

*Full Length Research Paper*

# Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: Where the Arab and African Worlds Collide

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**This paper explores the extent to which the British colonial administration was responsible for the post-colonial conflict between North and South Sudan. Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian regime, British administrators continuously separated the Northern and Southern regions on a socio-economic basis while maintaining political unity. The combination of these policies was likely the root cause behind the postcolonial conflict between the Northern and Southern Sudanese. To show evidence of this assertion, the following paper will assess pre-colonial tensions within the region and illustrate how the British's decision to unite the North and South despite its preexisting divisions only furthered tensions between the Sudanese. Next, the paper details the inconsistencies in early colonial policy and its role in creating the Northern Sudanese hegemony. The study will analyze the motivation behind a series of regional separatist policies and how these policies pushed the North and South on separate paths of development, furthering the socio-economic divide. The paper details the self-serving motives that influenced the British to politically unify the region at the time of independence, despite the consequences this decision had on the Southern Sudanese. It also describes the decolonization period, in which the combination of forced political unification, Northern hegemony, cultural division, and pre-colonial tensions caused the beginning of a half-century-long war.**

**Key words:** Sudan, South Sudan, British colonialism, ethnic conflict.

## INTRODUCTION

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was the collision of the Arab and African worlds. Between the 7th and 15th centuries, Arab Muslims traveled from the Arabian Peninsula to Northern Africa, introducing Islam to the Northern Sudanese (Cartwright, 2019). After decades of peaceful coexistence

between the Arab migrants and indigenous Northern Sudanese, the region soon became a cultural and ethnic blend of the Arab and African worlds. However, just a few hundred miles south, past the Nuba Mountains, Sudan becomes unrecognizable: dry, arid deserts become lush

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rainforests, and rocky mountains turn to green swampy plains. The drastic geographic change comes with an equally drastic demographic change: South Sudan was both culturally and ethnically untouched by Arab influence. The Southern Sudanese lived among tribes, each characterized by its own religion, language, and culture (Sikainga et al., n.d).

Throughout its history, this ethnic and racial diversity became a driving source of regional conflict less than a year after the country's independence from British colonialism, ethnic conflict between the Northern Muslims and Southern Christian triggered a series of civil wars that consumed the area for over half a century (Collins, 1976, p. 3). Following the British departure, both Northern and Southern Sudanese blamed their former colonizers for the war they had endured in the post-colonial sphere. Therefore, the question arises: To what extent did colonial forces manufacture the regional conflict in Sudan? While pre-colonial tensions and ethnic differences between the Northern and Southern Sudanese are at the root of the conflict, the British administration is responsible for worsening the situation by separating the regions on a socio-economic basis while maintaining political unity.

### Pre-colonial tensions

The history of conflict in Sudan is as intrinsic in the name as it is in the nation. The word *Sudan* originated from the Arabic root *Sud*, meaning "black." Arabs throughout the Islamic Empire used the term *Sud* or *Sudani* to describe the black slaves they captured throughout the country (Hasan, 1977). This system of slavery within Sudan created resentment and prejudice, building the foundation for post-colonial conflict well before the presence of British colonizers. However, the British administration's choice to politically unify the Sudan despite the historical tensions and ethnic differences initiated conflict between the North and South.

For centuries, the Arab Northerners played a direct role in the enslavement of Southern Sudanese. With the rise of the Islamic empire from the 7th century to the 15th century, there came the subsequent demand for slave labor in all areas, ranging from the military to entertainment (Cartwright, 2019). The principles of Islam prohibited Muslims from enslaving fellow Muslims, so historically, semi-Islamic or non-Islamic tribes were the first to become enslaved. As the demand for slave labor increased, the general direction of the slave trade moved southward to the Nuba Mountains in search of non-Muslims. Arab cartographers called the southern regions *Bilad Al Sudan* or "The Land of the Blacks." Soon, the slave trade extended to present-day Bhar al Ghazal. Due Northern Sudan's unique geographic position between Sub-Saharan Africa and the growing Islamic empire,

Northern Sudanese were both slave holders and more importantly slave capturers: groups such as the infamous "Jaballa" were directly responsible for raiding Southern Sudanese tribes and bringing them north. Moreover, the economies of regions such as Khartoum, Dar Fur, and Sinnar largely benefited from the slave trade, leaving the North inextricably involved in the practice. In 1821, the Ottomans and Egyptians conquered Sudan, beginning the Turko-Egyptian Regime; the primary reason behind the invasion was to gain access to slave labor from the South. The Turko-Egyptian Regime intensified the slave trade, and thus, Northern Sudanese involvement in the practice. By 1882, the Egyptians had pushed further south into Equatoria until the arrival of the British (Gray, 1971; Great Britain, War Office, General Staff, & Geographical Section, 1921).

The North's direct involvement in precolonial slave trade built the foundation for prejudice and mistrust between Northerners and Southerners. In the North, slavery inspired the popularization of racially pejorative vocabulary (like the usage of the word *abid*, meaning enslaved person, or *Sudani*). This language perpetuated the Northern Arabs' feelings of supremacy over non-Muslims, specifically the Southern Sudanese. In the South, the impact of Northern slave raids left the tribes full of resentment. Tales of Arab-induced violence were passed down from generation to generation, further cementing hatred towards Northerners (Okeny, 1991).

Slavery also created a social hierarchy in which power was deeply intertwined with Arabism: since the non-muslim or un-arabized tribes were historically targets of slave trade, these traits soon also became determinants for one's standing in the social hierarchy. For instance, the Ja'alin, Shaigiya, and Dangala tribes were not subject to enslavement due to their predominantly Arab genealogy and their strict practice of the Islamic faith whereas semi-arabized and un-arabized tribes such as the Dofurians, Nubas, and Baggara were the first to be enslaved upon the expansion of the Islamic empire. Therefore, the Ja'alin, Shaigiya, and Dangala tribes (also known as Riverain tribes due to their proximity to the Nile River) were the early feudal lords, property owners and sultans of pre-colonial Sudan. After the Turko-Egyptian conquest in 1821, enslaved individuals from semi-arabized tribes were eventually replaced due to the increased supply of southern Sudanese slaves. However, despite their freedom, these individuals remained inferior on the social hierarchy, limiting economic opportunity and social mobility. In contrast, upon the beginning of the Turko-Egyptian regime, Arab Sudanese were the first to be given minor administrative roles, allowing them to further develop political and social power. The race-based social hierarchy left a lasting divide between lesser Arabized groups and the Riverain tribes as its effects persisted to generations of Sudanese (Pekkinen, 2009).

By the late 19th century, the Turko-Egyptian regime

was losing power to a religious revolution led by Muhammad Ahmad Bin Abdullah, the self-declared "Mahdi." Abdullah claimed he was a religious prophet sent by God to rid the world of injustice and evil. He and his supporters sought to fight the over-taxation, corruption, and general misgovernment of the Turko-Egyptian regime. Mahdism inspired a sense of unity rooted in shared oppression and religion, and this early nationalism fueled the Mahdist Revolution. Despite having a more organized and advanced military, the Turko-Egyptians lost control over Sudan, and the Mahdi and his supporters established their regime. The Mahdist administration lasted for over a decade until Egypt allied with Britain to reclaim their possession of Sudan, and within ten years, the Anglo-Egyptian army defeated the Mahdists. They reconquered the region and renamed it the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan after the "Bilad Al Sudan." The Egyptians and the British governed the new nation under a joint condominium agreement (Collins, 1976; Warburg, 1981).

Evidence from books and reports written by early British colonizers demonstrate a clear acknowledgement of the inherent differences between the North and South. In 1899, Winston Churchill, a British army officer at the time, documented the Mahdist War in his book titled, "The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (1899)". Given his position as a high-ranking officer, Churchill's account gives insight into the British's general understanding of Sudan prior to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian regime. In his book, Churchill notes the presence of 'two Sudans': "The real Soudan, known to the statesman and the explorer, lies far in the south – moist, undulating and exuberant. But there is another Soudan, which some mistake for the truth, whose solitudes suppress the Nile from the Egyptian frontier to Omudurian" (Churchill, 2017). Though understanding of the severity of ethnic and historical tension in the regions is not shown in Churchill's statement, his acknowledgment of clear differences between the regions indicate that British colonizers recognized that formation of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was an unlikely union. Furthermore, the British's ability to acknowledge, but not understand the differences indicate that the decision to unite the North and South was born from a combination of ignorance and disregard.

The formation of the condominium represents its inherent dysfunctionality. Before the British, "Sudan," in essence, did not exist. There was no sense of regional unity amongst the "Sudanese"; instead, the centuries of institutional slavery solidified the animosity between Arabs and Africans in the region. The name itself is a representation of these historic tensions: *Sudd* was just a loose term to describe the semi-Islamic or non-Islamic tribes whom northern Arabs sought to enslave. However, after the British won the Mahdist War and created the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the name became the shared national identity of diverse cultures across this region. It

united the victims of the Arab slave trade with the people most directly responsible for their enslavement. Whether it may be from ignorance of or disregard for the impacts of pre-colonial slavery, the British's decision to forgo these factors and unite the country set the stage for post-colonial conflict.

## METHODOLOGY

This paper explores the extent to which the British contributed to the creation of post-colonial conflict in Sudan. The study primarily employs a qualitative approach, emphasizing the analysis of primary and secondary sources. Due to a lack of access to reliable data, this study uses little quantitative research methods.

### Primary source material

There were three primary historical actors involved in the conflict of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: the British colonial administrators, Southern Sudanese, and Northern Sudanese. The following section details primary source material used to represent each perspective. The main primary sources used to explore the British perspective throughout this paper were annual colonial reports on the state and progress of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. During the Condominium period provincial governors and heads of departments submitted detailed annual reports to the Governors-General who then compiled them to send to the High Commissioner in Egypt. These reports contain detailed information and statistics on education, economic growth and general administrative policy. Reports collected by General Sir Reginald Wingate between the years 1902-1914 are particularly valuable due to the abundance analysis behind policy decisions. These reports also contained derogatory remarks said by British administrators in regards to the intellect and character of the Southern Sudanese people, providing evidence for the influence of racial stereotypes in administrative policy making. All reports between 1914 and 1920 are missing, limiting the paper's discussion of economic and educational development to secondary source interpretations. After 1920, few reports contain the level of detail in regards to educational development seen in early reports written by Wingate. However other aspects of policy such as economic development and general administrative decisions are still discussed in detail. These reports were accessed through the *Sudan Archive* in *Archives and Special Collections* published by Durham University.

To explore the often overlooked Southern Sudanese perspective, the paper relies on primary sources from Sudan Open Archive. The archive contains a broad range of songs composed by distinct Southern Sudanese tribes, detailing the tales of the oppression suffered at the hand of British and Arab colonialism. These songs are essential to developing an understanding of the perspective of early tribal people in Southern Sudan. However, the archive fails to represent the perspective of Southern Sudanese towards the end of British colonialism due to a lack of Christian nationalist literature from the late 1940s to the early 1960s.

This paper also employs journals and reports published in the *Sudan Notes and Records* as the main primary source to explore the Northern Sudanese perspective. Established by the British administration in 1918, the *Sudan Notes and Records* (SNR) is the first academic journal which published literature about early Sudan. At the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, authors of SNR were primarily European colonials, explorers and missionaries. By the 1920s, the journal began featuring Sudanese nobles and tribal chiefs and in the late 1930s the journal included Sudanese elites and intelligentsia, including El-Mahdi. During the 1940s, when

administrative power was being given to Northern Sudanese, the SNR became a mechanism to develop nationalist ideals and fight for independence against the British. SNR reports used in the research of this paper were found on the *Sudan Memory* archive and *JSTOR: Sudan Memory* includes earlier SNR issues from the 1918 to the late 1920s whereas later SNR issues are found on JSTOR.

### Secondary source material

Most scholarly secondary sources used in the research of this paper were from JSTOR and Google Scholar. Some prominent academic journals used were *The Journal of African History*, *Journal of the Royal African Society*, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, *Northeast African Studies* and *African Affair*. Prominent secondary authors include Heather J. Sharkey, a historian at the University of Pennsylvania studying the modern Christian and Islamic worlds in the Middle East and Africa. Her work explores the complexity of ethnic identity and nationalism across the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Some articles written by Sharkey in the writing of this paper are, "Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: the Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race" which explores the dichotomy between Arab and African identity in Northern Sudan and its implications for Arabization of the South. Sharkey also wrote, "A Century in Print: Arabic Journalism and Nationalism in Sudan", which discusses the rise of Sudanese journalism and its impact on the growing Nationalist movement; this article was beneficial in understanding the social development in the North during the time of Southern Policy. Another prominent secondary author used in the making of this paper is Peter Woodward, a historian in the field of post-colonial studies, particularly in Africa. Woodward's writings are particularly focused around the political dynamic between the Northern Sudanese, Southern Sudanese, British and Egyptians in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. His article, "The South in Sudanese Politics" discusses the role of the British administration in aiding the political repression of Southern Sudanese, whereas his article, "In the Footsteps of Gordon: The Sudan Government and the Rise of Sayyid Sir Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi, 1915-1935" discusses the rise of Mahdism as a dominant force within Northern Sudanese politics.

### Limitations in research methodology

The primary limitation in the research methodology was unequal representation of different perspectives due to historical documentation practices. The British more frequently wrote of their experiences in colonial Sudan due to mandatory colonial reporting procedures whereas Southern Sudanese often relied on generational storytelling as a method of historical documentation. Similarly, historical documentation of the Northern Sudanese perspective only emerged after the 1920s, due to the nationalist movement and the growth of journalism. Moreover, the unequal preservation of documents written by different historical actors further contributes to a lack of information regarding the Northern and more so the Southern perspective. Moreover, the Northern perspective is also limited because certain Arab nationalist newspapers (*Raid Al Sudan*, *Al Hadarat*) were written only in Arabic. The northern newspapers (*the Sudan Times*) which did print in English were catered towards a European and Sudanese audience and therefore were more sympathetic to British colonialism. Therefore, the paper's interpretation of Arab nationalism is limited to these perspectives.

In addition, there is limited contemporary literature on colonial Sudan as more recent writings of the country discuss the postcolonial civil wars. Most scholarly literature on the condominium

period itself was written in the middle and late 20th century as this was when the British Empire was coming to an end.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### Early inconsistencies in colonial policy

Upon their arrival in the country, the British formed distinctly different relationships with the Northern and Southern Sudanese. These distinctions led to regional inconsistencies in colonial policy, which then became systematic imbalances in economic opportunity that set the tone for conflict in years to come.

### *The Northern provinces*

Soon after the formation of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, the British adopted a pro-Islamic policy to foster peace and understanding between themselves and the Northern Sudanese. By the early 20th century, the British had squashed the Mahdist revolution, and any remaining protests quickly dissipated. Although the movement had died, the spirit of Mahdism still existed as a quiet flame in the hearts of many northern Sudanese. These remnants of Mahdism made it difficult for the British to maintain peace: Mahdists fought for an independent Sudan free from colonial influence; therefore, the British and Egyptians were, by nature, the natural enemies of Mahdism (Rahim, 1966). In response to the growing tension and mistrust between themselves and the Northern Sudanese, the British adopted a pro-islamic policy.

This policy is apparent in the writings of Sir. James Currie, the general of education and principal of Gordon College from 1900 to 1914. Throughout his time in Sudan, Currie was heavily involved in the early economic development. Prior to his death in 1937, Currie wrote a series of reports titled, "The Educational Experiment in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1900-33" which provide a thorough account of Northern educational development. At the beginning of his report, Currie outlines the process of building a peaceful relationship between the Sudanese and their colonial administrators. He describes an interaction between the Governor General of Sudan (Sir Reginald Wingate) and a group of Arab Sudanese elites after the outbreak of World War 1. To demonstrate the administrations tolerance towards the Islamic faith, Wingate remarked, "God be my witness that we have never interfered with any man in the exercise of religion" (Currie, 1934, p. 365). The Governor-General's promise of religious tolerance indicates the colonial administration's desire to maintain peace between themselves and the Northern Sudanese. In his writings, Currie also demonstrates the administration's acceptance of Islam through the numerous measures which the British administration took to facilitate culture and religion

in the region: they limited the work of Christian evangelists; organized trips to Mecca; maintained the Sharia courts to continue the Islamic justice system; and built mosques throughout the North (Currie, 1934). Moreover, the British employed many Egyptians as teachers, religious figureheads, and minor governmental administrators in Sudan to maintain religious and cultural practices (Warburg, 1970). The British's acceptance of Islam was essential to offsetting the mistrust of colonial powers which had developed as a result of Mahdism and the Mahdist War. In the absence of this mistrust, the British fostered a relationship of peace and understanding between themselves and the Sudanese regime.

### ***Colonial objectives and higher education***

The British administrators' attempts to foster a peaceful relationship with the Northern Sudanese contributed to a broader goal they envisioned for the North: self-governance. They believed that building a relationship with the Northern Sudanese was the first step to enabling them to control the region's social and economic development. Moreover, The British administration's objectives of self-governance were apparent in the educational reports written by James Currie. According to Currie (1934), the stated goals of British colonialism were:

1. The creation of a competent artisan class.
2. The diffusion among the masses of the people of education sufficient to enable them to understand the machinery of Government, particularly with reference to the equitable and impartial administration of justice.
3. The creation of a small administrative class, capable of filling many Government posts, some of an administrative, others of a technical nature.

These goals became the basis for educational development in Northern Sudan. In 1889, Lord Kitchener, the governor-general of Sudan, built Gordon College in memory of the late General Gordon, a British army officer and administrator who died in battle during the Mahdist War. Graduates of Gordon College went on to make up the "elite class" of Sudanese as Gordon acted as a gateway for Northern Sudanese to fill higher administrative roles (Currie, 1934).

To create this elite class of Sudanese, the British administrators were highly selective when deciding who would gain admittance into Gordon College. They primarily chose Riverain Arab Sudanese while rarely selecting more Africanized northerners and wholly excluding all southerners. The selection of Riverain Sudanese over other groups preserved the social hierarchy of the Turko-Egyptian regime. Gordon College became a mechanism to keep lesser Arab and non-Muslim individuals at the bottom of the social hierarchy, reinforcing the relationship between ethnicity and social

power (Pekkinen, 2009).

The administration's attempt to understand Sudanese cultural and religious practices aided the success of educational development in the region. Initially, early educational development in Sudan was hindered by a lack of participation in the colonial education system. Sudanese families feared the prospect of a Western education as they believed it would indoctrinate children with Christianity and western values, causing them to abandon the religious values they learned in their homes (Currie, 1934). Lord Cromer, a prominent administrator in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan who served as the governor of multiple Sudanese provinces, recognized that the lack of participation in government schooling was a direct result of the Sudanese mistrust. Cromer argued that teachers and professors should gain experience understanding the culture of the Sudanese people by working minor administrative jobs. His recommendations contributed to the success of Gordon College as most teaching staff at Gordon also worked as minor governmental administrators, creating understanding of religion and culture in Sudan. Similarly, the British administration created primary and secondary schools that prioritized Koran studies and taught young Sudanese children the principles of Islam. These schools sparked the interest of Sudanese parents, allowing the British to pair secular studies with religious studies by 1922 (Archer, 1925).

The expansion of Gordon paralleled the economic developments made in Northern Sudan. Through the years, Gordon College acquired a medical school, an agricultural/scientific research facility, and a military and civil court school. These additional schools allowed for the development of educated professionals who could resolve their nation's most pressing issues. For instance, at the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, religious Kahdis (judges) were required to resolve minor disputes within the region; however, there were initially not enough Egyptian Kahdis, so civil court students eventually filled these judicial positions. Likewise, the medical school produced the necessary expertise required to fight the rampant disease in the region (Currie, 1934). British administrators facilitated this process by strategically allocating funds to specific departments in Gordon College. The 1925 report, on Sudan's finances, administration, and condition, written by the governor-general, recorded Gordon students' college and post-college success. Administrators also tracked how Gordon students contributed to society in their respective fields. Once the British assessed their effect, they purposefully allocated funds to schools that would significantly impact society or produce the needed intelligence to solve the specific problems that challenged the Northern administration (Archer, 1925). The Gezira scheme is one prominent example of the parallel between economic development and educational expansion. In 1907, in light of the agricultural development in Sudan, Wingate sanctioned 100,000 pounds to scientific education so graduates could be more involved in these developments.

The scientific research produced by Gordon students drove the development of the Gezira scheme. By involving Gordon students in the development of their nation, the British not only enhanced economic expansion but also created a new generation of experienced and capable leaders (Currie, 1934).

### ***The Southern provinces***

Upon coming to the Southern regions, the British quickly categorized the Southern Sudanese as a violent, unintelligent and uncivilized group of people. This can be seen in early anthropological reports written by British administrators. At the beginning of African and Asian colonization, European colonizers struggled to understand racial and ethnic structures in their colonies. This struggle influenced the birth of anthropology, a field of study dedicated to understanding the culture and character of distinct ethnic groups. Anthropological reports written of the Sudanese people were especially popular at the start of the condominium due to the complex ethnic demographic of the region. In addition to gaining understanding of ethnicity, the study of anthropology also guided policy making in colonial administrations. An example of this is the *Sudan Notes and Records*, an academic journal established by the British with the intention to collect anthropological research dictating policy making in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. One such study is a SNR article titled, "The Raik Dinka of Bahr El Ghazal Province" written by G. W. Titherington, a British colonial administrator and writer for the *Sudanese Notes and Records*. In his observation of the Raik Dinka tribe, he describes, "Nothing can be further from reality than a happy savage living in a golden age of carefree innocence... ignorance of cause and effect, and a credulity which never ceases to astonish the observer" (Titherington, 1927). The openly mocking nature of his remark encapsulates the British's demeaning attitude towards Southern Sudanese. Moreover, the Titherinton's patronizing remarks regarding the intellect of the Southern Sudanese shows evidence that the British believed they were unintelligent, a racial stereotype held against the Southerners throughout the condominium period. Later, in his report, he describes the Dinka people as having an "irresistibly fiery temper" and an "ungovernable pugnacity". Since Southerners had strong allegiances to their tribe, they responded to tribal rather than colonial authority; this was a primary source behind the growing tensions between the British and Southern Sudanese. Titherington's remarks indicate that the British perceived this unwillingness to give up autonomy as a sign of innate violence. These remarks also demonstrate the belief that Southerners are uncivilized and violent, two other primary stereotypes held against Southerners throughout the colonial administration (Collins and Herzog, 1961). Titherington's (1927) remarks show evidence both of the

existence of racial stereotyping and its influence on administrative policy making in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

The sentiments of British officials reflect the narrative that Southerners required reform or pacification to become amenable to colonialism. For instance, in the 1903 British administrative reports, Lord Cromer claims the Southern Sudanese were "physically fine men and make good soldiers, when properly trained and under control, but in their wild state, they are cruel, treacherous and lazy to a degree and liars of first water (Wingate, 1904). Unlike Titherington (1927)'s reports, these remarks demonstrate the British's belief that when the Southern Sudanese are "trained or under control," they could become more useful to colonial rule. Moreover, these remarks further demonstrate the role of racial stereotyping in policy making: due to the belief that the Sudanese are "treacherous and lazy", as outlined by Lord Cromer, the British believed they must use measures to pacify the Southerners to establish their colonial regime.

The British administration's classification of Southern Sudanese and their desire to pacify them became a justification for their violent rule in the South. Southern tribes preserved the records of colonial violence from generation to generation through songs and stories; one example is the "Amoko Yien of The Chief," a tribal song originating from the Lokoya tribe in present-day South Sudan, Equatoria. This song details the story of a violent interaction between the members of the Lokoya tribe and the incoming British administrators. The Lokoya were a generally peaceful tribe that, upon British arrival, was amongst the most receptive towards British rule. However, this peaceful interaction was soon interrupted after a simple misunderstanding: members of the tribe spotted a football brought by colonial administrators for recreational use, and due to their unfamiliarity with this object, a panic spread amongst the members of the tribe. This event resulted in the injury of a few British administrators. To retaliate against the Lokoya tribe's perceived aggression, the British fought back with their superior weaponry and killed many members of the tribe (Liberato, 2021). The "Amoko Yien of The Chief" is only one example of accounts of British violence against Southern Sudanese; similar accounts of violence exist in annual reports written by British colonial administrators. One report details the swift murder of an entire Dinka village following the murder of one British official at the hands of a Dinka man (Wingate, 1903).

The "Amoko Yien of The Chief" allow readers to glimpse into the Southern Sudanese perspective of early British colonialism. Unlike the British and Northern Sudanese, who documented their experiences during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in reports and journals, the Southern Sudanese primarily relied on oral communication. Therefore, their experiences with British colonialism were largely unrecorded until after Sudan's independence. As a result, much of the current and past literature regarding British colonialism in South Sudan

presents the Southern Sudanese as violent people because of the way they are portrayed in British reports. However, the "Amoko Yien of The Chief" provides insight regarding the intention behind the Southern Sudanese's actions; whereas British sources attribute the seemingly violent actions of Southern Sudanese to an inherent disobedience within the people, this source demonstrates that the Lokoya Lirya's initial "attack" was likely a misunderstanding.

As time passed, the violence of British colonialism aggravated tribal warfare within the region. British officials in the South were quick to remove tribal leaders who did not submit to colonial rule, resulting in the loss of legitimacy in the existing tribal systems. Tribal leaders whom the British appointed did not have the support of their people and thereby had no jurisdiction to monitor conflict within the region. Warfare and colonialism worked in a never-ending cycle; as British administrators took steps to prevent tribal disputes, they were derailing existing power structures and perpetuating the conflicts they sought to end (Collins and Herzog, 1961). As a result, tension between the British and the Southern Sudanese only worsened due to the continual violence.

The rising violence and tension between British administrators and Southern Sudanese made any prospects of educational and economic development in the Southern provinces sparse. Due to the massive educational and agricultural investments being made in the Northern provinces, the British limited the amount of money being invested in the South. Since this limited budget was squandered on subduing tribal rebellion, the British did not have the finances to provide formal educational systems for Southerners. Moreover, the years of conflict between British administrators and tribes strained their relationship, making the Southerners unlikely to partake in government-funded education. The few schools that opened up in the South were missionary funded, but these organizations made little progress due to a lack of experience and financial capital.

The early inconsistencies in colonial policy set the stage for control of power in Sudan. Upon the formation of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, both the Northern and Southern Sudanese garnered mistrust of Western colonialism. However, the British's objective to cooperate alleviated Northern Sudanese mistrust whereas the British's attempts to domination only intensified Southern Sudanese mistrust. As a result, the fundamental difference between British colonialism in the North and South lay in the British's distinct relationships with the Northern and Southern Sudanese. The relationship of trust that the British sought to cultivate between themselves and the Northerners made educational development in the region possible. In contrast, the growing tensions between the British and Southern Sudanese due to racial stereotyping made development in the area near difficult, adding a layer of economic inequality to the existing social divide between the North

and South. By allowing only Northern Sudanese to take part in the economic progression of their nation, they were placing the future of Sudan in the hands of only half the population.

### ***The 1924 Uprisings***

This work analyzes the patterns of divide and conquer in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The events following the 1924 Uprisings demonstrate how one incident spiraled into a series of separatist policies that furthered existing social and cultural divides between the people of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In the late 1910s and 1920s, the Sudanese and the Egyptians formed an anti-colonial movement to gain independence from the British Empire. Despite Egypt's official position in the condominium, Sudan unofficially acted as a British colony; every governor general of Sudan had allegiance to Britain, and the British had almost exclusive control over Sudan's funds. Frustrated with their inferior position in the Condominium, the Egyptians rebelled against British rule, sparking the Egyptian Nationalist movement.

As the Egyptian Nationalist movement grew, it enlisted the growing force of Riverain Sudanese elites, inspiring a subsequent Sudanese Nationalist movement that fought for Sudan's independence from British colonialism and its unity with Egypt (Warburg, 1981; Rahim, 1966). The peak of this movement came in 1924 when Egyptian and Sudanese elites led riots, protests, and demonstrations against British colonialism. These protests were known as the 1924 Uprisings, and they came to an end on November 27th, when the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of Sudan from 1922 to 1924, caused the British to threaten to disband all Egyptian military and civilians out of Sudan. This event sparked unrest in the Sudanese sector of the Egyptian army. Within a little over a week, Sudanese soldiers broke into stores, armed themselves, and marched north to demonstrate their allegiance to Egypt. By the next day, the British had suppressed the uprisings. They took further measures by evacuating all Egyptian civilians and military from Sudan by 1926. Additionally, they strictly monitored travel between Egypt and Sudan, separating the Sudanese military unit from the Egyptian army to create the Sudanese Defense Force (El-Amin, 1986).

### ***Closed districts ordinance***

In response to the 1924 uprisings, the British sought to separate the Northern and Southern regions to maintain control over the region. The British understood that shared religion was the primary motivation behind the Sudanese involvement in the Egyptian nationalist movement. After 1924, they began to fear that the spread of Islam into the Southern regions would enlist

Southerners into the movement for independence, intensifying the existing violence in the area. Therefore, soon after the Egyptian-Sudanese Nationalist movement, there were serious calls for creating a separate political entity for the South. This idea is vocalized in the Milner reports, a series of intelligence reports written by Lord Milner, the Under-secretary of finance in Egypt. These reports detail the Egyptian Nationalist movement and its potential implications for Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Milner specifically outlines the threat which Egyptian and Sudanese Nationalism pose to South Sudan, describing that, "The possibility of the Southern (black) portion of Sudan being eventually cut off from the Northern (Arab) area and linked up with some Central African system is borne in mind" (Rahim, 1966). Milner's recommendation, to separate the North and South as a response to the growing Arab nationalism, shows evidence that a desire to maintain control of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was the primary reason behind the proposed separation of the South. Soon after these reports, the British administration acted; in 1922, they passed the Passports and Permits ordinance, limiting travel and trade between the two regions, and soon after, they passed the Closed Districts ordinance, which strictly prohibited northerners from traveling into the South and vice versa. These ordinances were the basis of "Southern Policy," a series of policies between 1922 and 1946 that treated the Southern regions as a separate colony. The British's Southern Policy was rooted in South Sudan's eventual political separation from the North (Rahim, 1966). At the time, British colonials justified Southern Policy by arguing that the ethnic divides and historical tensions between the North and South made separation necessary to maintain peace (Okeny, 1991).

Southern Policy aimed to remove traces of Islamic influence from the South, intensifying the existing divide between the North and South Sudan. In his report titled, "The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan 1899-1947" Mohamed Abdel Rahim, a Northern Sudanese nationalist and staunch proponent against Southern Policy, analyzes how ethnic divide served as an outcome and motivation for Southern Policy. Though the South was free of any Islamic influence, after years of Turko-Egyptian rule, there were still traces of Northern culture in the South, especially in more populated regions where Arab slave traders had once resided. Arab vernacular, like "sheik" and "sultan," were still common, and in some areas, the natives spoke a combination of the indigenous language and Sudanese Arabic. During this period, the British Government attempted to remove any traces of Arab culture from Sudan and encouraged Southerners to embrace their indigenous culture. Therefore, the usage of Arab vocabulary was discouraged. Moreover, the 1928 Rejaf language conference established the six vernaculars (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Latuko, and Zande) used in schools and everyday communication. Primary schools taught in an

individual's native language, and as one progressed to higher levels of education, like secondary school, English became the form of communication (Sanderson, 1980). Furthermore, the British banned any northern attire and changed the rest day from Friday to Sunday. Though removing Arabic influence and integrating European religion and culture seemed unlikely, these policies eventually came to fruition (Rahim, 1966). While the ethnic division between the North and South existed since pre-colonial times, these policies further actualized the division. Moreover, these aspects of Southern Policy indicate the true motive behind the policy; the British sought to maintain cultural divisions between the North and South to ensure that the South did not become involved in the Northern nationalist movement.

Though Southern Policy was rooted in ethnic division, certain aspects of the policy provide an avenue for development. David Nailo N. Mayo, a Southern Sudanese researcher and the author of "The British Southern Policy in Sudan: An Inquiry into the Closed District Ordinances (1914-1946)," argues that Southern policy ultimately protected the South from further conflict with the North. In his writings, Mayo argues that the years of historical tensions and the cultivation of Arab supremacy in the North made unity between the two regions unlikely. Moreover, he notes that the continued presence of domestic slave trade executed by Northern Sudanese slave traders inhibited Southern development and separation would allow for the creation of Southern political and economic spaces free from Northern Sudanese domination (Mayo, 1994). While evaluations of Southern policy written by Northern Sudanese scholars such as Rahim acknowledge important criticisms such as propagation of ethnic divide, they often disregard the presence of pre-colonial slavery and the intrinsic cultural and religious differences when discussing the policy. Evaluations written by Southern Sudanese scholars like David Mayo seek to understand the Southern perspective by criticizing both British and Arab colonialism.

Though British officials claimed Southern Policy was an act of protection for the Southerners, in truth, it was a method to maintain control; when their colonial authority wavered, the British resorted to using historical divides to quell the spread of rebellion. Years after Southern Policy, Southern Sudanese compared the morals of British imperialism to be similar to "the morals of a shepherd who rescues a ram from a lion, not in the interest of the ram, but in that of the cooking pot" (Okeny, 1991). This quote encompasses the nature of Southern Policy; though it ultimately benefited the Southern Sudanese, its intention demonstrates the issues with British colonialism. Moreover, their selfish motives and usage of "divide and conquer" are evident in their response to the 1924 uprisings; they created barriers between Egypt and Sudan and the North and South to prevent the spread of nationalist ideas. This parallel in colonial policy reflects the lengths the British went to maintain power and control



in the region, regardless of the ramifications of their actions.

### ***Ramifications of Southern policy***

After the implementation of Southern Policy in 1924, the North and South began on two separate paths of development until their eventual reunion in 1946. During this time, the North continued to develop on both a social and economic level. In contrast, the South experienced stagnated growth due to the British administration's lack of investment into Southern educational development. The development in the North and the lack thereof in the South during this period furthered the existing economic and social divide between the two regions.

### ***Economic development in the south during Southern policy***

After years of neglecting the southern provinces, in the early 1920s, the British administration took its first steps to improve educational and economic policy. In 1925, the British began directly subsidizing financial resources to missionary organizations so they were able to educate the South (Sanderson, 1980). Furthermore, the British created a formal system of education that mirrored that of the North. In this system, schools split into four levels: village schools, which were small local vernacular schools that typically served as a rudimentary form of education to Southern children; elementary schools, which were a more advanced form of education and consisted of a four-year course; and intermediate schools, a six-year course with English as the language of instruction. While village schools offered no pathways to pursue higher educational opportunities, elementary schools allowed twelve percent of students to progress to intermediate school. The elementary schools aimed to teach only "the basic needs of the people," while those who moved on to intermediary schools filled technical positions like teachers, clerks, etc. Missionary organizations received a standard curriculum for elementary and intermediate schools and government grants finance these educational institutions (Archer, 1925). The Government appointed two education inspectors in the South to oversee this transition (Sanderson, 1962).

Despite the improved educational system in the South, government missionary tensions hindered development. Missionary organizations did not prioritize education. Many missionaries argued that education was the Government's responsibility, and while missionary schools benefit the spread of faith, their primary goal should remain evangelism. Regardless of missionary protests, after 1925, the Government required missionary organizations to take on the role of educators if they wished to continue operating in Southern Sudan.

Therefore, many missionaries accepted the subsidies and cooperated with the Government. However, this agreement had implications for Southern education; since education was only a secondary goal for missionary organizations; missionaries felt their education responsibilities were a burden. Reports of Southern education note that the lack of enthusiasm regarding educational development was apparent in the classrooms. In addition, despite the financial compensation missionaries received from the Government, these monetary benefits could only do so much to counter the shortage of educated missionary teachers. Missionary organizations were unqualified to take on educational responsibilities, regardless of the money they received from the colonial administration. The overreliance on missionaries left Southern education fragmented and incohesive (Sanderson, 1980; Rahim, 1966).

A lack of opportunities for higher education further limited Southern education. By the end of 1956, over 350 schools had been built in the South, yet only 48 were elementary and three were intermediate. The only form of "higher education" was the Juba Training Centre, which, according to British records, taught little more than an intermediary school (Archer, 1925). Moreover, even at more rudimentary levels of education, the British encouraged missionary organizations to teach practical skills while ignoring literary skills. As a result, there was little economic and social development to accompany the few educational developments made during this era (Sanderson, 1980).

The contrast between educational development in the North and South is the primary contribution to post-colonial economic inequality. The British directly invested into Northern education with the intention to create a class of Sudanese who would promote economic and social advancements in the region. However, the lack of direct government investment and the inability to promote higher education in the South led to a failure of the education system. Moreover, due to the years of violent colonial rule, attempts at Southern educational development were halted until the 1920s, whereas educational development in the North had begun decades before. This gave the South limited time to reach the level of economic development achieved in the North, putting the South at a further disadvantage.

### **Social development and the growth of a national consciousness in northern Sudan**

#### ***Neo-Mahdism***

With the help of the British administration, Mahdism reemerged amongst the Northern Sudanese during the period of the Closed Districts Ordinance. During World War I, many British Islamic Colonies throughout the British Empire began to rebel against their colonizers in support of the Ottoman Empire. In fear of a similar

rebellion in Sudan, the British revived the very religious institution they had initially sought to destroy: Mahdism. The Mahdists were the natural enemies of their former colonizers, the Ottomans and Egyptians, so the British hoped that resurrecting Mahdism would rekindle century-old resentments towards the Ottomans.

In 1915, the British contacted the young son of the former Mahdi, Sayyid Abd Al Rahman Al Mahdi, and requested his assistance in spreading anti-Turkish propaganda (Woodward, 1985). The Al-Mahdi agreed to help the British, and Mahdism quickly grew in the rural and eventually urban parts of Northern Sudan. In the late nineteen-tens, with the growth of the Egyptian nationalist movement, the British continued neo-Mahdist policy in hopes of fighting Sudan's growing allegiance to Egypt (Ibrahim, 1980; Rahim, 1966).

With these developments, Mahdism became the backbone of Sudanese nationalism. Northern Sudan consisted of many diverse groups who historically did not get along, so until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there was no distinctly Sudanese identity. However, the shared oppression of the Turko-Egyptian regime became a unifying force amongst the Northerners. Since Mahdism was born out of this shared oppression, it was Northern Sudan's first and only form of shared identity (Holt, 1956). Moreover, Mahdism used religion to rally the northerners, furthering their feelings of statehood. Though the initial intentions behind neo-Mahdism were to remind the Northern Sudanese of their historic grievances towards the Egyptians, it also brought about a sense of unity essential to building the Sudanese national identity.

### ***Sudanese centered literature***

Neo-Mahdism inspired the development of Sudanese journalism, a driving force for socio-political development in the North. With the rise of Neo-Mahdism, journalism in the 1920s catered towards the "Sudanese" perspective; journals propagated Sudanese nationalist ideologies, hired Sudanese journalists, and discussed Sudanese issues and accomplishments. On the frontline of this development was *Hadarat al Sudan*. In 1919, Hussein Sharif, later known as the "father of Sudanese journalism," founded the first Sudanese-owned newspaper, *Hadarat al Sudan*, with the support of his uncle the Al-Mahdi. Sharif was a Gordan graduate and a young Sudanese elite; being a firm believer in the intellectual progression of his nation, Sharif aimed for *Hadarat al Sudan* to become an outlet for Sudanese nationalism (Sudan Memory Editors, n.d).

*Hadarat al Sudan* played a crucial role in breaking down the divides that separated the Northern Sudanese, specifically by popularizing the term "Sudanese." From the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Northern Arabs did not identify as "Sudanese." To be "Sudanese" was an attack on their Arab Muslim identities,

as the term historically described enslaved Southerners. The Northerner's reluctance towards adopting the term "Sudanese" reflected the intense divides in Sudanese society. Riverain Sudanese refused to be associated with lower-class Africanized Northern Sudanese, just as the lower-class Northerners refused to be associated with Southerners (Sharkey, 2008). However, in a series of essays published in 1927 by Hamza al-Malik Tambal, a little-known Sudanese poet and district officer, Tambal became the first to use the label "Sudanese" in his writings. Though Arab elites initially rejected the term, Tambal and his peers had transformed the meaning of Sudanese; what once was an insult to their identity soon became an emblem of national pride. This change reflected a pivotal moment in the country's social development as it broke down the intense social divides. Tambal inspired other northern writers to explore the existence of a distinctly "Sudanese" identity, and soon, many journals wrote of Sudanese problems, themes, and sentiments. Tambal's writings were among the first to distinguish "Sudanese" literature from broader Arabic literature (Sharkey, 1999).

The adoption of the term "Sudanese" had several implications. It represented the coming of a social transformation; for years, ethnic divides separated the Northerners, but the combined forces of neo-Mahdism and Sudanese journalism helped form a shared national identity. On the contrary, the redefinition of the term implied severe ramifications for the South. Due to Southern Policy and the Closed Districts Ordinance, the new definition of "Sudanese" completely excluded the Southerners, who ironically were the people it originally intended to describe. These nationalist developments limited southern participation in the social and political sphere.

### **British appeasement and the end of southern policy**

#### ***A "Sudan for the Sudanese"***

The rise in Sudanese journalism was vital to driving political initiative amongst the Northern Sudanese. After the Egyptian Nationalist movement, the question of alliance with Egypt or Britain became the forefront of Sudanese press and literature; to address this debate, *Hadarat al Sudan* published a series of articles under the "Sudan Question," which discussed the merits of Egyptian and British colonialism. The Sudan Question articles created a broader discussion on the limitations of alliance with both colonial powers. As the attitude towards Britain and Egypt became increasingly critical, more Northern Sudanese recognized that only they were their nation's ultimate salvation (Salih, 1965). Moreover, the growth in Sudanese national identity united the Sudanese against both colonial forces. The rise of the Sudanese nationalist movement inspired the formation of

the Gordon Graduates Congress, an organization of elite Northern Sudanese who countered the forces of Egyptian and British colonialism to represent Sudanese ideals (Taha, 2008).

The growth of the Sudanese nationalist movement led to a shift in British colonial policy. In 1942, the Gordon Graduates Congress sent a memorandum proposing Sudanese self-determination. Due to World War II, Britain no longer had the financial resources to manage its colonial empire, and the spread of nationalist movements throughout African and Asian colonies caused further strain on the empire (Okeny, 1991). As a result, this memorandum caused a massive shift in British colonial policy; with their financial strain and the growing Sudanese nationalist movement, the British had accepted their time in Sudan was short-lived, so their objective shifted to securing an alliance to maintain political control in the post-colonial sphere. Similarly, Egypt saw the upcoming independence of Sudan as an opportunity for the union of their nations, so they, too, sought to tighten relations with the Sudanese. These developments had implications for the power dynamic in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; for either colonial power to have a future relationship with Sudan, they had to appeal to the growing force of the Sudanese elite (Taha, 2008).

### ***The end of southern policy***

As self-determination transitioned from a mere thought to an actuality, the Northern Sudanese began to raise their concerns about Southern Policy. Despite their divisive past, the Northerners viewed South Sudan as an integral part of the country. Moreover, they blamed Southern Policy and the work of Christian missionaries for creating regional differences in culture and religion. Rahim (1966), a famed writer and critic of Southern Policy, described it as "by far the greatest failure of that Administration". He continued, "There can be no doubt that by implementing [Southern Policy], the Condominium regime has landed the independent Sudan with its most intractable problem and the present generation of Sudanese people, throughout the country, with the greatest challenge in their post-independence history". In light of their grievances towards Southern Policy, the Gordon Graduates Congress sent a memorandum in 1942 advocating for the reversal of Southern Policy and the Closed Districts Ordinance.

The purpose of Southern Policy's reversal was to appease the Northern Sudanese, despite the consequences this decision would bear on the Southerners, demonstrating the British administration's prioritization of their own political goals over the Southern Sudanese. The British initially rejected the Graduate Congress's proposal due to their concerns about the feasibility of reintegration: one report from the Sudan Political Service, a group of British officers responsible for

administrative functions in the country, argued that there was "simply not enough time for the South to catch up [with the North]" (Okeny, 1991). Another report from the Sudan Political Service claimed, "If the two are ever to fuse... the northerner has to realize that here and now south and north are utterly different countries joined by geographic and economic ties, and that he is more of an alien here than we are. Until he realizes that he'll do neither himself nor the South much good" (Okeny, 1991). These comments demonstrate a clear understanding of the ramifications of reintegration. However, with their desire for a post-colonial alliance and the threat of Egyptian unity looming over their heads, the British eventually relented. After a series of discussions during the Sudan Administrative Conference of 1946, the British officially banned Southern policy and began the process of reintegration.

After reintegration, the British continued to prioritize Northern appeasement over upholding the concerns of Southerners. After Southern Policy was banned, the British and Northerners suggested the creation of a new legislative assembly that would represent both Northern and Southern ideals. Prominent Southern Sudanese and British administrators in the South immediately opposed this assembly, believing the South needed more time before taking steps towards integration. To these remarks, James Robertson, Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government, remarked, "To rule out Southern participation in the Assembly would be received with great disappointment in Northern Sudan and would incline many of those who are now supporters of the Sudan Government to go into opposition and drift across to the Egyptian side" (Woodward, 1980). Robertson's remarks show evidence of the British's desire to prevent an alliance between the Northern Sudanese and Egyptians to maintain their own political alliance with the North. This incentive overrides the political and economic well-being of the Southern Sudanese.

Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the British consistently chased their political agendas: the initial purpose of Southern Policy was to maintain control throughout Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and its end was a means to appease the North and secure a post-colonial alliance. These self-serving colonial policies had significant ramifications for Sudan; Southern policy added a layer of economic and social division between the regions and reintegration created a situation in which the South was politically, socially and economically inferior to the North. In treating the North and South differently regarding educational development, the British worsened economic inequalities between the regions when the time for independence came. The primary issue with British colonialism in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is not Southern policy but rather a failure to establish a long-term objective for the South. In pursuing a policy of economic separation and political assimilation, the British would truly leave Sudan with the "greatest challenge in their

post-independence history" (Rahim, 1966).

### **Decolonization**

Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian regime, the British continually separated the North and South on both a social and economic level, only to push the two regions back together in attempts to create unity before independence. The actions of the British administration left the South socially separated and economically unequal, leaving them at a severe disadvantage during the decolonization period.

### ***Juba conference***

In 1947, the British planned the Juba conference to address the issue of reintegration. The conference's objective was "to bring together and integrate what are basically two nations with differing aspirations and outlooks", while ensuring "equitable socio-economic development" (Okeny, 1991). The conference included prominent Southern chiefs, Northern nationalists, and British administrators. During the conference, most Southerners voiced concerns about their people's economic and political representation, arguing that the South would need time to grow and develop before deciding on integration. Others claimed they would need more time to form a consensus amongst their people. Above all, representatives advocated for safeguards against any hindrance to social, economic, and political advancement and the preservation of religious and cultural practices. Despite claims made by British administrators and Northern Sudanese to respect these boundaries, they largely ignored Southern requests during the conference (Laki, 1996). After the conference, James Robertson, the civil secretary of Sudan, remarked, "If the North had predatory instincts and is going to do down the Southerner, all the safeguards you like to put in your ordinance won't do any good once the British authority, whether direct or advisory, has gone" (Woodward, 1980). Robertson's acceptance of Northern domination and dismissal of the South's protection indicates a shared negligence towards protecting the rights of the Southerners. This negligence resulted in the British doing little to uphold Southern concerns at the time of independence.

The Juba conference prefaced what the South would endure as they transitioned into independence. The Southerners came into the conference with an immense disadvantage: while the Northern representatives were college graduates who had experience in the political sphere, most of the Southern representatives were illiterate and had little exposure outside their respective villages (Laki, 1996). Additionally, the very purpose of the conference implicated the early political inequality between North and South: while the question of ending

Southern Policy had already been debated and discussed in an earlier conference, Juba was simply a gesture to appease Southern leaders. Moreover, British administrators and Northern Sudanese failed to address most concerns raised by Southerners, demonstrating their lack of regard for Southerners as the country transitioned into the decolonization period (Woodward, 1980).

### ***The Sudanization movement***

The consequences of mismanagement and stagnated economic growth in the South became apparent in the years leading up to independence. During the 1940s, the British began the "Sudanization" movement, which pushed Sudanese to take administrative positions that would be empty upon the departure of British administrators. Due to the lack of educational development in the South, few Southerners had the expertise necessary for higher positions in the condominium. Therefore, the British severely excluded Southern Sudanese from this movement, leaving Northern Sudanese with most of the vacated jobs. On a political front, the Southern Sudanese could not counter the growing force of Northern Sudanese elites. The political inequality between the North and South was a product of British colonialism; the British created educational institutions specifically to bring the elite Northern Sudanese into power, but the lack of higher-level educational opportunities in the South left few Southerners able to take positions of power during the condominium period. Moreover, due to Southern Policy's emphasis on preserving tribalism, most Southern Sudanese had little sense of national or even regional identity. However, the years of neo-Mahdism and Sudanese journalism in the North fostered a nationalist identity throughout Northern Sudan, which was present even in its most remote areas.

The Northerners took advantage of the political inequality between themselves and the Southerners, further limiting the Southerner's political power. Soon after reintegration, Northern Sudanese legislators and elites prohibited the formation of Southern political parties, leaving the South socially and politically disorganized. Moreover, the British and Northern Sudanese also excluded Southern Sudanese from numerous conferences before independence (such as the 1953 Cairo Conference) to limit the representation of the Southern views when making essential decisions about decolonization. Since the Southerners were not able to push for the creation of a representative government at the formation of the independent Sudan, they had little political voice in the post-colonial sphere (Woodward, 1980).

Soon after reintegration, the North used its economic and political hegemony to culturally assimilate or "Arabize" the Southern Sudanese. After 1946, Southern churches

were destroyed and replaced with mosques, and the Sudanese government pushed many missionary organizations to leave the region. Moreover, the Northern Arabs discouraged the use of English and indigenous languages, and instead, new administrators encouraged the use of Arabic, a language that had long been out of use. The Northerners modified the education system to teach students Islam, and mandatory Quran studies were added to Southern students' schedules (Sharkey, 2008).

As conflict grew between the North and South, the South became increasingly apprehensive that a future with the Northerners would starkly match their past. In 1955, tensions between the North and South peaked when the Equatorial Corps, a Southern military unit created by the British, was forcibly transferred to the North, sparking a Southern rebellion against Northern military generals. To Southern Sudanese soldiers, this movement was a product of both present apprehension and past grievances. During the Turko-Egyptian regime, many Southern men were forcibly taken from their families to become enslaved soldiers, so the sudden movement of Southern troops away from their families and homes was a firm reminder of the subjugation they suffered at the hands of Northern Arabs. Moreover, records of the mutiny show that Southern soldiers only attacked the Northern generals upon being called "abid," a racially prerogative term meaning "slave," which dates back to the Turko-Egyptian Regime. The Torit mutiny incited protests throughout Sudan, marking the beginning of the First Sudanese Civil War (Tounsel, 2021). Just months after the mutiny, Sudan entered independence as a fractured nation, already at war.

The Torit Mutiny was a cumulation of the South's past, present and future apprehensions. Upon reintegration with the North, the South was continuously excluded by both the British and Arab Sudanese from the economic and political spaces. Moreover, instead of modifying their definition of the Sudanese identity, the Northerners forced Southerner's into their version of the Sudanese identity through Arabization Policies which enforced Islamic teachings on the Christian South. The combination of social, economic and political repression during the decolonization period not only fostered present frustration but also served as a reminder of historical grievances and a warning of continued repression in the post-colonial sphere. This can also be seen through the events of the Torit Mutiny: according to accounts of the mutiny, the Southern soldiers in Torit rebelled against Northern military leaders upon being called "abid", a racially pejorative vocabulary meaning "slave". The historical connotations of this insult combined with the present situation invoked fear of another future of Arab hegemony. To the Southern Sudanese, the end of British colonialism only represented the beginning of Arab Colonialism. Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian administration, the British played a crucial role in empowering Northern domination. In 1899, the British uniting the North and South while disregarding the clear

historical tension and ethnic division between people. At the beginning of the condominium, the British showed clear prioritization of the Northern regions over the Southern regions, creating unequal economic opportunity. Similarly, in 1946 when the British decided to reintegrate the regions, despite evidence of economic, social and historical divide, they continued favoring the Northern Sudanese, allocating a majority of political and economic opportunity to the North. This parallel between the beginning and the end of British colonialism demonstrates a continued negligence towards the Southern Sudanese, resulting in another half-century of Arab colonialism.

## Conclusion

On January 1st, 1956, the Sudanese experienced their first breath of freedom from British colonialism in over half a century. A newspaper article describing the momentous day explained that verses of the Koran were shouted on loudspeakers for the "first time in history" (The Sudan Times Editors, 1956). The article recounts, "Most of the people there failed to suppress their emotions, there were tears of joy and pride" (The Sudan Times Editors, 1956). Despite their departure from the colony in 1956, Sudan felt the effects of British colonialism for years to come; by 1956, Sudan experienced its first civil war, and the country would remain in a constant state of conflict until 2005.

Sudan was far from alone in its fate; it was just one of over forty countries in the 1950s and 1960s to gain independence from colonialism, and like Sudan, many of these countries faced postcolonial violence due to European colonialism. In Kenya, the British's ignorance towards the complex dynamic of ethnic groups caused them to bring together conflicting tribes while dividing existing communities. This aggravated conflict between ethnic groups, causing political instability in the post-colonial sphere. In Rwanda, the Belgians favored the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority, intensifying tensions between the two groups. The combination of Belgian colonialism and historical conflict incited the notorious Rwandan Genocide, an event so violent and inhumane it caused a global movement towards genocide prevention and international peacekeeping. The story of Sudan, like the story of numerous other former colonies, shows how the legacy of colonialism survives in the societal cracks that haunted the region for years to come.

## CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interest.

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