre-colonial kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole. In contrast, the North of Uganda was entirely populated by fragmented ethnic groups such as Lango, Acholi and Karamoja. Finally, in the East there was centralised Busoga as well as fragmented Teso and Bugisu societies. Going by the Max W description of a state with a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain geographical territory; these groupings; and Buganda in particular, provided the structures within which bureaucracy thrived.

At this juncture, focus will be turned to Buganda as one of the kingdoms in Uganda. The pre-colonial history of Buganda provides fertile grounds for examining the development of bureaucracy. It is however important to provide a brief background to the emergence of Buganda state as a foundation for analyzing the development of the bureaucracy. Buganda as a state emerged on the northern shores of Lake Victoria. This area of swamp and hillside was not attractive to the rulers of pastoral states farther north and west. There, as in the nearby Haya kingdom of west Tanzania, the wealth of the ruling class continued to depend more on banana, land and groves than cattle, and no sharp caste-like distinction between farmers and herders formed. Buganda became a refuge area, however, for those who wished to escape rule by Bunyoro or factions within Bunyoro who were defeated in contests for power (Nicola, Ibid).

One such group from Bunyoro, headed by Prince Kimera, arrived in Buganda early in the 15th century. Assimilation of refugee elements had already strained the ruling abilities of Buganda’s various clan chiefs and a supraclan political organization was already emerging. Kimera seized the initiative in this trend and became the first effective Kabaka (ruler) of the fledgling Buganda state (Nicola, Ibid).

Nicola (Ibid) further states that the Buganda’s kingship was made a kind of state lottery in which all clans could participate. In forming a government, each new king was identified with the clan of his mother, rather than that of his father. All clans readily provided wives to the ruling Kabaka, who had eligible sons by most of them. When the ruler died, his successor was chosen by clan elders from among the eligible princes, each of whom belonged to the clan of his mother. In this way, the throne was never the property of a single clan for more than one reign. There were no privileged individuals who monopolized political decision-making, and separated by status and organization from the population as a whole. At this point in time, it is pertinent to know the very core of power which defined the Kingship in Buganda.

At the time the first Europeans arrived in East-Africa, the Buganda kingdom had a well-developed government. Not only did this create a strong attachment between the king and his people, but the Buganda kingdom also maintained a strong position towards the other regional kingdoms in the area. Originally, the early organisation of society in Buganda was based on possession of land resting in the hands of the leadership of various clans. However, in the 14th century, a new political organisation was imposed with all the power and wealth of the land centred in the position of the king, called Kabaka (Sathyamurthy 1986). Within the 19th century the king was the supreme leader and had gained considerable power over the clan leaders.

**Bureaucratic milestones**

Some of the bureaucratic milestones were the centralized command vested in the King included centralized command and authority, and appointments of subordinates. According to (Ray, 1991), the power of the king consisted of four activities, levying taxes, appointing chiefs, judging legal cases, and waging war. In addition, the king controlled the distribution of land. The predominant position of the Kabaka was further supported by the fact that the king appointed his subordinates down to the lowest level of administration (Ray Ibid). In this sense, the king exercised almost total control over his kingdom. In addition to the powerful king, the administration consisted of a Katikkiro, who acted as the Chief Minister, a council of county and department chiefs called the Lukiiko, and several levels of chiefs (Ray Ibid). Rather than the bureaucratic principle of formal selection of chiefs on the basis of technical qualifications and competence demonstrated by training, education or formal examination; the ranks in the hierarchy were determined by the authority granted by the king and measured by the number of people under the control of a chief. Apter 1967 noted that due to social mobility, the peasants could rise and be recruited into the hierarchy based on excellence in war. The fact that the social and political organisation accepted upwards and downwards mobility can in turn explain the popularity of the Buganda kingdom among the Baganda, and their strong feeling of attachment to their king.

Given the central role of the Kingship in appointing local chiefs or other high-level traditional authorities; the Kabaka had discretionary powers to abruptly dismiss any official if the performance of their area of jurisdiction in terms of for example tax collection was poor (Low, 1971). The departure from the contemporary understanding of bureaucracy was that while the structures in place were hierarchical, there were limited delineated lines of authority where the King in some instances played the role of policy maker and implementer. Likewise, none of the actions were taken on the basis of and recorded in
written rules. The bureaucratic officials who in this case were the chiefs did not have expert training nor did they implement the King’s directives with neutrality given their strong allegiance to the King. Career advancement in terms of hierarchy within the monarch was based on close association and allegiance to the King rather than on technical qualifications (apart from skills in warfare) judged by Kingship.

The strong position of the Kabaka was also explained by the fact that the king was the leader of the clan system, and held the title Ssabataka, which meant that he was the ‘Chief of the clan heads’ or ‘Supreme man of the land’ (Wrigley, 1996). The clan system remained the foundation for the social organisation of society, and as Ssabataka, the king was both the leader of the clan system and the administrative system. The rules of law did not provide for impersonality of either the King or his chiefs with the positions they held which to some extent promoted nepotism and favoritism. However, being a chief or a King provided for lifelong employment but adequate protection of individuals against arbitrary dismissal was not guaranteed. In this sense, the chiefs and the Baganda was tied to their king both through the social and political organisation of society. In addition, the Baganda were tied to their king through patron-client relations which gained importance during the colonial period. These relationships were repeated right up the ladder, so that everyone, except the Kabaka, was in effect the dependent client of someone else (Wrigley ibid and Mafeje, 1998). The chiefs acted the owners of the areas of jurisdiction, collecting taxes and remitting to the King, without fixed salaries and could not develop their career within the Kingdom administration since training facilities were non existence. With the expansion strategy in the mid 19th century, Buganda had doubled and redoubled its territory, conquering much of Bunyoro and becoming the dominant state in the region. Newly conquered lands were placed under chiefs nominated by the king. This kind of state organization was what the first British explorer Henry Morton Stanley in 1875 found in place; setting ground for the colonization process.

Colonial bureaucracy in Buganda

The historical accounts suggest that pre-colonial institutions played a role in shaping the colonial pillars upon which the Buganda Kingdom was ruled. The dominant position of the Buganda kingdom in the region was further supported during the colonial period when Buganda was declared a British protectorate in 1894. According to Nicola (2006), British rule was formalised through different treaties, and Buganda managed to maintain a high degree of self-determination. The British soon extended their control outside the territory of Buganda. British rule in Buganda was characterized by a strong continuity of pre-colonial institutions (Pratt, 1965) of government based upon hierarchy of chiefs (Apter, 1961). In this process they used Baganda as fighters and as agents for British imperialism (Mutibwa, 1992). In exchange for their collaboration, the Buganda kingdom gained more autonomy than the other kingdoms in the protectorate.

Bureaucratic milestones

The main bureaucratic milestones during the colonial rule which will form the basis for discourse included the hierarchical structures, semblance of centralized command given that the chiefs reported to both the King and colonial masters, appointment of administrative agents by colonialists as well as by the King. The positions of the Kabaka, the Katikkiro, the Lukiiko, and a hierarchy of chiefs were guaranteed, although they operated under the supervision of the British. The administrative apparatus that had been developed in Buganda was exported to the rest of Uganda. The British considered this as a cheap solution since they could rule through pre-existing structures, take advantage of local labour forces, and reduce the import of British personnel. The chiefs in the colonial political hierarchy had dual subordinate to the Colonial Administration and accountability of traditional authority, but the paucity of European officers on the ground which according to Low (1965) allowed them to exercise a great deal of unsupervised power. While the authority hierarchy stressed by the bureaucracy theory was to some extent observed where chiefs reported to the colonial administration, the multiplicity of the chiefs’ areas of jurisdiction undermined effective supervision. The direct consequence of this situation was that the local chiefs – accountable to distant colonial and cultural offices – were relatively free to exploit their subjects. Indeed, Burke (1964) reports that in some of the areas under the Buganda Kingdom, there arose a system of effective but completely autocratic chieftainship. This undermined the tenets of bureaucracy especially in the absence of formally written rules and regulations where uniformity of actions by the chiefs could not be ensured. There was, however, a difference. In Buganda the king and his chiefs governed, while in the other areas the British District Commissioners, the executive authority within the districts, were recognised as the highest authority (Johannessen 2003). The other kingdoms therefore experienced greater interference in their local administration by the colonial power than Buganda (Sathyamurthy, 1986).

With time, the colonial administration strengthened their administrative grip on the Buganda polity to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations they had put in place; and uniformity in their application. Appointment of people in key positions was based on their allegiance to the colonial masters but also hinged on their ability to
perform in the circumstances that the education systems which would produce highly trained bureaucrats was still in its infancy. The effects of change in the system of administration with improved accountability to the colonial administration had a number of positive outcomes. Crucially, historians stress that such accountability fostered modernization along two dimensions. First, it induced local chiefs to rule in the interest of their communities (Apter 1961) thereby fostering the introduction of new agricultural technologies (Richards, 1960; Ehrlich, 1965), religion and education (Low ibid), and modern health facilities (Pratt ibid).

Second, it improved coordination between local chiefs of different districts within the Kingdom, who were all in the main accountable to the traditional authority but with some level of accountability to the colonial administration. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this second effect boosted the ability of centralized groups to build roads (Pratt ibid) and to control epidemics (Low, ibid). In sum, as suggested by Mamdani’s (1996) ‘local accountability’ view, during the colonial period modernization gave a great deal of power to local traditional authorities. Yet, while in fragmented groups in other parts of Uganda especially the north and north east; unrestrained local chiefs abused this power, in centralized groups the traditional system of checks and balances prevented local chiefs from doing so. As a result, pre-colonially centralized groups were better able to implement modernization programs because in those groups a) the relationship between local chiefs and local masses was less tyrannical than in fragmented groups, and b) the efforts of local chiefs could be coordinated to a greater extent. Max W’s (George, 2009) argument that bureaucracy constitutes the most efficient and (formally) rational way in which human activity can be organized, and that this is indispensable to the modern world in service delivery came to bear during the colonial administration. The reflection was that Buganda Kingdom developed much faster compared to other polities at the time and even in the modern Uganda state.

Although the impact of pre-colonial centralization was probably strongest in the colonial period, its effect remained sizeable long after independence. Accordingly, historians confirm the continuing importance of pre-colonial institutions in the postcolonial period Nicola (2006), Buganda Kingdom reveal a clear continuity between postcolonial political leaders and pre-colonial rulers, as traditional patterns of politics influenced the nature of the postcolonial Buganda itself (Potholm, 1977; Picard, 1987). The pre-colonial institutions continued to play an important role at the local level, where post-colonial Buganda as a regime like other colonial predecessors could not achieve their objectives without the cooperation of traditional power holders. Interestingly, Herbst (2000) observed that postcolonial heads of state often had to come to pacts with traditional authorities as noted in the Uganda Peoples’ Congress lead by Obote I government where alliance was sought with King Mutesa’s Kabaka Yekka party (“The King Only”). Herbst (ibid) further noted that where kingdoms were abolished or marginalized after independence; governments only turned around to invite them back a few years later in the face of extraordinary difficulties to govern the rural areas. To sum up, Buganda history shows a clear continuity of pre-colonial and colonial bureaucratic institutions into the post-colonial polity and their crucial role in modernization. In line with the “local accountability” view of Mamdani (1996), historians confirm that, by leading to greater coordination and reduced local tyranny, pre-colonial centralization through its bureaucratic systems of management helped to improve policy implementation in colonial and postcolonial Africa. The local accountability view fostered the system of elected governments after independence which at the same time witnessed the emergence of a stronger bureaucracy in the post colonial administration in Buganda under Uganda as a wider polity. This then sets a foundation for the discourse on the bureaucratic milestones in the post colonial Buganda Kingdom with regard to its governance within the wider Uganda as a nation. It is however pertinent to first analyse the transition period from colonial administration to independence as a background to the discourse on the post colonial bureaucracy.

Post colonial bureaucracy in Buganda

In order to understand the post colonial bureaucracy in Buganda, it is prudent to first analyze the process that lead to independence in Uganda as a wider polity within which Buganda Kingdom was housed. Due to the autonomy Buganda gained, a major feature of colonial rule was the creation of Buganda into a state within the state of Uganda.

Bureaucratic milestones

The milestones in bureaucracy during this era were continuity from the colonial times. They in addition to what was pointed out included a stronger reflection of Weberian bureaucracy with the central government taking more control on the state apparatus and subsequently leaving the Kingdom with residual bureaucratic systems. This was later followed by the abolition of monarchs with their reinstatement in the National Resistance Movement regime. The subsequent bureaucracy in Buganda was greatly influenced by factors that operated in Uganda as a whole thus dwarfing the Buganda state which resulted into the different misunderstanding with the central government given the special status the Kingdoms continuously agitated for compared to the rest of the kingdoms in Uganda. This can help explain Buganda’s controversies with subsequent governments.
Towards independence

An important feature of the decades before independence was the demands made by Buganda to retain the privileged position of the kingdom. These demands concerned Buganda’s quest for self-determination, land, Buganda’s position vis-à-vis the rest of the protectorate, and the protection of the institution of kingship (Oloka-Onyango, 1997). Having enjoyed state power through which bureaucratic authority was exercised, Buganda’s increasing demands led to the deterioration of the relationship between the colonial power and the Buganda government. When demands for African political participation became more pronounced in the 1930s and 1940s, Sathyamurthy (1986) noted that the colonial power realized that the system of indirect rule through the traditional administration could not be harmonized with popular participation. As a response, administrative and institutional reforms were adapted as a way to prepare the ground for independence and self-government. The British had anticipated that the process of de-colonialization would last for thirty years. But, due to popular demand and international pressure, the move towards independence developed momentum to the extent that there was limited time to establish and develop democratic rules and institutions. Mugaju (2000) argued that the colonial power had been reluctant to allow political parties, arguing that multiparty politics would breed sectarianism, regionalism and instability. As a result, the first political parties were only established in the 1950s. The introduction of partisan politics added new dimensions to the struggle for Buganda’s interests. As the parties tended to represent specific geographical interests and only a limited national focus, they could not be described as mass-parties (Mittelman, 1975).

Skepticism towards political parties was also evident among traditional authorities all over the country who feared that the new political elite would undermine the position of traditional bureaucratic institutions once they took over power from the British. This was evident among the neo-traditionalists from Buganda who considered political parties to be enemies of the kingship, and feared that the Kabaka and the chiefs would lose power if regular elections were held. As Independence approached in the 1940s-1950s, it was clear that the Buganda wanted extensive autonomy in Uganda, and the Buganda King’s party Kabaka Yekka emphasized this desire. However this was not favored by most Ugandans of other tribes and amongst some Buganda educated elite who formed an alternative party, the Democratic Party (Uganda) to aspire for national unity. Although unpopular in Buganda, the Democratic Party had widespread support in the rest of the Bantu-speaking South (Christopher, 2002). All these measures were intended to safeguard the kingship. Kasfir (1976) posited that prior to independence, the Buganda kingdom therefore became more resolute in the demands for self-determination to the extent that it was proposed either the Kabaka would become the Head of State of Uganda after independence, or Buganda would secede. As noted by Rukooko (2001) the consequences were that the kingdom boycotted the independence elections and as a result only 3% of the Buganda population voted.

Considering the lack of political parties with national support and the focus on questions relating only to Buganda, the sub-national character of politics was confirmed in the period leading up to independence. The lack of focus on the national level can partly be explained by the nature of the colonial policy, which emphasized, rather than removed, differences. The districts, the units for local government in the protectorate, had been developed as if they were independent of each other since this was considered the easiest way for the British to maintain control in the protectorate. This, according to Karugire (1996) particularly affected Buganda where people felt attached to Buganda and showed little loyalty to Uganda as a nation. The Independence Constitution of 1962 further confirmed the development of sectarianism. The fundamental constitutional problems were to decide what form of government would be suitable for an independent Uganda, and who should be the head of state. The various kingdoms had more or less been governed as autonomous areas, and it was therefore necessary to create a national system presided over by a universally accepted head of state. As a result, Odongo (2000) argued that the Independence Constitution provided for a semi-federal system. Buganda achieved a full federal status, while the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro, and the territory of Busoga were granted a semi-federal status (Constitution, 1962: Article 2). The rest of the districts were accorded a unitary status with the central government. The Independence Constitution accordingly consisted of elements of unitarism, federalism and semi-federalism, considered as a challenging foundation for a peaceful and united nation (Mutibwa, 1992). In this sense, the constitution certainly supported the idea of Buganda as a strong unit within Uganda but with limited authority compared to what the King had during the pre-colonial and colonial era.

In 1963 the Independence Constitution was amended to provide for a constitutional president of Uganda as head of state. Since the head of state could not be a commoner or a politician, the election was limited to hereditary rulers and constitutional heads of districts (Mutibwa, 1990). Accordingly, Mutesa II functioned as king for Buganda, and President for the nation Uganda. This meant that the King maintained discretionary powers to appoint traditional leaders (chiefs) through the Buganda bureaucracy while at the same time preside over the formal government system where the true bureaucratic mechanisms set up by the British colonialists were operational. In the following years the relationship between the President whose power was also derived from the traditional systems of government...
and the elected Prime Minister with powers to control the mainstream bureaucracy systems caused considerable antagonism.

The 1966 crisis

The events that took place in 1966, which eventually led to the abolition of kingships have to a considerable extent impacted on successive regimes and bureaucratic institutions in Buganda and the wider Uganda. All regimes have faced pressure from the Baganda to restore their Kabaka and the return to the position of pre-eminence enjoyed until the pre-colonial and colonial times. In Rukooko’s (2001) opinion, when Prime Minister Obote suspended the Independence Constitution in 1966, and introduced a new interim constitution, the relationship between the central government and Buganda further deteriorated. The new constitution increased the power of the centre at the expense of the kingdoms and the districts. In addition, Mutesa II was removed from the presidency, the prime minister post was abolished, the powers of the presidency were extended, and Obote declared himself executive president.

The 1966 constitution certainly attacked federalism and monarchism, and changes were introduced which weakened the powers of the Kabaka and the Buganda government. As a reaction to the new constitution, the Buganda government passed a motion ordering the central government to remove itself from the soil of Buganda. The resolution was in itself futile since the Kingdom did not possess one of the key instruments of power; the army; to enforce their decree. And since Mutesa II could not accept the new decisions made by central government which deprived him of powers to run the Kingdom bureaucracy, the conflict culminated in an assault on the Kabaka’s palace by troops from the Uganda Army. This, according to Oloka-Onyango (1997), caused Mutesa II to flee into English exile where he died in 1969 giving Obote the opportunity to consolidate his position in power. The brutality which ensued during Obote’s and that the subsequent one lead by President Idi Amin forced Buganda to suspend their demand to restore the monarch; the privileged position and therefore control of the state bureaucracy initially enjoyed was lost until the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came into power in 1985. In essence, Buganda Kingdom lost of control over its own bureaucracy with the abolition of the monarch. It can be concluded that after the 1966 crisis, the Buganda bureaucracy went into abeyance.

The ascent of the NRM into political power soon ignited the demands for restoration of Buganda traditional ruler and the kingdom’s political power. Their demands were to some extent addressed in 1993 when the incumbent National Resistance Movement government decided to restore traditional rulers. On the 31st of July 1993 Prince Mutebi II was crowned as the 36th Kabaka of Buganda. Hence, the Buganda kingdom was the first kingdom to be restored. Opposed to the political character of the institution in the past, the restored institution of kingship was confined to cultural functions. Kayunga (2001) argues that this implied that the institution changed from being a functioning state; with its attendant bureaucracy within the Ugandan state, to an institution located outside the political sphere and the formal state structure. The King attempted to restore the administrative hierarchy composed of the Supreme Council, which had acted as the advising council of Mutebi II since he returned to Uganda, and transformed into the Lukiiko. In addition, Mutebi II established what seemed like a modern cabinet, with a Katikkiro, or Chief Minister, and what does this mean to the bureaucracy ministries such as justice, finance, economic planning and local government. The resurrection of the Lukiiko meant that the institution of kingship had restored important elements of its former administrative structures. Considering that the institution was restored as a cultural institution, some have questioned the need for governmental and organisational structures. The administrative structures are not recognised in the constitution and therefore have no legal basis and cannot exercise bureaucratic functions of a state (Constitution, 1995: Article 246). The implication was that the Kingdom had lost control of the state bureaucracy which triggered the demand for a federal state structure with executive powers. This has continuously dominated the political debate in Uganda to date, with significant influence in the electoral processes in the 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 presidential elections. Linked to the increasing executive dominance witnessed in Uganda and most recently seen through the removal of term limits for the presidency, and the more sophisticated bureaucratic mechanisms in the central government, the paper holds that the bargaining power of the monarchs to regain bureaucratic power has visibly and continuously diminished since 1995. The monarch will continue to exercise the relics of bureaucracy to the extent it has control over its traditional institutions which in essence have not direct influence to the mainstream government bureaucracy.

The current state of affairs

Currently, the Buganda bureaucracy is operationalized through the monarch headed by the King with the Parliament as the supreme political organ. The executive arm is constituted by the cabinet headed by the Prime Minister (Katikkiro). County and sub county chiefs as well parish chiefs represent the interests of the Kingdom at the lower level. In the main, the current bureaucracy has been reduced to mobilizing the population towards social development albeit with virtually no discretionary powers or the main constituents’ characteristic of functional bureaucracies as espoused by Max (1887).
Conclusion

This paper provides a theoretical progression analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial bureaucracy in Buganda. It first analyses the pre Weberian definition of bureaucracy which existed during the pre-colonial era in the Buganda monarch where the system of government was managed by unelected career officials. In this sense bureaucracy was seen as a distinct form of government, with the King holding absolute powers of establishing the administrative hierarchy, appointing chiefs and other traditional leaders based on capabilities in warfare. The rules and regulations were not written but were executed with loyalty by chiefs who were subordinate to the King.

With the advent of colonialism, the well developed pre-colonial administrative structures were taken advantage of by the British colonialists to exercise their rule and mainly played a supervisory role. During this era, the bureaucratic machinery had dual lineage where on one hand, the chiefs paid allegiance to the cultural institution as well as the British administration on the other hand. This enabled Buganda to expand its influence to other regions of Uganda and establish its influence. The increasing agitation for self rule ignited the pressure for independence thus setting the stage for transformation of the governance system through elected leaders. This had an effect on the bureaucracy in Buganda where initially the King had both presidential and Kingship responsibility. Managing the two rather contrasting forms of government resulted into conflicts which saw the abolition of the monarch and its inherent bureaucracy. With capture of state power by NRM, the monarch was reinstated albeit with only a cultural mandate where the form of bureaucracy was limited to reestablishment of the Lukiko, the cabinet and chiefs; a replica of the pre-colonial and colonial monarch. This was similar to the established strong central government bureaucratic system constituted by the civil service. Without the means to fund its bureaucracy, and the lack of supportive legislation, the current Buganda monarch remains a shadow of its former self, agitation for federal status notwithstanding. The increasing demand for accountable government will continue to undermine the institution of the Buganda monarch especially where entrusting the public resources to unelected officials minimizes their relationship with the populace. In conclusion therefore, it can be argued that the pre-colonial Buganda monarchists achieved their first goal, the restoration of the institution of kingship, through a bargaining process with NRM. However, their second goal, federalism, which would combine bureaucratic powers vested in the monarch and the state apparatus has never been achieved. The quasi-state which Buganda has put in place that resembles a modern cabinet with a chief minister and ministers; and the local administrative system with a network of county and sub-county chiefs; to a large extent overlaps the official state structure based on districts and local councils. The restriction by the 1995 constitution which prevents the traditional rulers from levying taxes and the currently irregular transfers from the central government continue to fuels the demands for a federal status hoping that the institution will be granted fiscal powers and be able to fund their bureaucracy (Kayunga, 2001). It is however, unlikely that the current NRM government will give in to the demands for federalism where the Kingdom can exercise a fully constituted bureaucracy.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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