

Review Paper

Disciplinary regime, neo-liberal bio-power and *alienation* of national sovereignty in Cameroon: Political economy of the imprisoned body

Alfred Ndi

University of Yaounde I, Ecole Normale Supérieure Bambili-Bamenda, Republic of Cameroon. E-mail: alfredndi@yahoo.com.

Accepted 22 September, 2009

This study found out that Cameroon's national sovereignty and prospects of development were alienated because globalization came to most African countries in the 1980s as a form of capitalist power with new norms that humanized disciplinary institutions in the country. It invaded all the vital sectors of the population's life and rendered the state apparatus deviant. This power system then enabled proponents of the free market in the west to deploy expansionist strategies of neoliberal capitalism such as structural adjustment programmes, deregulation, privatization, good governance, poverty eradication papers and so on. Global bio-power was thus crafted on claims of provision of social welfare and means of productivity of the people and their safety, as against state mechanisms of mutilation and surveillance of the body. It was more sensitive to the individual's perspective, his human rights, rehabilitation and new knowledge systems of normalization. Global power decentralized and pluralized the sources of its institutional knowledge so that no single state authority could have autonomous and self-regulating authority. It co-operated with the Cameroonian subject instead of contesting his standpoint. It created new 'scapes, which appeared to empower society while at the same time, they merely served to expand the legitimacy of neoliberal capitalism. The paper ends with three suggested strategic policies to contain the ill-effects of globalization.

Key words: Disciplinary regime, globalization, bio-power, alienation of sovereignty, underdevelopment, neoliberal capitalism, body.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is now a multidimensional force, affecting all aspects of economic, cultural, environmental and social life in Africa, in general, and Cameroon, in particular. Especially from the 1980s with liberalization and new information technologies, the flux of goods, people, ideas and cross-border trade intensified and foreign direct investment flows increased. Although, the free market promised growth in trade and international investment, in practice, this global process undermined the development process in Cameroon in the 1990s and heightened domestic instability and marginalization. Cameroon recorded a growth rate of 5% in 1998 (Molua, 2002), but at the same time, its situation was exacerbated by an unsustainable external debt, lack of financial support to pursue its reforms and development efforts, high inflation rate, low per capita income, low GNP, etc. Even this growth rate achievement (still below pre-1980s annual growth rates of 7%) was at the price of costly structural

adjustment programmes that impoverished the vulnerable national population. But, ironically, this situation compelled this resource-endowed country to supplicate international financial institutions for financial resources and relief from the burden of its external debt, through cancellation or rescheduling, foreign direct investment (FDI), etc,

At independence in 1960, Cameroon was a country blessed with enormous petroleum and other natural resources such as huge hydroelectric potentials (of 3000 MW), favourable climatic conditions, fertile soils, considerable water reserves (9598 km² of submerged land and 465402 km² of dry land), massive forestry resources and a wide range of untapped mineral resources, including chromium, uranium, iron ore, natural gas, bauxite, gold and nickel. Particularly from the 1980s, it was required by international financial institutions to overhaul its trade policy and liberalize its economic activities. It was instruc-

ted that, in order to get any foreign assistance and make the economy more efficient and attractive to international business, it would have to carry out many economic reform programmes. Consequently, it completed a three years program with the IMF and started another programme, known as 'second generation reforms'. It removed non-tariff barriers chiefly by eliminating import quotas, suppressing import and export licenses, and scrapping off price harmonisation and administrative control of profit margins. Distortions from the preferential tax schemes were suppressed and beneficiary firms were governed by the ordinary law system.

From 2000, the Cameroonian government's macro-economic objectives for the coming years were to increase real GDP growth rate. In order to realize this goal, it had to contain consumer price inflation at 2% and limit the external current account deficit (excluding official transfers) at about 3 - 3.5% of GDP. The IMF, World Bank and its foreign partners required it to implement structural adjustment programmes, to privatize major state-owned companies in the telecommunication, electricity, water, banking, transport, etc, sectors. In conformity with these demands, the US Company, AES SIROCCO Limited, for example, was selected as the interim bidder of the state-owned electricity company, SONEL. In the agro-industrial sector, it proceeded to privatize the Cameroon Development Corporation, CDC, and SODECOTON, the cotton industry, the sugar company CAMSUCO, the oil-palm industries, SOCAPALM and the rubber company HEVECAM. It was also asked to participate in the realization of the pipeline project from Chad to Cameroon, although, the project was heavily criticized as being dangerous to the environment and the socio-cultural life of communities around the project.

In addition to these economic reforms, aimed at curtailing the powers of state services and transaction costs, it also reformed the political sector from one based on single party politics (the Cameroon National Union and then the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement) from about 1965 to 1990, to a liberal democratic system with a plurality of parties, the most notable ones of which have been the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement, the Social Democratic Front, the National Union for Democracy and Progress, the Union of Populations of Cameroon and the Cameroon Democratic Union, which were represented in the National Assembly. From the 1990s, the level of freedom increased in the country with new laws on the freedoms of expression and association, freedom of the press, speech, etc. Thanks to its 60% literacy rate, its two official languages of English and French and its rich natural resources, it became the destination of numerous western MNCs and the recipient of huge population waves from West African countries and, particularly, the CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community) zone countries.

But, despite the fact that it undertook these economic, political and social reforms, the country was not able to

come out of grinding poverty, social misery, corruption and underdevelopment. After the liberalization of trade, the enforcement of human rights laws, good governance programmes and other socio-political freedoms, which were appreciated by the Paris Club that proceeded to reschedule its debt, the prospects for the country were still not bright, its economy did not improve as the rhetoric of the Bretton Woods institutions had promised; instead, it was admitted to the debt relief plan and elected humiliatingly into the Club of Heavily Indebted Countries. Today, it is referred to in international discourse as (three times) the most corrupt country in the world (Transparency International, 2007) and as a heavily-indebted and poor country (IMF, 2006). But, most critical of all, even with the increasing crisis of the neoliberal capitalist system represented by the US economy, which has affected the rest of the world, the depressing condition of the national economy in Cameroon and the growing social misery of the people, the discourse in state, economic and social circles today has continued to be, not on how to extricate themselves from the grips of capitalist institutions, but on how to integrate the country further into its systemic circuits. Cameroonian farmers complained against global dumping of cheap poultry legs, which displaced them out of business and then wondered how they could export their products abroad for better profits. The national population of youths protested in February 2008 against high fuel and food prices, feared the spread of new diseases like HIV/AIDS, bird flu, swine flu, mad cow disease, etc, but paradoxically, believed their 'salvation' can only come from the international capitalist economy and then devised complex and 'illegal' ways of migrating to Europe, Asia and America in search of 'greener pastures'. When pressured, the government complained of slow economic growth as the reason for the underdevelopment of the country but still settled for new ways of facilitating global penetration into the country. This ambivalent situation that may be referred to as the 'despair/embrace' syndrome, certainly encouraged by the power myth of the 'trickle down effect' (Chaudhry, 1993), has been under-theorised.

This paper attempts to understand how most African countries and Cameroon in particular, got to this ambiguous position of alienation of sovereignty and consequent underdevelopment from which they appeared unable to extricate themselves. Through a Foucauldian genealogical analytics of power, it investigates how the population alienated from a chiefly disciplinary, neo-patrimonial regime, toward a 'neoliberal biopower' machinery. Even though economistic analyses have contributed to discussions of how African countries got into this alienation and developmental impasse, they remain largely deterministic and little satisfactory work exists in the way of examination of the specific power mechanisms that were at work between national and international institutions resulting in the production of low economic growth, social poverty and continued marginalization.

Consequently, this study probes into this paradox by inquiring, in particular, about how the politics of incarceration, education, medicine, sexuality and class-oriented accumulation, as told through the celebrated writings of selected Cameroonian authors and media literature, provided the grounds for global penetration, domination and economic marginalization. These creative and sociological writings are relevant to the study's aims, because they tell us about the transformation of neo-patrimonial formations of power into constructions of 'global power' enmeshed within circuits of neo-liberal, capital. They show how, from the 1980s, the increasing anxieties of neoliberal capital culminated in the transnational management of the affairs of the nation state.

This study proposes to examine these institutions as a way of understanding the unstaying power of the neo-patrimonial, disciplinary regime and the transition to the globalization of Cameroon, because the institutions constituted the contestatory sites where neo-patrimonial rule displayed its ethical and political weaknesses, which neoliberal forces of global power exploited to legitimate their imposition of the new order. Following on from this reasoning, the justification for turning to Michel Foucault (1991, 1982, 1972, 1980) as a postmodern theorist resides in the fact that Foucault is working in the Nietzschean tradition and therefore, unlike with most structuralist thinkers within political economy, his theory represents the world as a much more contested place. In Michel Foucault's analytics of power, one finds tools to understand the reproduction of the new global order as a complex interaction of distinctive expressions of control associated with categories of difference. On the whole, the paper argues that we need to understand the way 'global power' works so that we can think of new ways of appropriating and mastering the developmental effects of the neoliberal, 'progressive' ideology. Such an analysis can help us to imagine new and effective strategic policies to control the degenerating impact of the free market in Cameroon, in particular and in the continent as a whole,

The disciplinary regime

This paper starts from the premise that the paradoxical situation of alienation of the population from the 'pastoral' missions of the state in Cameroon and the resulting situation of poverty were the results of complex processes of power exercised by proponents of (neo) liberal capitalism. These proponents had learned the lesson from European history (with its failed dictatorships like Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, etc) and long before nation-states were created in Africa in the 1960s, that the disciplinary regime, based on iron-fisted mechanisms of regulation, were very costly, damaging and ineffective. Consequently, they sought to have leverage over national disciplinary systems in Africa by transforming their foun-

foundations. It further notes in the case of Cameroon that global biopower did completely replace disciplinary power from the perspective of its ideologies within which those traumatized by it lived and had 'to be defended'. Nevertheless, from the light of the institutions of state, the elite groups who still benefited from them or those who still owed allegiance to them could not be displaced; it simply grafted itself onto their disciplinary spaces and by so doing, incorporated aspects of its power into their functional mechanisms. The biopower technology dovetailed into the disciplinary mechanisms, integrating but also modifying them, infiltrating into but also embedding itself into their techniques. Consequently, it would be necessary to briefly present the disciplinary mechanisms of the state in Cameroon as represented by the writings.

The disciplinary regime in Cameroon was introduced as an inheritance from the French and British colonial administrations after the 1960s. It was employed fully from the mid 1960s and only began to be systematically dismantled during the 1980s with the rise of globalization and the intensification of biopower. The disciplinary regime in Cameroon was a 'post-independence' technology devised to support the primary commodity (raw materials production) in the economy and endorse the ruling-class structure that had been formed from it. It was a system of partitioning and surveillance in the prisons, law courts, police security (Mukong, 1990; Boh and Ntemfac, 1985), the economic institutions of accumulation (Asongwed, 1992), the church (Asong, 1997), school, hospital, etc. Foucault (1991) refers to this system as the anatomo-politics of the human body. It was at the basis of neo-patrimonial rule in Cameroon and was centred on the control of the body as a machine at the microphysical level. The body was accordingly 'disciplined' in such a way that its capabilities were optimized and its usefulness and docility were increased so that it could be integrated efficiently into the national and international economic systems that the new state had inherited with political independence.

The disciplinary regime soon became an enactment of 'daily life', an integral part of the invisible power of the 'state' without any 'exterior'. For example, it was entangled in ideological relations similar to that of a 'family' and was based on narratives of unity: the fatherland, the nationalist founders, the ever-present danger of external forces of neo-imperialism, etc. At the political and economic level, the national population was disciplined into two main linguistic groups, namely, francophones and anglophones and two major classes, namely, the 'elite' and the 'ordinary' society. The 'elite' society was comprised of the wealthy and well-to-do politicians, big businessmen, administrative, military and religious executives with power, resources and the repressive apparatus to quell down any threat to this status quo. The 'ordinary' society was made up of the poor masses, taxi-drivers, truck pushers, shoe-menders, prostitutes, farmers, etc. A middle class emerged from the intersection

of these any of this two comprising teachers, lawyers, the intelligentsia, etc. It was this class that furnished the rebellious intelligentsia that the carceral institution, the prison, tried to control by manufacturing what Foucault calls docility in their bodies that were hostile to this status quo and its disciplining techniques.

Albert Mukong, for example, was incarcerated for more than six years in detention centres under the despotic regime of late President Amadou Ahidjo and the more tolerant regime of Paul Biya. His autobiographical oeuvres titled *Prisoner without a Crime and My Stewardship in the Cameroon Struggle*, [1] detail his personal experiences of the discipline and punishment that the state systematically inflicted on dissidents, who had dared to stand their ground. Accordingly, he castigated the regimes for annexing the anglophone population: exploiting petroleum in anglophone territories, subjugating the anglophone territorial space under a francophonization policy of commodification that destroyed corporate marketing boards, alienated British foreign investment, deteriorated the anglophone cultural identity, favoured the francophone legal, educational and administrative systems, appointed anglophones only to junior positions, etc and asked for a federal system of government as the political solution. Until his death in 2004, Albert Mukong was without doubt, anglophone Cameroon's most prominent political prisoner, spokesperson and human rights advocate. Boh and Ntemfac (1991) raised the issue of anglophone marginalization in their autobiographical text. *The Prison Graduate* in terms of restriction of mass media communication. These writers raised what is today referred to [today] as 'the Anglophone Problem' in Cameroon.

The regimes then saw these critics as national security threats and subjected them to technologies of torture, isolation, deprivation and surveillance in different penitentiary towns like Kondengui, Mantoum, and Tchollire. These technologies consisted in enforcing lingering pain and bodily control, applying battery, depriving them of food, cigarettes, leisure, denying them sleep by illuminating bulbs throughout the day, removing them from the company of sexual partners, leaving them in conditions of uncertainty about the future, exposing them to inhuman conditions like mountains of faeces, baking heat and so forth. The "mbele khaki" (police officers) of these institutions used physical violence with punitive appliances like iron whips and the notorious gadget, the "balançoire" for corporal mutilation (*Prisoner*, 16). This kind of disciplinary violence used from the 1960s to the 1980s was designed to induce 'trauma' in the prisoner as well as specific effects such as feelings of insecurity, fear, regrets, yearnings for reconciliation and so on.

The 'normalizing' carceral gaze was also used to assert the power of the regime. Particularly in Mukong's and Boh and Ofege's texts, the prison was designed, following the Benthamian idea of the panopticon, in such

a way that prisoners positioned were aware that they were being observed by guards and accordingly, they started to 'police' their own behaviours. Other methods were subtle in their exercise; they engaged the prisoner in the enterprise of surveillance. For example, the non-nonsense disciplinary spirit of Kondengui prison was reflected at its entrance by the inscription: 'Ici il n'y a pas de Dieu' ['There is no God here'], (*Prisoner*, 16). In this way, the walls of the prison became themselves 'gazing' spaces designed to tame the mind and body of the detainee. The writings show that there was violence, mutilation and even outright executions. The prisoners were 'caged in like animals' (*The Prison Graduate*, p. 75) and were subjected to '...a daily dose of some of the best modern punishment borrowed freely from Tubab: beatings, blindfolding, keeping them in shackles and chains, electrocution, starvation, etc' (*Born to Rule*, p. 212). But what was predominant was the subtlety of the power. Disciplinary power was dependent upon the institutional gaze: that is, the inspecting 'gaze' of the morning rounds, the gaze of the armed guards, the unsuspecting gaze of the prison spy who was imagined to be living among the detainees, etc. These gazes were all interiorized by the prisoner to the point where he became his own overseer working through self-surveillance against himself. The idea was that this insidious power would be internalized by the prisoner in due time and he would bring himself to acquiesce to the legitimacy of the national order and the power of the ruler and collude with neo-patrimonial standards of obligatory allegiance to the state leader, through his self-construction of docility.

The judicial institution, which was defined by processes of legal dispensation such as criminal procedure, charges, evidence, court sentence and so forth, remained cagey and alienated from the accused person, his family, the national public, the international community and so on. Throughout in prison, the protagonist, Mukong, agonizingly asks the prison guards why he is being detained in prison, but is refused notification, hence the title of his oeuvre. In *The Prison Graduate*, the authors report about an old man who: '... does not know why he was arrested; this one was to spend the night coughing and spitting blood' (79). The judiciary institution was based on random equivalentialism: for example, criminal investigation on a treason file was equated, not with a stage of determining the legality of his activities, but with an "a priori" guilt itself. The suspicion that the prisoner was 'cooking' a plot to undermine national security was equated with an already established culpability; hence he was tortured even before the determination of his 'crime' was exhausted. The law was not a 'transparent', disinterested code, but an instrument of the power of the ruler over the 'body' of the suspect criminal. For example, the presupposition in the symbolically portrayed president's speech in *Born to Rule* is that a name embodies a person and what a person is assumed to be, he is already it: 'since prisoners are after all prisoners and not free peo-

ple' (212). The body of the prisoner, whether innocent or suspect, became the locale for expressing his culpability and articulating the power of the national ruler.

This were, briefly speaking, the type of national conditions that the forces of neoliberal capital found in the 1980s and set out to undermine. More importantly, they found that domestic resistance was already building up against the disciplinary regime; but, it was weak and in need of assistance, hence, the application of biopower mechanisms. For example, although Albert Mukong was languishing in detention and this was symptomatic of disciplinary power policing life, he was also revolting against the concept of state subjectivity. As Mukong confirms: 'I wanted only my liberty to be away from that place. Indeed my spirit revolted against the existence of the place; the government had no right to keep a single soul there' (77). Karl Marx had maintained that a crucial precondition to revolutionary activity was 'class consciousness' among those exploited by capitalism. In prison, Mukong and Boh and Ofegbe, cultivated a revolutionary consciousness with which they identified themselves and all those with whom they were struggling as part of a class (the 'ordinary' class including the middle class) struggling against the 'elite' class. But, what was unmarxian about them is that their struggles were not for the establishment of socialism but for a federal system of rule and for freedom in Cameroon. This then resonated with the neoliberal ideology of capitalism.

The idea of revolt against the disciplinary regime can be elucidated from a Foucauldian understanding of subjectivity and critical autonomy. Implicit in Karl Marx's idea of class consciousness was the notion that biopolitical processes of subjectification under capitalism could not be managed efficiently because there was always friction. The institutions by which capitalist identities were reproduced were thus vulnerable to resistance. The inmates of Kondengui, Malloum, Tchollire and other prisons in *The Prison Graduate*, *Prisoner without a Crime*, and *My Stewardship in the Cameroon Struggle* refused to be identified as merely 'sheep', to be programmed by the disciplining ideologies of national and social subjugation. Political revolt also took the form of self-imposed migration, with 'enemies...residing abroad' and manifested as coups d'État (*Born to Rule*, pp.163-185; p.183). Other forms of revolt were social as represented by poor individuals like Denis Nunqam in *Salvation Colony* (Asong, 1997). They revolted against the imposition of nationalistic and social subjectivities upon them and this resonates with Foucault's conception of 'critical autonomy', according to which, one may emerge through power, but a certain ontological freedom awaits to be practised. The prisoner, while still being incarcerated enacted a critical ontology of himself and revolted against the nationalist self being imposed upon him. Foucault's ethical project of askesis, that is, of 'refusing what you are', applies here in the sense that if the self does indeed possess a critical capacity, it can in-

tervene in its relationship to itself. It is maintain here that these revolts constituted the sites of contestation upon which modes of biopower were grafted to engender new political, economic and social relations antagonistic to disciplinary mechanisms.

From disciplinary regime to biopower

From the 1980s and 1990s, the forces of neo-liberal capital emerged very prominently in Cameroon, in particular and in Africa, as a whole and began to undermine the regime of disciplinary power by complementing its institutions and replacing its ideologies with a new regime of biopower. The disciplinary regime in Cameroon could not resist the control system of global biopolitics with its cyber-cafes, e-commerce, virtual markets, flexibility of specialized labor, humanization of state institutions, institutional plurality, etc. As Deleuze (1990) points out, in this new control system, populations are not subjected to confining situations, but are exposed to continuous control and instant communication where nothing is left alone for long and to its own devices. The disciplinary regime was repetitive, predictable and tended toward the 'intransitive' (assumption of a nationalistic 'end of history') whereas biopower was linear and 'transitive', that is, limitless in historical scope, geographical insights, economic perspectives and was therefore evermore incorporating minute realms of everyday national life. In the face of this 'swarming' of new control methods into the country like the judicial system of human rights, the disciplinary methods in the carceral system such as physical mutilation, torture, use of photographs, surveillance tapes, fingerprints, blood types, etc, appeared to be old-fashioned, primitive, oppressive and deviant. The keeping of records of the biography of the 'criminal', his transgressive deeds, investigative discourse, suggested that the 'criminal' existed before the 'crime', was always a 'criminal' and lived outside it, while biopower was concerned with norms, with personality, that humanized the 'criminal' as someone with human rights, as an individual with a 'soul' deserving consideration, respectability, etc. This modulation of power norms through governance of relations of futurity placed the individual in a new temporal continuum where 'risk', 'opportunity' and 'challenge' highlighting specific relations were incorporated into the mechanisms of neoliberal governance. What was at stake was the shift from disciplining relations between people and confining objects (prison, environment, food, position, etc), to relations between people and the futurity of times (present and future).

Biopower took control of the public management of the economic and carceral policies, health, administration, religion, sexuality, etc, as each of these different fields of intervention became political issues in themselves. It was thus involved in all aspects of life, which later became the sites for deploying new policies and strategies of globali-

zation such as structural adjustment programmes, good governance, etc. Biopolitics and its control dispositifs came as a grand 'social medicine' applied to cure the population's ills and govern life; life henceforth became part of the field of power. Global biopower came to signal the moment when the traditional dichotomy, nation/state, was surpassed by a political economy of internationalization of life in general. With life itself being the power system, that is, labour, language, desire and sexuality, became sets of correlations where practices, knowledge and institutions were interwoven.

As a pervasive form of power, global biopower engendered homologies and regularities across the different aspects of life in Cameroon. Its telos and legitimacy existed in its ability to optimize the energies of individuals, families, organizations and even of the state. It related, represented and explained the life forces of the population and adapted them to global ends and, in this way, sought to minimize social risks and to maximize individual well-being through technologies of the self and engineering of society. For example, the new public discourse radiated the idea that it was socially 'risky' to confine Mukong to the prison because this could trigger a national uprising against the regime; it was 'safer' then to treat him as 'citizen' with human rights than as 'prisoner'. It was also seductive because its logics were offered as tools for a society that manages its own government rather than as depending upon a disciplinary government with outmoded methods. The national population began to stress a 'rational' approach to administration away from the subjective and arbitrary form of dispensing acts in which the security officer, for example, took it upon himself to extract the life of the detainee if he so wished on the basis of showing off his own power and abilities.

The Foucauldian concept of biopolitics is a general framework of power relations in which power was exercised from innumerable positions within the interplay of unequal relations. One of these positions was the global jurisdiction. The juridical models of discipline were thus subjected to a political critique because biopower was a non-static, non-hypostatized process; it functioned by moving history connected to a long process that brought productivity to the centre of mechanisms of power. The disciplinary modes of surveillance based on the security apparatuses of old and the idea of resistance or insurgency against the state became increasingly irrelevant, unrealistic and unnecessary in this new globalizing 'society of control' (Deleuze, 1990). New techniques of survey, security and control were now being exercised in such a way that there was no identifiable 'outside'; the global 'outside' was already in the national 'inside' so that these definitional concepts of place lost their conventional meaning. There was no 'inside' and no 'outside'; there was only an expanding and unique order of juridical globality. Biopower stressed a new mode of intervention, a global scale, as opposed to the disciplinary mode that showed productivity of power through state policies on

individual normalization. The weakness with the disciplinary mode from this light was that it allowed a dichotomy between 'power' and 'resistance' and this could tip into any one of the directions. Disciplinary power consisted in shaping a classified type of subjectivity based on surveillance but this attempt to mould was also resisted by opposition parties, chieftaincies, the intelligentsia class, ethnic groups, the younger generation, etc (Prisoner, pp.60, 72; My Stewardship, pp.49, 88, 111; Born to Rule, p.78).. Consequently, there were inside/outside spaces of power. But with global biopolitics, there was no inside/outside; there was only a massive scale of intervention, statistics of an individual's fragmentation into his smallest components (division of labour, skills and multiple subjectifications) within the same individual. Cameroon was perceived as being both within the territorial 'domain' of the global empire and at the same time as being at its 'border'. From this light, in its attempt to expand its sovereignty, neo-imperial capitalism linked up its control of Cameroon and of the continent as a whole, to its power over territorial space and its biopolitical strategy over the nation state. What happened to Mukong's body and the bodies of all others resisting discipline under the regime of 'global power' was significantly different. For example, transnational NGOs and human rights, religious and social groups began to put pressure on the government of Cameroon regarding the continued but unnecessary detention of Albert Mukong. These efforts represented a significantly new form of power because these global institutions through which power now flowed depended upon what Michel Foucault refers to as the 'ethical cult of the self' (Foucault, 1988).

The disciplinary strategy consisted in laying out constructions of the 'unworthy' (prisoners) and the 'worthy' (obeying citizens, ruling elites) in the lives of Cameroonians. But in the biopolitics of global humanism, the people who had to be 'defended' were now prioritized 'the worthy'; they were considered as a new class of victimized bodies to be protected and set up against the criminalized class of ruling elites, whose disciplinary regime was considered as 'unworthy', comprised of greedy people practising dictatorship (Besong, 1986; Beti, 1972) and stomach-oriented politics (Bayart, 1979); and had to be confronted and destroyed. The global governmentality increased its biopowering strategies by 'policing' the means necessary for making the forces of neoliberal capital to increase from within Cameroon by addressing questions of the population's safety and well-being in the light of the cruel acts of the elites' disciplinary regime. In this way, the global empire transferred onto itself pastoral functions that were assumed to be played by Cameroon's rulers, such as provision for the well-being of the poor nation against all forms of carceral abuse and this virtually meant arrogating to themselves all other functions in all other areas. The ruling elites (now the 'unworthy') were represented as voracious individuals who had worked to enrich themselves while

the ordinary people were impoverished (cf. the satire itself behind *Born to Rule*). This qualification was easily accepted as true and from this conclusion, the connection was made to the problem of how to enrich the lives of the people through neoliberal policies. Hence, the growing 'global' population in Cameroon was able to expand by integrating the problematics of the 'incarcerated' and 'impoverished' population into the apparatus of liberal democracy (human rights, multiparty democracy, freedom of speech, of the press, etc) and the machinery of free trade as the ultimate answer.

In order to refine these power mechanisms and make global biopower much more effective, the Cameroonian population problematic was portrayed in terms of variables like numerical, health, educational level, per capita income, etc, in such a way that it now emerged not merely as a problem but also as an object about which something must be done, namely, analysis and intervention. The technology behind this biopower mechanism consisted in producing statistically high levels of mortality in state prisons, exposing inhuman conditions of detainees, describing low economic growth, low quality of population health, characteristics, etc. These strategies were aimed at eventually dismantling the neopatrimonial regimes of discipline so that the brutalized and poor Cameroonian population could be legitimately integrated into the circuits of liberal political economy and production. In this way, the problem of governance in Cameroon came to be reflected, thought, debated and enacted from outside of its sovereign borders, namely, in the Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF, World Bank, the UN, the Paris Club, international media, diplomatic channels, Transparency International, etc. Through the technique of reformulation, the political system and the economy that would liberate the people from oppression and poverty was thought of as an existentialism outside the national boundaries but related to the livelihood of the people therefore by opening up the state's borders to the liberal forms of democracy and to economic liberalism (structural adjustment programmes, poverty eradication papers, deregulation, etc). This enabled the global empire to create a field of possibility from which to problematize the neopatrimonial state's sovereignty over the national population and territory.

The interventionist arm of biopower governmentality consisted then in enacting an alienating political and economic system that aimed to limit the authority of the nation state given that its relationship with the national jurisdiction, welfare and wealth had been pathologized and criminalized. Through new knowledge, elaborations on political governance and technologies of appraisal, measurement, qualification and hierarchization, the carceral institutions of discipline began to fade off in their potency as they were incorporated into a large continuum of liberal apparatuses such as the media, human rights movements, church organizations, civil rights groups as well as the IMF, World Bank, the Paris Club with regula-

tory functions on the population's welfare and productivity. Through these institutional dispersions, the disciplinary power of neo-patrimonialism waned because it was no longer confined only to the carceral state machinery nor to the economic sector of raw materials; it was now re-emerging in the new biopolitical institutions of democracy and production as they aspired to securitize the welfare and productivity of the national society. These institutions which were now more of private than public ones produced new kinds of control spaces and practices based on technologies that promoted the idea of individuals as rational, profit-maximizing and self-motivated agents.

Over the course of the 1980s, 1990s and the decade of the new millennium, neo-patrimonial power was transformed by global capitalism through the use of biopolitical modes of control over the life forces of the national population. By employing techniques of prisoner rehabilitation, information and communication technology, the national population was being governed through rationalization of individuals into the ethics of choice, autonomy and participation in order to create a new liberal welfare order. The production of this Foucauldian telos was facilitated by expert organizations and groups like the media, human rights movements, church organizations, civil rights groups with biopolitical knowledges. These knowledges expanded global power at the level of society (heeding to the city-game), but at the same time and following the shepherd-game principle (Olsen, 1999:30), they subjectified Cameroonians to a new ethics of individualization. By dispersing knowledges through new kinds of professions, the teachers, psychologists, medical doctors, human rights lawyers and activists, church officials, social workers, etc, were now helping citizens to adopt attitudes of self-regulation, personal liberty into their everyday lives as a form of delegation of sovereignty. These then translated into a discourse of normality, security, public order, welfarism, etc, which contrasted with the disciplinary discourse of the 'abnormal': enemies of the state, spies, intoxicators, thieves, ingrates, betrayers, etc, found in all the writings, that neopatrimonial rule had adopted.

Institutional knowledges fragmented the act of dispensing 'court judgement' that was hitherto the sole prerogative of a single judge. From the 1980s, court 'sentencing' was no longer passed by the 'judge' alone in his chambers because there was now a 'public' group of professionals who appropriated their own say in penal matters such as journalists, revivalist and orthodox Christian churches, medical people, aid donors, embassy representations, human rights activists, the vigilant public especially in Bamenda, Yaounde and Douala, the international community, political party leaders and lawyers trained in the liberal ideologies of globalization. These new professionals and the ordinary people, the new 'judges' that also included teachers, businesspeople, students, the unemployed and so on exploited the power

narratives of the global economy in order to challenge the dominant power system by expanding the realms of 'normality'.

The global institutions of democracy, respect for human rights, structural adjustment programs, good governance, freedom of speech, freedom of press and so forth, reconstructed a very effective power system based on the 'ethical cult of the self' (Foucault, 1988). These global institutions of power were represented as a forward-looking and future-oriented pedagogical mission aimed at bettering the individual, improving the human person in order to ensure his progress. They extended the judgmental grounds of 'crime' to incorporate the personality of the presumed criminal. In this way, decision-making on Mukong's sanity, treatment, well-being, family relations and so forth and the cumulative effects of these new areas of focus energized the imperative of his release from prison. The 'why' was separated from the 'what' of his 'crime', the 'motive' behind the culpable act of challenging the status quo from its 'magnitude', the 'crime' from the 'criminal'. Consequently, instead of calling for the execution of Albert Mukong, the 'criminal', the public gaze shifted to the conditions under which he was being detained such as repetitive arrests, poor hygienic conditions, brutality, incompetent officials of the legal system, arbitrariness, etc, the noble nature of his struggles (material freedom of anglophones, institution of democracy, struggles against dictatorship, etc), and the personality of the prisoner (public 'hero', political intellectual, a man with extraordinary spiritual powers, a moral nationalist, elder statesman, political guru, writer and so on) (My Stewardship, p. 78).

These new 'judgmental' criteria competed with the penal verdicts of official state judges by subjecting Mukong's body to greater public scrutiny and removed his body from the physical prison setting. Thanks to the 'humanization' of global power, there was a greater publicity and visibility of the individual prisoner. Albert Mukong's integrity, sensitivity and liberty took a prominent place in the mass media, political conferences, popular discourse, law courts, public speeches, diplomatic releases and so forth and the crime of 'treason' took a backseat. It became increasingly difficult for the regime to subject Mukong to death under these new power situations. This shift conferred a new status on Mukong; from the 1990s, he was no longer just any ordinary 'prisoner' in the disciplinary sense, but a respectable 'delinquent', (My Stewardship, p. 85) a more considerate term used to differentiate him from a 'criminal'. Albert Mukong was no longer the body to be acted upon, but the subject of global 'political technology' affected by new mechanisms of observation and examination. His sojourns in and out of prison and detailed timetable hour by hour were now monitored extensively by the general public, newly created political parties, embassies, legal experts in the west, mass media in and out of Cameroon such as the VOA, the BBC and RFI (My

Stewardship, all of chapter 1). The idea of Mukong as 'criminal' became highly contentious; it moved away from the notion of an 'enemy' of the state, to one of a 'normal' human being who is simply concerned with the welfare of the Anglophone community. Soon, Mukong became the 'useful citizen' (My Stewardship, p. 98) fighting not only for justice for anglophones but also for the freedom of dispossessed francophone masses. The new technology of power clearly set him apart from the status earlier entrusted upon him but it also opened up a new setting that facilitated his supervision and objectified his body as a target of liberal institutions.

Biopower became a method of co-operation with the subject rather than contesting the subject; and through the subject, it was able to attain the rest of society, namely, the ruling elites, prison guards, law courts, police and security officers, party officials, lawyers, administrators, magistrates, prosecutors and all. Mukong's My Stewardship shows that this new paradigm of possession was a type of instrumentalization crafted upon the technique of organization through the biopolitics of associations, groupings and belonging. Consequently, in order to advance the global ethic, numerous human rights organizations were created and legalized such as Action des Chrétiens pour l'Abolition de la Torture, Conscience Africaine, Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Cameroun of the anglophone priest, Cardinal Tumi, Mouvement pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés, S.O.S Droit et Démocratie, Human Rights Clinic and Education Centre, SOS Jeunesse Libre and Albert Mukong's own Human Rights Defence Group with headquarters in Bamenda. In Cameroon, these human rights organizations co-existed with NGOs (e.g. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), more than one hundred and fifty opposition parties (SDF, UNDP, UPC, UDC) and legally registered civil society movements such as S.O.S Dialogue. Prominent lawyers and experts in international criminal and military law, such as Maurice Nkouendjin-Yotnda, Yondo Marcel, Akere T. Muna and election observers, emerged to defend 'the people' against disciplinary dictatorship (My Stewardship, chapter 8).

With the influence of western diplomatic sources, journalistic units such as The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Reports on Cameroon, Transparency International and independent newspapers like The Messenger and The Post, the single party machinery of neo-patrimonial was compromised. Several western countries such as the USA, Holland, Britain, France and Japan and organizations working with NGOs in these states provided financial support and scholarships for courses in democracy and human rights projects. Western political parties such as the German social democratic party contributed information on the human rights situation, and repeatedly criticized the ruling elites in Cameroon for human rights violations, corruption and abuse of political power. Consequently, on 8 November, 1990, decree No 90/459 was signed in Cameroon setting

up the National Commission for Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) charged with documenting grievances about human rights infringements, proposing initiatives on the respect of human rights, reporting them to officials of the state and organizing courses on human rights in prisons. The creation of the NCHRF reflected the extent to which neo-patrimonial power was already waning, although the NCHRF instantly became an ambiguous narrative perceived by the national community, the intellectual societies, the independent press and so on, as a window-dressing measure intended to manipulate western countries with their human rights conditionalities prior to obtaining loans from the IMF and World Bank.

After his release, Albert Mukong and many others (Yondo Black, Jules Nkepchou, etc) who were also freed, did not go into oblivion but went into the public light as active human rights lawyers and activists visiting other prisons in the country and writing reports for newspapers, international organizations and local groups. Boh and Ofegbe and other professionals like Dr. Eyoh Ndumbe, a university professor, were also released when news came to the government's attention that university of Yaounde students had 'programmed a public march, and had spent the morning chipping in to buy material for placards, billboards, graffiti, etc, in preparation for the event' (The Prison Graduate, p. 87). Instead of taking Boh and Ofegbe to court to answer charges of making public calls for multiparty elections, the state executed the orders of the now 'public' judges, namely, the students, after they broke into 'the advanced school of mass communications (ASMAC) to demand the release of the journalists' (Prison Graduate, p. 89). They showed that neo-patrimonial rule was a deviant system, it was the 'illness' of Cameroonians which had to be treated by an appropriate global therapy under the responsibility of technicians and engineers of the liberal ideology such as NGOs of human rights, transparency international, embassies, the new breed of lawyers, churches, etc. Mukong's human rights organization was supported morally and financially by western embassies and international organizations such as Amnesty International and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy for defending the abused rights of citizens, bringing greater awareness of respect for the individual's 'body' to officials in prisons, police security cells, the administration and causing magistrates to expedite rather than delay court rulings. Mukong traveled to deliver speeches in the UN on the human rights situation in Cameroon; he sojourned in Britain where he met political leaders like the UPC's Ndeh Ntumazah (My Stewardship, p.111). Before Mukong's recent death, he was honoured and supported financially by the state of Cameroon. Like many others, his group contributed to narrate a post-patrimonial national era by inspecting and gathering information on cases of torture of females, juveniles, student activists, journalists, trade unionists and intellectuals in prisons, detention camps and security services. He gave reports

of violence enacted on victims by the authorities, fed these into the mass media and disseminated them across to the west.

As one of the founding fathers of the Social Democratic Front, Cameroon's most important opposition party, Mukong kept alive the language of multiparty democracy through conferences on concepts like federalism, independent electoral commission, minority rights, rights of women and children, multiple media bodies, free speech, disability rights and so forth. The very enthusiastic responses to and discussions of his ideas by anglophones and francophones attested to the changing times and, probably, his discourse on freedom also opened up new perspectives for separatist movements, such as the Southern Cameroons National Conference (SCNC), an offshoot of the Anglophone Cameroon movement, with radical demands for secession and international recognition of national independence for the anglophone part of Cameroon. But separatist movements like the SCNC, transformed from political movements to pressure groups, were sometimes undermined by factional leadership. Nevertheless, they succeeded to draw national attention to the fate of the 'anglophone problem' by constructing new narratives of power based on what they termed the 'force of argument and not the argument of force' through reminders such as '1 October: independence day', 'anglophones as second citizens', 'Southern Cameroons versus la République' and so forth, thereby causing the state to mobilize its elites to take more seriously and rhetoricize the national unity idiom on 20 May and 1 October of each year, to consider Anglophones in more important administrative and parliamentary appointments and so forth.

Mukong distributed his books, pamphlets (e.g. 'Where Things Went Wrong') and articles in university bookshops, clubs, press offices and so on and created an intellectual-moral bloc to educate the masses on their rights. This tactic of mass literary dissemination spawned 'fantasies' that had the potential to mobilize growing reactions and disrupt the legitimacy of the ruling elites in the eyes of the masses. Popular literature by private newspapers, human rights activists in the form of tracts, private radio information, etc, created new public imaginaries, transformed the mind-set of the regime, changed public attitudes and now, one could see frequent protests, open outcries, that enabled a robust 'defence of civil-liberties' and a more humanizing nation state. Other signs show that there was an active and fairly effective counter-power system present in the Cameroon of the late 1980s and beyond and was being 'narrated' by churches, human rights organisations, political parties, private radio stations, the mass media and the international community. For example, even the hitherto hesitant regime of Paul Biya soon began to embrace multiparty politics and liberalism (Biya, 1987) and most vocal leaders of the opposition political movements were either not imprisoned, released if they had been imprisoned or

were quickly released soon after if they were incarcerated for fear that this may needlessly 'soil' the image of the state before the more conscious national public and the international community that controlled the Bretton woods institutions. The prospect of an 'official' arrest or long term detention of opposition leaders like Ni John Fru Ndi, Hameni Bieleu, etc on chiefly political grounds as was the case in the past was no longer possible or ceased. There were fewer cases of censorship of newspapers compared to the past. However, this era of press freedom opened up new forms of journalistic imaginaries marked by publication of unconfirmed or untrue stories. Consequently, journalistic utopia (correct information source, refined language, acknowledgement of limitations, etc) gave way to media dystopia in which all knowledge forms (insult, defamation or libel) were permissible in the name of freedom of speech, right of access to thought and alternation of ideas and so forth.

Nevertheless, these neoliberal governmentalities promoted the citizen's self-regulation and optimization, while at the same time enforcing social control, and pursuing their own fragmentation and divisibility. While the neoliberal policy of optimizing and protecting individual freedoms and liberties was clearly liberating, at the same time, this liberation concealed the global goal of marketization of the Cameroonian society, based on a rather mistrusted and highly risky assumption that capitalist market freedom was the ultimate medium for the expansion of society's development so that marginalized individuals could also benefit from its fruits. At least, today's economic crisis in America, which has affected the rest of the world, bears out a powerful proof of this risk. From this light, it can be argued that this strategy of fostering the accountability and responsibility of the citizen was simply a way of reverting from the repressive power of the disciplinary regime, not to a situation of absence of power, but to another, this time, more latent and very subtle form of power, based on the positivity of freedom. Although at the external level, the neoliberal policy set out to promote freedom and social justice, at the internal and therefore concealed level, these goals were denied by the imperative for capitalist penetration and accumulation in Cameroon. In this way, the very policy that sought to liberate the individual citizen conspired to deny him the distributive justice it promised. The result was the deep crisis Cameroon is experiencing today; it has been so grinding a crisis that, ironically, the very Bretton Woods institutions that facilitated the policy, have admitted that Cameroon is very poor and heavily-indebted (IMF, 2006).

By using technologies that engaged with the 'cult of the self', it did not matter whether that self was a category called 'group', 'association', 'teacher', 'police officer', 'farmer', 'town planner', 'the disabled' or 'street beggar'. The process of knowledge production started from the premise that all of these categories were equal, had rights and had to have the same opportunities for self-

improvement. Under neoliberal governmentality, sovereignty was dispersed among groups of society and 'individuals' rather than centralized in the Cameroonian state in such a way that the pastoral responsibilities of the state were re-distributed among individual subjects, ethnic subjects, village subjects, regional subjects, etc, who now felt empowered more than before. Instead of the National Produce Marketing Board, the main establishment that regulated raw materials production and sales and which eclipsed in the 1980s, a plurality of 'privatised' enterprises emerged like the Bakweri Co-operative Union of Farmers, Santa Coffee Estate, the Tea Estate, etc. The National Telecommunications was replaced by MTN, Orange, Camtel, etc. The National Bank, Cameroon Bank collapsed and was replaced by multitudes of foreign-owned/shared international banks, such as BICEC, SGBC, SCB and now multitudes of micro-finance banks have been created and each ethnic group in Cameroon is now creating its own cooperative bank. The rationale advanced for this pluralism was that the banks were targeting the impoverished masses to start their own individual businesses and 'right the wrongs', which had been inflicted upon them for decades by the disciplinary regime. At the same time, state officials felt a sense of relief from this pluralism because the 'risks' that came with economic governance were disseminated and the government could not be subjected to the same pressure to treat the needs of every single sector of the nation.

In this productive administration of life, individual Cameroonians were induced into serving the interests of market forces and capitalist accumulation as 'partners' rather than as merely 'clients'. For example, Cameroonians were recruited as new managers of the health conditions of the national population (thereby replacing the medical doctor in the disciplinary state hospital) through pharmaceutical interventions like the sale of food supplements, which promised to add vital nutritive elements (calcium, proteins, vitamins, etc) into the malnourished bodies of impoverished Cameroonians. These individual Cameroonians, who could now be 'consulted' (as pseudo-medical doctors even without any training) by the public for prescriptions on their different ailments, food needs, etc, rented apartments in the cities and neighbourhoods and set up public notices that announced the miraculous virtues of products like GNLD, NG4L, Tianshi tea, etc. But they were not just commercial agents for these very expensive products, they were also stakeholders and market advertisers charged with co-opting their potential customers to appreciate not only the nutritional but also the financial benefits they would derive if they too joined in the 'chain' of vendors by proposing the products to their own family members, friends, etc, in exchange for a bonus if they managed to sell the products to new clients.

In this way, biopower expanded the capacity of capitalism to expropriate value from dependent relations

of production but without significantly improving the working prospects of these civilian 'partners' of capitalist expansion. Indeed, many of these 'partners' soon went out of business as public trust in the virtues of the products declined, and they joined the increasing fold of the poor and the unemployed. As another example, unemployed youths, single mothers, school dropouts, etc (the society that must be defended), could now be found as vendors of phone credit cards, mobile phones and other telecommunications products distributed by various ITC partners. But their trade subjected them to very difficult working conditions (the heat-baked streets of Cameroon, frequent accidents, etc), and they could not really make sustainable profits and a long-term career in it, although, even with these disadvantages, this was seen as better than 'nothing'; 'nothing' being the failure of the state to effect its pastoral function of providing employment, health services, security, and so on. The state's pastoral role was also negatively affected in the sense that the biopower web of entanglements transformed the state as authority with a welfare mission, into institutions of rent and soon the state was seen as implicated in the degeneration and corrupt practices of privatized parastatal organisations. Global market operations such as privatization and the consequent regulation of privatized parastatals were placed in the hands of the state. But soon, this operation implicated officials in acts of corruption or duplicity. Instances of this entangling power abound where 'liquidation turns punitive' for the state ministers (Eden, 2009: 3).

Neoliberal governmentality expanded its presence 'from a distance' through biopolitical 'technologies of the self' that used flexible networks across social realms of life (Nadesan, 2008). For example, government schools and universities were now rivaling with strings of private school establishments and universities offering more flexibility in the nature of the curricula, conditions of admission, installment fee payments, and with flows of advertisement rhetoric on the certain prospects of immediate employment upon graduation. In order to make their establishments more credible to the public eye, they announced technical and cooperation ties with prestigious universities in Europe and America. Private teachers offered extra and paid tuition to regular students in state establishments; private doctor services proliferated and traditional herbal therapists moved from their villages to propose their services on conspicuous roadsides because native doctors from Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, were making their entry already into the country and offering very competitive services to the public especially in areas like fertility, sexually-transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS, which they claimed to cure. Here, consultation was free but treatment for natural and unnatural diseases, which was available, was paid for whether the passer-by was ill or not (Ngarka, 1985).

In the Cameroonian disciplinary regime, the citizen moved progressively from one type of 'enclosure' to ano-

ther, for example, from school to work (the ministerial administration, military, company, etc), to appointment as an executive officer within the workplace, to retirement and death. In the control society of globalization, following the Deleuzian concept of 'modulation' (Deleuze, 1990), the citizen was never done completely with anything in life; he moved from the school environment to the enterprise of capital, where he worked for a short time and could return to school to acquire some more specific skills in a more technologically advanced area and then went back to the enterprise and then could see opportunity elsewhere in another company and shift accordingly or move to another country, and so on. This type of flexibility of productivity and subjectivity of labour was very competitive in a disciplinary setting where upward social mobility within the administration, for example, was very restricted at times and was dependent upon which political party one belonged to, and was frozen at other times even for those who militated in the dominant, government party.

Disciplinary techniques used by the neo-patrimonial elites knew only the body of the individual whom they punished. Biopower, on the other hand, focused on people as a mass to regulate, characterize, mobilize, and forecast. Where disciplinary power focused on particular political opponents like the intellectual prisoner, Albert Mukong (Mukong, 1985), biopower focused much more upon the generalized and generalizable category called the citizenry, who could be serialized (placed in a repeatable and transposable cycle). The biopower epistemology consisted in deploying mechanisms of governmentality to produce 'new kinds of people' through, for example, health programs on HIV/AIDS prevention in Africa. George Bush's terms of abstinence and faithfulness only were applied in Africa to regulate the population as a mass comprising the 'good' (abstaining from sexuality, being faithful) and the 'bad' (sexually promiscuous users of condoms). These mechanisms, concerned with the mass, reflected a way of producing knowledge that erased individuality and particularisms and prioritized generalizable categories and classifications. But by erasing particularisms in favour of deploying a universalized mechanism across the continent of Africa, biopower also faced moments of resistance. For example, after the visit of Pope Benedict XVI on 16 March 2009 during which he asked youths (as a whole, not a particular class of youths) to practice sexual abstinence, prostitutes went into a rampage to protest! At such an instance, a new national historiographical trend emerged to distance itself from the production of universalized knowledge based upon a particular behavioural biopower epistemology.

An extension of this critical view included western medicinal biopower in Africa. The western states had the ability to produce, distribute, administer, and regulate HIV/AIDS retroviral drugs in Africa. From this perspective, pharmaceutical companies were an annexure of western

state influence. Medicine was used as an instrument of global capitalist expansion, in South Africa, for example. Foucault's insight about 'people as species', about 'individuals who could be generalized and [are] generalizable...serialized,' is applicable to the South African and indeed the whole African context, where Africans were 'generalized' into binary categories such as HIV Positive and HIV Negative, reflecting how in the past imperialists reduced Africans to binaries, such as civilized/uncivilized. Thus, as a technology of (bio) power, western medicine influenced the way Africans were 'known' globally but also informed the ways Africans reacted against this kind of control system. In South Africa, HIV/AIDS patients went on the streets to protest against any further withholding of the drugs. This was consistent with the 'good/bad' policy of President Bush; and had the patients (the 'bad' population) not gone on strike, the outcome would have been massive death. The positive response that followed from the strike, namely, reproduction of the drugs by the South African government, showed that biopower was also a vulnerable power. South Africa is now producing retrovirals, though the majority of drug laboratories, research facilities and university experimental hospitals continue to exist mainly in the west. In these sites of discontinuities, divergences and contradictions, the African state was re-instituted as a distinct category rather than as just a single global, continuum and this explains the staying power of the state even though it has lost much of the authority it possessed after independence. The global multinational corporations, NGOs and institutions concerned with the fight against HIV/AIDS, came across in Cameroon as survey institutions preoccupied with maximising the life chances of the threatened 'species' of the national population, against the 'epidemics'. It took a stance of prevention of the obstacles (e.g. refusal to abstain from sex, infidelity, etc) to the impending calamities that the Cameroon population was faced with. In the eyes of the people, biopower was a legitimate regulative mechanism, because it had come to manage the 'unpredictable' future that the one-party system had created. It was thus represented as a force bringing equilibrium to a nation that had lost its balance and was tipping toward insecurity, instability, etc;

Global biopower came in the institutional form of new revivalist religions and evangelical missions. What was particularly notable about them was their plurality but also their adaptability: from the orthodox Roman Catholic Church and protestant missions (Presbyterian and Baptist, notably), which endorsed the discipline regime, there was a sudden emergence of multiples of revivalist movements such as the Synagogue Church of all Nations, Seventh Day Adventist church, Mountain of Fire church, Calvary Church, and so forth, found in all the neighbourhoods of Cameroon. They delivered sermon in local languages suggesting their acculturation within certain ethnic groups or used the varieties of English/

French that were more reflective of the ordinary people's lingua franca. Reverend Pastor Shrapnell represents these revivalist movements in Salvation Colony (Asong, 1997). In his Salvation Colony of the Angels of Limbo Church of Africa, one finds Cameroonians of all walks of life, who have been frustrated by the disciplinary life of the state, namely, single, unmarried mothers, the crippled, beggars who have come for money and food, refugees, abandoned children, the unemployed, etc. The pastor makes no secret of the superiority of his church vis-à-vis other conventional churches, as he meets his first converts: 'it is different from all the others in that we do what they do not and cannot do. For instance, we live together in one brotherhood, in a colony where the blind, the lame, the deaf, the dumb, the good, the bad, the ugly, are all shown the way to God. It is deeper than Deeper Life, truer than the so-called True Church, witnesses more miracles than the Jehovah Witnesses, preach more gospels than the so-called Full Gospel' (Salvation Colony, p.56). By giving food, drinks, money and all that pulled the unfortunate toward the colony, Limbo Church of Africa, like most revivalist movements, shows itself as being sensitive not only to the spiritual but also to the material needs of its flocks.

In this way, global evangelical revivalism in Africa went hand in hand with the market, as Karl Marx had theorized in his famous discourse of the 'opium'. Free market capitalism generated more oppression, poverty, hunger and displacements than the disciplinary regime; hence, the role of this institutional 'superstructure' was to 'tranquillize' the confused and impoverished population and give them a sense of a spiritual direction away from the material injustices of the new world. Nevertheless, this only legitimated the penetration of capital and could not stop it from causing the havoc that it was programmed to trigger.

New landscapes of global flow

In the geopolitical philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the critics urge us to discard the perception of territoriality as a stratified structure and adopt a new understanding of territoriality in which territory incorporates the ambiguity of space, origins are unstable and new possibilities are created and produced by global interconnections (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). From the 1980s, state sovereignty in Cameroon underwent unsettling moments of de-territorialization, transgression and inconsistency. There was a renunciation of the state by the nation through a social flux in which the idea of a national 'home' became problematical. This is not to suggest that de-territorialization invalidated the idea of Cameroon as a nation, but that de-territorialization subverted the notion that territory can be policed and identity disciplined so as to create a strict category called 'home' that will indefinitely protect nationals from the exigencies

of their economic livelihoods. The notion of Cameroon as an autonomous state bounded up by its own national 'economy' and internal dynamics 'fainted out' and was replaced by the idea of a state within the world-economy. Under this new circumstance, the state in Cameroon was increasingly unable to exercise agency in the global system and the national community in Cameroon was now disillusioned and functioning within the dynamics of the global capitalist world (Sitton, 1996). Their awareness as national members living only within the nation state of Cameroon was almost becoming "dépasseé".

From the 1990s to 2000, the Cameroonian state mechanism was eroding and being transformed into a 'client' institution within the wider structural global context of capital. The international system was no longer a 'states system'; rather, it was now 'plurilateral', that is a plural and 'composite', structure (Cerny, 1995). Global capitalism induced changes in the national configuration and in the economic role of the state in Cameroon. For example, the economy was regulated not only by the new market but also by new ideologically-controlled forces. The reductions in the public service imposed by the rationalist forces of structural adjustment programmes had a negative impact on the developmental economy. The nation's boundaries and state's constituent elements were becoming 'uneven' because global forces opened up opportunities for nationals to re-assert themselves through what Appadurai terms as 'scapes' (Appadurai, 1996). Migration to the west increased: ruling elites, who had embezzled state funds or suffered human persecution in different forms were 'immediately granted political asylum...in Tubab [USA]' (Asongwed, 1992:120). Ordinary Cameroonian immigrants without such an opportunity used illegal means to traverse Libyan deserts and routes through Morocco and Spain to become labour forces in France, America and Britain. Nowadays, Cameroonian migrants live in the USA, China and Europe as medical doctors, teachers, professors and service providers such as babysitters, careers for elderly persons, etc. In these countries, they were discriminated against, ghettoised as 'pathological' cases or refused socio-cultural integration. But they now represent a huge 'brain and labour drain' that has continued to impoverish and under-develop Cameroon in favour of the capitalist west. Faced with this epochal challenges, other Cameroonian youths who could not cross the frontiers to the west in search of what is referred to as 'greener pastures', came increasingly to the fore as a vanguard of struggle. Consequently, the informal sector emerged to dominate the formal sector through menial economic activities such as shoe polishing on streets (Bebey, 1988), drug vending and 419 money-doubling or con feymanism (Eba, 1997). With the rise of the informal society, the formal bureaucracy that was established at independence to facilitate development increasingly underwent corrosion.

As Appadurai rightly suggests, today, nation-states (like

Cameroon) do not monopolize the idea that 'territory' is the vital diacritic of sovereignty (Appadurai, 1996: 54). Although territorial tropes for the imaginary of the Cameroonian nation continued to take new forms, on the whole and following Appadurai, fissures appeared in Cameroon between local, translocal and transnational spaces. With migrational flows to the west, the mass media, internet, etc, the Cameroon territory as neo-patrimonial locus increasingly divorced itself from the territory as site of sovereignty and state control of civic society. With structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), good governance, deregulation, privatisation, etc, whatever was left of the developmental functions of the state in Cameroon degenerated further because the 'squeeze' in international aid and the increasing conditionalities for further assistance meant that the state could no longer service the numerous demands of the informal and formal sectors. But without a strong state direction, the market too could not drive neo-liberal programmes in Cameroon; hence, an ambivalent situation emerged in which the state was pronounced as neither dead nor alive in Africa (Thandika, 2001). What survived was the bureaucratization of the state by global forces, 'world capital...effectively absorbed the state system into itself' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: x).

Globalization removed national issues of 'nation as territory' from the control of the state and insulated socio-economic and environmental questions from public scrutiny and inspection of its legislative institutions. With the advent of international financial organisations, transnational corporations and NGOs, the new global governance introduced a legal plurality, overlapping sovereignties and an ambivalence in the role of the state, conceived of as both central and marginal (Randeria, 2007; Chang, 2003). The internal autonomy of the state declined in many areas and its external status eroded as well as it became only an agent of globalization. The Cameroonian state became indispensable to globalization because its laws and policies were now employed to transpose neo-liberal agendas onto the nation. With the rights of the Cameroon nation to development assimilated to the rights of investors, NGOs and neglect of the environmental and political crises, the country sank into a Hobbesian condition of poverty. The democratic aspirations which had once characterised the state were nullified by financialisation of international capital in Cameroon. The state in Cameroon now assumed a new and ambiguous function within the capitalist world economy; it now served as an instrument to facilitate expansion of free market ideas and cultures for the global world to which the nation state now belonged, by eliminating all acts of economic 'distortion' such as regulation, tariffs, protectionism, etc. Therefore, to cite the poet, Giftus Nkam, the 'beauty land called Cameroon' found itself in a fluid situation in which it was given '...out on loan by those with hearts of stone' (Nkam, 2006, p. 26), namely, the forces of international capital. International relations of capitalist

production continued to grow and to take new forms like deregulation of the economy, devalorisation of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc currency in 1994, structural adjustment programmes, poverty eradication papers, privatization of state corporations, streamlining of the civil service, etc (Asongwed, 1993, p. 55, 70, 98).

The poverty and underdevelopment of Cameroon was further accelerated when biopower took the forms of social connectivity, integration and interdependence that were not only at the economic but also at the social, technological, cultural and ecological levels. This was facilitated by the transnational spread of democracy, knowledge and technology with rapid grounds gained through internet networks (scamming, downloading of rock'n'roll, Afro-American blues, British, French, Indian music, etc), the use of parabolic antennas for watching foreign films, football (e.g. Manchester United is now more popular in Cameroon than its national team, the Indomitable Lions!), cell phones, ice-creams, etc. With different media re-localised such as the VOA and BBC frequencies, trans-national migrations of Cameroonians to the west was now referred to affectionately as 'bushfalling' (in reference to the Bush family presidencies). The educational system promoted by World Bank, IMF and other international lending organizations in Cameroon constituted one of the focal points from where the global order applied biopower (Foucault, 1980). This investment in education created an 'enlightened' space that enabled the institutions to press for new global measures such as cuts in government expenditures, liberalisation of trade, reduction of price controls and production for export. Consequently, there was a wave of privatisation of public utilities like CAMTEL (now run by a Chinese telephone consortium, Huawei), Sonel (now by a US electricity company, AES-Sonel), SNEC (now by a Moroccan Water Corporation), etc, which was more or less accepted. With devaluation of the CFA currency in 1994, which was rhetoricised as necessary by the 'educated' elites of the state, the state became more vulnerable to change driven by international financial forces and state reliance on global capital to fund economic growth increased as market ideology intensified.

Appadurai characterized globalization as a time of 'flow' a moment of influx of institutions of liberal capitalism geared at creating a new global cultural economy, a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order, which cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models. The complexity of the current global economy has to do with certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics. The global flows link the two 'real' communities through democracy, human rights, protection of freedom of speech, press, associations, free and fair elections, mass media communication networks, etc. In Cameroon, new 'scapes' of private radios, micro-finance banks, lobby groups of liberal and democratic political parties in Europe and USA,

revivalist Christian organizations, multinational capital, etc, were now replacing the social role of the welfare state in development. For example, the US diplomatic representation in Yaounde has been employing Enlightenment 'ideoscapes' like freedom, minority rights, anti-corruption, democracy and recently, environmental protection to justify direct intervention and direction of state policies and priorities in these areas.

In 2008, the US ambassador to Cameroon, Frances Cook, gave out funds to sponsor opposition parties' activities in preparation for municipal and parliamentary elections in which the state party of the CPDM was to take part. When the US diplomat was confronted by journalists and charged with direct interference in the internal affairs of the 'sovereign' country, she responded convolutedly as captioned in a newspaper: "I supported democracy, not Fru Ndi" (The Weekender Post, p. 1) by saying she was just supporting democracy to grow by empowering Cameroonians to know and enforce their rights. Appadurai's other 'scapes', such as his 'finanscapes', were already perceptible in Cameroon fueled by US capitalism. It will be recalled that 'ideoscapes' were of late employed, when the U.S. sought to justify its invasion and control of Iraq and Afghanistan under the compelling morality that it was bringing democracy, freedom, human rights, anti-dictatorship, etc. In addition, there were U.S. 'technoscapes' and 'mediascapes' in the country, which were regulated by and bound up with U.S. financial power. The U.S. has signed protocol agreements with private radio stations in Cameroon. An example is the most popular radio station in the North West Province, the Radio Afrique Nouvelle FM, located in Ms Ngen Junction, Bamenda, which regularly broadcasts America's own version of international and national affairs. In this way, the United States government provides financial, technical and ideological input to global development via national medias and technology.

Global capitalism penetrated into the entire system of Cameroon's natural resources as well and re-colonised the 'Unconsciousness' of indigenous human and environmental habitats. For example, in the findings of The Inspection Panel Report and Recommendation on the Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project and Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement (CAPECE) Project (Credit No. 3372-CM) (External Compliance Monitoring Group, 2003, 2004), it was reported that the CAPECE project had to assist Cameroon to develop a national capacity for environmental management and monitoring of the pipeline project and help ensure the environmental sustainability of future projects, programs and policies in its petroleum sector; including strengthening its capacity to mitigate the negative social and environmental impacts of the petroleum project. This CAPECE project extended to strengthening local institutional, regulatory and legal frameworks, increasing coordinating capacities for environmental management, strengthening public intervention capacity to protect the environment, improving resource mobilisation; creating a

climate favourable for private sector development and enhancing the state's capacity to mitigate potential negative social and environmental impacts of the Pipeline Project.

But following a report submitted by the center for the environment and development (CED), a local non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Yaounde by Mr. Savah Narcisse acting on behalf of a number of people living along the Pipeline route and other residents of Mpango village (Kribi), it was clear that the rights and interests of the people living in the areas of the pipeline project and their environment were seriously affected due to violations and misapplications of policies of the World Bank (Inspection Panel, 2002, 2003). The violations have taken the forms of 'insufficient information during the preparatory and implementation phases of the project, inadequate consultation process; insufficient, non-existent or inadequate compensation; no respect for workers' rights; a renewed outbreak of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS all along the oil pipeline and an increase in the prostitution of minors along the length of the oil pipeline. The natural habitats were not respected, there was an increasing dust and noise nuisance, which impacted negatively on the level of game available for subsistence and caused pulmonary and other health hazards to workers in the pipeline area. [1] The NGO noted the limited capacity of the state of Cameroon to undertake follow-up operations and implement the necessary mitigation measures. It revealed the World Bank's inability to ensure adequate strengthening of the capacities of the Cameroonian administration, the adverse effects of the project on water sources leading to drying up, reduction of flow and/or pollution of water sources, with harmful impact on fisheries and on the availability of water for consumption and irrigation. It regretted the loss of the rights of the fishing communities and warned that the project has caused structural impoverishment of numerous persons living along the oil pipeline. In fact, because of the lack of management and methods of payment of compensation, many local populations living along the oil pipeline have not been able to reconstitute plantations destroyed during the construction work.

With the new status of the state as an agent of change having been severely diminished, in 1996, the Bretton Woods agencies, the IMF and World Bank and bilateral partners declared the state of Cameroon as among 41 'heavily indebted and poor countries' (HIPC), with total debts amounting to about 10% of Third World debts. Persistent reports such as African Development Fund's Memorandum of 3 February, 2004 and International Monetary Fund's Country Report No. 06/190 dated May 2006 (IMF, 2006) as well as accounts of governments of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, have continued to suggest that the imperative for development and poverty eradication in Cameroon is for the state to trigger off substantial growth through the ap-

plication of macroeconomic reforms, structural adjustment programmes, good governance, financial education, deregulatory frameworks, privatisation of state corporations, removal of quotas and tariffs, etc. Cameroon's development situation deteriorated in 1985 when the state declared for the first time that it was in a serious economic slump. Several years after it was admitted into the HIPC Club, the country has continued to sink into the vexingly de-humanizing problems of absence of growth and low levels of social welfare. The status of the nation state deteriorated into further 'underdevelopment' as the patterns of interactions produced greater inequality; and 'inequality' became an intrinsic part of these interactions.

The globalization of the economy in Cameroon increasingly became a controversial issue in public debate, especially by the late years of the last millennium, with the rise of a neo-liberal thinking that sermonised the virtues of unregulated markets and advocated structural adjustment programmes, currency devaluation, privatisation, etc. The drive for a minimalist, pro-business state intensified through the radical changes of structural adjustment plans, free trade, etc, that were now implemented, often under pressure, by multilateral agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and WTO. The attention given to globalization sparked off a renewed interest in political economy. In fact, there were a large number of books and articles on whether there was the crisis of the nation-state, the eclipse of the state, the retreat of the state and even the end of the nation-state (Moon and Prasad, 2005; Ohmae, 1995). The main thematic in these eulogies was that nation-states in Africa had lost control of their national economies, currencies, territorial boundaries and even their cultures and languages and that macroscopic forms of power were shifting from the nation-state to the global market and transnational corporations. Ironically, while globalization progressed apace under their auspices, states were seen as increasingly circumvented and weakened by the requirements of global capital.

Suggested strategic policy perspectives

This paper has attempted to show that the 'take-off' epoch of development from the 1960s to present date failed to move to the phases of maturity, industrialisation and mass consumerism as some scholars thought (Walt, 1960) and as others predicted (Leys, 1996) in Cameroon, like in many other African countries (McMichael, 1996; Asante, 1991), because the welfare economic agenda was intertwined with national and international power politics. In past scholarship, the practice was to conceive boundaries between 'capital' and 'state', 'market' and 'nation', 'economics' and 'politics' as though they were separate domains (Sørensen, 1992: 37). From this study, it can be argued that these boundaries do not really exist because the space called 'nation state' is in-

distinguishable from the expanding spaces of neoliberal capitalism, because of this intertwining, the state's pastoral role in Cameroon was surrendered to market forces and the result was that poverty, indebtedness and exclusion, disease spread, child mortality and other social problems increased while rates of life expectancy, health provision, education, etc decreased in defiance of developmental rhetorics of the 'trickle down effect'. Today, the simple division between 'state' and 'market', 'domestic' and 'international' and 'economics' and 'politics' is no longer sustainable (Strange, 1999; Storper, 1989; Lumsdaine, 1996) when it comes to explaining a wide range of issues concerning Cameroon's development effort during its take-off phase. It is almost as if Cameroon had moved from a state to a market mode of production (Lefebvre, 1977) with all the risks that this transition entails.

Much more is needed for economic growth than only capital, skills and transfer of technology (Morgenthau, 1962). In order to address the increasingly complex post-independence context of market development in Cameroon, an integrated approach to development analysis is required. Stated in another way, capitalist power relations should be regarded not merely in the light of its economic nature, but also as a unity of economic, political and ideological structures. Economic penetration is intertwined with political power and the domination of ideological forms (Cox, 2008). The state class in Cameroon possessed economic power and the national class was powerless and poor not because the state class controlled the state, but because the hierarchical structure of the society in Cameroon ensured the preservation and reproduction of the entire system. The task of devising strategic policies in this national and international context is very challenging because current social and political theory is incredulous of the prospects of the welfare state in the face of the encroachment of globalization and the neo-liberal market (Holmwood, 2000). In addition, strategic policies that can bring about economic and social growth cannot be enforced entirely without taking into consideration potential foreign economic retaliation or national reactions. At global level, the risk would be that any such policies may be perceived as a challenge by the global powers and by the Bretton Woods institutions as a sign that Cameroon was putting its domestic political and economic problems ahead of its international commitments and responsibilities.

Nevertheless, with the US credit crunch/ financial crisis, the looming recession in Europe and the world and the increasing poverty, exclusion and underdevelopment in Cameroon, it is suggested that the imperative strategic policy for Cameroon's take-off development would be to start from John Maynard Keynes's famous concept that public policy must promote the 'euthanasia of the rentier'. Capital should be employed not for short-term financial gains but rather for supporting productive investment in the long term in order to promote full employment and

contribute to the fight against poverty and exclusion. Full employment would encourage social cohesion and this would transform capitalism by embedding the financial sector in the social, thereby ending finance-driven capitalism. There should be greater democratic control over political and financial institutions.

It is necessary to construct a relationship of political legitimacy between the state and its 'national communities'. There should be a new kind of 'state restructuring', a 'developmental state' restructuring (Purcell and Nevins, 2005; Verena and Menocal, 2006; Woo-Cumings, 1999) in Cameroon whose role shall be to 'cement' social and national relations that are now severely broken because this would ultimately redistribute the resources of capitalist accumulation. One way of starting the healing process caused by the national (francophone/anglophone) division, would be for the state (whatever remains of it anyway) to stimulate 'convergence' of the anglophone/francophone nationalist and indigenous economies, similar to the example in Eastern Europe (Drahokoupil, 2007). In this way, by 'bringing the state back in' (Skocpol, 1985), Cameroon would shift its focus from its present inward-oriented and divisive political, social and economic nationalisms, into a greater nation-state vision capable of meeting the challenges of global competitiveness.

Third, an approach from alternative development strategies to deal with globalization as suggested by certain scholars (Osaghae, 1998) would be to build a strong network of civil society which is presently absent in Cameroon. There is need for institutional changes to assist the economy and national community to climb out of its current 'low level equilibrium trap'. The emphasis of a new policy consensus (IFAD, 2001; World Bank, 2000, 2002) should be on the institutional environment (lacking formal attention to institutional arrangements), through government and civil society action to improve social communications, social property rights, treatment of the natural environment with more sensitive strategies of protection (Simon, 2003), the macro-economic system and access to information to support competitive markets.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am very thankful to the anonymous reviewer whose very insightful comments, criticisms and observations on the first draft of this paper gave me additional inspiration.

Footnotes

[1] The renown Cameroonian critic, Professor Bole Butake classifies Albert Mukong's writings *Prisoner Without a Crime and My Stewardship in the Cameroon Struggle* in his lectures and anthologies of Cameroon writing in English as autobiographies.

[2] It should be recalled that parallel situations of environmental destruction exist in other parts of Africa such as Ivory Coast where a transnational company, Trafigura, dumped toxic wastes in Abidjan causing numerous deaths and various pulmonary diseases in the community. In order to avoid judicial proceedings against them, Trafigura reached a US \$197 million settlement with the government of Ivory Coast and recently, accepted to pay US \$1500 to each individual victim. Nevertheless, this compensation is only symbolic and can never cover long-term damages caused at social, cultural and environmental levels

REFERENCES

- Appadurai A (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Asante SB (1991). *African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies*, Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan
- Asongwed T (1993). *Born to Rule*, Heritage Publishing Company, Maryland.
- Bayart JF (1979). *L'Etat au Cameroun*, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.
- Bebey F (1988). *Trois Petits Cireurs*, Editions Cle, Yaounde.
- Besong B (1986). *The Most Cruel Death of the Talkative Zombie*, Nooremac
- Beti M (1972). *Main Basse sur le Cameroun*, Éditions François Maspero, Paris.
- Biya P (1987). *Pour le Liberalism Communautaire*, Editions Pierre Marcel Fabre/ABC, Switzerland. Cambridge J. Econ. 25(3): 289-313.
- Cerny PG (1995). 'Globalization and the changing logic of collective action, *Int. Organ.* 49(4): 595-626.
- Chang HJ (2003). *Globalisation, Economic Development and the Role of the State*, Third World Network and Zed Books.
- Chaudhry KA (1993). 'The myths of the market and the common history of late developers', *Pol. Soc.* 21(3): 245-73.
- cohesion in Africa,' AAPS Occasional Paper Series, vol, 2, no, 2. Press, Limbe.
- Cox K (2008). 'The abstract, the concrete, and the argument in the new urban politics', *J. Urban Affairs* 13(3): 299-306
- Deleuze G, Felix G (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Drahokoupil J (2007). 'State strategies in Central and Eastern Europe: the politics of the process of convergence towards the competition state,' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, TBA, New York, New York City.
- Eba P (1997). *The Multimillionaire*, Copy printing technology, Mankon. Eden Newspaper, 2009, 24 August, no, 397, p. 3
- External Compliance Monitoring Group (ECMG) (2003). *Ninth Site Visit October – November*, Chad Export Project, Cameroon Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement Project, Chad Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project, D'Appolonia, December.
- Foucault M (1991). *Discipline and Punish*, Penguin Books, London.
- Foucault, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass
- Hardt M, Negri A (2000). *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Holmwood J (2000). 'Three pillars of welfare state theory: T.H. Marshall, Karl Polanyi and Alva Myrdal in defence of the national welfare state,' *European J. Soc. Theory* 3(1): 23-50.
- Inspection Panel (2002). *Investigation Report*, INSP/R2002-0003, July 23, 2002.
- International Monetary Fund (2006). 'Cameroon: enhanced heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative-completion point document and multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI),' Country Report No. 06/190, Washington, D.C. 20431.
- Lefebvre H (1977). *De l'État 3: Le mode de production*, Union Générale d'Éditions, Paris.
- Leys C (1996). *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.
- Lumsdaine D (1996). 'The intertwining of domestic politics and international relations,' *Pol. Forum* 29(2): 299-306.
- McMichael P (1996). 'Wither development?' in McMichael P., *Development and Change, A Global Perspective*, pine forge press 8: 241-258.
- Molua E (2002). 'Cameroon and the challenges of globalization: an exploration for adaptation and benefit maximization,' Cameroon Development Project, Discussion Paper No. 15/2002, Centre for Independent Development Research, Cameroon.
- Moon C, Rashemi P (2005). 'Beyond the developmental state: networks, politics, and institutions,' *Governance, An International J. Pol. Admin. Institut.* 7(4): 360-386.
- Mukong A (1985). *Prisoner Without a Crime*, Alfresco, Bamenda.
- Nadesan MH (2008). *Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life*, Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought, No. 57, New York and London
- Nkam G (2006). *Tears from Within*, Unique Printers, Bamenda.
- Ohmae K (1995). *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*, Harper Collins, London,
- Osaghae E (1998). 'Structural adjustment, civil society and national state theory, and the case of U.S.–Mexico border enforcement in the 1990s,' *Pol. Geo.* 24(2): 211-235
- Randeria S (2007). 'The state of globalization: legal plurality, overlapping sovereignties and ambiguous alliances between civil society and the cunning state in India,' *Theory Cult. Soc.* 24(1): 1-33
- Simon D (2003). 'Dilemmas of development and the environment in a globalizing world: theory, policy and praxis,' *Progr. Develop. Stud.* 3(1): 5-41.
- Sitton J (1996). *Modern Marxian Theory: Class Formation and Social Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, University of New York Press, New York.
- Skocpol T (1985). 'Bringing the state back in: strategies of analysis in current research,' in P. Evans et al (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, New York pp. 3-37.
- Sørensen G (1992). 'Economics and politics in international relations,' In Helena Lindholm, ed., *Approaches to the Study of International Political Economy*, Padrigu Papers, Göteborg, pp. 36-60.
- Storper M, Walker R (1989). *The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology and Industrial Growth*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Strange S (1999). *States and Markets*, Pinter, London.
- Thandika M (2001). 'Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,' *The Weekender Post*, July, 4, 2008, No.0965,
- Transparency International (2007). *Global Corruption Report 2007*, CUP, London. Committee of the Union of the Populations of the Cameroons, Cario.
- Verena, Fritz and Rocha Menocal, Alina, 2006, 'Re-building developmental states: from theory to practice,' *Working Paper*, no, 274.
- Walt R (1960). *Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge University Press, London.
- Woo CM ed., (1999), *The Developmental State*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.