

Review

The politics of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and power sharing in Zimbabwe: Challenges and prospects for democracy

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September 2008 marked a new era in Zimbabwean politics, as a united front between the major political parties enabled the forging of an agreement that laid the foundation for a government of national unity. The unity government has brought hope not only to Zimbabweans but also to the international community for many view it as a purveyor of better moves for the country and its overall standing in the region and beyond. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an overview of the politics of governments of national unity in Zimbabwe from the first post-colonial Government of National Unity (GNU), the 1987 Unity Accord and the current 2008 GNU. It is the purpose of this research to bring to the fore, the dangers posed by the much-touted Government of National Unity to the prospects of the nascent democratic movement in Zimbabwe. The paper posits that among other factors, through the removal of a government in waiting, confinement to specific political parties, the exclusion of civil society and other new political players and critics of government policy in institutions promoting democracy; the GNU is clearly a negation of democracy. The paper also makes critical analysis of the viability, pros and cons of governments of national unity by, presenting the challenges that the GNUs encountered or, is likely going to encounter in Zimbabwe. For clarity and provision of a balanced analysis, the current GNU's prospects of success are provided as well.

Key words: Government of National Unity (GNU), authoritarianism, power sharing, democracy, Zimbabwe.

INTRODUCTION

For the past ten years in Africa, there has been a continuing trend in the increase in governments of national unity/coalition governments. Largely, these are emerging out of hot political contestations depicting high levels of violence and tense fragmentation of society. Recently, Zimbabwe has been caught up in the same situation, following a hot political contestation dating back to the year 2000 with the entry onto the scene, of a new political party formed by civil society groups, challenging the once dominant political party that had brought Zimbabwe independence through the barrel of the gun. Since the year 2000, there has been deepening political and economic crisis which ultimately got into 2008, a year when the country held harmonized elections (these included electing leaders at the local council level, representatives to the house of assembly, the senate and

the country's top post). Results were tilted in favour of the then opposition political party (MDC-T). The harmonized elections had no outright winner for the country's top post, leading to the holding of a run-off which failed the intended objective, as the other contestant withdrew, citing massive violence perpetrated by the ruling party ZANU-PF. The results did indicate that though ZANU-PF claimed the presidency on technical grounds, it was difficult to form a legitimate government to address the wishes of not only the majority of Zimbabweans but also of the large sections of international community. Hence the negotiations that led to the signing of an agreement to establish a government of national unity in September 2008 and ultimately, leading to the formation of the government in February 2009. The obtaining situation has implications for democracy. This becomes the objective of this paper, as it analyses the challenges and prospects of GNUs in promoting democracy. In essence, as the Zimbabwean case demonstrates, there are several challenges to achieving democracy. What is obtaining in

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Zimbabwe is a pure derailment of the very fundamental ethos of democratic change and transition in Zimbabwe. The central thesis of the paper is that, power, in essence, can never be shared and that power in Zimbabwe lies with those that control the state apparatus and government.

CONCEPTUALISING GOVERNMENTS OF NATIONAL UNITY

Whilst in general, people allude to power in a simplified manner, that is, referring to control or those in charge of the situation, it is important to note that it is a term that is difficult to define in political science. In simple terms, power is understood in two ways. The first meaning of power is its capability or possession, this means that one can possess power in itself or has the capability of doing what one wants without limitations. In order for one to be said to be possessing power, he or she should own or control the instruments of power, that is, have control over resources that are either tangible or intangible. Tangible resources in relation to the state pertain to military capability (the ability to use force or control the instruments of force), economic capability, also, other resources relating to population, territory, geographical position, and natural resources. Intangible resources pertain to issues of ideology, national morale and national leadership and most importantly, information. Secondly is, power, meaning a relationship, thus one has to relate to others in order to exercise the power one has. According to Dahl (1957) power is when "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do." In essence, this implies that power is exercised by creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consolidation of only those issues that are important to the actor. Thus, power in this sense relates to influencing outcomes to make another actor do things that they would not otherwise do.

Power sharing therefore denotes distribution of power among power centers, that is, actors in the power game would share their exercise of control over resources as well as their ability to influence outcomes. One question that often arises is, 'Is power sharing possible?' The Zimbabwean experience with GNUs seems to reflect otherwise. State power is vested in the head of state and the head of government. Zimbabwe's 1987 government, brought into being, a coalition government of the two major political formations with ultimate authority being retained by the sole leader, the president, with executive authority. The current GNU, though creating the post of the prime minister coming from MDC-T, does not translate on the ground to controlling resources that will ultimately lead to influencing the running of either affairs of the state or government, at most, his post is that of a supervisory role.

In keeping with the meaning of the origin of the word

democracy, *demos*'s *kratia* in Greek, this principle literally means "people rule" or its modern equivalent, popular self-government (<http://www.idasa.org.za>). Simply put, democracy by definition is a principle that means the control of authority comes from public, and ruler and non-ruler are the same. In order for a state to be considered a democratic state, it must be in possession of attributes of democracy. These attributes include the freedom to choose leaders through free and fair elections, all the freedoms as enshrined in the national bill of rights, accountability, transparency among others. In this regards, as the Zimbabwean case demonstrates, GNU threatens some of the very attributes that define democracy. For the purpose of this paper, democracy is not only the freedom to choose a government; it is about the freedom from abject poverty and economic deprivation. It is also about systems of government that enable countries to continually achieve incremental socio-economic development.

The nexus between power sharing and democracy is that, where there is power sharing, there is equal access to resources and instruments of control. In theory therefore, where there is power sharing in government, there is equal control of state apparatus, government portfolios and all key posts in the running of the state and government. Translated to all other citizens, irrespective of political affiliation, everyone is supposed to be benefiting from government policies, and be supportive or critique the government on non partisan basis.

National unity assumes the achievement of national consensus on broad national issues and vision. It further assumes the active recognition, participation and inclusion of the broader spectrum of the nation's political opinion. The product of this is an integrated approach to national questions. The assumption behind national unity is that, it must arise out of internal processes, based on mutual respect and equitable participation in the affairs of the state and development processes.

At a very basic level, a GNU is a coalition government, designed specifically to accommodate all participating political players in governmental structures (Mukoma, 2008). This includes, the civil service, cabinet, diplomatic posts, the judiciary and in other instances, army, police and the intelligence arms. The logic behind this is that, equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and development. The assumption behind this logic is that conflict arises from mere exclusion of key political players in structures and processes of national governance.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper is based on the emerging theoretical framework on democratization and electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Howard 2006, Lindeberg, 2006). From such a perspective, parties and elections are a central part of a survival strategy by incumbent regimes (Geddes, 2005; Magaloni, 2006).

From this scenario, Zimbabwe has, since independence, gravitated from a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime which “hold(s) elections, but they are so dominated by one political force or party that the electoral process and results are hegemonic,” to the current situation which qualifies the country as a competitive electoral authoritarian regime which ‘hold(s) competitive elections that do not necessarily translate the preferences of voters’ (Schedler, 2004). The former was the situation in the period 1980 to 1999 when ZANU (PF) had an unchallenged hegemonic control over the country, while the latter can be traced from 1999 to present, after the emergence of the MDC as a vibrant opposition. According to Schedler (2004), authoritarian regimes have adopted competitive electoral institutions, but the electoral process is manipulated to such degree that these regimes cannot be considered democratic.

Lindberg (2006) argues that while the world over, a number of states have become either electoral or fully liberal democracies, many countries in Africa are still run by electoral authoritarian regimes. In this regard, Diamond (2002) has come up with a classification that is strongly suggestive of the type of regime operational in Zimbabwe prior to the February 2009 inauguration of a GNU. Thus, the paper seeks to show that Zimbabwe has over the years, been ruled by an electoral autocracy. It is our contention that Zimbabwe fits the bill of “...countries that holds elections, but do not live up to the minimum criteria for either electoral or liberal democracies...” (Schedler, 2002). The longstanding conventional wisdom regarding why authoritarian regimes establish parties, hold elections, and convene legislatures is that these institutions convey an aura of legitimacy, both domestically and to the outside world. Nevertheless, it is often preferable to make changes under the cover of formal legislative institutions with ruling parties composing a parliamentary majority. In fact, in many authoritarian regimes there is surprising attention paid to issues of procedural integrity, even when passing the most draconian and undemocratic of laws. The existence of elections and parliaments also conveys a certain degree of legitimacy to the outside world. Levitsky and Way (2003) argue that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period of Western liberal hegemony began and that the costs associated with the “maintenance of full-scale authoritarian institutions” rose considerably. Authoritarians, it seems, would benefit from the establishment of institutions that appeared to be democratic to reap the benefits associated with liberalization and it is our contention that Mugabe has chosen this path as his way to legitimacy.

HISTORICAL ISSUES TO GOVERNMENTS OF NATIONAL UNITY IN ZIMBABWE

The concept of a government of national unity is not new to Zimbabwe as the country has had several experiences with coalition governments intended to achieve national unity. These include the 1978 Muzorewa/Smith

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia coalition, the 1980 independence government, and the 1987 ZANU/PF-ZAPU unity government.

In March 1978, with his regime near the brink of collapse, Smith signed an accord with three African leaders, led by Bishop Abel, who offered safeguards for white civilians as a result of which the internal settlement elections were held in April 1978. The United African National congress (UANC) party won a majority in this election and formed a coalition government in 1978 when he became the prime minister of Zimbabwe - Rhodesia.

Soon after the attainment of independence in 1980, the Patriotic Front, comprising ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU entered into a GNU with the former ruling Rhodesian Front after the historic elections in 1980 had given ZANU (PF) an unassailable 57 seats from 80 seats on the common roll. When election results were announced, the leader of ZANU PF who was the Prime Minister designate invited his PF ZAPU counterpart into government. The formation of this GNU was in itself a follow up to the agreement to work as one entity dating back to the Geneva Conference of 1976. It is the same agreement which had been used during the 1979 Lancaster House Conference leading to the Lancaster House Agreement. However, this GNU fell apart in 1982 after government security officials allegedly discovered arms of war on PF-ZAPU properties. Arising from the alleged discoveries, on 17 February 1982, the government accused Joshua Nkomo, leader and founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union, of plotting a coup, and dismissed him from the cabinet (Nkomo, 1987). This break up led to a protracted civil conflict which only ended in 1987 after a period of intense fighting in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. After the forces of ZAPU were crushed, militarily and ZAPU was humiliated, Nkomo joined a government of national unity in 1987 (CCJPLRF 1997). Of the 1987 Government of National Unity, Tekere (2007) remarked in his biography: “As it turned out, ZAPU was indeed swallowed up by ZANU, leading to an effective one party state. Nkomo agreed to compromise to such an extent because he was afraid of another Gukurahundi which would wipe out the Ndebele people completely.” This background then laid the basis for problems for this GNU. Despite such a background, this government proved to be slightly long lived and was in place up to the formulation of the present government.

The peculiar feature of these three examples is that they succeeded periods of severe conflict, and were thus aimed at “buying peace at any cost”. It is critical to note that all three ultimately failed, in their espoused objective and one wonders if the 2008 GNU could become an exception to this trend. The 1978 arrangement faltered because it was state driven and not people driven. It failed to reflect any sensitivity to the fundamental grievances of the black populace as it was elite driven. The 1980 arrangement also failed in that, some of the key structural issues that had led to the liberation struggle remained unresolved; chief among them being the land

question, and economic marginalization of the black majority. It was also largely characterized by suspicion between the parties to it. The 1987 arrangement simply integrated the "vanquished" into the status quo, without altering the structural and relational causes of the conflict between ZANU and ZAPU. Zimbabwe's subsequent degeneration is testimony of the sterility of this arrangement which ended conflict but failed to build a true democracy based on tolerance, peace, truth and justice.

These examples demonstrate the limitations of a parochially defined government of national unity as well as its dangers. Fundamentally, all of these processes failed to build durable peace. Unity is not just about accommodation of the interests of political elites. For unity to succeed it must grow upwards, from the people on the ground, and it must deal with the structural barriers to people's economic and political participation. Now, after a 10-year stand off between the protagonists in the current conflict, all-inclusive government of national unity was born in February 2009.

THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

In the Zimbabwean case, the government of national unity poses many threats to democracy. First and foremost, the source of the unity between the parties to the GNU is worrisome and shaky. These parties have nothing at all in common when it comes to ideology. What comes into the limelight is that the GNU has effectively served a serious punch to the nascent democratic movement in Zimbabwe. By taking the two MDC formations into government, the GNU has effectively led to the removal of a government in waiting. In reality, it implies that there is no opposition in the Zimbabwean parliament for the duration of the GNU except for the only independent MP Jonathan Moyo who had also rejoined ZANU PF in 2010, totally eliminating opposition. One fearsome likely outcome is the emergence of a group, where the ruling elites will implement policies that will serve their interests at the expense of the general populace. What has emerged is that members of parliament cannot exercise a personal conscience vote on an issue on the floor of the Parliament unless special permission has been granted for this to occur by the party leaders and in the spirit of unity government; this is not even likely to occur. Thus, opposition politics will for now, largely remain in the realm of civil society activities, which is also weak, in that, most of the civil society groups had been politically aligning themselves with political parties in one way or the other. In fact, according to Hamill (2008), the national unity approach smacks of a surreptitious attempt to reintroduce old-style African one-partyism by the back door, in which pluralism, free debate and inter-party competition are seen as inherently dangerous and to be discouraged in favour of consensus politics.

Another serious challenge to the GNU comes from the approach used in the formulation of the GNU. The government was formed through an accord between the main political parties' leaders only, leaving out civil society organizations and other leaders and lesser political parties. Furthermore, the removal of opposition representation in parliament effectively means the removal of checks and balances since parliamentary governance is by consensus of those in leadership. Resultantly, this stifles debate which should be the duty of the parliament as the governing will use caucuses such that bills will be brought to Parliament simply to be passed. As such, parliament becomes more of a rubber stamp for the executive.

The GPA and subsequent Constitutional Amendment Number 19 pose a serious challenge to a basic tenet of democracy as they effectively cancel elections. The agreement on electoral processes defeats the whole processes of free and fair elections and the right of the people to choose their leaders. The parties to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) agreed that in the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 20.1.7(b) above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising. This was further buttressed by the GPA section 21 which asserts that; for a period of 12 months from the date of signing of this agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local authority or parliamentary seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall be entitled to nominate and field a candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying with the rules governing its internal democracy (Government of Zimbabwe, 2008)

In effect this means the parceling out of constituencies between the parties to the GPA totally disregarding the people's wishes and right to choose their own leaders. In the GPA, the parties to the agreement unilaterally decided to increase the number of MPs contrary to the constitution which stipulated that the House of Assembly would have 210 elected members. The parties agreed that "there shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, which shall be filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M." (GPA) As if it this was not enough, the agreement further gives room for the appointment of ministers from outside parliament when saying of the 31 Ministers, three (3) one each per Party, may be appointed from outside the members of Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so appointed shall become members of the House of Assembly and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote. This implies an increase of people in government who are not elected by people to satisfy partisan politics at the expense of the people.

Since a government of national unity elevates the state above the will of the people, it is antithetical to democracy

itself. According to Betram (2003), Western liberal democracy is based on the social contract, which for theorists such as Jean Jacques Rousseau bound the state to managing and fulfilling the people's general will. Failure was grounds for new leadership. However, the GNUs negate this as they seek to perpetuate the stay in office of those who will have lost elections by virtue of being deemed failures in service delivery. In other words, a government of national unity, where the belligerent government and a power-hungry opposition share power, is formed precisely because democracy itself has been sabotaged through electoral theft, violence and threat of civil war. According to Harmill (2008), the national unity option appears to offer a seductive short cut to stability. In fact, it is a dead end. It provides the illusion of progressive change, but will actually serve to close down democratic space and undermine the democratic process by prioritising the interests of ruling elites over people's actual votes.

The GNU has put civil society in a quandary. This is because the government has seen some members of civil society becoming part of the government one key example being the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office Hon. Gordon Moyo, who until his appointment was the Executive Director of Bulawayo Agenda, a governance based NGO. In essence, this has in a way revealed the partisan nature of the civil society as Moyo's appointment was on an MDC ticket implying his allegiance to and membership of the party all along. This has also led to the pacification of the civil society including the media which is supposed to play a critical role as a watchdog over government activities since they might balk at criticizing one of their own.

Over the past five years in Sub-Saharan Africa, it should be worrying that democracy is increasingly being subverted through power-sharing deals and governments of national unity. All these are machinations meant to perpetuate the reign of rulers who have been rejected by their electorate. In reality, these GNUs pose a serious threat to the nascent democracy in Africa in general and the countries where they have been implemented in particular. This then puts into question the importance of elections in democratic processes since these governments negate the people's input and decisions by allowing losers to remain in power rather than giving way to winners. These power-sharing deals and governments of national unity that are fast becoming a norm are a travesty of democracy meant to propitiate the losers. They are an indelible blot on the African Renaissance. They are retrogressive and are sending a bad message to the African citizenry that the ballot cannot change governments.

One question that comes to mind is whether the GNU demonstrates true power sharing. Although the GPA created consensus on the need to build institutions that support and consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe through attaining commitment from the three main political parties

in the country, on the ground this has not been achieved and might remain a pipe dream. It would appear as if the policy-making process within the GNU (which should have been placed in the Prime Minister's Office after the reconfiguration as per the GPA), has remained plugged mainly within Cabinet and has tended to emerge within a context of degenerative pluralism, characterised by hyper competitiveness, strategic and manipulative behavior, hidden agendas, a focus on "winning" and gaining credit or "placing blame" discrediting one's "opponents" without a willingness to search for common ground (Shonhe 2008). In particular, ZANU PF continues to capitalise on the existing legal framework to advance and guide illogical, deceptive, divisive constructions of targeted persons, systematically over-representing, undeserving of its supporters, disregarding democratic political rationality and instrumentality rationality. The MDC formations have also aided ZANU PF in its quest for a continued stranglehold onto power as they have as yet made no moves towards the repealing of repressive laws such as AIPPA, POSA and the Broadcasting Services Act.

Against this backdrop, Zimbabwe's GNU does not stand a chance. First, Mugabe's Zanu-PF shows no interest in living to the letter of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) reached on Sept 15, 2008. There has already been predictable squabbling over the distribution of government positions. Article 20 of the GPA stipulated 31 ministers and 15 deputy ministers, with 15 coming from ZANU-PF, 13 MDC-T and 3 MDC-M for a total of 46. The most asinine GPA proposition was the joint control of the Home Affairs ministry by ZANU-PF and MDC-T. However, Mugabe's ZANU-PF set out to grab all the key and important ministries. It was originally allocated 15 but seized 22 anyway. A furor erupted and 15 additional ministries were created, bringing the total to 61. Still, Mugabe was not satisfied and transferred major portfolio powers from Communications Minister Nelson Chamisa of MDC-T to Transport Minister Nicholas Goche of Mugabe's own ZANU-PF party. In the long run, this has shown a great unwillingness to share power as per the GPA.

The power-sharing agreement which sets up a coalition government for Zimbabwe offers little scope for dealing with past human rights abuses, denigrating the role of civil society and making only tentative mention of a mechanism to achieve national healing. In line with this is the fact that theory has so far not found a match in reality. According to the GPA, a plethora of freedoms and rights will be enshrined and protected by the GNU. However, the situation on the ground is far from the realization of this as continued selective application of the law has continued. As we write this paper eight MDC (Tsvangirai) legislators are facing charges of varying nature in the courts of law with four of them already convicted, sentenced and suspended from parliament. This has been viewed as an attempt by ZANU-PF to whittle down

MDC's majority in parliament.

A Joint Monitoring Implementation Committee (JOMIC) was set up with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the Global Political Agreement and ensure that that Agreement is implemented to the fullest extent possible in letter and spirit. However, commitment to its task seems doubtful given that JOMIC started off without any resources nor funding from the state. It does not even have an office or secretarial staff. Even then, JOMIC has no power of enforcement; only an authority of persuasion.

Another strong challenge to the GNU comes from the Chiefs of Staff. Evidence so far shows that it is unlikely the military generals, who vowed they will never accept an MDC electoral victory, will support the unity government. Indeed, hardliners in ZANU-PF, Joint Operations Command (JOC), the military and air force have formed a clandestine group, the Social Revolutionary Council (SRC), which operates from the president's office with the aim of sabotaging the GPA. Perhaps, in attempting to establish the feasibility of institution building for the re-establishment of democracy, it may be prudent to establish how power is distributed in the country: whether power is up for grabs; whether it is fragmented; or whether the situation is closed with power already controlled by one group. Institutional reform or reconstruction is difficult in a closed situation, such as that of Zimbabwe where despite the GPA, ZANU PF continues to have better leverage and control of state institutions.

However, the GNU also seems to be setting obstacles towards its own success. In the first place, the government itself is a product of a number of constitutional amendments, chief amongst them being amendments number 18 and 19. These amendments showed a proclivity for piecemeal changes rather than wholesale reforms as they could have introduced a new constitution rather than making amendments. Furthermore, the parties' decision to embark on a parliament driven constitutional reform process has set them on a path to clash with civil society that argues that they are bent on imposing a constitution on the people.

In cabinet, the divisions are glaring. A number of contradictions have been emerging. The implication is that despite being in the same cabinet, the ministers put party loyalty first. They do not view themselves as one unit and this surely is not good for state affairs.

There are a number of provisions where the President is required to exercise his authority in 'consultation' with or on the 'advice' of the PM or cabinet. It is important to note that this does not mean that the President must follow the advice or information given during consultation.

He can consult or get advice but ignore it in the end. According to Magaisa (2009), the Agreement makes no provision for the President to give reasons for his decision for ignoring the advice or consultation. This is not right.

Of course, ZANU PF will no longer have the monopoly of power given that it does not have control of Parliament

or Cabinet. Nevertheless, this only exacerbates the problem, especially if ZANU PF continues to resort to the informal sphere and the two MDC formations also resort to their respective National Executive Councils. If they all resort to their different informal spheres, the Inclusive Government could be relegated to a secondary forum which will simply become a battleground. This could also affect the otherwise noble institution of the National Economic Council created under Article III of the Agreement and indeed Council and Cabinet. (Magaisa 2009)

Political neutrality of some state institutions only appears on paper. While the top leadership of those in the agreement have since seen the importance of working together or at least are learning to work together it appears some institutions and individuals are far away from realising the unity itself. The army, police and traditional leaders seem to remain as political, especially in their support of ZANU PF. Communities that have been living in fear and intimidation have not recovered and bitter struggles are still being fought at the local level. The spirit of revenge and compensation still affects the individuals who have suffered from political violence that had dominated the Zimbabwean politics since the year 2000.

In general the GNU has opened avenues for consensus building as a battered country seeks ways of moving out of a crisis situation. This would rise out of a situation where it will be now possible. Like the 1987 unity accord it provided the basis for consensus building which brought Zimbabwe out of the civil war that had been characterising the Zimbabwe society brought stability that lasted more than ten years.

The prospect for democracy lies in the fact that any government being formed offers a chance for the realisation and promotion of an environment that promotes democracy. Where Zimbabwe was/is there are few alternatives except to go for the government of national unity. That peace has returned is a stepping stone into building a democracy through consensus. The political gladiators in Zimbabwe are working together to build institutions that will enhance democratisation of the Zimbabwean state. Together the political leaders will produce a framework for the promotion of the rule of law, accountability and transparency that will reflect the needs of at least political leaders with diverse backgrounds.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the paper has shown that the concept of government unity though having an advantage of bringing peace and cooperation, it puts the concept of democracy under threat as the basic ethos of democracy will be at worst ignored or put into abeyance. For Zimbabwe, despite several challenges the GNU is holding on and steps towards reform are slowly being administered. Though this is welcome what Zimbabwe really needs is effective democratic government not piece-meal government that will keep people held up watching what will

become of the next step in the government. A true democracy will create a government that is able to achieve peace and social order and maintaining the dignity of all citizens. A democracy that provides the institutions and parties, civil rights and constitutional authorities, and the free press that help countries avoid a head-on collision between rival groups.

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