A philosophical introduction on the relationship between religion and politics

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Much discussion has been put forth so far by the academics and religious experts regarding the relationship between religion and politics. The result of all these represents a wide spectrum of ideas ranging from absolute lack of relationship to the complete identicality. What is far from clear, however, is the nature of this relationship. An attempt is made in the present article to clear this issue by surveying critically the three existing theories in this regard, that is separation of religion from politics, the complete identicality of the two, and the common boundary between the two, and coming to the conclusion that: (a) the first two theories are almost indefensible that is given the separation of theoretical and practical politics, the relationship between religion and politics becomes of registration type in the field of theoretical politics and of the institutional type in practical politics. (b) despite the third theory, this relationship is of the absolute universal and subaltern type in the field of practical politics and of the relative universal and subaltern type in the field of theoretical politics.

Key words: Religion, politics.

INTRODUCTION

Some believe that there is no relationship of any type between religion and politics; on the other hand, some believe that this type of relationship is of the absolute identicality. There is still another group who posit some type of commonality between religion and politics. Thus the current insight in the field can be presented into three categories: the theory of separation of religion and politics, the theory of identicality of religion and politics and the theory of commonality (Luck, 1997).

The theory of separation of religion and politics

Among Western philosophers, John Luck (Luck, 1997) has taken the most important step in this regard. According to Luck either of these (state or the church) should play its role in its own domain, that is one of them should devote itself to the material welfare of the people and the other should deal with training of their spirit. If neither of them overrides its responsibility, that is, one always deals with material welfare and the other deals with spiritual salvation of the people, there will never be any crash between them. There are some Islamic thinkers who tend to support the aforementioned theory. As an example, Haeri (1999) states that: “the government in its political sense is absolutely different from the Islamic religion which is divine inspiration.” According to his ideas, the best religious reason for the separation of government from religion is manifested in the words of Imam Ali (Peace is upon him) who says: people should necessarily have government, either it is a good (religious) one or a bad (non-religious) one.” So he sees no relationship between religion and politics under normal circumstances. In case some type of relationship arises between the two that will be because such a relationship is inevitable at that specific time under those context-bound circumstances.

Criticism

Those who believe in the separation of religion and politics are not beyond the following groups:

a) Unbiased scientists who believe that they can access an absolute politics disregarding any other ideology, with
the theory of separation of religion and politics. Their objective is to achieve a kind of pure scientific and neutral politics, which, similar to physics and chemistry, deals with political realities and has no relation with researchers’ conceptual suppositions. This type of understanding of politics might be acceptable in the domain of theoretical politics which is the observant of political realities but cannot be defended in the domain of practical politics.

b) Thinkers who are supposedly religious who summarize the religious messages in some praying and superficial moralities. Since they have no clear understanding of politics or because they consider it as deception, they think that the relationship between associate; the two associates evil with a holy action. As a consequence they propose the separation of religion from politics. It seems that Luck and Haeri are such thinkers (Luck, 1997; Haery, 1999).

c) Not knowledgeable but superficial scientists who are neither similar to the first group—who are afraid of the impurity of politics when it is mixed with religion and try to build a pure and virgin science out of politics—nor similar to the second group—who are afraid of the impurity of religion when mixed with politics and try to purify it from the devil of politics (as they might imagine). This group, intentionally or unintentionally, without a clear understanding of religion and politics, has been exploited as an instrument available to either of the aforementioned two groups and are benefited by either of them depending on the situation.

Contrary to the first groups’ belief it is not possible to build up a pure scientific politics, because as De Vorge (1990) states: “It is of no use to hope that a day will come when the realm of scientific politics becomes inclusive enough to cover the whole realm of politics—including the concepts of art and practice—and turns to a totally pure science. Political decisions play not only with objective data, but with mental judgments about human and society.” Secondly, contrary to the second group’s belief, neither the responsibility of religion is so much restricted, nor is the politics so much deceptive. The third group, however, who are instrumental, could have no idea in this regard.

The theory of identicality of politics and religion

According to this theory (Montazery, 1989), Islam is concerned about all human needs in both material world and hereafter. That is, it has expressed all human needs and the ways of their satisfaction from the time of conception to his death and even after death. According to this conviction, issues like involvement of government in congregational prayers, Fetr and Ghorban Eids, prayers by Imam, the testimony of breaking fasting by the observation of moon by two adults in the presence of Imam, the punishment of the illegal fasting breaker by the decree of Imam, the necessity of the tradition of Etekaf in a Jame Mosque in which an Imam has been leading the praying, Zakat and assigning a group of representatives to collect and distribute it by Imam, the consumption of Zakat under the supervision of Imam, possession of Khoms and Enfal by Imam, the political aspects of Haj and Jihad, the necessity of Jihad against the rebellions who are against Imam, involvement of government in the affairs like marriage, divorce, and the like are among the issues upon which the identicality of religion and politics has been reasoned. This idea, however, is not tenable because of the following reasons:

a) Those who believe in the identicality of religion and politics are actually assuming a part of politics as the whole. As it will be pointed out, both religion and politics can be divided into two theoretical and practical sections and the relation between religion and politics is of the identical type only in the domain of practical politics. In other words, what is referred to as the identicality of religion and politics, concerns the practical politics, while today theoretical politics covers a wide range of issues which are not necessarily in relation with religious commandments and morals.

b) Religion has a divine origin, while politics (at least in its theoretical concept) has its roots in human knowledge. So to regard them as one entity needs consideration. Moreover, the religious domain is much wider (including public and private domains) than the domain of politics where we deal with the public domain and get involved with coordinating human relations.

c) The term relationship by nature implies the concept of duality because conveyance of object oversef is not imaginable. Explanation of this concept will be dealt with when talking about ‘essential’ a priori conveyance and common artificial conveyance.

The theory of commonality

This theory has been presented by different authorities in different ways. Although they have not explicitly talked about the commonality theory, the fact that their theories are not consistent with the previous theories makes us regard them as theories belonging to this third category. First, some of them will be introduced here, and then they will be critically analyzed.

According to Bashirieh (1995), the relationship between religion and politics can be assumed at different levels and with varying degrees (Bashirieh, 1998). One level is where the politics and government become religious without the intervention of religious people. This means that groups other than religious people become rulers and follow the religious commandments. In all traditional political systems which are based on political justifications, the politics has had the religious nature
following this concept. The second level is where religious people have always acted as an influential group in traditional systems and have been part of the ruling class. There have always been more or less agreements between rulers and religious people. This means that traditional rulers are supposed to respect the religion; otherwise, they are objected by religious people. Today in modern societies, religious people are of the influential groups, although involvement of religions and religious people in politics has changed under the influence of modernity. Of course anti-religiousness of politics and the threats posed by modern societies have paved the way for religious fundamentalism as a reaction toward threats of modernity and destruction of the old system of the world. This being so, it is more probable that the involvement of religion and religious people get increased by the spread of secularism in the modern era (Haery, 1999). According to Bashirieh (1998), Islam, compared to other religious systems, is not only a religion, but a system of government, and its legal and political commands have been actualized in different ways. The first and the most important problem after the death of the prophet were to find someone as his successor to lead the political and religious affairs of the people. This was the cause of the appearance of Khavarej, Shiite, Sunni and common people (Bashirieh, 1998).

The state of Medina destroyed the tribal system of the Arabia peninsula and made political and ideological unity among fighting tribes. Moreover, the basis of this state was the contract (beiat) signed between the prophet and the tribes. These agreements which made the basis of the Medina state included: agreements of the 1st and 2nd Aghabeh, agreement between pilgrims (Mohajerin) and friends (Ansar), Hodaybieh agreement with the people of Mecca, and the agreement signed between the Meccans and the prophet after the occupation of the city, and the subsequent contractions. Medina agreement that was signed in the first year of Hijra, was the first political document, and, in fact, the constitution of the unified Medina under the supervision of the prophet. According to this agreement, Muslims and all their relatives made a unified population (Omat) who were supposed to congregate during peace and war. Based on the second part of this agreement, even the Jews were considered as a part of population (Omat) and enjoyed the same rights as Muslims did and could hold their own religion, unless one disobeyed and broke the promise and committed sins. Malekian (1998) contends that the term religious government can be used in any of the following concepts:

- **a)** A government whose authorities are formal religious people who, explicitly or implicitly, consider themselves as the representatives of Allah on Earth.
- **b)** A government that aims, superficially or in reality, to actualize all human rights—including political, economic, judicial, international, etc.—according to the commandments of a specific religion. Such a government has, at least, two important presuppositions: One is that religions are in the position of providing all human rights under all conditions, in all places, and at all times. The second is that there is a special procedure through which one can liberate the trainings of religious leaders—which are proposed for special places, times and conditions—from their belonging to those special conditions and make them applicable to any other contexts.
- **c)** A government whose authorities’ behavior is according to ethical considerations and religious values.
- **d)** A government which is accomplished in a way to accommodate the people’s life and to help them achieve their religious objectives in the best possible way. This means that it should make a condition in which people’s religious objectives overshadow their unreligious objectives.

According to Malekian (1998), these four stances are not in opposition in reality. However, they are conceptually different. From the viewpoint of those who care for their religious beliefs, the ultimate objective is to have a government with the fourth meaning (Malekian, 1998). Based on Malekian (1998), this government is neither religious, nor can it be secular, because both situations have common presuppositions, none of which is defendable. That is, both share the common concept of essence presented by Aristotle (Malekian, 1998). As they believe, a government has an essence, with this difference that one considers religiousness and the other, un-religiousness as the essence of government. Natural creatures do not enjoy the essence according to the concept proposed by Aristotle. For these creatures, a different essence can be accounted as nominal essence in contrast to Aristotelian real essence. Even if we could accept that different natural creatures possess the essence by Aristotelian concept, this concept, however, cannot be accounted for other philosophical and abstract concepts as justice, freedom, civilization, culture, and of course, government. In short, since Malekian (1998) does not accept this essence-oriented view, he considers the government, neither religious, nor nonreligious, in nature (Malekian, 1998). Mojtahed (2000) in this regard states for me a religious government is the one in which people are religious and choose a government dedicated to the religious commandments and values (Mojtahed, 2000). I know no other meaning of religious government such as the one determined in the Koran and the Tradition (Sonnat) or the one in which the government is in the hand of a specific person. Those who claim for such a government have not been able to defend their claim by any justified reason. But in relation to the mission of prophets and their special governments there has never been such a divine right for them, according to religious texts. Prophets have brought the messages of God to people for their salvation. This has been the role of
prophets throughout the history, not that of a governor.

Therefore, the theory of special government granted to prophets by God cannot be defended. It has been observed many times in the history that prophets have been the governors, but this cannot be considered as a belief. That is why there is no contradiction between the dominance of human beings over their destiny and the mission of prophets (Mojtahed, 2000).

According to Shabestary (2000) the establishment of social institutions like governments and determination of their objectives and establishment of some social order criteria, have been given to people, according to religious texts (Mojtahed, 2000). If people, in their choices, follow the affairs of value to the prophets, they have shown their obedience to God and achieved happiness and success, but if they do not, God does not need people’s favor. In addition to Muslim thinkers, some of the non-Muslim authorities have emphasized on the relation between Islam and politics in one way or another. Samuel (1994) in this regard says “Islam rejects any separation of the religious society and the political society (Hantington, 1994). In this way the affairs of this world and those of the other world are not separable. World is not separate from politics. Political contribution is a religious responsibility.”

Critical survey of the commonality theory

As it was mentioned earlier, the relationship between politics and religion appears under different guises, some of which are presented here:

1) Involvement of the government in religious affairs and following the religious commands without intervention of religious people (Bashirieh, 1998).
2) Involvement of religious people in the political system in a way that they become a part of the ruling class (op. cit).
3) A government that is organized in a way in which people are more dedicated to religious objectives of their life than non religious ones (Malekian, 1998).
4) Selection of a state which is bound to religious commandments and teachings in a religious society (Shabestary, 2000).
5) The relation between religion and politics in a way that political affair such as political participation and the like are considered as religious responsibilities (Huntington, 1994).

This theory is more advantageous over the other two theories because of its realism and avoidance of absolutism which were hidden in the previous two ideologies. It has, however, some weak points such as:

1) Lack of separation of theoretical and practical politics.
2) Lack of illustration of the relation between religion and politics in the area of theoretical politics.
3) Lack of illustration of a logical relation between politics and religion.

To sum up the above mentioned theories, while there is no commonality between religion and politics according to the first theory, religion and politics enjoy total identicality according to the second theory. The third theory, however, occupies a mid position, according to which, although these two systems are separate from each other, they have some common points. Now a question regarding the nature of the relationship remains to be answered. To answer this question, the theory of “the relative relation between religion and politics” is suggested, the details of which will be presented here.

Selected theory: The theory of relative relation between religion and politics

What is meant by relative relation between religion and politics is that contrary to the current theories that account for absoluteness or identicality of this relationship. Here the relation between religion and politics might differ depending on either religion or politics is considered theoretically or practically. This theory which is the core of the discussion in the present paper is based on some introductory issues as follows:

1st introduction: The definition of religion;
2nd introduction: The definition of politics;
3rd introduction: Demarcation between theoretical and practical politics;
4th introduction: Attention to the logical quarter proportions;
5th introduction: Essential a priori conveyance and artificial common conveyance.

The definition of religion

Religion can be defined according to different credits such as the credit of content, the credit of epistemology, and the credit of solidity. Here, however, we deal with the content dimension.

As late Allameh Tabatabaee (Tabatabaee, 2002) contends, religion comprises three components regarding its content. They are beliefs, morals, and actions (commandments). By beliefs he means believing in God (origin), in direction and director (the Koran and the Prophet) and doomsday (Maad). By Morals, he means decorating oneself with pleasant characters like understanding the responsibilities, having good intentions, love for human beings, keeping promises, following justice, and the like. Finally, by action he means performing activities that leads to the goodness of oneself and his society, like praying, fasting, and the similar
activities, and being away from actions that lead to destruction and corruption. Having observed the contradictory definitions of religion, used the definitions proposed by other researchers, Glak tried to present a definition for religion. His definition is, to a large extent, close to that proposed by Allameh Tabatabae. He collected different aspects of religion which were identified inductively, in the following four dimensions (Tabatabae, 2002):

1) Ideological dimension including belief in God, Maad, paradise, the hell and the like.
2) Rites dimension which observes our religious activities like praying, inquiry from God, and the like.
3) Deductive dimension that includes moral principles like forgiveness rather than taking revenge, being honest in business rather than profit seeking and the like.
4) Experiential dimension which observes believers' spiritual experiences like the feeling of communicating with God or their disappearance and the like.

As it is observed, the dimensions of this classification—except for the experimental dimension—are analogous to the three sections of beliefs, commandments, and morals in Allameh Tabatabae’s definition. Putting the above two definitions together, it can be concluded that religion has four dimensions, which include: ideological dimension, rituals dimension, moral or deductive dimension, and spiritual or experiential dimension (Tabatabae, 2002).

The definition of politics

The first and the most important question to deal with in the domain of politics are asking about the very definition of politics. The importance of this definition is that it makes the cornerstone of politics, the stone on which the building of politics lies, where any small fault might distort everything. Politics cannot be defined in vacuum that is any definition of politics requires some ontological, anthropological, and epistemological bases. Politics, from one side, relates to man (world), and from the other side, to the existence. This unity which is called the unity of the contemplator and the contemplated (the unity between scientist and science) has a long history. Supporters of the theory of the unity between the contemplator and the contemplated generalize this unity to all levels of the self. On this basis they achieve unity between the perception and the perceptible, and that between the imaginative and the imagination. That is, self is united with the perceptible at the level of perception, with imaginative at the level of imagination; and with contemplatives at the level of intellect. Thus, the political knowledge unites, on one side, with man as a symbol of scientist or wise man, either being at the level imagination or contemplation and on the other side with political phenomena, either at the level of known or intellectual. Depending on the level of understanding of a person, he defines politics at the same level. This means that the one who is at the level of perception, his definition will be sensible, and one who has stopped at the level of imagination, his definition will be imaginative, and finally if he is at the level of contemplation, his definition will be contemplative. It seems that the discrepancy that exists among scientists for the definition of politics—and some of which were mentioned here—is rooted in the mixture of the mentioned concepts. Actually, since everybody defines politics as he understands it, its meaning remains blurred.

Political authorities have provided many definitions of politics, which are beyond the scope of this paper, but to clarify the issue, some of them are presented here before the researcher’s ultimate definition is given. When defining politics, some consider it as science and on that basis, they account for the “science of state”, “science of power”, and the science of government”, and the like. Others have put it either inside the domain of campaign or art. When they define politics, they talk about struggle for power, or the art of using facilities. Still there is another group who define politics under the concept of distribution; For example, Alam (1998) believes that politics is the powerful distribution of values. It is evident that each of the mentioned definitions is in a way or another representative of politics because power, campaign, and distribution are all involved in politics. Not unlike the story of the elephant in the darkroom, each of the definitions touches upon a small part of politics and forgets about the rest. For a definition to show the real nature of something, it has to be comprehensive enough. Among the presented definitions of politics by the Western thinkers, that of De Vorge (1990) seems more comprehensive (De Vorge, 1990). He thinks of politics as being theoretical and/or practical, with differing abstract and/or concrete aspects. As he states, people who think about politics swing between the two ends of the same continuum; some believe that it is a campaign for those who look for power and profit, others consider it as an attempt to establish order and justice in a way power is to value public benefits and their good willing over private inquiries.

Considering some of the definitions and ideologies in this regard, he states that the real meaning and the nature of politics have always served dual purposes (Kadivar, 1998). That is, while it is an instrument to induce the dominance of some social groups over the others, it is an instrument to preserve social order and unity among the members of the society and toward the benefits of all. Although this definition could also be criticized, because of its exactness it would be the basis of the discussion in this paper.

The demarcation between theoretical and practical politics

By theoretical politics, we can refer to political philosophy,
and political theory (the science of politics); while by practical politics we refer to political theology, political ideology, and the like.

Among the mentioned categories, political philosophy, following intellectual or abstract method, is in relation with the objectives of government and deals with the necessity of government, the legality of government, the right for government, justice, freedom, equality, and finally the best form of government, and of course, the means for achieving those objectives. According to De Vorje (1990): “We have to be able to distinguish between political philosophy and political discourse, because while political philosophy is restricted to what is available to human being detached from any divine inspiration, the political discourse is teachings which are derived from divine inspirations (De Vorje, 1990).” But the political theory or political science is a modern phenomenon like other branches of science, which are put forth in the 20th century, and seeks the rule-governed nature of political phenomena by experimentation (Bashirieh, 1995). Moreover, from the ideological point of view, what this discussion should focus on is following the stable principles on one side and dedication of the followers to the principles on the other. In other words, “political ideology” is to attract beliefs and because of that, it is closer to religion than to the political philosophy or “political theory”.

Thus, while the political philosophy are more concerned with rational or intellectual principles; and political discourse with rational and discoursal principles; and political theory or political science with experiential principles to explain political phenomena theoretically, political religion and political ideology stem from the human mind. In other words, political philosophy and political science fall in the domain of theoretical philosophy, and political religion and political ideology fall in the domain of practical philosophy. To illustrate this, the following issues seem necessary to be clarified.

Philosophers have categorized knowledge or Hikmat (philosophy in general) in two groups: Theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. By theoretical philosophy they mean three areas of metaphysics, natural sciences, and arithmetic. Today theoretical philosophy refers to philosophy (in its general sense), all natural sciences (including natural and human sciences), and mathematics. By practical philosophy they mean morals, household management and political sciences. In other words, they have named all experiential and theoretical sciences (existence), under theoretical science, and all practical sciences (should and should not) under practical sciences. It is needless to say that the criterion for judgment in theoretical philosophy is theoretical intellect and its accommodation to reality, while what is decisive in judgment in practical philosophy is practical intellect or its accommodation to good or evil intellect. Based on the above-mentioned category, political science is placed within the domain of practical philosophy. This means that what they mean by philosophy is practical philosophy (against theoretical philosophy), whereas today theoretical politics or the science of politics, in addition to practical politics, is one of the branches of theoretical philosophy and is placed within the theoretical sciences.

**The logical quarter proportions**

From the logical point of view the relationship between any two general concepts is not beyond the four conditions: identical, totally separate, absolutely universal and subaltern, and common universal and subaltern. This means that, these two concepts are either identical among all people and all senses or they have no commonality whatsoever, either one of the concepts includes all parts of the other concept, or it includes some parts of the other concept. If we think of either of these two concepts as a circle, the logical relationship between religion and politics in the first, second, and the third theories indicating identicality, difference, and commonality could be drawn as shown in Figure 1.

**Essential A priori conveyance and artificial common conveyance**

Logically, when there is a relationship between two things, in fact, one is conveyed over the other. The meaning of conveyance, is unity between two objects (subject and predicate), because conveyance means that this one is that one. Of course, the other meaning of conveyance indicates the total difference between the two objects, as well. Since they are two objects, if there is no difference, they would not be more than one object. Therefore, the conveyance is necessarily indicating either
identicality or total difference; otherwise, conveyance would have no meaning. So conveyance of two different objects which have no relation is also nonsense. Conveyance of object over self is not right either, because objects have no difference with themselves. Moreover, when we talk of the relation or unity between two objects, this unity could be in conception or in application. If their unity is conceptual, their difference is something abstract. In this context the purpose of unity or relationship is that the nature of the subject is the nature of the predicate, and they are in some respects different. Clearly, when there is such a conceptual relationship between two objects, their applications is the same. This type of conveyance is called the essential a priori conveyance. But if the relationship between two objects concerns their external application, their difference is conceptual, meaning that the conveyance of one subject, a member, or an application is the concept of predicate. This conveyance is called ‘artificial common conveyance’.

**DISCUSSION**

According to the aforementioned introductions, if we can divide religion into two concepts of theoretical (notions) and practical (commandments and morals) and divide politics into two concepts of theoretical (including science of politics and political philosophy) and practical (including political ideology, political theology, and the like) and multiply them by one another, we can achieve four logical proportions:

1) Proportion of theoretical religion and theoretical politics.
2) Proportion of theoretical religion and practical politics.
3) Proportion of practical religion and theoretical politics.
4) Proportion of practical religion and practical politics.

In the first case (either the science or philosophy of politics is concerned) since it accounts for the existence or nonexistence, there is no room for being religious or non-religious. And as a result the relation between religion and politics is of the type of partial universal and subaltern, because what exists in the real world is of the same value for science and religion and is equally understandable for religious and non-religious people. The reason lies in the theoretical agreement over many scientific problems among scientists. In other words, it can be stated that in the theoretical domain the relation between religion and politics is subject to the relation between science and religion as general. That is, any proportional relation between science and religion is evident between political science and religion, as well. This reasoning is based on the necessity of the religious commandments, according to which, any political problem which is absolutely confirmed by theoretical intellect, is acceptable by religion too and vice versa. Theoretical intellect is surrendered to that part of the political ethics of religion that is understandable for it. The actual meaning of this concept is that religion has no contradiction with science and intellect, and it does confirm them. As a result since in the same way that some religious predicates are scientific, and some scientific predicates are religious, it can be stated that some of the religious predicates are political and some of the political predicates are religious. This is in line with the congruency of some of the problems of political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and new scientists (like Rawlez) with the political philosophy of Islam. In the second and the third cases, however, as was mentioned before, the relation is of absolute difference (separation), because logically neither the existence nor nonexistence of a relation between theoretical politics and practical religion is imaginable. The reason is that in theoretical concepts we deal with the existence or nonexistence, and in practical concepts we deal with must and must not. That is, we cannot make a practical conclusion out of a combination of two major and minor premises, as it is not possible to build a theoretical predicate out of two practical premises. There is no doubt that the practical politics is based on the theoretical notions in any religion, but building practical politics over theoretical religion is different from logical building of practical politics from theoretical religion, and of course one of the discrepancies that exist among the supporters of the relation between religion and politics is of this type.

Finally, in the fourth case the relationship is of the absolute universal and subaltern type meaning that in any religion, practical politics is part of the commandments and morals of that religion. That is why some believe in the identicality of religion and politics. From the perspective of the relation between religion and politics of the type of conveyance of religion and politics, in both domains of theoretical and practical politics, the conveyance is of the common artificial type. Because conceptually, religion is religion, and politics is politics and only parts of each application of these concepts unite with each other in the external world. Therefore, it can be stated that, the first and the second theories, which account for the absolute difference or absolute identicality of religion and politics cannot be defended because of the following reasons. The first reason: Assuming that there is no relationship between religion and politics, if by politics, practical politics is meant, there cannot be any relationship between any thought system and politics. The reason is that any thought system observes its own assumptions and basic rules. In other words, contrary to theoretical sciences in the domain of practical philosophy, the basic thought principles of researchers influence the behavioral patterns of human beings behavior in that society. Since at least a minor part of political science is located in the domain of practical philosophy, it can be concluded that practical politics (government) is never
free from the principles of a system of which it belongs. Thus, in any ideology that claims politics and government, such as Islam, Liberalism, Marxism, and the like, there is a close relationship between the teachings of that ideology and politics. Of course, such a relationship in the domain of practical philosophy deals with must and must not issue. The second reason: As it was stated, if we assume that there is a relation between religion and politics, this relation is not of identical type, at least in the theoretical domain. Because in the theoretical domain of religion, there are many non-political predicates in addition to political ones that is the proportion of non-political predicates is much greater than that of political ones. As an example, if we pay some careful attention to some verses of the holy Koran (as the main and the most important Islamic source) which are about the creation of the Earth, the sky, creation of man, animals and other creatures, the conception and development of man from the fetus to a total human being, the ascends of water from the sky leading to the appearance of plants, the creation of the moon, the sun and other celestial bodies, their circulation and their final destination, the heaven and the hell, Jins, resurrection, faith, praying, fasting, and the like, it will be evident that none of them is a part of theoretical politics.

From the other side, however, not many of the prevalent problems in theoretical politics can be considered as religion. As another example, if a political researcher intends to do an investigation on the structure of the government in some democratic countries and report his findings as "a theory in the structure of democratic government", although his work is justified in the theoretical politics domain, it might not have any relation with religion; actually, it is no more than a description of democratic government in the body of a scientific theory. At the same time it is possible that some of the applications of this theory are, accidentally consistent with the applications of religious government, and in this case it cannot be considered as the identically of religion and politics in all aspects. But if in a country with an Islamic government a person is sentenced to death by Islamic rules, while this judgment is a religious one, it is a political judgment too. Here politics is a part of religion and the practiced conviction is an application of practical politics. If, on the other hand, this happens in a non-Islamic country (country X) and according to ideological principles of that country, the same conviction is issued for the murderer, this conviction while being a political issue, is a part of the ideology or religion of that country too.

CONCLUSION

Finally, it can be stated that considering the four mentioned multiplications, the theory of commonality is justified with the first case, the theory of the separation of religion and politics with the second and the third cases, and the theory of identicality of religion and politics with the fourth case. In other words, given a separation between theoretical and practical politics, the nature of the relationship between politics and religion is registration-type in theoretical politics and institutional in practical politics.

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