

*Full Length Research Paper*

# Using Hooke's law of elasticity to explicate trends and dimensions of crisis in the Niger Delta

Nkpah, Young Aakpege

Department of Sociology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria.  
E-mail: [youngtize@yahoo.com](mailto:youngtize@yahoo.com). Tel: 08064525958.

Accepted 24 October, 2011

The study draws from a corollary in the physical sciences, showing how a quantitative form could change to a qualitative form (that is water under 100°C). Likewise, the constant bombardment of the Niger Delta social formation could alter its relations of production. To this end, the study goes beyond, (i) the era of early oil exploration/expansion years and community passivity (1903-1970), (ii) Era of oil-industry "consolidation", incipient agitations and of oil companies, (iii) Era of state command intervention and community reactive militancy to (iv) 'fracture'. However, elastic materials, either stretched, compressed, or bent comes back to its original shape and size when the force is removed. We posit that the "proportionality limit" is exceeded in the Niger Delta and the region can never be the same using this theoretical exposition. This supports our thesis that "mindful humans under certain conditions would tend to behave like mindless atoms". The study recommends a Cognitive Personal Development Scheme (CPDS) for development of innate skills and adaptive mechanism for youths of the area as panacea to youth restiveness

**Key words:** Elasticity, elastic limit, socio-economic conditions, viscerogenic, plasticity, psychogenic.

## INTRODUCTION

Many of the founding fathers of sociology were of the opinion that it will be possible to create a science of society based on the same principles and procedures as the natural science such as chemistry and biology (Haralambos and Heald, 2006).

Comte for instance, maintained that the application of the methods and assumptions of the natural sciences would produce a "positive science of society" (Haralambos and Heald, 2006). He believed that this would reveal that the evolution of society followed "invariable laws". It would show that the behaviour of man was governed by principles of cause and effect which were just as invariable as the behaviour of matter, the subject of the natural sciences.

It follows that the behaviour of man could be objectively measured. The quantitative form of water subject to a certain temperature leads to a qualitative form. When two bodies at different temperatures are brought into contact, their temperatures soon become equal as a result of the passage of heat from the body with higher temperature to

the body of lower temperature. Resultantly, the constant bombardment of the relations of production (social formations) in the Niger Delta can lead to the development of another social formation.

Robert Hooke, after his investigation to the extension of elastic material under the action of different forces concluded that provided the proportionality limit is not exceeded, the extension is produced is directly proportional to the force (load) applied on an elastic material.

Similarly, in human society, it has always been the case that the expansion of the economy leads eventually to a change in the form of social relations (Rodney, 1972).

In this paper, the interplay of community, government and multinational provides a dynamic pressure on the expanding economy of Niger Delta. It follows that from Adaka Boro, Ken Saro-Wiwa, militancy and post-militancy, the economy has been expanding just like the elastic material extends. We postulate that Nigeria have

reach “plasticity” - a point where elastic materials lose their elastic characteristics.

However, specific cases will help buttress our position and provide the focal lense (the case study approach) and descriptive research method was used. Using the Odi massacre as a case in point for our introduction, notably in February 2000, Nigerian federal troops stormed Odi, a sleepy village right in the heart of the troubled Niger-Delta, a spatial cash cow with 20 billion barrels of oil reserves and 120 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Ostensibly, the troops were on the trail of suspects who had allegedly kidnapped and killed 12 mobile policemen in one of the regions numerous uprisings against ecological devastation and neglect – offenses in which multinational oil companies (including Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, Texaco, Chevron, Elf, and Agip) and the colluding Nigerian government all stand accused. Apparently frustrated by their failure to nab the suspects, the troops sacked the entire village and razed it to its very foundations (Adabanwi, 2001).

The punitive expedition against the inhabitants of Odi - one of the communities from which Nigeria, the fifth-largest oil-yielding country in the world, has extracted crude oil worth billions of dollars in the last four decades - drew public outrage, both locally and internationally. It was particularly shocking to Nigerians, who had reasonably expected that the recent return to civilian governance would mark a departure from the repression that had been the hallmark of military rule. However, to those familiar with the history of the Niger Delta, the Odi invasion merely reflected older patterns of repression. Odi, populated as it is by deprived and despoiled villagers living in thatched riverside shanties, is an archetype of the state of affairs in the Niger Delta. The poverty of these villagers contrasts sharply with the wealth buried in their soil, a wealth that the oil companies - along with their pool of expatriate and Nigerian staff- enjoy. For more than a decade, the oil yielding communities have been agitating for an increased share of oil revenue, along with control over resources and an end to environmental pollution. Under both military and civilian regimes, the government has responded to the agitation with undisguised severity. The current crisis contains the ingredients for another civil war, which could break up the Nigerian federation.

## STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The history of the oil industry is the history of imperialism. In 1956, Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) discovered crude oil at Oloibiri, a village in the Niger Delta, and commercial production began in 1958. These developments changed Nigeria’s relationship to the global capitalist order. Previously, Nigeria had been mainly a producer of cocoa, groundnuts, and other agricultural items.

These goods, representing the Country’s major source of external revenue, were exported principally to the West. As the exploitation of oil resources continued in the ‘postcolonial era, Nigeria became increasingly reliant on oil, and its reputation as an agricultural producer disappeared. Oil revenue now accounts for 90% of Nigeria’s export earnings (almost \$300billion in the, past 40 years) (Adabanwi, 2001).

In turn reliance on a single source of revenue distorted the relationship between successive (mostly military) regimes in the country, and the citizenry. Oil exploration introduced an entirely new element into the structure of the Nigerian state - an internal predatory elite that saw the new commodity as God-sent and so saw itself as unaccountable to the communities that produced it. This lack of accountability has continued in the post-colonial period. The discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities, and its emergence the primary fuel of the Western industrial economies, combined to ensure that the post-colonial Nigerian state did not cultivate its own citizenry. Nor did it put into place appropriate infrastructure that would have helped to create local wealth and provide a strong local tax base for its operations. As for the wealth derived from oil exploration, both the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies believe that what they owe the oil-yielding communities is minimal, and that even this must be given at their own pleasure. Today, there are 606 oil fields in the Niger Delta, of which 360 are onshore and 246 offshore. These have been parceled out to the oil multinationals for extraction. Also, over 3,000 km of pipeline lie across the landscape of the Delta, linking 275 flow stations to various export facilities. The Nigerian state operates a joint-venture agreement with the multinationals, which in turn pay the federal government royalties running into hundreds of millions annually, African Report (2006).

According to a Revenue Allocation Formula, the Nigerian state is legally required to inject part of the revenue from oil royalties into the oil yielding communities. But the communities only receive revenue from on oil deposits, which account for less than 10% of total oil deposits. The off-shore deposits are much larger than onshore deposits, and exploration is more limited off-shore.

Historically, the communities have received only 3 to 5% of the on-shore revenue. The Obasanjo government increased the share of on-shore revenue, but only to 13%. Some people in the oil-yielding communities see the oil multinationals as potential stakeholders in the development of the region. Yet the multinationals have been anything but that. Back in 1983, for example, the Inspectorate Division of the state-owned Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) noted the environmental problems caused by the activities of the oil companies in the Niger Delta. The Inspectorate described “the slow poisoning of the waters of this country, and the

destruction of vegetation, and agricultural land by oil spills which occur during petroleum operations.” “Since the inception of the oil industry it continued, “there has been no concerted effort on the part of the Government, let alone the oil operators, to control the environmental problems associated with the industry” (NNPC News Letter, 1983).

The impact of these conditions on oil-yielding communities has been devastating. The crux of the problem in this paper is predicated on what (the Niger Delta people] used to call upon for their livelihood and well-being has been wrecked for eternity by the coming of oil and exploitation by the Nigerian state.

They cannot fish because marine life has been flushed out, they cannot hunt because the game fled a long time ago, thanks to the oil hunters and their land no longer yields good harvest. The destruction of flora and fauna has been compounded by endemic poverty, the absence of basic social amenities, and at best primitive health and educational facilities.

Why has the Nigerian government failed to address these problems? It has been totally at the beck and call of the multinationals. The Niger Delta debacle is a classic case of collusion between international finance capital and a corrupt, morally derelict state.

## CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

For prescriptive clarity, some concepts will be operationalized for conceptual contextualization of usage.

### Concept of elasticity

Elasticity of a material is its ability to regain or recover its original shape and size when the force of deformation applied on it is removed. An elastic material may be stretched, compressed or bent by a force but it comes back to its original shape and size when the force is removed. Most materials do not possess this property and are said to be inelastic. Examples of such materials are paper, glass, stone etc.

Given as;

$$F \propto \text{extension (x) or } f = K_x$$

Where K is the constant of proportionality and  $K = f/x =$  magnitude of force per unit elongation (extension) (Slaughter, 2002).

Operationally, in relation to our study, the force which is the load is the socio-economic conditions (joblessness) that would act on the social formation (material). The K is the constant of proportionality which represents the state.

This tripartite crucible forms the basis of analysis which provides the derivatives.

From the foregoing:

$$F = K_x \text{ and } K = f/x$$

Where K = state

F = force (social formation)

X = socio-economic condition (extension).

It follows that social formation = state F (unemployed youth).

$$\text{Social formation} = \frac{\text{state}}{\text{socio-economic condition}}$$

### Concept of elastic limit

This is the point at which the extension produced is no longer proportional to the force, although the material still regains its shape and size when the force is removed (Figure 1 point B).

### Concept of socio-economic conditions

Unemployment is not the only variable that has constituted the extension on our graph. It helps to understand current social actors in the Niger Delta crisis, conditions that led to the emergence of the militant youths, hostage taking, kidnapping and illegal bunkering. These are:

- i. Oil companies who armed youths to secure oil installations in a bid to provide employment for idle youths in and secure their production lines in the oil producing areas, as part of the sustainable community development strategy.
- ii. Corrupt government officials who double as barons of oil bunkering cartels, added to the mix by employing more of these youths who were not so lucky to get the oil sector “jobs” as armed escorts for their bunkering business.
- iii. The precarious situation ballooned when youth in Niger Delta engage to fight their sponsor’s battles for political relevance in 2003 and 2007 general elections.

Operationally, three conjectures are identified to form the basis of the load extension (i) Ethnic based political domination which is used to expropriate the resources in the oil communities for the benefit of the dominant groups, (ii) The alliance between the dominant groups, the oil companies and state enterprises, which restricts the minorities from gaining access to the modern and more rewarding sectors of oil company, and (iii) oil based environmental degradation which undermines the traditional peasant or fishing economy of the oil producing areas without providing a viable economic alternative (Naanen, 1995).




Figure 1. A Correlate of elastic material and dimensional crisis in Niger Delta.

**Plasticity**

This is the point at which an elastic material loses its characteristics of extension. To this work, it signifies the mindlessness of human under certain socio-economic condition. It follows that as atoms dart under stress of compression or extension, humans can as well dart under certain social economic conditions that is a case in point is the recent bombing of United Nation’s building in Nigeria.

**Viscerogenic needs**

These are physiological needs such as food, clothing and shelter in Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory.

**Psychogenic needs**

These are psychological needs. They have nothing to do with physical needs but could be painful and frustrating if not met. This could be grouped under the Hygiene Factors Theory of Herzberg.

**EXTRAPOLATING HOOKE’S LAW OF ELASTICITY TO EXPLICATE TRENDS AND DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS IN THE NIGER DELTA**

Robert Hooke a British physicist stated this law in 1676 as a Latin anagram “Ut tensio, sic vis” meaning “as the extension, so the force”.

Hooke investigated the extension of elastic materials

under the action of different forces and concluded that provided the proportionality limit is not exceeded, the extension produced is directly proportional to the force (load) applied on an elastic material (Figure 1).

Within the region OP of the graph, Hooke's law is obeyed by elastic material, the social formation, beyond E that is when a load is greater than  $F_B$  is applied, the extension produced is no longer proportional to the force and it is called the elastic limit, although the material still regains its shape. It is the limit beyond which the material does not regain its original shape and size when load is removed - fractures. The material becomes permanently distorted. Thus, a load if greater than  $F_B$  will alter the shape and size of the elastic material permanently when the load is removed. Beyond the elastic limit an elastic material becomes plastic – a condition known as 'plasticity'.

From the region, OP on the graph, social formation of the Niger Delta society is not fully bombarded. This era corresponds to what Okodudu (2008) called era of early oil exploration/expansion years and community passivity (1903-1970). The first era had one load, its extension as Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro in 1966.

Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro was Delta's first post-colonial rebel. An Ijaw and former police officer born in Oloibiri (the town that hosted Nigeria's first oil well), he led a handful of barefoot, machete-wielding peasants in rebellion in February 1966, six years after independence. Although the rebels began with just four rifles, they stole more from a police station and symbolically declared all oil contracts null and void. Boro ordered oil companies to negotiate their directly with his new administration. To emphasize their seriousness, one of the rebels' two units dynamited Nigeria's first oil well and raised the flag of independent Niger Delta People's Republic (African Report, 2006).

Government troops, who according to Boro used pontoon boats provided by Shell, forced the rebel leader's surrender after just twelve days and subsequently tortured him and his men mercilessly. Boro escaped execution by joining federal government forces at the start of the Nigerian civil war in June 1967. He was shot dead on 16 May 1968 in what many Ijaws believe was a government-backed assassination. In the decades since, the tale of the rebellion has become known as the "Twelve Day Revolution": title of Boro's out-of-print and posthumously published autobiography. Boro is portrayed by establishment Ijaws and radicals respectively as a champion of Nigerian federalism and a Niger Delta separatist hero. A statue at a park bearing his name in the city of Port Harcourt shows him wearing a Nigerian military uniform. Yet Delta warlords such as Alhaji Dokubo-Asari and other militant leaders have invoked their memory to stir populist anger against the Nigeria federal government. "The Niger Delta struggle is unstoppable", was the rhetorical message on a twenty-foot banner at a rally held by Asari's supporters on 16

May, 2005, the anniversary of Boro's death. Those words were flanked by pictures of Boro and another Delta icon, activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.

Given the increase in the reinforcing variable of ethnic based political dominant groups, which are into two fold; (i) restriction of minority access to the modern and rewarding sectors of oil industry and (ii) distortion of sources of livelihood without viable economic alternative mounted more pressure on the already stretched social formation. This led to the second phase of era of oil industry "consolidation", community incipient agitation and Oil Company's ambivalent corporate social responsibility. This category is the Ken Saro-Wiwa era. Xp - XE had a stretch that weighed on (i) the class and manipulative expansion; (ii) the internal colonization expansion; (iii) the cultural explanation and (iv) the historical evolution explanation (Akinyanju, 1998), succeeded in closing of the operations of major oil companies in Niger Delta.

In 1990, an eloquent writer, orator and businessman, Ken Saro-Wiwa, helped found the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The Ogoni, numbering just 500,000, arc among the smallest of Nigeria's approximately 250 ethnic groups. Yet, the 404 square- miles they inhabit produced 634 million barrels of oil between 1958 and 1995, estimated by company officials to be worth \$5.2 billion and by Ogoni activists much more Pepple and Detheridge (1998). Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP drew international attention to Ogoni demands for political and economic empowerment at the beginning of the modern Niger Delta struggle for resource control. In August 1990, MOSOP adopted an "Ogoni Bill of Rights", which demanded Nigeria's then-ruling military regime grant "political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit" and the "right to the control and use of a fair proportion of economic resources for Ogoni development (Ogoni Bill of Right, 1991). On 4 January, 1993, MOSOP held a rally attended by close to one-half of the entire Ogoni population. Shell, which operated nearly all the 96 wells in Ogoni, withdrew its staff and later in 1993 ceased production in Ogoni, which accounted for 3% of the company's total Nigeria output. Shell cited intimidation of its staff as the reason for the pullout, although MOSOP consistently claimed to use only non-violent means. Active shell pipelines continued to cross Ogoni, carrying oil from other field but shell production facilities in Ogoni remain closed to this day. Although MOSOP's primary target was the Nigeria government, the group has consistently accused shell of colluding with officials to deprive Ogonis of oil revenue and compensation for environmental damage due to oil spills and gas flare. Nigeria's military government responded to MOSOP agitation with a crackdown, creating the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force unit to deal with the Ogoni crisis, Saro-Wiwa and several other Ogoni activists were arrested in May 1994 following the mob killings of four

**Table 1.** The value of Nigeria's average daily oil production stolen and shut in between 2000-2008.

| Year | AV price<br>Bonny<br>Crude | Volume<br>Stolen<br>BDP | Value of Stolen<br>(USD) | Assumed<br>production<br>shut in USD | Value of<br>production<br>shut in USD | Daily AV.<br>stolen<br>shut in | Total<br>value<br>USD |
|------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 2000 | 28.49                      |                         |                          | 250,000                              | \$2.6 billion                         |                                |                       |
| 2001 | 24.50                      |                         |                          | 200,000                              | \$1.8 billion                         |                                |                       |
| 2002 | 25.15                      |                         | \$ 3.2 billion           | 350,000                              | #3.7 billion                          | 650,000                        | \$6.9b                |
| 2003 | 28.76                      | 300,000                 | \$4.2 billion            | 230,000                              | \$3.2 billion                         | 530,000                        | \$6.4b                |
| 2004 | 38.27                      | 300,000                 | \$5.1 billion            | 180,000                              | \$3.7billion                          | 430,000                        | \$8.8b                |
| 2005 | 55.67                      | 250,000                 | \$5.1billion             | 600,000                              | \$3.7 billion                         | 700,000                        | \$17.0b               |
| 2006 | 66.64                      | 100,000                 | \$2.7 billion            | 600,000                              | \$14.6 billion                        | 700,000                        | \$19.26b              |
| 2007 | 75.14                      | 100,000                 | \$2.7 billion            | 600,000                              | 16.5 billion                          | 700,000                        | \$19.2b               |
| 2008 | 115.81                     | 150,000                 | \$6.3 billion            | 650,000                              | \$27.5nbillion                        | 800,000                        | \$33.8b               |

Source: Stephen Davis, 2009.

Ogoni leaders from a MOSOP faction that had opposed Saro-Wiwa's factions and been accused by some of being government collaborators. Sixteen MOSOP members were tried for the murders and nine, including Saro-Wiwa were convicted and sentenced to death by a special military tribunal whose procedures, human rights watch charged blatantly violated international standards of due process, Human Right Watch, (1999). They were executed on 10 November, 1995.

Hundreds of Ogoni activists have been detained in the years since, and although MOSOP has experienced internal divisions and never recovered its former strength, it continues to press for political and economic reforms. For non-Ogoni groups in the Delta, MOSOP's legacy has been to show how a well organized civil society group can press for change. But a noticeable difference between MOSOP and successive Delta activist movements with the exception of several women's organization has been the increasing levels of violence used to counter what local groups view as the military repressive tactics.

The third phase is the era of state command intervention and community reactive militancy. This shows that from E- B on the graph the elastic limit has been reached. The militancy era made Nigeria lost at least one quarter of its oil production due to the frequent attacks on oil installation resulting in shut-down, the unwholesome activities of oil bunkering cartels and kidnapping for ransom in the region (Table 1).

Nigeria's southern delta region has long been an uncomfortable place for outsiders, for four centuries, slaver and palm oil traders, colonial rulers and post-independence governments have used a combination of diplomacy, deception, bribery and threats to coax commodities from this Scotland-size region of tropical swamps and rivers, unaware or unconcerned that their commercial activities were stoking violence. Over the past quarter century, unrest in the Niger Delta has slowly graduate into a guerrilla-style conflict that leaves

hundreds dead each year. The battle lines are drawn over the crude oil and gas that make Nigeria the number one oil producer in Africa, the world's tenth largest crude oil producer and the fifth biggest supplier of U.S. crude imports. The vast majority is produced in the Niger Delta, with nearly all the rest offshore. Impoverished residents, many of whom live practically on the doorstep of multimillion-dollar oil installations complain of being excluded. Militancy and criminality are the convergent streams of the popular resistance that has emerged oil theft, known as "illegal bunkering", is both symptom and cause of the resulting violence, so, too, is the secretive and semi-illicit system of government and oil company payments to militants. Who have learned the unfortunate lesson that violence, extortion and kidnapping are a way-sometimes the only way-to be taken seriously. Sabotage of remote riverine installations and two "symbolic car bombings in regional cities mark a turning point in the conflict, whereas unrest in the 1990s and earlier this decade mainly involved groups organized at the village and clan level, sometimes with limited short-term aims including winning-or extorting-promises of cash or sorely-needed municipal development projects, today's militants are increasingly connected in a loose network. While they may not even speak the same language, they share an increasingly common goal: "resource control" for a region whose residents perceive history to have deprived them of their fair share.

Among the latest rebel groups to emerge was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Apart from the resource control, the group threatens to immobilize the oil industry unless demands for government and corporate compensation for decades of environmental damage and the release of two imprisoned ethnic Ijaw leaders are met. Attacks since December 2005 have cut production by 500,000 barrel of oil per day, two bombings in April 2006 were designed sending the message the group has increased its capabilities and can and will use more violent tactics if

forced to do so.

MEND has destroyed pipelines and claimed responsibility for attacks that have killed at least 29 security force members, including a 15 January, 2006 strike against Shell's Benisede flow station that badly damaged the facility and left fourteen soldiers and two civilian contractors dead. A militant close to MEND asserted the flow station was chosen as a target in part as retaliation for the shooting of civilian protesters in 2004. The group has also claimed responsibility for a majority of the 25 foreign oil workers taken hostage. All have been released.

MEND became an umbrella organization for other rebel groups in the region. Its numbers are difficult to estimate which likely range from high hundreds to the low thousands.

The fourth stage is the post amnesty or after fracture. The boundary margin between B and XN connotes this margin. The period signifies self-determination, consciousness, emotional attitude and personal adjustments. Militants need rehabilitation and accommodation; these are the viscerogenic needs as well as psychogenic needs. The viscerogenic needs are the physiological needs such as food, clothing and shelter while the psychological needs include self-esteem, self-actualization, love and security. Beyond the elastic limit, an elastic material becomes plastic - a condition known as "plasticity". Plasticity in this work is a condition where people (unemployed youth) become so disenchanted with the social system and may take to suicide bombing, just to drive home their point. Put in another way, the development of 'mindlessness'. It follows that the consciousness of man can no longer guide him to conform to the norms and laws of the society. Inordinate decision and religious alternatives are seen as reasonable outlets to actualize goals.

## THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE

This paper has been able to explicate a positivist approach that assumes that a science of society. The corollary of objective observation and analysis of social life is drawn on a premise that physical properties in the natural sciences are studied through explanatory frameworks of "cause and effect". From the foregoing, the uniformity and regularity of behaviour could be objectively studied. Once behaviour is seen as a response to some external stimulus, such as economic forces or the requirements of the social system, the methods and assumptions of the natural sciences appear appropriate to the study of man. Marxism has often been regarded as a positivist approach since it can be argued that it sees human behaviour as a reaction to the stimulus of the economic infrastructure.

Reasoning along this line, the differential access to oil economy gives room to some scholars to suggest that we

have "internal colonialism" in Nigeria. Disparity exists between Niger Delta towns and Abuja as well as revenue allocation.

Some Nigerians see Abuja as the model for the country's aspirations. The international airport is modern, and paved roads lead through quite manicured suburbs. The city boasts gleaming government buildings, office towers and the impressive, federally-built national mosque, cathedral and stadium.

To describe the capital, I felt angry and sick the first time I went. I wanted to leave. It was obvious that I was looking at the place where our oil money has been going and is still going, said a young community activist from Port Harcourt.

A trigger point still frequently cited by such activists was the two-million-man march in March 1998, when the late military dictator, Gen. Sani Abacha, bussed people from around the country to Abuja and paid them to rally for a continuation of his rule. For thousands of young Niger Delta residents, the sight of highway overpasses in a city with no river was a revelation. In reaction to what Marx sees as the stimulus of economic infrastructure, on 11 December, 1998, Ijaw signed the "Kaiama Declaration", which demanded a military withdrawal from the Delta, rejected the Petroleum Act and Land Use Decree and unilaterally reclaimed ownership to all Ijaw lands and resources. The federal government argues that historical grievances have overshadowed the fact that the Niger Delta states have been the largest recipients of monthly federal government allocations since military rule ended in 1999 - equivalent to 13% of revenue derived from mineral resources. Between June 1999 and July 2004, Akwa Ibom received \$979 million, Bayelsa \$900 million, Delta \$1.5 billion and Rivers \$ 1.04 billion. During the same period, Lagos, Nigeria's most populous state and the biggest beneficiary among those that do not produce oil, got \$614 million, Davis (2008).

The recent rise in oil prices has widened the gap between oil-producing and non-oil producing states, according to official figures. The four biggest recipients of the federal funds disbursed to Nigeria's 36 states in April 2006 were those Delta states, each with more than three times the amount collected by Lagos. Bayelsa, the top recipient, got \$16 million compared to \$1 million for Lagos. State government corruption and mismanagement is perceived to have reduced the effect of this money, however, although some benefits have trickled down to ordinary residents, much leaks into corrupt channels and stays in the region's main cities. Yenagoa was little more than a shantytown surrounded by swamp when it became capital of the newly formed state of Bayelsa in 1996. It has exploded in size, spreading tentacle-like along the sole road linking it with the rest of Nigeria. Several (African Report, 2006).

Offshore revenues are currently exempt from the derivation formula. A subsequent crisis group report analyzes arguments about the derivation formula. Recent

monthly breakdowns on state and local government allocations are on the Federal Ministry of Finance website, at [www.fmf.gov.ng/](http://www.fmf.gov.ng/).2010.

## CONCLUSION

We posit from the explication of the above theory that “Mindful humans under certain conditions would tend to behave like mindless atoms”. The study recommends a Cognitive Personal Development Scheme (CPDS). This involves the removal of dependence on oil companies and government supports packages from intervention agencies to the development of innate skills and adaptive mechanism. The youth should look inward on what they can do, not what should be given to them.

## REFERENCES

- Adabanwi W (2001). Nigeria: Shell of a State. Dollars and Sense Magazine, July/August. pp. 1-4
- African Report (2006) “The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria Delta Unrest”. See Crisis Group African Report No. 113, Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty.
- Akinyanju P (1998). Ken Saro-wiwa and the Nationality Questions in Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Crisis of the Nigerian State edited by Omotoye Olorode, Wumi Raji, Jiti Ogunye, Tunde Oladunjoye Published by Committee for the Defense of Human Right (CDHR).
- Davies, S. (2009) The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta, cited in Youth Militancy, Amnesty and Security in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Paper presented at the Joint African Institute of South Africa/South African Association of Political Science (AISA/SAAPS) Colloquium, Burgers Park Hotel, Pretoria South Africa, 15-16 October, 2009.
- Haralambos M, Heald RM (2006) Sociology: Themes and Perspective Newyork: Oxford University Press.
- Human Right Watch (1999) The Price of Oil: Human Right Overview, Nigeria, 2004, Human Right Watch, at <http://hrw.org/>.
- Naanen, B. (1995) Oil Politics and Minority Agitation: The Ogoni Uprising. Journal of Commonwealth Comparative Politics. pp. 1-9.
- Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (1983) Environmental Pollution and Oil Exploration Activities. Editorial comment Newsletter. pp. 3-5.
- Ogoni Bill of Rights (1991). Cited in Ken Saro-Wiwa (1992) Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy Port Harcourt.
- Okodudu SA (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Policy and Crisis in the Niger Delta; an Appraisal of SPDC Global Memorandum of Understanding. IPS Monograph, University of Port Harcourt.
- Pepple N, Detheridge A (1998). A response to Frynas. Third World Quarterly, 19(3).
- Rodney W (1972). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa: London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications London and Tanzanian Publishing House Dar-Es-Salam.
- Slaughter WS (2002). The Linearized Theory of Elasticity. Birkhauser: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN0817641173.