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A critical review of Agenda 2063: Business as usual?

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This paper sets out to review and critically examine the Agenda 2063, a strategic long term planning instrument for the development of Africa in the next fifty years, prepared by the African Union Commission on the occasion of celebrating the OAU/AU golden jubilee in 2013. The objectives of this paper were to examine the viability of the agenda, to elucidate critical issues underpinning its successful implementation, to analyze its strengths and weaknesses, and to suggest ways of dealing with persisting challenges. Through perusal of the agenda 2063 and various other documents related to it, the authors build their argument around three thematic issues namely: Agenda 2063 and African Integration, socio-economic aspects of Agenda 2063 and the political ideological basis of the agenda. Limitations and challenges have been explored and recommendations formulated. It was noticed that Agenda 2063 provides an excellent vision for African countries and African people. It was prepared following a broad-based bottom-up participatory approach, and advocates for inclusion and empowerment of all groups of people. However, the point was made that the agenda 2063 is likely to be confronted by the same or similar setbacks which prevented previous African long term plans from achieving significant results. These include limited finances, lack of ownership, lack of political will, diverse and sometimes conflicting interests, and lack of ideological backup to sustain the vision. Thus, unless adequate measures are put in place to overcome these challenges, Agenda 2063 may be added to the pile of the many other planning documents which were never implemented.

Key words: Agenda 2063, regional integration, development, Pan-Africanism.

INTRODUCTION

The quest for African integration is not a contemporary issue. It began with the Pan African movement back in the 1960s. This movement championed the struggle of Africans and peoples of African descent for emancipation and the restoration of their dignity, against slavery, colonialism and all forms of racism and racial exploitation. This force and passion for freedom led to the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The OAU had a mandate to pursue both political and socio-economic African independence. This was divided into five main areas; decolonization, advancement of peace and security, promotion of democracy, human rights and...
good governance, fostering international relations and cooperation and regional integration. Its political agenda was dominated by issues of decolonization, liberalization and the struggle against apartheid (African Union Commission AUC, 2015a: 43-44).

Although different member states at the time agreed that African integration was paramount, they however, had differing ideologies about how African unity should be achieved. They were hence divided into camps; the Casablanca group which pressed for immediate continental unity and the Monrovia group which argued for a gradual approach. They were however, able to put their differences aside and focus on African Unity, hence influenced the charter of the OAU. It is claimed that the OAU did not have a clear vision and strategy for realization of continental unity and this affected its structures, organs and performance in general. The policy organs and strategies consequently went undeveloped and not fully implemented. As a result of this and other challenges the African Economic Community (AEC) and OAU were transformed into the African Union (AU). The Constitutive Act of the AU incorporated the objectives of both the OAU and AECs. It nonetheless brought in new elements and principles these included; more participation of the African citizens in the activities of the union, right to intervene in member states pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, an area that the OAU shied away from. This is in addition to the right of member states to request intervention from the union in order to restore peace and security all this enabled the AU perform better than its predecessors (AUC, 2015a: 44-45).

Given that the question of economic emancipation was one of the fundamental objectives of the Pan African movement, the AU adopted a strategy for political unity that involved building from the bottom through establishment of regional economic communities. These various strategies and frameworks for economic development were agreed on by the continent's leadership from the late 1970s onwards. But by the 1980s, the economic, social and political problems in Africa had reached crisis proportions, Africa largely putting the blame on external forces and factors (colonialism and unfair international relations) (AUC, 2015b: 47). This is yet another old blame song played by Africans and a trance we have to wake up from and take charge of our destiny. This is because Africa is to blame for some of the poor economic policies and deficit in governance systems.

In response to the 1970 crises, OAU collaborated with (United Nations Economic Commission for African) UNECA in 1979 and mobilized to forge a vision and plan to address the crisis. This led to the Monrovia declaration which was subsequently incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action 1980 and the Final Act of Lagos 1980. They articulated African’s future development trajectory, provided a plan for action to foster the continent's development and were underpinned by political decision for attaining economic cooperation and integration. They too demonstrate several attempts made by Africa to define continental visions and action plans to address the economic, social and political challenges facing the continent. They too sought to carve out alternatives for the continent's future, address issues of poverty, industrialization, agriculture, science and technology, structural transformation, integration and cooperation remained at the core of all these initiatives. They however, remained partially implemented—a situation attributed to lack of capacity, lack of political will and lack of resources and external interference. The development of plans was mostly technocratic in approach, not sufficiently participatory and therefore failed to galvanize ordinary Africans (AUC, 2015b: 47-48), a situation that Agenda 2063 is hoping to rectify. It is also important to note that even though African countries at continental level endorsed the plans for transformation, at national level competing external agendas held the day. This experience provides lessons that are crucial for the success of Agenda 2063 (henceforth to be referred to as the Agenda). The Agenda, therefore, needs to be fully integrated into national and regional plans and the need for strong political leadership to ensure that continental commitments are followed through at national and regional levels (AUC, 2015b: 48). The AUC (2015b: 49) views the Agenda as the context of the durability of the quest for political unity and economic emancipation of the continent.

**Why the Agenda 2063**

Agenda 2063 is rooted in Pan Africanism and African Renaissance. It attempts to provide a robust framework for addressing past injustices and realization of the 21st century as the African century. The Agenda 2063 (hence with to be referred to as the Agenda) echoes the Pan African call that Africa must unite to realize its renaissance. This Agenda evolves from the OAU to postulate that Africa is looking forward to the next 50 years. It therefore requires an account of lessons from the past to be able to have a clear picture of the future Africa is going towards. The success of the Agenda necessitates mobilization of the people and their ownership of continental programmes at the core; the principle of self reliance and African financing its own development, the importance of capable inclusive and accountable states and institutions at all levels and in all spheres, the critical role of regional economic communities as building blocks for continental unity; taking into consideration challenges faced by both island and landlocked states and holding ourselves and our governments and institutions accountable for results. The AU commission further believes that the Agenda requires
conscious and deliberate efforts to nurture a transformative leadership to drive the agenda and defend African interests. The Agenda too embraces the Pan African Vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (African Union Commission, 2015: 3).

The agenda is also based on the Eight priorities of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration that include: African identity and renaissance, continued struggle against colonization and the right to self determination, the integration Agenda, Agenda for social and economic development, peace and security Agenda, Democratic governance, determining Africa’s destiny and Africa’s place in the world. Agenda 2063: The future we want for Africa is an endogenous shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development for African transformation and a continuation of the Pan African drive for self determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity. It aims to galvanize and unite in action all Africans and the Diaspora, harness African’s continental endowments embodied in its people’s history, cultures and natural resources, and geo-political position to effect equitable and people centered growth and development; eradicate poverty, develop Africa’s human capital, build social assets, infrastructure and public goods, consolidate peace and security; put in place effective and strong development states, participatory and accountable institutions, and empower women and youth to bring about the African renaissance (AUC, 2015: 6).

In addition to the Pan African vision, the Agenda lays down seven (7) crucial aspirations that are to propel Africa to the next level. These include; (i) a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, (ii) an integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance, (iii) an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and rule of law, (iv) a peaceful and secure Africa, (v) an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics, (vi) an Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for the children and (vii) Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner (African Union Commission, 2015: 4). For purposes of the article, care will taken to discuss in detail the feasibility of some of these aspirations, to determine whether they mere platitudes or not.

Aspiration two; which is based on the 1963 quest for African unity inspired by the spirit of Pan Africanism, focuses on liberation, political and economic independence. It is motivated by development based on self reliance and self determination of African people with democratic and people-centered governance. It predicts that by 2063, Africa will be an integrated, united, peaceful, sovereign, independent, confident and self-reliant continent. The AU envisions that by 2020 all remnants of colonialism and all African territories under occupation will be fully liberated. Additionally all kinds of oppression including gender, racial and other forms of discrimination will be ended. The Agenda assumes the political unity of Africa will be the culmination of the integration process, which includes free movement of people establishment of continental institutions leading to full economic integration, and that by 2030 African governments will have arrived at a consensus on the form of continental governments and institutions (African Union Commission, 2015: 6).

Aspiration three, postulates that by 2063, Africa will be a continent where democratic values, culture, practices, universal principles of human rights, gender equality, justice and rule of law are well-established; an Africa with capable institutions and transformative leadership in place at all levels. The Agenda also assumes that the continent’s population will enjoy affordable and timely access to independent courts and judiciary that deliver justice without fear or favor. It also assumes that corruption and impunity will be a thing of the past. African citizens will actively participate in social, economic and political development and management. The Agenda generally claims that African institutions at all levels of government will be developmental, democratic, and accountable and transformative leadership will prevail (AUC, 2015: 7).

Aspiration six of the Agenda envisions an Africa, where African women will be fully empowered in all spheres with equal social, political and economic rights including the right to own and inherit property, sign contracts, register and manage business. Rural women will have access to productive assets, land, credit, inputs and financial services. All forms of gender based violence and discrimination (social, economic and political) against women and girls will be eliminated and the latter will fully enjoy all their human rights. All harmful social practices (FGM-Female Genital Mutilation, child marriages will be prohibited, and barriers to quality health and education for women and girls eliminated (African Union Commission, 2015: 10-11). The Agenda too supposes that by 2063, full gender parity with women occupying at least 50% of elected public offices at all levels and half of managerial positions in the public and private sectors, the economic and political glass ceiling that restricts women's progress will be shattered. The Agenda recognizes that 'no society can reach its full potential unless it empowers women and youth and removes all obstacles to women's full participation in all areas of human endeavors' (African Union Commission, 2015: 14). Aspiration seven notices that Africa shall continue to advocate for reform of other global institutions, including The World Bank, the IMF and the WTO to enhance international standards in a way that caters to the aspirations of developing countries and enables these countries face their challenges.
Agenda is striving to ensure that by 2063, Africa takes full responsibility for financing its own growth and transformation (AUC, 2015a: 39-40).

The Agenda, however, recognizes the following as critical enablers for African transformation; it requires people’s ownership and mobilization, Africa needs to finance its own development, it needs accountable leadership and responsive institutions, capable and democratic developmental states and institutions, the populace needs changed attitudes and mindsets, Pan African perspective and the ownership of African narrative and brand to ensure that it reflects continental realities, aspiration and priorities and the African position in the world (AUC, 2015a: 21).

It further identifies some factors that prove a great opportunity for consolidation and rapid progress of the continent; significant positive and sustained growth trajectory of many African countries, notable reduction in violent conflict, increased peace and stability, advances in democratic governance, prospects for the rise of the middle class, youth-bulge catalyst for further growth in consumer sectors and services, change in international finance, architectural rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and improved flow of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment (AUC, 2015a: 20) Some of these factors are quite questionable and some might think are the reason why Africa is still lagging behind, especially when it comes to the issue of financing. It is also important to note that over the last decade Africa has experienced sustained levels of growth, peace and stability and positive movements on several human development indicators. It must therefore sustain and consolidate this position and use it as a spring board to ensure it leads to transformation and renaissance (AUC, 2015a: 18).

In order to continue advancing the agenda for economic emancipation and drawing lessons from the global energy crisis of the 1970s, Africa has taken strategic decisions to pursue continental integration as a strategy for economic development for example; the Lagos Plan of Action and the Bretton Woods agenda on structural adjustments. The Agenda builds on and accelerates the implementation of a continental framework, most notably the Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja treaty, NEPAD, The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Minimum integration programme (MIP), the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA), the AU/NEPAD Science and Technology Consolidated Plan and Africa’s Afro-Industry and Agribusiness Development Initiative, (AUC, 2015a: 19).

The Agenda also plans to develop an implementation mechanism underpinned by strong knowledge management systems that enhances the quality of delivery through cutting edge research, innovation and codification of ground breaking experience, promotes sharing of experiences and learning from each other, and establishes communities of practice (AUC, 2015a: 20).

The Agenda further recognizes that the continent is more united and a global power to reckon with. Africa is now capable of rallying support around a common agenda and speaking with one voice with capacity to negotiate and withstand the influences that would like to see it divide (AUC, 2015a: 20) This is, however, questionable. Many a times, Africa has betrayed itself and failed to stand up and be heard in situations where it would have proved to be a formidable force. The question is: is this indeed true about Africa or just a fallacy? While colonialism may have played a role in Africa’s lack of development, post colonial policies by leaders as well as their practices in power have consistently denied Africa any room for growth and development (Qobo, 2007: 2).

The Agenda also continues to call for unity, transparency, willingness and capability to assess performance, correct mistakes, build on successes, placing citizens first, and social governance and values. It is also important to note that the long term planning strategy has been adopted by member countries for Uganda’s vision 2040, South Africa and Egypt’s 2050, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Cameroon’s 2035, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Lesotho, Cote d’Ivoire are readjusting their visions ending in 2020 to take them beyond 2050. The Agenda, therefore, seeks to build upon and consolidate these efforts (AUC, 2015a: 21). However, just as the AU and Africa has had a number of ambitious plans that have had limited success, this raises concern for the Agenda and its downward dissemination. If some countries are finding it difficult to fulfill their individual visions, then this in itself may create a dent in the Agenda 2063, since its success depends heavily on the efforts made by individual countries. Thus for regional integration to be successful in Africa, African leaders will have to move beyond grand gestures and abstract visions to more focused and gradual steps that are carefully executed at the domestic level (Qobo, 2007: 1).

Is the Agenda 2063 business as usual for Africa? The African Union (AU) tries to address this situation by claiming that it is not a business as usual scenario. If it were then, economic growth and investment rates of recent years would continue, Africa’s labor force would continue to grow, commodity prices remain high and generally improved policies of the last two decades maintained. It would also assume that there is no sustained action on a new policy agenda, there is lack of inclusiveness, lack of job growth, substantial poverty, and unsustainable natural resource management, non-accelerated productivity growth, and Africa’s economies would not be transformed.

The Agenda realizes that despite the fact that the latter are challenges that need to be dealt with, success will be assured if African countries build upon past achievements and capitalize on emerging opportunities and draw upon the continent’s strong cultural and spiritual values (AUC, 2015c: 41-43).
Scope of the Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063 has a wide and diversified scope of operation. Geographically it concerns the whole of Africa as a continent and all 54 African countries and members of the AU. It is also far-reaching in its socio-economic aspects such as the planned continental infrastructure development projects (Grand Inga Power Plant, high speed train network, the pan-African e-network, and Africa outer space strategy). It also aims to be owned by all Africans including African diaspora and to involve as many African institutions and create new ones for its implementation. It is a global strategic rolling plan with short- (10 years), medium- (10-25 years), and long-term (25-50 years) perspectives.

Stakeholders and partnership considerations

During the preparation process of the Agenda broad based consultations were sought with as many stakeholders as possible. These include the private sector, African academics/think tanks, civil society organizations (CSOs), planning experts and development specialists, African diaspora, the youth, women, media, Faith Based Organizations, former heads of state and government web-based general public at continental level, sector ministries, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), etc. Their views were considered and their inputs were included in the drafting of the Agenda, which is a positive feature of the agenda. It is likely to be owned by all Africans from many walks of life, both on the continent and in the Diaspora.

Additionally, the AU is engaged in a number of strategic partnerships with both traditional and emerging partners. However, different levels of short comings have characterized the management of these partnerships. Most of the shortcomings in the management of high-potential strategic partnerships were as a result of AUC-level challenges, which were due to lack of an AU partnership policy and strategy, as well as AU-level deficits in terms of financial, technical and coordination capacity. It is stated in the Agenda that the envisioned United States of Africa Government will strengthen its Partnership Policies with its partner countries and regions, and its capacity and role in global negotiations-in the global economic, environment, security and social negotiations as well as on the reforms of the multilateral institutions including the UN Security Council, (AUC, 2014: 21). It also warns that some partnerships may constrain Africa’s development and thus should be avoided, giving the example of the EPA with Europe which is likely to constrain African countries from accelerating industrialization in the next 15/20 years.

Agenda 2063 and African Integration

The Establishment of: the Continental Free Trade Area by 2017, Investment Bank and Pan African Stock Exchange (2016); the African Monetary Fund (2018); and the African Central Bank (2028/34), a single African air transport market, the African Passport and free movement of people, are practical projects planned for in the first ten-year implementation plan of the Agenda that will further African integration effort on top of the cross Africa major infrastructure development projects (AUC, 2015a: 16).

(i) Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017: To significantly accelerate growth of Intra-Africa trade and use trade more effectively as an engine of growth and sustainable development, through doubling of Intra-Africa trade by 2022, strengthen Africa’s common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations and establish the financial institutions within agreed upon timeframes. The CFTA is a determined attempt by African governments to unlock Africa’s tremendous potential to deliver prosperity for all Africans. Studies by UNCTAD and other institutions indicate the major benefits expected to emerge from the CFTA, include boosting trade and welfare gains and fostering a vibrant and resilient African economic space. These, in turn, could serve as a springboard for more beneficial integration by Africa into the global economy (UNCTAD, 2015).

(ii) Establishment of the African financial institutions: Establishment of the Continental Financial Institutions: aims at accelerating integration and socio-economic development of the continent, as they are important institutions when it comes to the mobilisation of resources and management of the financial sector such as the African Investment Bank and Pan African Stock Exchange (2016); the African Monetary Fund (2018); and the African Central Bank (2028: 34) (AUC, 2015a: 16).

(iii) The African Passport and free movement of people: Transforming Africa’s laws, which remain generally restrictive on the movement of people despite political commitments to bring down borders, with the view to promoting the issuance of visas by Member States and enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries by 2018.

(iv) Establishment of a single African air transport market: This flagship Programme aims at delivering the single African air transport market to facilitate air transportation in Africa.

These programmes, if adequately financed and well implemented, have the potential of taking African integration to the next level and raise the hope that the dream of a united Africa such as envisaged by pioneers of pan-Africanism can come true. However, if the Agenda is to achieve more successful regional integration in a
timely fashion, it will critically need a new level of political commitment by Africa’s leadership. The willingness to incorporate the envisaged programmes in national long term strategy and the disbursement of required resources rests with African states and governments and their heads, in particular. Its successful implementation will also, in a great measure, depend on the efficiency with which the already identified impediments to integration are addressed. These include: African countries commitment to multiple regional blocs, fear of economic losses as a result of foregone customs revenue or competition with local industries, RECs themselves being weak institutions, lacking resources and strong politically backing, states’ internal weaknesses with inefficient bureaucracies that undermine the countries’ abilities to manage their borders and economic regulations, Africa’s infrastructure backlog, the security stresses that undermine normal life, and lack of citizens’ awareness and involvement in integration efforts (Corrigan, 2015).

**Agenda 2063: Not business as usual**

The agenda is not business as usual because it pledges to position Africa for growth over the next 50 years and incorporating lessons and experiences from the past. It aims at getting African states to do things differently, it is people centered, and envisions better governance, performance outcomes, and impact on African citizens. The Agenda recognizes that Africa needs a paradigm shift if current hopes for a better future are to be realized. It includes citizens’ participation, speaking with one voice and international affairs and accountability for results. (AUC, 2015a: 50; DeGhetto et al., 2016: 94).

The agenda also appreciates that the pace of regional integration needs to be accelerated to allow Africans to take their destiny in their own hands. This it agrees can be achieved if the spirit of solidarity, determination and sacrifice that was once a strong feature in efforts of Africans and their political leadership is rekindled, especially among African’s young people to enable the continent to face the challenges of the current times (AUC, 2015a: 49). Additionally, the importance of good governance and functional democracy in preventing and effectively managing conflicts is emphasized. As most conflict in Africa occurs due to deficiencies in ensuring accountable, transparent and inclusive governance systems, as well as inadequate efforts to address the challenges of poverty and inequality. The Agenda understands that addressing the above will go a long way towards strengthening peace, security of persons, communities and nations, and contribute significantly to the socio-economic transformation of the continent (AUC, 2015b: 89).

We cannot overemphasize the necessity to include women and other minority groups in the development process. The AUC (2015b: 92) notes that the progress in the continent with regard to women’s representation in parliament is low given that in many African countries, women generally constitute a minority in some critical parliamentary committees tasked with drafting bills, which later become law. With respect to MDGs (Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction, African performance lags behind in one of the most important indicators, gender equality. The continued monopoly of power by the male political elite, lack of political will, socio-economic challenges, the non recognition of unpaid care and domestic work as well as patriarchal traditions and beliefs continue to limit the formal and meaningful involvement of women in governance, peace and security, and development processes. The Agenda plans to address this phenomenon because it acknowledges that the continent cannot meet is ambitious goals while limiting a dynamic segment of the population—women from realizing their full potential (AUC, 2015a: 93).

In order to mitigate the challenges that have so besieged African development, the Agenda proposes to build the capacities of RECs (Regional Economic Communities) to find regional solutions to address drivers of fragility. The Agenda also intends to plan for value addition in the agricultural and mining sectors, diversification of African economies away from dependence on agriculture based exports and also dependence on one or two primary commodities. It also aims to build human capital, a skill revolution promotion based on the notion that well educated citizens have the potential to transform the risks of demographic and disease burden into a demographic dividend and lead to economic transformation of the continent (AUC, 2015b:125). This legitimizes the need for regional integration schemes in Africa with an outward oriented approach aimed at integration into the global economy. Regional integration is likely to be more successful, if it is outwardly oriented and promotes global integration. Thus as Africa learns from the mistakes of the past (failed import-substitution industrialization of the past) it also needs to maintain close relations with countries in the north, but this relationship has to be mutually benefiting. Premiums too need to be placed more on infrastructure related/project based regional cooperation to manage regional public goods (Qobo, 2007: 7,11,13).

**Socio-economic aspects of Agenda 2063**

The key question here is whether agenda 2063 presents enough potential to bring about socio-economic transformation that would result in African people’s welfare enhancement. A review of the extent to which socio-economic factors are considered in the agenda and its five-year implementation plan is made under this subhead. Africa remains, in economic terms, one of the poorest parts of the world (Beegle et al., 2016). Food security is a cause for worry. Almost one-third of Africa’s
population is undernourished (AUC, 2014: 85). And many have no access to clean water, electricity, good public roads; education; and healthcare systems. Sub-Saharan Africa particularly, remains the region where the world’s poorest people are most heavily concentrated with an average per capita income of roughly US$1 a day (Moyo, 2009: 5). Bad leadership, corruption, poor infrastructure, unemployment, lack of access to healthcare and conflicts remain a cause for worry in many African countries. Worst still, the very people, Africa’s best and brightest, who could be leading an African Renaissance, are leaving Africa every year for richer countries in the West, where they stand a chance to prosper.

Socioeconomic factors are the social and economic experiences and realities that help mould one’s personality, attitudes, and lifestyle. These factors can also define regions and neighborhoods. Education, income, place of residence and infrastructure are some of the key factors that determine the level of socio-economic development of an individual, household, country and region. The agenda caters for these and other national aspects of socio-economic development such as peace and security, eradication of poverty, hunger and disease (AUC, 2015a: 6). In Aspiration1, A Prosperous Africa based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, it is envisioned that by the year 2063, Africa will be a continent of shared prosperity, which finances its own development, and where:

1. African people have a high standard of living and quality of life and well-being;
2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation for a knowledge society
3. Citizens are healthy, well-nourished and have long life spans
4. Cities and other settlements are modernized and people have access to all the basic necessities of life
5. Economies are structurally transformed to create shared growth and decent jobs for all
6. Modern agriculture for increased production, productivity and value addition contribute to farmer and national prosperity
7. The continent while attaining prosperity maintains healthy ecosystems and preserves the African and global environment.

Agenda 2063 makes good provisions for the following socioeconomic development aspects. If implemented they would really have welfare improvement effects on the lives of many Africans. However, as rightly suggested by Udah (2015a: 7), while the Agenda offers a roadmap on how to achieve the desired future for the Africa we want, Africa’s development challenges call for changes in attitudes, new level of consciousness, a greater degree of innovation and hard work. It demands discipline and transparency, honesty about what works and what does not as far as development is concerned.

Education

Education is one of the most important socioeconomic factors. One’s level of education can shape how he or she views the world and can contribute to social growth. It can lead to increased earning capacity, which in turn can contribute to quality-of-life issues. Education can also contribute to decision-making processes that alter the paths people take in life (Mabasanyinje et al., 2016). Agenda 2063 recognizes that a key driver of Africa’s prosperity will be its world class human capital developed through quality education and health services.

Agenda 2063 First Ten-year implementation plan provides for the establishment of an African Virtual and E-University, increasing access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa by reaching large numbers of students and professionals in multiple sites, simultaneously, and developing relevant and high quality Open, Distance and e-Learning (ODeL) resources to offer the prospective student a guaranteed access to the University from anywhere in the world and anytime (24 hours a day, 7 days a week) (AUC, 2015).

Income

One’s income and corresponding occupation are factors that can contribute to socioeconomic status. A career in medicine, for example, places a person in a higher income bracket, while also making that same person part of a social class of doctors, nurses and other medical-profession peers. In society, we often are judged by what we do and what we earn. Agenda 2063 states that Africa would by 2063 be a continent, which would have benefitted from accelerated and inclusive economic growth and macroeconomic stability. There would be annual GDP growth rates of not less than 7%, investment and savings of 25% and above, and macroeconomic policies that promote growth, employment creation, investments and industrialization. The local private sector would have grown to claim over 50% of the GDP (AUC, 2015).

Place of residence

From the type of house we live in to the region and neighborhood in which we reside, place of residence is another leading socioeconomic factor. For better or worse, neighborhoods often group us socially among people with similar incomes and often similar backgrounds. For instance, at points in history, entire neighborhoods have been established around factories or
mills for purposes of housing employees. Agenda 2063 provides for the modernization of human settlement. Some priority actions for urbanization and human settlements listed on page 42 of the Agenda 2063 framework document include: Improving shelter/housing delivery and slum eradication, ensuring financing for urban development, facilitating spatial planning and service delivery, and strengthening the productive base of urban economies (AUC, 2015a).

Infrastructure development

The AU summit approved the following infrastructural mega programmes/projects as part of the agenda 2063 flagship projects: all included in the first ten year implementation plan. Four of twelve flagship projects of the agenda aim to develop international Africa-wide infrastructure. These are: The Integrated High Speed Train Network, The Grand Inga Power Plant, The Pan-African E-Network, Africa Outer Space Strategy (AUC, 2015a).

1. Integrated High Speed Train Network: Connecting all African capitals and commercial centres through an African High Speed Train to facilitate movement of goods, factor services and people, reduce transport costs and relieve congestion of current and future systems.

2. Implementation of the Grand Inga Dam Project. The optimal development of the Inga Dam will generate 43,200 MW of power (PIDA) to support current regional power pools and their combined service to transform Africa from traditional to modern sources of energy and ensure access of all Africans to clean and affordable electricity.

3. The Pan-African E-Network. This involves a wide range of stakeholders and envisages putting in place policies and strategies that will lead to transformative e-applications and services in Africa; especially the intra-African broad band terrestrial infrastructure; and cyber security, making the information revolution the basis for service delivery in the bio and nanotechnology industries and ultimately transform Africa into an e-Society.

4. Africa Outer Space Strategy aims to strengthen Africa’s use of outer space to bolster its development. Outer space is of critical importance to the development of Africa in all fields: agriculture, disaster management, remote sensing, climate forecast, banking and finance, as well as defense and security. Africa’s access to space technology products is no longer a matter of luxury, and there is a need to speed up access to these technologies and products. New developments in satellite technologies make these very accessible to African countries. The Brazzaville meeting on aerial space technologies underlines the need for appropriate policies and strategies in order to develop the regional market for space products in Africa.

Limitations

Even though the above arguments show that the Agenda 2063 is not business as usual, there are a number of areas that have not been addressed which seem to show that Africa is creating a vicious cycle of ambitious projects and ideas which barely meet implementation requirements. Some scholars argue that African regional integration is marred by ambitious schemes with unrealistic time frames towards deeper integration and in some cases, political union. Essentially, African integration is following a stepwise goods, labour and capital markets – monetary and fiscal integration. Starting from a free trade area, customs union, common market-monetary and fiscal matters (economic union), and the political union is the ultimate achievement. The question is how feasible is this linear model of regional integration for the African environment? (Trudi, 2011: 4–5).

The agenda advocates for participation, inclusion and empowerment of all citizens (AUC, 2015a: 122) but does not seem to show how this would be achieved. How will inclusive growth and sustainable development be possible without inclusive institutions? DeGhetto et al. (2016: 98) argue that Africa must build effective institutions capable of balancing and protecting competing interests without conflict or open warfare, while also avoiding state capture and fragility. And one of the ways of achieving inclusive institutions at regional level is to foster economic and potential integration with Africa. One of the ways of ensuring this is the creation of the inclusive economic institutions, proposed by the Agenda, beginning with the formation of the TFTA (Tripartite Free Trade Area) which includes; COMESA, EAC and SADC. However, they also note that this brings in far less than half of the AU countries, hence the fear that some countries left out of this and other trade agreements may fall even further behind. Integration may also increase complexity, hurt small businesses, benefit developed over developing countries, and limit trade with other regions.

In addition, economic growth and prosperity are associated with inclusive economic and political institutions; but the reverse is true, extractive institutions enrich a few at the expense of many. They create a platform for extractive political institutions to persist. This shows why nations fail today. Because of extractive institutions that do not create an incentive needed for people to save, invest and innovate (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 106–413). This argument is further supported by Boldrin et al. (2012: 1) when they argue that political institutions determine economic institutions. To achieve economic success, political institutions must be sufficiently centralized to provide basic public services including justice, enforcement of contracts and education.
Inclusive institutions enable innovation energies to emerge and lead to continuing growth, as exemplified by the industrial revolution. The question is, Agenda 2063 does not lay the ground or explain the basis of how this is actually going to happen.

The Agenda also attempts to treat Africa as a single unit of analysis, and this may be a blunder, because Africa is so diverse that the issues discussed during the consultation and implementation mean different things for citizens of different regions. These differences are likely to complicate the design, implementation and even monitoring and evaluation of the Agenda’s plan of action (DeGhetto et al., 2016: 98). For instance, weak states may be stumbling blocks to the development of robust rules-based regional integration agreements (RIAs, because they are unable to develop manage and implement a comprehensive regional integration agenda (Trudi, 2011: 19). Similarly Geda and Kibret, (2002: 12) contend that an integration scheme, where countries are at different levels of development will suffer disproportionate gains from integration and their commitment to implement agreed upon treaties could be adversely affected. This is an issue the Agenda action plan needs to address or the Agenda 2063 will not be any different from its predecessors. Without shared values and common interest, the regional integration process will be complicated (Qobo, 2007: 6). Although integration as proposed by Agenda 2063 is a perceived strategy for overcoming individual weaknesses and developmental obstacles, it may, to the contrary, generate conflicts and tensions within and between states, especially when opposing ideologies and political systems are involved or when economic benefits are perceived to be uneven (Chingono and Nakana, 2009: 397).

The challenge for Agenda 2063 is how to ensure that ordinary citizens can imagine a more positive future while reconciling with past misdeeds and atrocities and simultaneously coping with the hardships and realities of the present. These scholars argue that when people are poor and preoccupied with the challenges of meeting immediate and pressing basic daily needs, they are less likely to focus on and imagine a more positive future (DeGhetto et al., 2012: 64-83) note in their book “Why nations fail” that disease is largely a consequence of poverty and of governments being unable to undertake the public health measures necessary to eradicate them. They too articulate the fact that poor countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty, they get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose. Thus, the Agenda and the AUC have the uphill task of alleviating poverty and improving the living conditions of its citizens, because unless this is done, commitment towards the agenda is unlikely.

Furthermore, the Agenda tends by nature to exclude the majority of the population who may not have completed a high school level of education. This is because it will be translated into the four AU official languages (English, French, Arabic and Portuguese) it runs the risk of the majority of the population not being able to comprehend it, hence the necessity for it to be translated into major African local languages. This exclusion undermines the consultative spirit of the Agenda (DeGhetto et al., 2016: 98-99). DeGhetto et al also observe that several struggling countries may be left behind, despite the fact that the Agenda’s implementation requires country specific actions due to the different levels of country development, resource endowments and priorities. The proposed plan of action does not include steps for working with these member states that may need especial assistance.

For instance in the EAC (East African Community) though markets are well developed, the quality of infrastructure, macroeconomic stability and health and education indicators are poor. Some of the encumbrances include lack of access to financing, corruption, high tax rates, inadequate supply of infrastructure (World Economic Forum, 2010 as cited by Trudi (2011:16). The ECOWAS countries though strong in institutions and innovation, are weak in health, education and infrastructure development. And even though some African countries perform well on various GCI indicators, the whole of sub Saharan Africa lags behind other world regions in terms of competitiveness, and more generally, faces a constrained business environment. Thus the need to improve competitiveness: a challenge the Agenda 2063 plan of action needs to address (Trudi, 2011:16).

The question of ownership of the Agenda also needs to be considered. This is because it has significant implications for buy in, commitment, resourcing, monitoring, and effective and sustainable implementation. This is based on the premise that it is difficult for two or more parties to work toward a common goal, if they do not have their individual issues resolved. Leaders in the public and private sector therefore, need to focus on how these resources are organized and utilized within and across national borders (DeGhetto et al., 2016: 101). This brings this argument to the most crucial issues of leadership and growth. Growth moves forward only if not blocked by the economic losers who anticipate that their economic privileges will be lost (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 100). The challenge that the Agenda will face lies in the fact that political motivation for regional integration in Africa plays a big role and perhaps specifically, in the overlapping memberships of RIAs. Although political commitment is persuasive, it does not seem to translate into effective implementation (Trudi, 2011: 6).

Adogamhe (2008: 21) stresses that most African states suffer from a democracy deficit and weak allegiance from citizens and that this creates a crisis of legitimacy for most of the existing state institutions. Adogamhe also notes that integration in African tends to be an elitist movement rather than based on democratic politics, rule
of law and good governance. African leaders tend to refuse to surrender any sovereignty as it would mean a loss of political capital which would develop into a loss of political power (Duthie, 2011: 139). Draper (2010: 15) further argues that given the youth of African nations, it is not surprising to find that leaders in many of these countries are reluctant to really yield their prerogative to regional institutions. It also goes without saying that lack of regime continuity which is dominant in African politics and governance, manipulative and technocratic power of transnational corporations, all constitute impediments to the pursuit of serious integrative processes in Africa (Biswaro, 2011: 415).

The Agenda puts forward a financing strategy that is articulated into domestic resource mobilization, intermediation of resources into investment and access to finance. The Agenda also pledges to adapt more effective and inclusive means of channeling those funds to where they can be most effective, and where there is market failure in the allocation of the resources. Financing is needed in regional integration, especially where infrastructure, science, technology and innovation-based industrialization and processing of local resources, agriculture and food security, and environmental sustainability is required. But the AU has inadequate financial resources to execute these programs (Adogamhe, 2008: 19). In addition, in the past, the AU was unable to manage well its partnerships due to lack of AU partnerships policy and strategy as well as AU level deficits in terms of financial, technical and coordination capacity (AUC, 2015b: 134-135). Boldrin et al. (2012: 5) suggests that nations fail because they are destroyed by their neighbors. Thus member countries should pay fully the agreed financial contribution and punctually, if Africa is to rid itself of foreign domination (Maruping, 2005: 149). The continent needs to tap into its own vast wealth to finance its development agenda (Eyster, 2014: 1). Self-sustainability is paramount at this point.

The question of markets is also going to be a challenge for the AU; and Agenda 2063 does not seem to show how this will be solved. A case in point, most countries in Africa have low per capita income levels and small populations, hence small markets. Fifteen sub-Saharan countries have small economies, are poor, and landlocked. This contributes to high trade transaction costs and high costs of doing business in Africa. Another challenge related to markets is that transport costs in Africa are still among the world’s highest throughout the continent and many road, air and rail networks remain unconnected. This makes the cost of doing business high and just in time production, impossible. Furthermore, the cost of starting a business remains difficult elsewhere except in EAC, calling for a need for African economies to improve the business negotiation to encourage more entrepreneurs to start business and enter the formal sector (Trudi, 2011: 5-17, 18). It is therefore, important that countries take integration not only as a lingering Pan African ideology but most importantly as an economic survival strategy aimed at combating marginalization from the global economy (Geda and Kibret, 2002: 2).

It is also more than likely that the implementation of the Agenda will face the problem of commitment. Given that the Agenda seeks to ultimately establish a political union and supra-national organs to act on behalf of African governments, it is unlikely that some African leaders will let go their sovereign power easily. One of the reasons cited for lack of progress in African regional integration is the unwillingness of governments to surrender sovereignty of their macroeconomic policy to a regional authority and face potential consumption costs that may rise by importing from a high cost member country, and accept unequal distribution of gains and losses that may follow an integration agreement, and discontinue existing economic ties with non members. This lack of strong and sustained political commitment and macroeconomic instability have hindered the progress of economic integration in Africa (Geda and Kibret, 2002: 3). Geda and Kibret further note that African countries are reluctant to create supra-national bodies and transfer power to them as the sanctioning authority. Countries are also more committed to other multilateral and bilateral commitments than to regional agreements, a situation specifically explained by aid dependence and the conditionality attached to the SAPs (structural adjustment programs) of member states (Geda and Kibret, 2002: 13).

Qobo (2007: 1-3) implies that regionalism as applied in Africa can be viewed as a form of escapism from real challenges at the domestic level as well as a strategy to consolidate an alliance that would reinforce political sovereignty of member states. The measure of progress in Africa should be the success of social and functional policies at domestic level. It is also important to note that Agenda 2063 is not the first ambitious, well thought out plan; the Lagos Action Plan and Final act of Lagos envisioned an integrated market by 2000, EAC was supposed to achieve a political federation by 2010. So while previous plans focused on intra-regional trade, agriculture technology and the environment, the new initiative emphasizes ownership, economic reforms and political modernization. Qobo concludes that African elites may be focusing on the wrong set of priorities with too little commitment towards the goal of African development.

The Agenda acknowledges the need to strengthen RECs to foster regional integration in Africa, but RECs still have a long way to go to achieve the objectives of the AECs. Various protocols of the communitieas including those to do with trade, customs, dispute settlement mechanism, and infrastructure and sector development have not yet been ratified by most member countries. Moreover, the levels of intra-regional trade are still too low to contribute to significant integration. Intra African trade amounts to 10% of Africa’s trade with the rest of the world. This is no basis upon which to build the United
States of Africa. And given that most African countries are still struggling to build well-functioning and properly integrated internal economies, regional integration at this rate will still experience difficulties (Qobo, 2007: 5). It is therefore, hoped that the AUC did enough feasibility studies to that effect or the Agenda 2063 will join the pile of Africa’s ever ambitious plans.

Maruping (2005:132,143,149) argues against RECs that Africa instead needs to participate in multilateralism from a regionalized standpoint to negotiate more effectively for international markets and ward off marginalization and unfair competition in the global area. Additionally, the monetary harmonization process in African integration has been slow especially in line with ensuring that a single currency is run by 2025. If RECs are to be effective, Maruping suggests that African countries and sub-regional blocks create an enabling legal and institutional socio-economic and political environment that supports and attracts financing for integration.

The Agenda also commits to following a linear approach of regional integration beginning with a FTA, through to the monetary union and fiscal policy and finally, political union. Some scholars, however, caution against uncritically following the linear approach exemplified by the EU (European Union) which though attractive, may not necessarily be in line with regional development challenges in Africa. How will African leaders achieve success at the regional level if they fail to do so at the domestic level (Qobo, 2007: 13). Tsikata and Melo (2014: 1) too, assert that the linear model of integration has slowed down the process of regional integration in the world economy. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the linear model of integration that was adopted at the advent of the OAU will take Africa further, given that it has not yielded significant results so far.

The majority of the Agenda 2063 flagship projects focus on transport and ICT, infrastructure and economic growth, indicating a drive for accelerated growth and economic structural transformation. However, ambitious mega infrastructure development projects such as those described above are not new in Africa. Harold Acemah, the then delegate at the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations in New York, reports that in the 1970s, ‘the Trans-Africa Highways’ was a project which the African Group at the United Nations in collaboration with the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa, had championed. However, the ambitious Mombasa to Lagos highway via Uganda, DRC and many other African countries was stillborn and never took off despite all the hype and a pledging conference which was held to raise funds for the project (Acemah, 2015).

The Trans-African Highway Bureau, established in the 1970s for the management of the Trans-African Highways ceased to exist in the 1980s, and the major efforts made in the early 1990s to re-establish it have failed. The main reason for this failure has been the lack of support among member states for such a reestablishment of the Bureau. This lack of support is the result of different developments and considerations, (UNECA, 2003). The question to ask is: ‘what went wrong?’ and what can be done differently so as to avoid what made this kind of project fail in the past? Many analysts have concurred that Agenda 2063 is a good roadmap for Africa with commendable economic and social objectives, but it must follow the political goal of African unity, which is the raison d’être of both the OAU and its successor the AU.

The first ten-year implementation plan has eight priorities translated into concrete targets, which impact directly on the welfare, lives and livelihoods of Africans. One priority is to expand agricultural production, develop the agro-processing and business sectors; increase market access and achieve food self-sufficiency and nutrition through smallholder agriculture, sound environment and natural resource management. Analysts agree that agenda 2063 and its supporting documents constitute an excellent planning instrument and a great vision for Africa.

However, some questions remain, especially those concerning whether the planned vision will be implemented and will not be stillborn as has been the case for previous plans. Some wonder whether present African leaders still have the spirit that animated the founders of OAU/AU. The Great Pan-Africanist Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, paraphrasing the words of the bible had said “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all the rest shall be added unto you”. He thought that political unity was better positioned to drive economic growth and independence. Fifty years later, Africa is still divided and is in fact, more divided; and its people still languishing in abject poverty. The Agenda 2063 relegates the question of Africa’s political unity to 50 years to come, when none of them will obviously be alive to see it, which makes some people think that Africa’s current leaders are not ready for the struggle for African unity, a concept to which they only pay lip service.

Therefore, as rightly put by Pheko (2014: 2) Africa’s present leaders must do an introspection of themselves. Are they pursuing and protecting the interests of Africa’s people with the passion, vigilance and wisdom that were shown by Africa’s leaders of the independence movement such as Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Patrice Lumumba, Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, Julius Nyerere, Haile Selassie and many others?

Conclusion

At current rates of performance (that is a “business as usual” scenario), the continent would neither catch up nor be able to meet the rising expectations of her citizens, especially the youths and women as: only a tiny number of countries, which had consistently high growth for the last two decades, will converge with
the rest of the world, while the majority of the other countries will not converge, and the fragile countries will stay fragile. Per capita incomes continue to rise at 1.9 per cent annually but given the growth in the rest of the world, Africa’s per capita incomes would actually diverge further from those of other countries. The middle-class will increase, but after decades would still be only about a third of the population. Nearly one in five Africans would, correspondingly, still be mired in poverty. Finally, given the growth elsewhere in the world, Africa’s share of global GDP would stagnate at a low level. Such a scenario, or at worst, one of stagnation, does not correspond with the aspirations of Africans for their future, and is certainly unacceptable.

What African leaders do now and daily will determine the place of Africa in the next fifty years. Africa has already waited for fifty years for the present African leaders to implement the foundational principles that the pioneers of Africa’s independence struggle laid down on 25th May 1963. If Africa has to wait for another 50 years to achieve her goal of economic development and technological advancement, and rescue her people from poverty, ignorance, enslaving “foreign aid” and its deepening debts, it is a sign that many present African leaders are subtly opposed to the Pan African vision and mission for which the African Union and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity were formed. Why must it take 50 years to rescue Africa from economic powerlessness in the midst of so much technology?

It is therefore, recommended that for Agenda 2063 to be successful, some concerns be addressed which include: the notion of continued adherence to sovereignty by some countries needs to be dissolved, countries should be ready and committed to taking necessary steps to internal socio-economic restructuring and ratifying of the various RIAs. The AUC may also need to explore other model of integration, in some instances, certain elements of the EU many not be appropriate to Africa and going down the same path may lead us into damnation. For instance, Draper (2010: 21) advocates that in place of ‘hard’ sovereignty, ‘soft’ sovereignty which will lead to inter-governmentalism not supra national structures that demand major sovereignty concessions. It is also recommended that the Agenda be communicated downwards to ensure maximum grass roots support. In most cases, these projects tend to be known only by the elite in society, and ordinary citizens are left to bear the burden of the decisions made for them; for commitment, they need to be owned by the citizens.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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**Full Length Research Paper**

**Why Equatoria Region in South Sudan may opt to secede**

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Since the founding of Southern Sudan, first as a region and later as a country, the Dinka tribe has continued to exercise absolute control and domination. Following secession of South Sudan, tribalism got elevated to a level that threatens the very unity of the new country. This study was therefore based on the hypothesis that Dinka lead governments in South Sudan cannot accept any system of governance which will not leave them in charge of leadership of the country and this will inevitably push the Equatorians to opt to secede to form their own country. Just as the Southerners felt that they had been handed over to a new colonial master when the British trusteeship of Sudan ended in 1956, so too do the people of Equatoria feel that they have become subject people of the Dinka dominant tribe, following secession of the region from Sudan. The study brought out the factors that perpetuate the ever-enduring turbulent relationships between the Equatorians and the Dinkas as well as mechanism for eliminating the factors if unity of South Sudan were to be preserved- colonial annexation of otherwise independent Equatoria territory to South Sudan as well as marginalisation and domination by the Dinka tribe. Carrying out research in this area was not only necessary, but also timely as there is on-going search to find solution for the country’s chronic tribal problems. Ethnicity in governance and all spheres of life have gotten so deeply entranced that it is affecting the Equatorians disproportionately and thus meriting the search for other ways of governance in the country.

**Key words:** Domination, control, leadership, tribalism, ethnicity, secession, unity, governance, perpetuate, ever-enduring turbulent relationship.

**INTRODUCTION**

The Republic of South Sudan, the youngest country in the world, is currently facing serious insecurity and political unrest. For most part of its independence, the country plunged into brutal civil war that has taken a tribal dimension. The civil war aside, there is growing agitation against Equatorians working in Dinka areas with international NGOs and UN agencies. These agencies are placed under increasing pressure not to employ Equatorians in exclusively Dinka areas or to terminate their contracts and evacuate them back to Equatoria if they had already been employed. In Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, a predominantly Dinka state, letters threatening violence against Equatorians were displayed at the gates of all humanitarian organisations, warning them to either leave or be eliminated. The threats forced the humanitarian agencies to repatriate Equatorians back
to Equatoria region and is a continuing phenomenon. The relationship between the Dinkas and Equatorians has over the years been turbulent. Unless the standing Dinka led government agrees to earnestly address the factors that reinforce the troubled relationship, emergence of another secession struggle for independence of Equatoria may as well be inevitable. This article examines the long enduring factors that feed and perpetuate the disharmony between the two groups as well as recommend a mechanism that would avert bloodshed and at the same time removing any need for secession.

METHODOLOGY

Tribalism and ethnic conflicts in South Sudan are both old and chronic. This situation can be traced to as far back as the 1950s when different peoples and territories were lumped together by the condominium government in Sudan to constitute what then came to be known as Southern Sudan. As one observes developments in the region, one can only deduce that there is a state of subdued, if not an outright open conflict between the Equatorians and the Dinkas even during peace times.

To unearth the drivers of such conflicts and solutions as perceived by the participants in the study, the researcher first carried out expert consultation through literature review which explored historical background to Equatoria and its experiences in Southern and South Sudan at different time periods. Following the literature review, the author obtained first-hand information from the respondents using qualitative research methodology to generate theory by describing and analysing suitable prescriptions to the subject of the study. I used this methodology in preference to quantitative method out of the consideration that the study is not so much about how many or how much, but sought to describe, explore and analyse the why and how of the problem in order to gain deeper understanding and the factors that compound them, as well as the requisite solutions (Patton, 2001). The research, and especially the data gathering process, was guided by four domains of open ended questions which were: (1) What, in your opinion, are the major causes of the uneasy relationships between Equatorians and the Dinkas? (2) Based on your responses above, what would you recommend as the best solution(s) to resolve the problems? (3) Suppose your recommended solutions are rejected, what, in your view, would be the only option left for ending the ever-enduring turbulent relationship between Equatorians and the Dinkas? (4) Any additional issues/recommendations. A questionnaire was used as data collection instrument because it ensures a high response rate and offers the possibility of anonymity given that the subjects’ names are not required on the questionnaires.

Given the time constraints and inaccessibility to most areas of South Sudan during the entire period of the study, the sample population of study was limited to Equatoria members in the national parliament who represented various constituencies of the Greater region, Equatoria members of faculty at university of Juba, students as well as some eminent Equatorians in Kenya. Fifteen Lecturers at Juba University and similar number of students at the university and eminent Equatorians in Kenya were purposefully selected as respondents. Some people might question the rationale for limiting the population of study to Equatorians only. The limitation was dictated by the focus of the study, which was not about the universal problems facing all the people of South Sudan. And this is not to imply that there were no such problems, but because to look at the universal problems of the people of South Sudan would be way beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, due to the regional focus of the paper, it was only natural and logical that the respondents had to be selected from Equatoria region, whose population are the recipients of the actions of the Dinkas.

Factors that push Equatorians towards secession

There are several factors that can be cited to explain why Equatorians are showing more pronounced inclination towards secession in recent times. However, the most significant causes lie in colonial action of bringing to an end the independent existence of Equatoria and annexing it to South Sudan; as well as tribal avalanche inflicted on Equatorians by the dominant Dinka tribe in the region.

As colonial powers moved towards ending their rule in the African territories, they rushed to create African countries by drawing artificial borders, with no involvement or regard to what the concerned African peoples may have wanted. In their haste to create the countries, the colonial powers took little or no care at all in clustering and grouping people together or breaking them apart to form a country. Due to the arbitrary creation of countries, many people groups find themselves out of place in the country into which they had been lumped, resulting in their desire to opt to secede (Bamfo, 2012).

But despite the arbitrary manner with which the colonial powers created the African countries, the Organisation of Africa Unity and its successor, the African Union, did not seek to rectifying the problems created. Instead, the continental body took the position that not only preserves the territorial borders as were drawn by the colonial powers but also prevents secession of any entity from any of those created countries to form new ones (Bereketeab, 2014). Since the Organisation of the African Union is the brainchild of the African heads of state who took over the leadership of the respective African countries from the colonist, it is little wonder that the continental body should adopt such a position. Thus, the leaders would not like their respective territories to be reduced through secessions, although some people argue that the speed with which the colonial powers surrendered political authority to African leaders left little time for the new leaders to develop entirely new borders throughout the continent, (Knox, 2012).

Nevertheless, the AU institutionalised opposition to self-determination and secession has not, and will not stop groups from seeking to secede. Indeed, African writers, like Professor Ali Mazrui, predicted that creation of many small states in Africa will be a continuing phenomenon as groups will continue to emerge to pursue self-determination. This is precisely why the continent has experienced emergence of numerous armed rebel groups seeking either to effect radical transformation in the whole state or to separate from it and create a new state, (Zikamabahari, 2014).

One of the territories which continue to suffer the consequences of arbitrary clustering and placement is Greater Equatoria region, in Republic of South Sudan. Equatoria region in South Sudan is one of the territories that was born out of colonial act of arbitrary breaking up, clustering and putting unrelated territories together to constitute a country. Originally, Equatoria Region was part of an independent Lado Kingdom in the heart of Africa. The Kingdom covered vast geographical area from the region known as Greater Equatoria in South Sudan and extended all the way through West Nile of Uganda to Ituri regions of Democratic Republic of Congo. However, this Kingdom was dismantled during the Ottoman Empire by the Turko-Egyptian governor, following successful invasion of Sudan and the Lado Kingdom. The Ottoman Governor divided the kingdom into three different parts and shared them out amongst the colonial powers in Uganda, Congo and the Ottoman Empire ruler of Egypt, Khedive Ismael (Eroti, 2014).
The Turko-Egyptian invasion of Sudan and by extension, Lado Kingdom, was motivated by Khedive Ismail’s desire to gain possession of the entire Nile basin in order to keep his irrigation systems for cotton plantations in Egypt fully supplied. As a result, the Khedive dispatched an invasion force under an English Major General, Sir Samuel White Baker, who had joined the Ottoman army, to conquer the territory. On successful conquest of Lado kingdom, Khedive Ismail appointed Major General Samuel White Baker as Governor of Lado as reward for his successful invasion and annexation of the territory in 1871 (Eroti, 2014).

Following his appointment as Governor, General Samuel White Baker embarked on actions that were to change the status of Lado Kingdom forever: He divided the kingdom into South, Central and North Lado. South Lado, comprising of North and South Ituri regions, where given to Belgium Congo – present day Democratic Republic of Congo, in appreciation for their acceptance to divide up the Lado Kingdom; Central Lado, comprising of present day West Nile and Madi district in Uganda, was annexed to British protectorate of Uganda, while North Lado was renamed Equatoria and made an independent province of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire (Eroti, 2014).

When General Samuel White Baker’s period as Governor of Equatoria ended, Khedive Ismael appointed Charles Gordon as Governor General in replacement. The Khedive also appointed Ishmael Pasha Ayub as Governor General of Sudan. The appointment of separate Governor General to Equatoria and Sudan was a clear indication that the two territories were indeed two different dominions, given that a governor general was only appointed to an entity that was in fact a separate country. Furthermore, the two Governor Generals differed over where the border between their respective territories should be. For the Governor General of Sudan, the border between the two territories was to be at Gondokoro, while the governor General of Equatoria wanted it to be at junction of river Sobat with the White Nile (Harell, 2010).

The setting up of two separate administrations, each headed by a Governor General, and the dispute between them as to where the borderline between the two territories therefore confirms the reality that Equatoria was indisputably an independent entity, quite separate from Sudan from the very beginning.

When the Ottoman Empire disintegrated and become republic of Turkey following the Lausanne agreement of 1923, all the foreign territories that were under its rule, including Egypt, were to become independent. While Egypt did become independent in the same year, Sudan and Equatoria missed the opportunity to do so (Eroti, 2014).

During the time of Anglo Egyptian administration that replaced the Ottoman rule in Sudan and Equatoria, Equatoria region became once again the object of foreign competition. King Leopold II of Belgium, who had established colony over neighbouring Congo, was craving for this territory. For him, this land was his glory and was prepared to resort to violence to occupy it (Anstey, 1979). Britain, on the other hand, was determined not to allow any European power to occupy any territory along the Nile. The two powers however reached bilateral Anglo-Congolese treaty in 1894, which recognised King Leopold’s claim over Lado Enclave, another name the British used to refer to Equatoria, but in the form of life lease. So, when the King died, Britain forced the Belgians to cede what was up until then known as Lado Enclave to come under its administration in South Sudan in as recent as 1910. From then, the territory again began to be called Equatoria. The annexation of Equatoria to South Sudan and making it a province brought the total number of provinces in South Sudan then to three – Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal Province.

Despite this background, Equatorians were at first prepared to live with the reality of their being lumped with totally different territory and people. This can be seen in the type of leadership Equatorians projected during the Southern Sudan’s first armed struggle for independence, called, Anyanya. The consulted materials written on the Anyanya period do point to the type of leadership that Equatorians provided and the actions of Dinka personalities within the Anyanya armed struggle (Lagui, 2006).

Anyanya Movement was an armed struggle, initiated by members of the Equatoria Corps. The name, Anyanya, was adopted from local Ma’di language and it means snake poison. The Equatoria Corps, itself, was essentially an army that one member of the Condominium administration in Sudan, Britain, created to safeguard her own interests in Sudan. This plan was executed when they brought former Lado Enclave or Equatoria, as it later came to be called, from the Belgium Congo under them in 1910. The creation of the Equatoria Corps was influenced by British suspicion of the elements of the Egyptian army stationed in Southern Sudan whose loyalty to them was questionable, (Collins, 2005). However, the British administration took care not to include the Dinka tribe into the Equatoria Corps army as they considered them to be of no use as soldiers, but fearing too that generally, the tribes of Southern Sudan had been exposed to Arab outlook and could as well turn against them (Collins, 2005).

As Sudan moved closer to attaining independence, the members of Equatoria corps mutinied in August 1955 when Northern Sudanese army officers, who were replacing the British, ordered them to move to the Khartoum, ostensibly to participate in victory parade for celebration of independence of Sudan. But members of the Equatoria corps interpreted the move as a plan for enslaving them in the Muslim battalions in the north and therefore resolved to resist the move. They attacked northerners in Torit and the uprising soon spread throughout Equatoria. Corps members then disappeared into the bushes from where they were to engage in protracted civil war that lasted for 17 years (Ga’le, 2002).

The conduct of Equatorians in the leadership of the Anyanya movement shows that they were both democratic and nationalistic in outlook. They did not alienate people from the other provinces of Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile on ground of being the founders of the movement. They would also use democratic means to resolve problems that crop up from time to time. These rare traits can be illustrated by the following examples:

In order to come up with the name for the armed wing of the movement, the Provisional President, Joseph Oduho Awor, an Equatorian, carried out consultations with Patron of the movement, Reverend Father Saturday, language and made an independent province of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire (Eroti, 2014).

During the consultative meeting, the Chairman informed delegates of the need for them to deliberate on what name they wish to adopt for their armed forces. While two names had earlier been proposed by the Patron, the President left it up to the delegates, drawn from the three provinces, to adopt either of them or come up with different name altogether. The floated names were: Southern Sudan Liberation Army, SSLA and Azania Liberation Army, ALA. The President also asked the delegates to explain to him what the word “Anyanya” meant, an indication of his personal proposal. After deliberation, all the delegates opted for the name Anyanya, empowering the president to declare that Anyanya was to be the name of the military wing of the Southern Sudanese Movement, (Ga’le, 2002).

Secondly, in order to formalise the leadership of the Movement and adopt important documents, the President convened a national convention in 1964. Each of the three provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal was requested to send seven delegates to the convention. In the convention, the President allowed for dissolution of the provisional administration of the movement which he headed to pave way for the delegates to elect a new leadership altogether, another example of democratic practice. The delegates
elected Aggrey Jaden as President and Philip Padek, from Upper Nile, as the Vice President.

Third, when William Deng Nyal, a Dinka, broke away to return to Khartoum in protest against his non-election as the President, and things were beginning to fall apart, a need for second national convention was agreed. The convention took place in 1967, with 40 delegates from each of the three provinces. As was the case in the first convention, the convention was to elect new leadership for the government of the SANU, another measure of democracy and nationalism practiced by Equatoria leadership. The delegates again elected Aggrey Jaden Lado as President of the Southern Movement. The President elect formed a cabinet in such a way that the three provinces were evenly represented and included even such personalities as Gordon Mortat, a Dinka who campaigned against him.

Furthermore when Joseph Lagu, an Equatorian, was appointed as Chief of General Staff of the Anyanya armed struggle, he embarked on training of the forces without tribal consideration, nor imposition of himself on the people with an iron fist, (Lagu, 2006). Likewise, whatever military materials he could get, was distributed equally to the Anyanya fighters from all the three provinces, as for example, the first military equipment that were airdropped at Garamba National Game Park in Congo, where waves of Anyanya forces came in droves from all the three provinces of Southern Sudan to take their portion of the arms, given without discrimination, nor special consideration, (Lagu, 2006). He farther divided the Anyanya fighters into three brigades of equal strength composed of men from the respective province, despite the fact that majority of the Anyanya fighters on the ground were from Equatoria Province. This, the Chief of Staff asserted, was necessary for laying a balanced structure for establishment of national army for South Sudan and at the same time alleviate any fear by the other two provinces of domination by Equatoria. In addition, he structured the Army command, which he called the Anyanya High Command, with the objective of creating a rotating military leadership for the union of the three provinces as equals in an eventual free and independent South Sudan as well as establishing stability by creating a system that would render future assassination or coup plots unprofitable, (Lagu, 2006). Finally, when the draft peace agreement between the Sudan and the Anyanya Movement was initialled in Addis Ababa, the Commander in Chief Joseph Lagu asked the entire Anyanya unit Commanders from all the provinces to report to the General Headquarters to review the agreement. This was yet another measure of transparency, exhibited by Equatoria leadership.

But despite all the above leadership attributes exhibited by the Equatorians, the following instances tend to support the perception that the Dinkas were not prepared to accept any leadership that does not have them in charge, right from the very beginning. The first action in this direction came when, William Deng Nyal, engineered breakaway of a faction of the Anyanya movement immediately after losing the support of Southern Sudanese to become president. He returned to Khartoum, taking with him whatever number of Dinka he could mobilise and on arrival declared that he was the leader of the Anyanya movement and that with his return, there was no longer existence of political movement in exile, (Ga’le, 2002).

Another example of defiance to the Anyanya under the Equatoria leadership came from Gordon Mortat, another Dinka in the Movement. This was despite the fact that the President, Aggrey Jaden, still appointed him as the Minister for foreign Affairs even when he campaigned against him. Despite this gesture, Gordon Mortat staged a coup against his President, Aggrey Jaden Lado. The Minister wrote to the President, who was pursuing some contacts in Nairobi, demanding him to return, sending him immediately to report to the headquarters urgently. As the President could not comply with the ultimatum issued by his minister, the Minister declared himself as the President of the Movement, with Camillo Dhol Kwac, another Dinka from Bahr El Ghazal as his Vice President. At the same time, he changed the name of the country unilaterally from Southern Sudan to Nile State, (Ga’le, 2002).

Equatorians were later to wake to the reality that their annexation by the British to be part of Southern Sudan, rather than letting them to be independent or pursue independence at the end of various colonial powers was like cutting out something and pasting it in the wrong place. The Equatorians now find out that they are perfect strangers with the people they had been cluster together and continue to feel a sense of annihilation by South Sudan successive governments, often dominated by the Dinka tribe, (Cozic, 1994). This perception has then been one of the innumerable sources of ethnic tensions between the Equatorians and the dominant Dinka tribe whose members, the British Administrators used to refer to derogatorily as ‘warlike, treacherous, pigheaded brutes, difficult to detribalise and would need a very long time to improve’, if at all possible, (Mawut 1995). It was for this reality that the British administration took care not to include the Dinka tribe into the Equatoria Corps army that they formed to provide a counterweight against any Islamic eruption in north Sudan, fearing that the tribes of Southern Sudan, of which Dinka was one, had been exposed to Arab outlook and could as well turn against them.

Apart from the colonial act of lumping totally unrelated territories to be part of one entity, another factor that reinforces the aspiration of Equatorians to secede is marginalisation and domination by Dinka tribe. The Dinkas practice crude and aggressive tribalism throughout the regions history. Some of the Dinka elites, like Dr. Justin Yac, do not hide their plans to rule over others. He exposed such plans when addressing Equatoria members of parliament in the Southern Sudan Regional Assembly stating that, while the British ruled them for 50 years and the Arabs for 17 years, “We shall rule (you) for 100 years, whether you like it or not, we are the majority tribe”, (Lagu, 2006). This assertion dovetails with the Dinka proclamation that they are a born to rule tribe. Such posturing made prominent Equatorians, like General Joseph Lagu, to charge that the Dinkas do not seem to consider that their tribalism is like forcing a cat into the corner from where it would have no option, but to scratch and bite in self-defense. Nevertheless, such reminders do to seem to deter the Dinkas from their plans as they continue to deepen and broaden their domination by adopting strategies that would guarantee them the opportunity to rule South Sudan for at least another 100 years, if not more (“The Jieng Council of Elders (JCE) 2015). Indeed tribalism in South Sudan, perfected through years of practice, is aggressively pursued that even non-South Sudanese as published in Sidint.Net (Juba: Fears of Dinka Domination Drive Rebel Action and Threaten Long-Term Stability n.d.) affirm that:

In South, the very strong sense among the people is that the SPLM government represents Dinka hegemony, dominated by a tribe with a sense of entitlement and equipped with the guns to enforce their domination.

In public institutions, Dinka language is used, a practice that is well articulated by Dr. Charles Saki Bakhtiet (2015), a distinguished personality from Western Equatoria in his presentation to Equatorians, (“Awake Equatoria: A Clarion Call by ESWSCA-USA,” n.d.) when he pointed out that:

Many government institutions which project South Sudan to the outside world, such as immigration, embassies and customs have been so tribalized so much so that as an Equatorian, you feel a complete foreigner in your own embassy or institution.

Furthermore, there is increasing agitation against Equatorians working with Non-Governmental Organisations in Dinka areas. In the Dinka regions, international NGOs and UN agencies are placed under increasing pressure not to employ Equatorians or to terminate their contracts and evacuate them back to Equatoria if they had already been employed. (“Bor Youths in Bor Have Asked Equatorians to Leave Jonglei State in 72 Hours” 2017.) Letters threatening violence against Equatorians were displayed at the gates of all humanitarian organisations. The Equatorians were
warned to either leave or be eliminated. Following such threats, the humanitarian agencies started to comply with the demand of the tribalists and started to repatriate Equatorians back to their region. In one instance, 92 Equatorians were evacuated from Northern Bahr El Ghazal and 12 others from Jonglei state respectively. These developments made the Equatorians to react in kind. Equatoria youth started to issue similar threats against Dinkas in Equatoria, warning them to leave Equatoria land, (“Equatorian Youth Warning: ‘It Is Time for Dinka to Leave Equatoria and Now’ – Nyamilepedia” 2016). It was precisely for such practices that Equatorians began to agitate for Kokoraisation (decentralization) of the Southern Region in 1982. The sought decentralisation would allow each of the former three Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile to become an autonomous region. This was more so because the Equatorians, in their classic pride, were against domination and exploitation and nothing short of complete autonomy would stop them from seeking to free themselves from any domination by anybody. Equatorians pushed relentlessly for an end to unitary system of government and for conversion of the former three provinces of Southern Sudan into separate regions. When Sudan’s President, Jaafar Mohamed Nimeri granted the demand of Equatorians by upgrading each of the three Southern Sudan provinces into separate regions, the Dinka elite, whose strategy of dominating the Southern government depended on a single and centralized administration in Southern Sudan, strongly opposed the move. This opposition was anticipated as no one so privileged, would be prepared to abandon his golden spoon without struggle, (Lagu 2006). Proponents of decentralisation pointed out that the strong opposition posed by the Dinkas to decentralisation was motivated by their selfish and hegemonic design to perpetually dominate the governance of South Sudan. As result, Dinka elite withdraw to the bush and started an armed rebellion in 1983.

Furthermore, Dinkas openly disregard the contributions of Equatorians in the struggle for liberation of South Sudan. For the Dinkas, they are the ones who fought and liberated South Sudan, an assertion that the President of the Republic seems to support, judging by his statement as restated by Nhial Thiwat, (“The Traumatic Past and Uncertain Future of South Sudan E Book by Nhial Thiwat Ruach - 9781504953931 | Rakuten Kobo” 2015) that: “The Dinka tribe, particularly those from Bahr El Ghazal, had gone through severe suffering; therefore, to be allocated numerous government positions as rewards for their contributions and sufferings during the struggle against the north-dominated government.

Such statement, coming from the head of the state, infuriates the Equatorians and further contributes to the tension amongst the Equatorians and other tribes on the one side, and the Dinkas on the other. Equatorians point out that the war that brought independence of the country, whose leadership the Dinkas enjoy, was won in Equatoria, fought by men and women of Equatoria and with resources of Equatoria. For when the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime, on Ethiopian soldiers, the main backer of the movement was overthrown and the SPLA soldiers became demoralised, with some of the fighters leaving the struggle to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries, Equatoria elders took it upon themselves to mobilise the people of Equatoria to join the movement to prevent an outright crushing defeat by the Sudan Government. This was despite the fact that the people of Equatoria had largely stayed away from joining the movement from the beginning as its formation was motivated by Dinka opposition to the decentralisation of Southern Sudan that Equatorians stood for. The people of Equatoria responded to the call of their elders, and their role soon started to tilt the balance of the war against the Sudan government. The civil population of Equatoria supplied food and carried logistics for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the SPLA soldiers, since the rebels did not have vehicles. Towns in Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria began to fall to the rejuvenated SPLA, one after the other, forcing the Sudan government to the negotiating table which culminated with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement. Above all, all Southern Sudanese participated in the referendum that finally brought the independence of South Sudan and therefore the claim that one particular tribe fought for and brought independence is misplaced.

In the ongoing search for peace in South Sudan, the stand taken by the Equatorians through their chiefs do underline their growing feeling of marginalisation. In their letter to the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General in South Sudan, (“Position of Chiefs from Equatoria Region on the On-Going Peace Talks in Khartoum, Sudan” 2018), the Chiefs point out that Equatorians have suffered a lot since the successive wars of liberation till date. “We offered our own sons, daughters, men, women, lands, resources and more for peace for all in south Sudan” and that it is their desire that any inclusive peace agreement to be signed should include adoption of the federal system of governance. They further drew the attention of the Special Representative of the Secretary General to their collective position that they would not accept any peace agreement signed by President Salva Kiir from Bahr el Ghazal and Riek Machar from Upper Nile that does not consider the views of Equatorians and would thus be ready to defend their region at all cost.

Given all the above factors, the turbulent relationship between the Equatorians and the Dinkas may as well lead to emergency of another liberation struggle by the Equatorians to become independent. This is particularly so as the people of Equatoria, who are usually peaceful by nature, respectfull of others and law abiding, but considered by some as cowards, cannot continue to tolerate imposition of tribal hegemony upon them and in their own territory for ever.

FINDINGS

The information generated from cross section of Equatorian society to obtain their perception on the issues at the centre of the difficult relationships between the Equatorians and the Dinkas confirm the expert opinion on the causes of the uneasy relationship between the two peoples.

First and foremost, tribalism and the accompanying corruption, stood out as major cause of the disharmonious relationships, which at times, threatens to escalate to conflict. Tribalism manifests itself in all sectors and different levels of the government to the extent that it is common to find use of Dinka language in government offices. The Dinkas do feel a sense of ownership of the government as well as the country and do not seem to care or be awake to the fact that the country is not their private property that they can exclusively run and manage the way they want.

Equally prominent, was illegal land grabbing and occupation of Equatoria lands and territories by the Dinkas. Many civilian residential areas and officially allocated Plots to individual Equatorians within Juba, the Capital City of South Sudan, are susceptible to grabbing by the Dinkas, who also occupy community lands, with no recourse to justice. Often when such cases were taken to the Court, little or nothing would be done to the grabbers because most of the Lawyers and judges are Dinkas themselves and would not judge the cases fairly.
Plots and community land aside, the country sides of Equatoria region are themselves occupied by the Dinka pastoralists who turn them to be grazing lands for thousands of their cattle. As a consequence, Equatoria farm lands are often devastated. Equatorians no longer see the need to complain as nothing would be done to the land invaders and occupiers. At times when the local inhabitants in a particular location begin to put up some resistance, the cattle people would move to another area within Equatoria for a while. They would keep on moving around until resurfacing again at the same place they had been made to move away from. The actions of the Dinka pastoralists give the impression that they are either more powerful than the government, or the government is abating their activities because it and the pastoralists are all but one thing. This is more so as the cattle keepers would not obey government directives or other times give conditions to the government to be fulfilled if they were to leave Equatoria. For example, they would demand for provision of vehicles to transport them and all their animals to their home state, as if somebody transported them from there when they were moving to Equatoria in the first place.

As a consequence, famine and hunger would ensue in Equatoria, partly due to destruction of crops, destruction of the fertile land itself by the cattle as well as risk aversion by the farmers when they begin to realise that there are no incentives to engage in farming since the crop would be destroyed by the animals any way.

Another interesting cause of conflict, some respondents point out, is the arrogance of the Dinka people who pride themselves as superior mankind, a perception that makes them to belittle other people and often taking them as their subordinates. Equally, their bragging that they are people born and ordained to rule over others does not help matters. On this basis, the Dinkas think that they are free and have the right to settle any way in South Sudan and other parts of the neighbouring countries, an orientation that makes them to consider and treat any other group of people in these places as foreigners. In fact, Dinkas do not consider Equatorians as South Sudanese.

Discounting of the contribution by the other people in the liberation of the country also featured amongst the causes of difficult relationships. The Dinkas do not believe in the contribution of any other tribe in the struggle that ended Arab colonialism in South Sudan. For them, they were the only people who liberated the entire South Sudan, a claim that only serves to drive a wage between them and annihilate other people from the running and management of the affairs of the country.

Some respondents also point out that, the influx of Dinka of all walks of life into Equatoria has led to emergence of unprecedented social problems. These people use their ill-gotten wealth to lure Equatoria women to have children with them as an indirect way of acquiring Equatoria lands. This is because the children born in such machination would claim citizenship of Equatoria, giving them the key to move from their home states to settle in Equatoria on the account of maternal relationships.

Furthermore, the legal and judicial systems are dominated by the Dinkas, which then denies Equatorians, and indeed any other non-Dinka person, fair hearing in the event of disputes they find themselves in which involve Dinka.

Lastly, but not the least, the Dinkas are portrayed to be conservatively a cultural people and quite different from the Equatorians in every respect. Their ideology, cultural norms and ways of life make it impossible to live together. They are utterly tribal people to the meaning, intolerant and with no sense of ethnicentrism. These people have no vocabulary of concession, apology, and are driven by their strong believe in the use of violence and physical power. These traits are not compatible with the Equatorians way of life and civility.

With regards to how the above multitude of problems can be solved, the respondents prescribe a range of solution. First, that all non-essential Dinkas should leave Equatoria and return to their homeland. In this regard, the government and all stakeholders would need to ensure peaceful exit of all the Dinka livestock from Equatoria. After that, rules and regulation have to be established to control the movement of Dinkas with their cattle into Equatoria. Secondly, all individual and community lands grabbed and illegally occupied are to be restored to the rightful owners and respective communities. Thirdly, that there has to be a reversion to the former three regions and bring them together in federal union to be governed on the basis of federal system. It is hoped that establishment of Federal System of government in South Sudan will address the anarchic state of affairs raging in the country. Introduction of federal system of government, where power is distributed across various levels of the government, some respondents pointed out, would return South Sudan to state of peace and tranquillity. This will then enable the people to engage in economic development and competition among the Federal states in provision of services. This way, Equatorians will have peace of mind as it will be relieved of the unnecessary disturbances by the Dinkas, who are adamant and always sticky after some negative things that cannot work in Equatoria society. Furthermore, some respondents propose dissolution of the country and establishment of three new countries of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal. Finally, in the event that all the proposed solutions are not acceptable or do not work, some respondents point out, then the last resort is for Equatoria to secede from South Sudan and become a new sovereign state. This way, Equatorians will have peace of mind as it will be relieved of the unnecessary disturbances by the Dinkas, who are adamant and always sticky after some negative things that cannot work in Equatoria society.
DISCUSSION

The responses from the population of study show that, while there is potential threat by Equatorians to seek to secede, there may still be a chance to avert such scenario if an acceptable system of government can be agreed and implemented in South Sudan.

Most of the respondents point to the direction that the problems inherent in South Sudan may be addressed by adopting the most appropriate system of government, in the first instance and only resort to secession as the last option. This then necessitates examination of the main types of government in use worldwide in order to identify the most suitable type that would be appropriate for South Sudan.

The main systems of government in the world are the unitary, confederal and federal system.

Unitary system of government

Unitary system of government is a form of state structure characterized by centralisation of power and indivisibility of sovereignty. In such system, there is only one source of authority – the central government. The other units are only subordinate, serving as agencies of the central government, established for its convenience and local administration, (Tsegaw, 2009). Thus, in a unitary system of government, the Central authority controls all powers, with the lower levels existing only to implement the policies designed by the national government. In the unitary system of government, the same set of laws are uniformly applied throughout the country without regard to peculiarity of different local situation. Therefore, the central government exercises complete control over the lower levels with full might, (Faroq, 2013). The lower levels of government are only subordinates and work under the supervision and direction of the central government. This type of government is useful only in states with no strong nationalities or those that are small in size.

Confederation

Confederation is voluntary association of independent states. It is governed by a common agreement of its members. Confederation is often formed for common objective and does not affect internal freedom, structure, law making and enforcing processes, external relations of the confederating states. As a union of sovereign states, members states are often united for purposes of other actions, usually against other states. Confederation is always created by a treaty. Each member state in a confederation retains its sovereignty and has the right to opt out of the federation at any time it wants, unlike in federal system of government where secession is not permitted. Any member in a confederation remains a separate international entity, with powers to head its own foreign policies. However, a confederal government is characterised by a weak central authority, since each member state retains all the powers of an independent state such as the right to maintain a military force, print money, as well as the power to make treaties with other countries (*Differences in Unitary, Confederate and Federal Forms of Government.

Federal system of government

Federal system of government is a type of government characterised by multiple levels of government, with each assuming different sets of responsibilities and managing the affairs of the respective entity. Mr. Endawke Tsegaw, an expert in the field of federalism, describes federalism as:

A form of state structure in which the basic elements of state: territory, population, government and sovereignty are divided vertically to form independent political entities that enables each to make final decision independently of the others.

The federal union, and its component units, enjoys considerable degree of shared rule and self-rule within its constitutionally defined powers and responsibilities. Federalism is a system designed to attain ‘both union and non-centralization at the same time. In the African context, federalism is indeed important (Ḥabīb and Mohammed, 2010) in that it relates to:

The idea of having a workable political arrangement that necessarily requires the perpetual existence of different levels of authority sanctioned by a supreme constitution which has to serve as a broader national framework for building consensus accepting the principle of unity-in-diversity as a basis for nation building.

This system of government is based on the formal agreement or covenant. It distributes power of the government across different levels— national, state and local levels, in such a way that allows each level some degree of independence and autonomy. Under federal system or federalism, each level of government has sovereignty in some areas, while in others, it shares power. This system of government is a middle ground that safeguards against a too strong national government or too weak state, or local government. It is a compromise system that distributes authority between the National government and its constituent units at the state and local levels in a way that specifies which powers are exercised by a particular unit and those that can be shared.

Federal states share some important essential qualities, which include: rule of law and constitutionalism, local autonomy and representative federal government institutions that bring benefits, enjoys the loyalty of all the component units of the federation on a sustainable basis,
Despite variations that may arise due to the different local realities in different countries.

Under Federal system of government, there is a constitution that specifies what areas of public life will be under the jurisdiction of the national government and which ones will be under the control of state government. In the United States, for example, unless the constitution gives specific powers to the federal government, all other powers belong to the state governments, ("What Is a Confederal System of Government?" n.d.). Unlike unitary system of government, the Federal type is best suited in big countries with diverse ethnicities with different needs, but a common identity that unites them all. Those different needs would require different local governments to address them. The system accords the different groups of people the opportunity to retain their pride, tradition and power, while allowing the Central government to handle overarching problems.

For effective provision of service under federal system, expenditure responsibilities are devolved to the level of the government where the service is provided and to be listed in the constitution accordingly. Subnational governments must have a significant degree of control over their sources of revenue. This can be achieved by assigning specified revenue sources to the subnational governments as to closely relate to the assigned expenditure responsibilities to the local level of the government. In doing so, some economist propose that consideration is to be based on general behaviour of the taxpayers with regards to tax compliance, rather than on simply assigning tax responsibilities to particular levels of government.

Broadly, those taxes that can help the federal government to redistribute income and stabilise the economy are given to the central government, while those immovable taxes that primarily provide benefit to the local government are left for the particular level.

However, some federal constitutions assign exclusive authority to collect revenue to the states. In this case, provision is made for sharing revenue with the central federal government, a process referred to by some as upward-revenue sharing or reverse revenue sharing, (Tsegaw 2009). But this system makes the central level of the government to be dependent on the states and can impede its principle responsibility of income distribution and economic stabilisation. Conversely, if the whole revenue sources are managed by the central federal government, the state governments would be rendered to depend on revenue transfer mechanism from the central government. This goes against the basic principle of federalism for devolution of power and functions across the federating units sub-level of the government.

Given the preceding three main systems of government, it is then necessary to examine what system of government has been in operation in South.

There are those who say that the type of system of the government in South Sudan since independence is federal presidential system, with the President heading both the government and the state. They are right to the extent that the country bears all the hallmarks of federal system of government given that it has all the institutions that are found in a federal system of government – National government, Bicameral parliament, states as the constituent units of the national government with their respective executive and legislature structures, down to county and payam levels.

The African Union Commission of inquiry on the crisis in South Sudan indicated that the system of government in South Sudan has both unitary and federal elements, and that it is essentially a ‘hybrid system’, in part because states lack competence in judicial power where the President is empowered to remove elected governors, and to dissolve both national and state legislative assemblies at will, (Kodjo, 2015).

However, for all practical purposes, the country is governed on the model of unitary system of government. The present system condemns people to perpetual insecurity and underdevelopment. The unitary government is obsessed with power and economic control, without regard to delivery of even the very basic services. The relationship between the central government and the states can best be described as that of Principle-agent relationships in that there is no significant devolution of power and resources to the states. The states are dependent on goodwill and resources transfer from the national government where power is concentrated on one person, the President, essentially to cover recurrent costs, leave alone development. The President can dismiss elected state governors at will. In perfect federal system, elected head of state government can be removed legally only by the legislative body of the state concerned. Even more, the South Sudan President does not limit his actions of appointing or removing individuals to constitutional posts only. He goes to as low as appointment and dismissal of civil servants, like Directors and Director Generals of parastatal bodies and independent institutions who are supposed to be recruited or separated through normal civils service process of advertising, shortlisting, interviewing and appointing. Furthermore, the people of Equatoria, often referred to as Equatorians, have seen the name ‘Equatoria’ erased completely from the map of South Sudan. They consider this to be a deliberate move by the President to do away with a name that the President and his constituency perceive to be unifying the people of the region against the Dinkas.

It then follows that the current system of governance in South Sudan is not suitable for the country, not only because it concentrates power to the person of the President and his networks, but also because South Sudan is a very big country in size and has many strong nationalities.

Equally, the confederal system of government may not be suitable for South Sudan. This is due to the fact that
confederation applies in situation where there are several sovereign countries who wish to come together for a common purpose. This is not yet the case in South Sudan, as the states there, are not necessarily independent.

Therefore, the only system of government suitable for South Sudan is the federal system of government. But there are some people who are determined to resist introduction of such system of government on the pretext that it would fragment the country into tribal homelands, with resulting insecurity, as well as high cost of managing the system. However, such fears are essentially expression of anxiety by some section of the population with vested interest as they would not know how to advance their welfare in a Federated South Sudan. Jacob K. Lupai, an Educationist at Juba university confirms this when he pointed out, (“Federal System of Government Appropriate for South Sudan - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan” 2018) that:

People may be paranoid of a federal system probably because of perceived deprivation of power and privileges, and perceived insecurity. The fear is also that of being uprooted from where one calls home.

But such fears cannot be sustained indefinitely, judging by the Sudan experience when it was so rigid on the call by the then Southern Sudanese for a federal system of governance that would be acceptable by all. Sudan governments’ persistence in resisting any calls for a federal system of government, or mere mention of federalism, only served to make the Southerners to be equally rigid and opt instead for complete secession, rather than federation, and they succeeded. By extension therefore, if an effective federal system of government cannot be agreed to and applied in South Sudan, the respondents were not ambiguous about what they see as the last resort – secession. Indeed, as many respondents state and other analysts point out, (“Federal System of Government Appropriate for South Sudan - Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan” 2018).

The ethnic dimension in South Sudan and the accompanying conflicts have rendered the perception of those who imagine that South Sudanese are one people to be nothing, but merely wishful thinkers and that South Sudanese will never be one people, even if the Son of Mary comes for the second time.

So, in the absence of adoption of the right modal of federal system of government in South Sudan, secession of Equatoria is an inevitability. Secession itself, is an act of withdrawal by a group from a larger entity for any reason, including domination and marginalisation, amongst others. The question then, is how the secession of Equatoria will be achieved?

Secession from an original country is a process that involves different strategies, including violence. It occurs as a result of decision by a representative body or referendum. While there is usually no clear legal provision in the national constitutions of most countries that allow for secession, most secessionists movements in Africa, use the African charter on human and peoples’ rights and the right to self-determination that most national countries have ratified as a legal basis to push for secession.

In the case of Kenya, proponents of secession drafted a bill to be presented to the country’s Independent Election and Boundaries Commission for review. They will then be required to collect a minimum of one million signatures from eligible voters to trigger a referendum, (“How NASA Wants Kenya to Be Divided” 2018). The draft bill seeks to amend an article in the country’s constitution to redefine the country’s territory to allow for creation of two new countries. The secession promoters in Kenya assert that “Breaking away will cure the evils of exclusion, tribalism, corruption inequities, impunity and general bad governance perpetrated by the Jubilee administration”. In the same country, another group of people from the coastal region of Kenya are also pushing for secession of the Coastal region to be independent.

However, secession is not often an easy path to take. There can be tremendous hurdles that secessionist movements will have to face. First, the steps that any secessionist movement needs to take can themselves pose formidable challenges to any drive to secede.

To begin with, there has to be sufficient grounds to warrant the need to separate. And then, there has to be massive, if not critical support for the secession move. Of critical importance too, is the question of leadership—whether there is a leadership that is ready to take up the issue of secession. In addition, there has to be a flag to act as symbol of a new state. Another consideration of equal importance is the question of tactics to be used to achieve secession.

From experience, there is no single tactic, or strategy that has delivered secession, but multiple strategies. These could include diplomacy, mass action and military campaign. This then will entail setting up a military wing to recruit, train and arm the followers to fight the government.

Secondly, the parent country from which secession is sought will mobilise all resources and efforts to scuttle any move for secession. Moreover, African governments have often taken and maintained anti secessionist stance, fearing that it could be a source of instability across the continent if allowed.

On these basis, the governments would stand in solidarity with the country threatened with secession and would dismiss any drive by any group to secede. For these countries, the issue of secession is non-negotiable, or redline, as some of them would assert. The strong position taken by the African governments on the issue of secession has meant that any given groups of people are not allowed to exercise their right to pursue self-determination. And the Africa Union, as a matter of principle, would always side with the country threatened with secession. The Union will, in such case, send
regional force to prevent any push for secession from succeeding, as is the case in the Sudan region of Darfur, amongst others, ("Lessons, Comfort, for Kenya’s Budding Secessionists - The East African" n.d.). In addition, the international community has developed a strong opposition to secessionist movements as well. Moreover, unless the territory seeking to secede is of some strategic significance to major powers, there will be no international interest to participate in resolving secession conflict. In such scenario, the conflict is most likely to drag on for decades without resolution as is the case with the Western Sahara conflict. Furthermore, even when an entity secedes by whatever means, recognition of that entity by the international community will not be easy to achieve, as exemplified by the case of Somaliland whose unilateral declaration of independence since 1991 has remained unrecognised by any single country to date.

Nevertheless, the continental body, African Union, has so far demonstrated some form of flexibility with regards to recognition of territories seeking to secede after decolonisation of the African countries. Such flexibility has left some people to consider the AU policy on secession to be like a matter of selective application, or double standard. But this implies that there is a window to pursue secession and be recognised as an independent country. The best examples to illustrate shifting stance by the African Union on the issue of recognition or none recognition of countries seceding after decolonisation of African include the case of Somaliland, Eritrea and South Sudan.

In the case of Somaliland, no country has ever formally recognised its independence since it declared itself to be independent from Somalia in 1991, with the African Union being the main stumbling block, ("Why Somaliland Is Not a Recognised State - The Economist Explains" n.d.). This is despite the fact that Somaliland has over the years build relative viable state institutions singly without external support. Indeed, Somaliland is more functional than the larger state of Somalia, which is unable to govern itself, even with the international recognition and external support it receives.

With Eritrea, the story is different. When various rebel groups united to topple the Ethiopian government, headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, Eritreans pushed for inclusion of a right for them to determine their future in a referendum. The constitution provided that right and in the referendum that followed, they voted to secede from Ethiopia and proclaimed their independent in 1993. Here, the African Union organisation went ahead to confer recognition to Eritrea as an independent country, on the ground that Ethiopia, from which Eritrea seceded, had given its consent for the country’s independence. Following the recognition by the African Union, other countries followed suit and conferred recognition to Eritrea’s independence.

Similarly, South Sudan was granted express recognition as an independent country by the international community when it fought and voted for independence, despite the fear by some members of the international community that recognition of independence of South Sudan could have some signalling effect on other separatist movements elsewhere in the Africa continent. Some countries based their recognition of independence of South Sudan on the suffering that the civil war caused and on the consent by the parent country, Sudan, that came under international pressure to concede, (Dugard, 2013).

Despite all the obstacles to secession, there will be no time that groups of people, particularly on the African continent, will not emerge to pursue secession. Self-determination and secession is an inalienable right that international law entitles group of people to exercise to freely determine their own destiny. The problem here is that, given the practice of the African Union to grant recognition to entities on the grounds of consent by the mother country or prolonged suffering, often following fierce fighting, the cost of secession will be pushed very high. This is because groups pursuing such objectives would have to put up a rigorous fight to inflict suffering and force the mother entity to consent to secession.

**Necessary condition to prevent secession of Equatoria**

Given the historical background and the struggle between the Equatorians for survival and equality; and the Dinkas for supremacy, emergency of calls for secession of Equatoria is only a question of time for it to be openly pursued on all fronts, including armed struggle. But while waging an armed struggle for a just course is a right of people enshrined in the bill of rights to exercise, achievement of secession can only be attained at very high cost. First, for the outcome of any secession struggle to be recognised by the African Union as a precondition for the rest of the world to follow suit, the concerned groups would have to fight hard to remove the country’s government and set up one that would allow for secession of any entity desiring to do so through a UN supervised referendum, as was the case with Eritrea, ("Secessionism in Africa: Where Will the Map Change Next?" 2012). Second, the party seeking to secede would have to engaged in vigorous fighting as to inflict serious human suffering and force the parent country to consent to recognise independency of the entity as a prerequisite for other countries to recognise the new country as exemplified by the case of South Sudan, (McNamee, 2012). As a result, use of military means to achieve secession cannot be an easy undertaking particularly as most of the African governments would stand with and protect the government in power from being removed.

Therefore to avoid any need for secession, accentuated by domination and tribal avalanche, it is important to tackle the pandemic problem effectively.
Such a scenario can only be averted by adoption of a system of governance that can remove exercise of domination by the big tribes. And in order to be successful in arresting the anarchic state of affairs raging in the country as perpetuated by tribal domination, there has to be a political will by the government first and foremost. Then adopt a functioning federal system of government, where power is distributed across various levels of the government to enable each region the opportunity of governing itself. To this end, the author recommends reversion to the three former provinces or regions of South Sudan, namely: Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal and make them to be the constituent units of Federal Union of South Sudan. Each region or state is to have its own government and parliament, guaranteed in the federal constitution. Governance at the federal level should be based on the Comoran system where the constitution provides for a rotatory Presidency, with three Vice Presidents, one from each of the Islands constituting the federation. In the Comoran system, the procedure for electing the President involves two rounds of voting. In the first round, the island whose turn it is to provide the President, will vote contenders from that island, an equivalence of the US primaries, but limited to voters of the concerned island. In the second round of election, the first three best performing candidates in the first round of the election would be subjected to nationwide election for all voters to elect the president, ("Comoros Country Review", 2017). This ensures that none of the constituting units of the federation feels excluded at the national level. Similarly, members of the Federal Assembly as well as that of Supreme Court are drawn from each of the constituting units of the federal union in equal proportion.

Conclusion

The case of Equatoria region in South Sudan poses tremendous challenge to the territorial integrity of South Sudan itself, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo unless the issues that keep the need for cession of this region are addressed. This is because should it secede, the feared signalling effect could as well come to reality. The other regions that together were part of Lado Kingdom, but which were annexed to Uganda and Congo following the division of the Kingdom and dividing the different constituent parts among the colonial powers in Uganda, Congo and Sudan could as well opt to secede to establish independent states.

The signals that are now coming out of Equatoria point to the inevitability of emergency of another protracted conflict for cession. Such eventuality will be more deadly given that the bar for recognition of new sovereign states has been raised high as a result of granting recognition only in situations where a government is forcefully removed, and a new administration is installed with prior agreement amongst the parties to allow for secession referendum or where significant prolonged suffering has been inflicted on the population.

Nevertheless, there is still some chance of everting another secession conflict and preserve the unity of South Sudan if those at the helm of leadership can demonstrate political will to address the issues of tribalism, domination and embrace good governance. And the best way to address all these ills, the author recommends, is first to revert to the previous three regions of South Sudan, turn them into federal states and introduce federal system of government to be based on the Comoros Islands modal. Such arrangement should be backed with sufficient constitutional safeguards to seal any loopholes that could be exploited later. The federal constitution has to have provision that allows for secession of each unit should it so desire. Such a provision will serve as a deterrent to acts that could trigger secession and keep the federation united.

The author strongly recommends adoption of the federal system of government as the only way of removing all the prevalent problems of domination and disarm those constituencies in South Sudan that are angling for secession. It would also save the country and region from the cost that are associated with secession wars.

Finally, although this study has unearthed some facts at the centre of difficult relationship between the Equatorians and the Dinkas, there is still need to undertake further study in the area of fiscal decentralisation to zero in on the most appropriate model for South Sudan as choosing a particular modal of federal system of government without the most suitable method of resource allocation may not by itself, resolve the problems.

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CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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