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Globalization, migration and the philosophy of in-ward looking: The contemporary Igbo nation in perspective

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The prevailing global order has maximally influenced the rate of migratory behaviour of people in recent times as so many individuals have been compelled by circumstances to shift bases. For instance, the rate of exodus of the cream of Igbos from their home-front in the last 30 years is excessive. It is a situation where about the weakest 30% of them are at home and the upper 70% of others live outside.

Key words: Globalisation, migration, Igbo nation.

INTRODUCTION

In a changing world as we are now, in a new millennium marked by regional alliances, continental unions, expanding borders, global villagisation, common markets, common monetary policies and common defence pacts, it would be abnormal for any society to close itself up (Uwalaka, 2003).

The conventional wisdom in the 21st century is that the wave and forces of globalization attempts at unifying widely different societies and deepening linkages of national economies into a worldwide market for goods, services and capital. This, for instance, takes place in an environment in which traditional development and growth paradigms no longer “bake bread” in the sense of providing adequate guidance for the satisfaction of changing population needs and demands.

Thus, it suffices to say that globalization and migration represent two of the most dynamic global socio-political trends of our present times. While both have their own driving dynamics, they are highly interrelated. Globalization has an ambivalence and somehow contradictory influence on the current migratory flows. For one, it creates situations and conditions which increase the pressure and desire to migrate. To be specific, the current at which many Igbos from the south-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria move away from their home base in recent times is rather disturbing and worrisome.

The question that keeps agitating minds is, how can a zone with such imbalance in its human resource development stir up a new consciousness towards integration into the new global order? It is against this background that the paper argues that there is an overwhelming need for strong home base directed development projects. The

assumption is that the Igbos in diaspora especially those who have in varying forms and persuasions contributed in the development of other parts of Nigeria and beyond, could as a matter of importance and necessity, competently evolve implementable (action result-oriented) programmes that are capable of transforming the zone into a centre of attraction – a global village.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

Undoubtedly, two concepts are central in this study – globalization and migration, and their analyses however, will be in that order.

It has been argued that the term globalization has been in us since (at least) the early 1990's to characterize the present period in which we live. Yet the concept is full of ambiguities and has generated a great deal of debate and controversies. One of the controversies is tied to 'what feature the term refers to, that is, the specific forms taken by globalization, the forces driving it and its consequences for the global system and for what particular group of countries (Oraegbunam, 2006).

From another point of view, globalization is conceived as an imperialist policy which is a successor to the 'structural adjustment programme' (SAP). The campaign for SAP ended in the early 1990's and the campaign for globalization replaced it in the late 1990's. In other words, since the end of the Second World War (1939 - 45) imperialistic circles have been speaking and acting through the global organizations which they dominate. These among others are principally the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, otherwise called the World Bank) and the Group of Seven (G-7) (Toyo, 2000: 8; Onimod, 2000).

Perhaps, it is in the light of the foregoing that Toyo (2000) poignantly asserts: "Anyone who thinks that globalization is not an imperialist policy supply because 'there is no evidence' those imperialists met somewhere as imperialists and conspired to proclaim globalization and impose it on all countries has a child's ignorance of the affairs of men. Who dominates the 'global' organization? Who sets them up? Whose interest primarily do they serve?"

Historically, globalization is a phase in the anti-stagflation, counter-revolutionary, tripartite competition and neo-monopolistic propaganda offensive of imperialism. It is a follow-up of the propagandistic and policy victories of the structural adjustment offensive. This follows that the current globalization campaigns is not the first in the history of capitalism. Mercantilism (1450 - 1800) was the first campaign which revolved around international primitive capitalist accumulation and the Trans Atlantic slave trade (Toyo, 2000).

Beyond this, globalization is changing the way the world looks and the way we look at the world by adapting a global outlook, we become more aware of our connections to people in other societies. We also become more conscious of the many problems the world faces at the start of the 21st century. The global perspective opens our eyes to the fact that our increasing ties with the rest of the world means that our actions have consequences for others and that the world's problems have consequences for us (Giddens, 2001).

As some scholars have noted, the era of globalization is characterized by greater integration of the world in the economic, social, cultural and political spheres. It is a process which intensifies the integration of the world economy and the people through technological advancement in several areas, particularly in the area of information technology. Scholars are also quick to recognize that though the process intensifies the integration of peoples and nations, it has impacted on different countries and peoples in an unbalanced manner: marginalizing some and rewarding some, with unequal distribution of benefits and losses (Khor, 2001; UNDP, 2001).

To Ake (1995), the whole issue of globalization stresses: growing structural differentiation and functional integration in the world economy and growing inter-dependence across the globe; it is about the nation state coming under pressure from the surge of trans-national phenomenon.

In other words, the concept is a call for lifting Restrictions on private imperialist direct investment, an attempt to exploit the fact that the Third World is chronically indebted to the imperialists already. It is a call for more capitalist investment in these countries and for firms to do business with capitalist industrial and financial firms without constraint. And it is a way of freeing the international

field of any obstacle that can harm the competition either by bilateral or by multi-lateral considerations. All these Toyo (2000) defined as 'capitalist and imperialist economic revolution'.

Globalization also images and crystallizes a brave new world of borderless trade (Higgins, 1991) in which global democratization and technological progress and innovation go hand in hand. In other words, its signification goes beyond that conventional wisdom of unfettered pursuit of profit (Hobsbawm, 1994), the decline of social reform (Teepie, 1995; Mcurtry, 1996) and an attack on democracy and social solidarity (Laxer, 1995). The emphasis is not on the world per-se but on the corporate world and how corporate opportunities, trade restrictions and cultural diversity can be managed in a changing world (Moorhead and Griffin, 1992).

As Vaughan et al. (2005) brilliantly explicated, the term globalization evokes images of the triumph of the free market system, massive capital flow, global information revolution, innovations in science, new transnational cultural expressions and rapidly shifting demographic conditions. These seemingly benevolent developments have, however, emerged in the context of the disintegration of the post-colonial state, the crisis of economic production and distribution, intractable communal conflicts, rising tension between labour and management, new pressures on the environment and the growing inequality in advanced industrialized and Third World societies following the collapse of communism in eastern Europe.

Perhaps, it is in the light of this, Steger (2003) identifies what he calls four core characteristics of globalization: Globalization involves the creation of new and the multiplication of existing social networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional, political, economic, cultural and geographical boundaries

It is reflected in the expansion and the stretching of social relations and interdependence

It involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities. Its processes also involve the subjective plan of human consciousness.

While there are some scholars who perceive globalization as a (inevitable) transformatory capitalist project, and those who argue that it is not a uniform process as it has differential impacts across the globe, Ake (1995) captures the contradictory nature of globalization thus: "It is uniformalises and diversifies; concentrates and decentres; it universalizes but also engenders particularities; it complexifies and simplifies. Always, it is mediated by historical specificities".

In the main, major disagreements remain about the precise nature of the causal forces behind globalization, with Harvey (1989, 1996) building directly on Marx's explanation and others such as Giddens (1990) and Held et al. (1999) questioning the exclusive focus on economic factors characteristics of the Marxist approach. Marx argues that it is the economy that serves as the foundation upon which is erected the super structure of culture, law

and government. However, the consensus on the phenomenon is that it is tied to deterritorialization by which a plethora of socio-economic activities take place irrespective of the geographical location of participants. As Ccholte (1996) opines, global events can via telecommunication, digital computers, audio visual media, rocketry and the like, occur almost simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world.

The point we are striving to stress is that globalization is the compression of space and time so that people from distant areas are able and in fact, obliged to interact with one another intensively and in a wide range of areas. In this wise, the world becomes one and interactions among diverse people begin to look like those within a village. Apparently, most arguments in favour of globalization pivot around Third world countries particularly Africa's needs for economic growth and the urgent need to join the global civilization and modernization.

'African nations are faced with low domestic consumer demands, lack of capital and shortage of entrepreneurial skills and cannot hope to modernize without engaging more in global economy'. Whereas many perceive globalization as the 'one ray of light at the end of Africa's tunnel of problem' using Oraegbunam's (2006) phraseology, others still have their reservation as per the whole question of the concept. These individuals feel that as far as Africa is concerned globalization is doing more harm than good. As an 'ideology', it is yet to be faithful to its avowed manifesto of enhancing global growth and development in the continent in question (Africa).

One could at this point ask: who globalizes and who is being globalized? Is the direction of the world economy today decided in Abuja, Nairobi and Accra? Certainly not in Africa but in London, Washington DC and Paris with the other G-7 governments always get in line. Perhaps, it is as a result of the abysmal de-link or disconnect of Africa from these giants that pave way for migration.

Migration has become one of the major issues of concern in the world in the last few years. The accelerated pace and impact of international migration on countries of origin, transit and destination is a phenomenon foreseen to continue. In his report on the strengthening of the United Nations – an agenda for further change, the last but one UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan identified migration as a priority issue for the international community (Nwajiuba, 2005).

The phenomenon is an inevitable part of human existence, with a long history. However, its pattern and nature has changed considerably over time, from the search for space, especially in the middle ages, to that of congestion in large cities (rural-urban migration) in the modern age (Amin, 1974; Brown 1980; Addo, 1972; Udo, 1975). As it is, by 2030 three-fifths of the world's population is expected to live in urban areas (Stephens, 2000; Nwajiuba, 2005).

In essence, migration may be associated with development, urbanization or the 'forced' movement of people

from one geographical location to another. There are two major kinds of human migration: internal and international migration. The former refers to the movement of people within their country or origin which could be due to varying social, economic and political factors, while the latter is the movement of people outside their country of origin into another country (immigration).

Whereas there are many theories explaining the concept of migration (Boswell, 2002; Crisp, 1999; Russell, 2002; Taylor, 2000; Usher, 2005), studies on the causes of migration are also legion (Adepoju, 1974; Caldwell, 1969; Green 1974; Imoagene, 1967a, 1967b; Cohen, 1995, 1996a, 1996b), the most popular perspective attribute migration to economic factors. For example, Amin (1974) holds that modern migrations are periodical migrations of labour not of people. Others talk of the migration of skilled and unskilled workers, seeking employment or 'better employment' of merchants seeking new and better investment opportunities.

The economic theory of migration is also supported by Crisp (1999) and Russell (2002). Crisp's argument is based on the scenario of people leaving low or middle income countries and seeking asylum in a more prosperous state. But this raises some questions: how are asylum seekers and others able to raise the large amount of money needed to pay for their journey? To what extent are these resources mobilized by means of remittances sent by members of the diaspora community? Other social, socio-psychological and political reasons have also been given for migration and these revolve around the better developed opportunities and amenities in urban areas which make living more convenient and comfortable (Osaghae, 1994).

Okome (2005) contends that Africans migrate from their countries of birth for much the same reasons that other immigrants do. Broadly categorized, these reasons include the economic, social or political motivations that either push immigrants into leaving their countries of origin and settling in a new country or that pull them into seeking immigration to a given country.

Push factors that stimulate migration from Africa include low pay, lack of employment, under development, exposure to endemic violence, persecution and oppression. The same applies to pull factors. Classified according to immigration status, one finds among Africans temporary migrants, permanent residents, naturalized citizens, exiles and refugees. However it is viewed and assumed that one other factor that propels and galvanizes migration is industrialization. When this is the case, the environment aptly attracts people of varying potentials and talents.

Hitherto, America today happens to be one of the most industrialized nations in the world hence, it is referred to as the melting pot of various nationalities – Afro Americans and the Jewish Americans. Some millions of migrants move from differing nations to the US. Little wonders today, brain drain and unauthorized migration are

increasing in scope as large number of Africans move to either Europe or North America in search of greener pastures or improved standard of living (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/migration>). The consequences of this migratory behaviour of Africa include, poor human resource development, attempts by immigrants to influence the foreign policy of their host country and the domestic policy of their home country and financial remittances to their homeland (Okome, 2005).

Specifically, Nigeria plays a key role in African migrations. As Africa's demographic giant, Nigeria has become increasingly involved in international migration to Europe, North America, the Gulf countries and South Africa. In the colonial era for instance, Nigerians migrated to the United Kingdom principally to pursue higher education. After independence in 1960, this largely highly skilled migration to the UK and the US continued (Adepoju, 2000; 2004). Recently, Nigerians have started migrating to countries such as Ghana, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa. In particular, Nigerians have found the booming economy of South Africa to be convenient alternatives to Europe, the US and the Gulf states (Black et al., 2004).

In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new major destinations of labour migrants from West Africa and Nigeria in particular. In fact, increasing restrictions and controls on immigration in Europe have not led to a decrease in Nigerian emigration rather migrants are more often undocumented and the movement tends to be longer in more perilous. The UK and the US (through student and professional migration as well as the Green card lottery) generally continue to attract the relatively higher skilled workers.

To be sure, the need to expand the UK National Health Services has created opportunities which poorly paid and unmotivated professional health workers find irresistible. As it is often argued, education has always been an important cause of Nigerian emigration. Hence, some take advantage of that and migrate with some members of their families to pursue studies in the US or the UK, just to escape the abysmal state of the Nigerian educational system. Besides, a significant number of Nigerians often apply for refugee status in European countries. In 2004 to be precise, Nigerians were the fifth largest group of asylum seekers in Europe (Carlilng, 2005). They tend to state ethnic and religious conflict as their reason for asylum.

Perhaps, it is against this background that the United Nations Human Rights Commission argued that failed and flawed development processes give rise to situations in which people are forced to abandon their homes, to leave their own countries and to seek refuge in other states. It (UNHCR) also assumes that it is precisely because the migrants have not been able to realize their human rights and fundamental freedom that so many of them felt obliged to seek protection outside their country of origin (UNHCR, Report June 2004).

Relatedly, the issue of trafficking of female Nigerian sex workers to Italy and other European countries has re-

ceived substantial attention. When Nigerians began migrating to Italy in the 1980's as a response to its high demand for low-skilled labour in agriculture and services, these women were only one of the many groups that migrated. The first prostitutes tended to work independently. However, in the early 1990's as immigration restrictions made prospective emigrant to increasingly depend on large loans in order to foot the bill for their move, it provided an opportunity for traffickers who enticed young women to migrate with promises of good jobs (but later coerced into prostitution) (Carling, 2005). According to a recent study, traffickers especially in Kano state successfully exploited the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes – prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work (Ehinder et al., 2006).

The Igbo migratory behaviour

While this paper does not claim to have enough evidence for most Nigerian ethnic groups in terms of their migration propensities, research suggests that the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria are the most migratory among the 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria (NISER, 1997). As buying and selling or petty trading is said to be an integral part of Igbo culture, so is the habit of migrating from one area to another. For the society (Igbo) population mobility is far from being a novelty introduced by colonialism. Instead, it has been a feature of the traditional economy. In fact, the era of slave trade rather added a new dimension to it as it saw the spread of the Igbo to almost all parts of the world.

Put differently, part of the Igbo way of life is their tendency to adventure; the Igbo are one of the most restless of people in the black race and the most traveled. It is no accident therefore, that while they put up in the Igbo homeland with housing that other Nigerian ethnic group would regard as a disgrace, they make sure that their auto-mobiles are as efficient as they possibly can be. That is, few Igbos have that passionate attachment to a particular soil, locality or region that is common among other African ethnic groups. As Ottenberg (1958) asserts:

“An Igbo man's country is his understanding, he carries it with him wherever he goes and whether he emigrates north to the Hausas or west to the Yorubas, his home is wherever he finds minds congenial to his own”.

In a related manner, Achebe (1983) captures Igbo migratory attitude thus, 'Igbo culture being receptive to change, gave the Igbo man an unquestioned advantage over his compatriots in searching credentials for advancement in Nigeria's colonial society. Unlike the Hausa-Fulani, he was unhindered by a wary religion and unlike the Yoruba, the Igbo man was unhampered by traditional hierarchies. This kind of creature fearing no god or man, was custom-

made to grasp the opportunities such as they were, of the white man's dispensation...'.¹

The migration of the Igbo can be explained historically, culturally and geographically. Chukwuezi (2001) linked the historical impact of the Nigerian civil war with spurring the outward-directedness of the Igbo into the private sector, specializing in trading that takes them to all parts of Nigeria. Linked to this is the culture of kinship which Smith (1999) identified above all other factors as the thread that links particular rural and urban communities in Nigeria and connects individuals and communities with access to resources and opportunities and the wider economy. Part of this kinship network among the Igbo operates through kin-based business apprenticeship thus linking urban business success to labour recruitment from the rural home base and delivering manpower for Igbo society (Chukwuezi, 2001).

The geographic explanation is related to the high population density in the Igbo region of origin which puts pressure on land resources. Early in the 20th century, the rural Igbo districts had about 800 people per square mile (Hodder and Ukwu, 1969). As a result, their presence in most major cities in the country has been attributed to land hunger, impoverished soil, declining crop yields, poor harvest and soil erosion among others (Nzimino, 1965; Smock, 1971; Afigbo, 1980; Fadayomi, 1979; Olsanya, 1969; Albert, 1993).

The end result of these problems was that many Igbo people took to trading and manufacturing which eventually required more market outlets than could be found in their home areas. The new economic activities directly or indirectly engendered a migratory tradition among them. To be sure, in the pre-colonial era, the activities of Igbo traders were largely concentrated within Igbo land and around the Niger Delta area. The most important of these Igbo trading communities especially in the 19th century, were the Arochukwu and the Awka people who were ably supported by their 'Ibni Ukpabi' and 'Agbala' Oracles respectively (Hodder and Ukwu, 1969; Afigbo, 1980; Ottenberg, 1958). These oracles were so feared in pre-colonial Igbo land that their owners successfully dictated the pace, pattern and direction of long-distance trade in Igbo society. The 'Ibni-Ukpabi' shrine of Arochukwu which appeared to be the most powerful and dreaded was finally destroyed by the British in 1902 when it was found to be a threat to free trade and the movement of people (Ifemesia, 1979; Afigbo, 1980).

Similarly, Mgbeafulu (2003) argues that migration of the Igbo to other parts of Nigeria was essentially a British creation. How? By 1900 when the British government took over the formal control of Nigeria and with the construction of the Eastern district of the Nigerian Railway, Igbo people took off in waves of migration criss-crossing the east to other parts of Nigeria. With the British administration established, there was the need to accommodate the new commercial and political activities. The new commercial and political activities attracted immigrants from

all parts of the country and beyond, including Igbos to serve as clerks, traders and artisans.

Some of these movements started with skilled or semi-skilled labourers while some were identified as seasonal migrants. For instance, the inflow of the Igbo northward was explained in terms of educational eminence of Igbo people (Mgbeafulu, 2003). The migration of southerners towards the north computed between 1952 and 1963 indicated that about 124,989 persons went to the central and core northern areas of Kano, Zaria, Kaduna and Jos. And of this number, nearly 60% came from the eastern region (Mgbeafulu, 2003).

By the same token, Nzimiro (1965) put up a statistics indicating a net outflow of about 630,000 persons from Igbo land to urban areas and he also observed that such had become the salient feature of Igbo geographical mobility by 1963. The same survey indicated that between 1952 and 1963, about 644,000 persons migrated to metropolitan Lagos at the rate of 59,000 yearly. Out of this figure, about 70% was estimated to come from the eastern region particularly from the Igbo speaking area (Eberegbulam, 1990; Echendu, 1965).

Be that as it may, the rate or degree of migration from the south east has remained unabated in post-civil war Nigeria. After the Nigerian civil war, Igbo land was seriously devastated to the extent that many infrastructures – hospitals, schools, road networks and even including homes were badly destroyed. Hence, many Igbos especially the youths, professionals and intellectuals often migrate out of their homeland as the environment increasingly remained unattractive and inhabitable due to gross neglect both from the government that be and the indigenes.

This was not the case before the balkanization of the former eastern region in 1967 into east central state, south eastern state and Rivers state. Then, the Igbos were totally in control of the entire region. They had no problems leaving their enclaves to Rivers and other south eastern states in search of a better life due to the presence of seaports in Port Harcourt and Calabar. The extensive investment the Igbos made in Port Harcourt before the civil war which were later declared as abandoned property can be traded to this fact.

In contemporary Nigeria, the Igbos have in great proportion maintained a healthy presence in most Nigerian cities inspite of fierce (cut throat) competition from the indigenes. If anything, the nature of businesses that go on in Lagos' major areas – trade fair complex, Idumota, Mandelas, Ladipo and Oshodi are largely controlled by 'Ndigbo'. In the North, the Igbo presence is not insubstantial. For instance, in the economies of Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and Abuja, the Igbos are forces to reckon with. In Abuja (the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)), the Igbos more than any other ethnic groups hold sway in terms of property market, retail trade and commerce. They dominate the hotel business and the inter-state mass transport industries. Again the number of Igbos resident in

parts of the world particularly in the United States cannot easily be quantified.

The seriousness of the desire for migration to these advanced countries by Igbos is often demonstrated by family willingness to sell land to raise funds to sponsor the migrant's journey. In the olden days, the community used to rally round to contribute substantial amount of money to send an individual abroad with the hope that such individual would come back to assist in the development of that community. As stated elsewhere, the perception of an economically buoyant Europe and North America fuels the desire to migrate to those countries. In addition, social factors, including similarity in education and language also impact on a migrant's choice of destination. Interestingly, when the migrants do not achieve their ambition in one area, they tend to move to other areas of interest legally or illegally.

The need for in-ward looking

There is this generally acceptable African saying: 'East, West home is best'. In other words to know where you are going, you need to also know where you are coming from. Socrates, the ideal of philosophers, stressing the import and essence of in-ward looking asserted thus: 'man, know thyself, the unexamined life is not worth living' (Solomon, 1985). The concept of in-ward looking emphasizes the imperative need for back to the land and the necessity for a viable and strong economic base in the home land.

While it is common knowledge that 'Ndigbo' are highly endowed and committed in the pursuit of their personal, professional, business and other individual enterprises, and while it is a universally accepted attribute of Ndigbo – both young and old to easily integrate and settle in any environment outside their home of origin, and while the Igbo man learns the culture and speaks the language of his host sometimes better than his host perhaps in order to enhance his entrepreneurship, there is still need for them to develop appropriate corporate culture, home base survival growth and development.

Unfavourable past events and experiences of the Igbo are enough indices to make Igbo professionals, technocrats, industrialists and academics to re-examine their development strategies. It could be recalled that during the 'pogrom' – the massive killing of the Igbo in the North and at the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war, many of them rushed back home from different parts of the country, empty handed and completely dispossessed. At that instance, millionaires became overnight paupers, people who were living in palaces, mansions and estates outside Igbo land came back begging for pen-houses and huts to lay their heads.

In a similar vein, in 1993, during the June 12 saga (Abiola exodus) many Igbos fled back home for safety probably because of an envisaged political crisis in the land. Regrettably, many of them especially those resident

in Lagos had their property and business looted before they got back. The worry is that the Igbo have consistently and unreservedly maintained the habit or culture of developing wherever they live, serving other people's local economies and creating wealth while their home is left unattended to.

The question, therefore, is, why do Igbos never have Igbo land in their economic planning as an investment zone? Why do they gloss over the fact that what they have at home, if well protected, is their more secure insurance? As some have argued, given Igbo's legendary traditional industrious nature, they quickly survived the harsh economic onslaught shortly after the civil war and by the mid 1970's set up cottage industries in the zone. But the dividends were 'impaired' by the import license policy of the federal government: which was favourable to the importation of foreign goods thereby killing the infant cottage industries established in the eastern zone. The rippled effects of this can still be felt hitherto (Igbokwe, 1995).

From another vantage point, economic experts may argue that people invest where they will reap adequate economic dividends and profit, where the economic environment is favourable and conducive; and where there are adequate infrastructures, energy, communication system, comparative advantage, the market and sufficient security. However, this paper's considered view is that since it is people or group of people with a vision and mission that provide such suitable environments, in other zones or regions, Igbo society is also endowed with people who can afford to create enabling environments for investments and development.

Essentially, the argument is not that Igbos should disinvest from where they are and come home nor that they should not conquer more markets, but rather the Igbo land should also be given due recognition as they plan their business and investment strategies. While it is possible that some parts of Nigeria may have better economic attractions vis-à-vis market and locations, the need to develop the region goes beyond the size of the profit margin. In other words, there is now a crying need to mobilize the talents, energies, contacts and resources of the over 70% of Igbo people living outside the geopolitical zone as well as those at home for the reversal of this continuing slide so that the region will be attractive in all its ramifications.

Studies show that some Igbo industrialists have established factories all over the country and even beyond. Unfortunately, most of these establishments are privately owned companies that are not open to the public for investment and more importantly, some are situated outside Igbo land thereby denying their kinsmen employment into these industries and infrastructural development in their areas. Studies also show that most of the manpower needed for these industries can easily be sourced in Igbo land but their owners often prefer to site their industries in areas outside Igbo land (Uwalaka, 2003; Chukwumezie,

2003).

What is more, the youth who finish their education in the region are always in a hurry to leave for other regions because the homeland cannot provide the essential things that make life comfortable, such as employment opportunities and centres of attractions. The question therefore is what should be done to ameliorate this deplorable condition? First and foremost, there is need for what Green Nwankwo termed Igbo Mental Adjustment Programme (IMAP).

IMAP emphasizes that Ndigbo should have a mental re-orientation from 'I' syndrome to 'we' syndrome. In other words, they should reinvent the pre-civil war Igbo spirit and values – that of collective responsibility and 'group think' particularly in relation to communal development. In this case, the application of the Igbo concept of 'Ako-na-Uche' (sense of reasoning) will come into play. This simply means the application of reason, judgment, wisdom and common sense in all matters and in all situations so as to secure the best and the desired results (Irukwu, 2007).

The Igbo in Diaspora can inspire the desired change as it takes a few good and committed individuals to produce a positive change for millions of people. Change is driven by ideology. By that it is meant the prescription of an ideal to be attained in the future supported by strategies and policies on how to achieve these goals.

It is perhaps, in the light of the foregoing that an organization called, League of Anambra Professionals (LAP) was established. LAP undertakes its developmental initiatives through the Anambra Foundation (AF). The Anambra Foundation is the development intervention agency. It provides the institutional framework for all Anambra men and women to be full time partners in developing Anambra state in all areas of human endeavour. In a related manner, the major mission and objective of LAP is to build a strong organisation to support multi-sectoral development in the state such as the development of subsidiary institutions with defined operational focus (www.lapworldwide.org).

Conclusion

There is no gainsaying the fact that the whole issue of globalization cum migration is topical and a challenging one in contemporary times particularly as one begets the other. While both concepts can be a chance, notably by fostering development and increasing intercultural relationships, it is becoming increasingly clear that the high rate of migration going on in most African states is disturbing particularly in the southeast geopolitical zone of Nigeria. For one, it has made the Igbos to continue to recall the negative effects of the Nigerian civil war since it was consequent upon that the rate of migration in Igbo society is in geometrical progression. This demographic distortion has grossly affected the development and economic transformation of the region which globalization is meant to preach.

To reverse the situation of the development inertia, the Igbos must take some bold and urgent steps at all levels, in mobilizing and harnessing the enormous creative and productive energy of the Nigerian and Igbo people to social and economic development. As Onwuejeogwu puts it: "my forecast is that Igbo speaking people are mobilizing their forces and energy in Igbo land towards a scientific revolution characterized by inventions and innovations in different fields of human endeavour that will enable Nigeria plunge into a new era of industrialization" (Uwalaka, 2003).

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