

Full Length Research Paper

## “Clientele democracy”: Political party funding and candidate selection in Nigeria\*

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The upsurge of democracy during the third and fourth waves democratic epochs has led to a “proliferation of alternative conceptual forms...involving democracy ‘with adjectives’” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997:430). Clientele democracy, though similar with neopatrimonial democracy, is distinguished in both concept and substance. At the heart of the development of different democracy are the nature and character of political parties. The character of political parties in turn is highly influenced by the pattern of party funding, which accordingly determines the system of candidate selection and nomination and the overall organisation of political parties. This paper argues that political parties as *conditio sine qua non* to modern democracy significantly contribute to the development of “clientele” democracy in Nigeria. This is evident in the nature of political party funding and candidate selection (both for party offices and general elections). In this context, this paper examines the various aspects of political party funding and strategies for candidate selection in Nigeria. The paper contends that the system of party funding and candidates’ selection in the country are reconstructing a new form of democracy that can arguably be called “clientele” democracy, in which *godfatherism* is the defining political technique of political party activities. The godfathers, in addition to serving as major party funders, also fully control their political terrain, through which they control both parties and the electorates. The paper argues that this practice is undermining political party institutionalisation in Nigeria.

**Key words:** Clientelism, democracy, political parties, party funding, candidate selection.

### INTRODUCTION

#### “Clientele democracy” and political parties

Two important theoretical issues have attracted the attention of comparativists during the last quarter of twentieth century: firstly, the transformation of authoritarian regimes into democracy. Secondly, new democratic political

regimes are exhibiting distinguishing characteristics that differentiate individual regimes and that as well differentiate them from established democracies. This consequently gave leverage to political scientists to define and describe different kinds of democracies. The intellectual effort led to what Collier and Levitsky (1997:1)

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term “democracy with adjectives”. They argue that with the phenomenal global upsurge in democratisation and attendant scholarly attention thereof, scholars tried to “increase analytic differentiation” in order to disaggregate the variety of democracies and provide normative and empirical conceptual validation. In this seminal work, Collier and Levitsky identify different adjectives employed to conceptualise and explain different kinds of democracies. Using Sartori’s (1970) moving up and down the ladder of classical subtypes, they distinguished regimes: civilian, competitive and electoral regimes from democracies: parliamentary, two-party and federal and illiberal democracies. Each of these democracies is distinct in both substance and procedure.

This classification does not represent the exhaustive list of the types and sub-types of democracies. The general problem is that the proliferation of democracy *vis-à-vis* the new terms and concepts that emerged thereof to describe it, mostly “mean approximately the same thing. The consequence once again can be growing scholarly confusion.” It is therefore, important for students of political science to always “define and explicate the concept of democracy they are using so as to situate themselves unambiguously...” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997:8). Because of this reason, defining clientele democracy is imperative.

Just like in other regions, in Africa too, the winds of democratisation gave rise to “range of regimes”, which are easily grouped into “imperfect democracies” (van de Walle, 2002:1-2). Be it as it may, as a result of this conceptual differentiation to define “precisely” these range of regimes, scholars seem to intuitively shy away from linking the emergence of regimes to the activities of political parties. To fill this theoretical gap, Gunther and Diamond (2002), appreciating the transformation of political parties during this period, attempt to reclassify parties based on their functions in representative democracy. They have identified five broad typologies of parties, grouped under either pluralistic or proto-hegemonic. Under each of these typologies, there is range of parties.<sup>1</sup> These typologies and classification of parties are important conceptual innovation in a period when political parties are undergoing radical transformation and facing new challenges.

Although it is theoretically difficult, associating the “democracy with adjectives” and typologies of parties would help in identifying the nature and texture of parties that operate in different political regimes. This understanding will in turn inform researchers about the extent to which parties “make” democracies. It is in this context, that this paper argues that clientelistic parties (Gunther

and Diamond, 2002) in Africa contribute to further entrenchment of what can be arguably described as “clientele democracy”. Furthermore, clientelistic parties and clientele democracies are arguably the functions of socio-political and economic system. In other words, political parties and the type of democracies they create are products of the system in which they operate. To this extent, the nature of party funding (formal and informal) and candidate selection and nomination (as important activities of parties) are salient in the creation of a clientele democracy. This paper examines the methods and techniques of party funding and candidate selection in clientelistic Nigeria and argues that these issues have transformed democratic politics in the country in which godfathers as major party funders become the *de facto* and informal leaders of parties and form the core of “invisible” government political leadership. This political transformation has mixed implication for the development of political parties and democratisation in Nigeria.

### **Clientelism and political parties: a ‘symbiotic’ relationship**

Unlike clientelism, which is a socio-political and economic activity, political parties are an institution. It can therefore, be hypothesised that in a hyper-clientelistic society, there is a symbiotic relationship between clientelistic activities and political parties. Each feeds on and reinforces the other. The terms ‘clientelism’, ‘patronage’, ‘patron-client clusters’ (Joseph, 1987) are often used interchangeably to refer to a form of personal, social and dyadic relationship of exchange characterised by a sense of obligation and depicts disproportion of power between the parties (actors) involved (Hopkin, 2006). This dyadic exchange system of relationship involves “the patron providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and services ... and social acts of deference and loyalty” (Mason, 1986:489). Clientelistic relationship is asymmetrical, hierarchical and reciprocal. Historically, this system originated during feudalism, in which feudal lords (patrons) offer favours to the vassals in exchange for obligatory support, loyalty in form of rents, labour, etc. The unequal and obligatory nature of this relationship suggests its exploitative character. Magaloni et al. (2002) argue that the patron as a monopolist controls and exploits the market power and expect total compliance from clients who need such services.

Perhaps, because of its unequal and hierarchical trait, clientelism is often associated with underdeveloped societies and at early stages of political institutionalisation. It is therefore, assumed that as societies developed, socio-political and economic structures become differentiated and institutionalised, clientelism would radically disappear. Evidently, the phenomenon has not only continued but transformed and new sophisticated clientelistic methods are now being employed. The nature

<sup>1</sup> For example, the typologies are elite parties (local notable and clientelistic); ethnicity-based parties (ethnic and congress parties); Electoralist parties (catch-all, programmatic and personalistic parties); movement parties (left-libertarian and post-industrial extreme right parties); and mass-based parties, which are reclassified into: (i) ideological/socialist (class-mass and Leninist parties); (ii) ideological nationalist (pluralist nationalist and ultranationalist parties); and (iii) religious (denominational-mass and religious fundamentalist parties).

of the methods differed from society to society depending on its level of socio-political development. By implication, even the character of exchange resources involved in such relationship have also changed. Today, scholars conveniently speak of old and new clientelism (Hopkin, 2006).

In electoral politics, clientelism involves politicians providing favours and benefits in exchange for votes. It is largely seen as a form of political investment. Hopkin (2006:3) stresses that in clientelistic-electoral contexts "patrons, or their agents, stand for election and their clients vote for them, sometimes out of a general sense of obligation and attachment, sometimes as part of a specific exchange for services rendered or promised." As a result of socio-political and economic transformation accentuated by modernisation, with attendant development in education, urbanisation and globalisation, traditional clientelistic exchange was replaced with new form of clientelism. He argues that:

*These developments have weakened traditional patron-client ties, which made way for new forms of exchange. Organised political parties, with relatively bureaucratised structures, replaced landlords and local notables as patrons (Hopkin, 2006:3).*

While conceptual precision is important in any political analysis, the transformation of clientelism and the complexes of the activities involved make such effort difficult. However, Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980:50) identified the following analytical features of clientelism, patron-client relation or patronage system as the terms are interchangeably used:

1. Patron-client relation and exchange are usually particularistic and diffuse;
2. Clientelistic interactions are based on simultaneous exchange of different types of resources, which are instrumental, economic and political and promises of solidarity and loyalty;
3. The resources involve in such exchange are affected by 'package-deal'. This means neither resource (from both the patron and client) can be exchanged separately;
4. Consequently, there is usually a strong element of solidarity in clientelistic relations. There is an interpersonal loyalty and attachment between the two parties. Sometime, this relation can be ambivalent, however element of solidarity can be strong;
5. Clientelistic relations are not normally based on any fully legal or contractual terms. These relations are opposed to established laws of societies and are based on informal but tightly binding understandings;<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> As we will see, in Nigeria such informal clientelistic relations though opposed to established laws, however, attempt was made to legal such relationship between patrons and their clients. In Anambra state for example, the governor was made to sign a resignation letter and made a videoed resignation clip before election. When the relationship between the patron and the client

6. Patron-client relations are established voluntarily and could be abandoned voluntarily;

7. Clientelistic relations are entered into between individuals or networks of individuals in a vertical pattern instead of between organised corporate groups; and

8. These relations are based on strong elements of inequality and of differences in power. The patrons have monopoly over economic and political resources that are important to clients.

Based on the above characteristics, it is apparent that any political and economic institution built on the threshold of clientelism would have significant impact on its functionality. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue that in contemporary societies, variability of income more than issue of poverty alone is the driving force of clientelism. No wonder, therefore that clientelistic activities often flourish in political and economically insecure societies and is an integral part of the 'politics of survival' for both clients and patrons (Migdal, 1988). Thus the relationship between clientelism and good democracy is often hostile. There is no gainsaying the fact that advance democracies were founded on clientelistic structures, however, as democracy develops such clientelistic activities steadily eroded. It should, however be maintained that democratic institutions in societies with deeply rooted clientelistic features function differently from those where clientelistic activities are minimal and sanctioned accordingly. Table 1 provides contrasting features between political institutions in archetypal clientelistic societies and those in liberal democratic polities.

The above continuum does not exist in pure form in any society. In other words, no society exhibits an archetypal clientelism. A mixture of the two is often common. Where clientelism is dominant as the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (Daloz and Chabal, 1999), such democracies could be described as clientele democracies. In such societies, despite the existence of democratic structures, every aspect of government activities is coloured by clientelism and patronage politics. In clientele democracies, the thread of clientelism permeates the whole society and dictates the pattern of formal and informal political and economic activities. Clientelistic considerations are the norms rather than exceptions. Democratic institutions are not only established on clientelistic socio-political structures but are equally compelled to function in clientelistic tones and textures.

For instance, political parties operating in clientele democracies could arguably be called *clientele parties*, all things being equal. Clientele parties exhibit all characteristics of weakly institutionalised parties. They are personalistic, particularistic and factionalised organisations. Patron-client relation characterises the activities of political parties. Parties are established to achieve clientelistic objectives, perhaps because in democracy

(governor) went sour, the governor was kidnapped and these documents were presented as evidence of his purported resignation.

**Table 1.** Continuum of political and decision making systems.

<b>Clientelistic</b>	<b>Democratic</b>
Authority is personal and resides with individuals	Authority is institutional and resides with officials roles
Core values: personal enrichment and aggrandisement	Core values: rule of law, fair elections and majority rule
Leaders tend to monopolise power and unaccountable for their actions	Leaders share power with others and are accountable for their actions
Leaders' relation to supporters and citizens is opaque and often unreliable	Leaders' relation to supporters is transparent and predictable
Regular procedures or existing procedures regarding government turnover are not followed	Regular procedures exist regarding leaders' replacement or change of government
Leaders hold onto power by providing personal favours that secure loyalty of citizens	Leaders only hold onto power by providing collective benefits that earn support of large segments of society
Policy decisions are taken in secret without public discussion or participation	Policy decisions are taken in the open after public discussion and review
Political parties are organised around personalities	Political parties are organised around stated programmes and ideologies
Civil society is fragmented and characterised by vertical links	Civil society is deep and characterised by horizontal links
Decision making standards are tacit and procedures are impossible to follow from outside	Decision making standards are explicit and procedures are transparent
Supporters' interests and needs guide policy decisions	Public interests and needs guide policy decisions
Extensive scope exists for patronage appointments and often outside the jurisdiction of political regulations	Limited scope exists for patronage appointments and based on the jurisdiction of political regulations

Source: Adopted from Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:5).

they are the dominant political institutions. Historically, according to Gunther and Diamond (2001), historically, clientelistic (clientele) parties began to emerge in 19<sup>th</sup> century as a result of the extension of franchise, industrialisation and urbanisation and the changing perspective of political mobilisation. This period saw the decline in obsequiousness to local elites, which necessitated the use of exchange of favours and coercion as instruments of political mobilisation. Contextually, Gunther and Diamond (2001:14) define clientelistic party as a:

*Confederation of notables [elites], each with his own geographically, functionally, or personalistically based support organised internally as particularistic factions. Such a party typically has a weak organisation and places little or no stress on programme or ideology. Its principal function is to coordinate the individual campaign efforts of notables, usually indirectly or loosely, for the purpose of securing power at the national level. Their campaign activities, in turn, are based on hierarchical chains of interpersonal relationships of a quasi-feudal variety, in which relatively durable patterns of loyalty are linked with the exchange of services and obligations.*

Evident from the above conceptualisation is that most political parties operating in developing clientele democracies actually exhibit these characteristics. The eventual decline of clientelistic parties in 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries marked the beginning of the development of institutionalised parties and democracy. Does the

proliferation of clientele parties today portends the beginning of the long hope of democratic consolidation and party institutionalisation? The answer is rooted in the changing nature of modern clientelism and the sophistication of the instruments of clientelistic mobilisation. Put differently, while the changing nature of globalisation and political transformation of modern states are offering good hope of deepening democratisation, the same forces and complex nature of modern governance system seem to be dashing such hopes. In developing democracies, parties are the instruments of clientelistic networks and coercive political mobilisation. Clientele democracies create clientelistic parties. Clientelistic parties in turn strengthen such clientelistic activities. There is therefore, a symbiotic relationship between clientelism and clientele political parties. One of the strongest mechanisms of entrenching such clientelistic networks within political party organisation is through party funding and candidate selection. The next section examines the pattern of party funding and candidate selection, and how they influence the activities of political parties.

#### **PARTY FUNDING AND CANDIDATE SELECTION: UNDERSTANDING THE THEORETICAL DEBATE**

**Party funding:** Party funding and candidate selection are the two most important activities of party organisation through which clientelistic networks are strengthened. They are also important areas, which if handle well can

aid party institutionalisation. In particular, research on the issues of party funding is grossly limited. Fisher and Eisenstadt (2004) argue that ironically, despite extensive studies on virtually all aspects of parties, financial issues seem to have eluded and escaped the attention of academic researchers. In fact, such studies rarely exist on the nexus between party finance and candidate selection as potentially relevant areas that undermine and/or strengthen party organisation. The importance of party funding is underscored by the contribution money can make in democracy and especially in developing economies where few elites control both the sources and distribution of money. By implication, money more than anything, is a source of political power and political power in turn is a source of economic power. While in a competitive democratic system, money can be used by parties for campaign reasons, to maintain inter-election organisations and for research and administration (Paltiel, 1981), in clientelistic systems, money is used to advance and fund clientelistic networks and maintain patron-client relations between and during elections.

Moreover, the centrality of party funding is underlined by how even in Western democracies, it contributes to general crises affecting political party institutions. For example, Hopkin (2004) argues that the manner in which parties fund their activities has been quite embarrassing. For example, series of corruption scandals have affected Western European parties and their leaders. He stresses that in Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain and even in Germany and the UK, parties have been involved in funding scandals related to corruption and violation of funding regulations. Similarly, studies have evidently documented the growing increase in corruption through political party funding (Bryan and Baer, 2005; Williams, 2000a, b; Pujas and Rhodes, 2001; Philip, 2001). The diversities of democracies as well as different typologies of parties identified earlier mean that party financing activities differ from one democracy to another and from one types of party to another. Hopkin (2004), for instance, employing theories of democracy, identifies the differences in the mode of party funding among mass parties, elite parties, cartel parties and clientelistic parties.

It is therefore, difficult to establish a strict distinction in terms of party funding among democracies and parties because of obvious reasons. A brief theoretical discussion of the system of funding clientelistic parties is imperative. In clientelistic democracies, party membership could be created through the use of state resources to distribute to clients and other citizens as incentives. Individuals are easily enticed to become party members and supporters in anticipation of patronage and largesse from prospective party candidates. According to Hopkin (2004), these favours can include but not restricted to provisions of government jobs to party members or their relatives, allocation of public contracts or preferential consideration in the allocation of welfare benefits, such as housing, disability allowances, and other discretionary benefits.

This method helps clientelistic parties to develop mass membership organisation and strengthen their grassroots penetration. This system of party funding was dominant in the US in 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries during the prime period of clientelistic parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2001; Shefter, 1994; Geddes, 1994; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977). Beyond underdeveloped bureaucracy, which was easily influenced by a political party (Lyrintzis, 1984; Shefter, 1994, cited in Hokin, 2004) in contemporary clientele democracies, poverty, low level of education and general economic underdevelopment as well as the socio-cultural nature of such societies contributes to the “success” of clientelistic strategies of party funding. It is therefore, not surprising to find that:

*In Western European democracies neither of these conditions hold in the contemporary; so clientelistic strategies alone are unlikely to succeed in sustaining mass organisations, although they may serve to complement other [party] organisational strategies (Hopkin, 2004:632).*

Instead, what is obtained in contemporary Western democracies is externally-finance and self-financing elite and cartel parties (Hopki, 2004). Despite its utility, van Bienen (2004) cautions against public funding of parties. Perhaps, because of its complexities and susceptibility to corruption and absolute abuse, certain mechanisms are designed to regulate party funding. The importance of institutions as rules and regulations and as organisations has drawn the attention of political science and comparativist scholars.

**Candidate selection and nomination:** Just like party funding, candidate selection and nomination procedures differ among democracies and among typologies of parties. There are two categories of candidates selected and/or nominated by political parties. Candidates are selected for manning party offices across all the branches and chapters of political parties. Candidates are nominated also to contest general elections. Unlike for party leadership positions, in the latter, candidates are selected by different political parties to compete in national or local elections. In any case, candidate nomination, which in broader terms is synonymous with recruitment, is one of the important functions of political parties across democracies. In fact, many party scholars define a political party in terms of this function (Schlesinger, 1991; Sartori, 1976). Katz (2001:277) notes that candidate selection “is a vital activity in the life of any political party. It is the primary screening device in the process through which the party in office is reproduced. As such, it raises central questions about the ideological and sociological identities of the party as a whole”. The method(s) which a party(s) employ in candidate selections and nominations has incontrovertible implications on those selected or elected and indeed how they behave in

either party or public office (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). Importantly, Katz and Mair (1995) argue that the technique of a party's candidate selection explains and provides adequate information on (i) how the party functions internally and (ii) the location of political power in a particular country.

That is perhaps why Pennings and Hazan (2001) contend that because of the crisis they face, the weaning relationship between them and voters and the declining party membership, parties are democratising their candidate selection procedures to regain the lost image. They argue that by expanding and enlarging the frontiers of those who participate in candidate selection process, parties could strengthen the participation of voters and members. Methods of candidate selection include primaries (either restricted to party caucuses only or extended to ordinary party members), internal party elections, centralisation, consensus, etc. The differences in candidate selection procedures among parties is explained partly by the nature of a political party, and partly by "national laws, intra-party decision-making and the electoral fortunes of parties" (Pennings and Hazan, 2001:269). Katz (2001), for instance, argues that candidate selection in elite parties at national level is made at local level.<sup>3</sup> The only exception was 18<sup>th</sup> century Britain, when a single patron controls more than one district. In the mass parties, candidate selection rests squarely with party on ground, but the central party office has overwhelming influence. In the catch-all parties, the central office is the heart of party leadership and therefore, significantly influences candidate selection. Similar pattern is obtained in cartel parties. In sum, Katz (2001:292) provides two important theoretical hypotheses regarding candidate selection, which are applicable across political parties, particularly in established democracies. Accordingly, the first hypothesis indicates democratisation of selection process through inclusiveness, while the second connotes democratisation through inclusive selectorates.

i. There will be increased involvement by the central party in candidate recruitment and in setting and limiting the options among which local selectorates will choose, at the same time broadening the range of groups from which candidates may be recruited (greater category inclusiveness) and limiting the choice of particular individuals from those categories (what might be termed 'personal exclusivity').

ii. There will be a movement of local candidate selection procedures and selectorates toward greater inclusiveness, in particular away from choice by local party officials and formal party meetings and towards selection by broad-based ballots, and towards procedures that are increasingly open to direct participation by party sympathisers rather than being restricted to formal members.

<sup>3</sup> There is a consensus among party scholars that a political party exists at local and national level, in government and outside government.

However, the extent to which parties democratise their candidate selection procedures, despite its generic importance depends on the national laws and internal party rules, as well as the extent to which party leaders adhere to these laws.

From the foregoing theoretical overview, it is clear that party funding and candidate selection are important activities of political parties. Not only they are part of the general crises and challenges affecting contemporary parties, but they are also significant as they could strengthen and/or undermine the capacity and capability of any political party. Nevertheless, in developing democracies, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa these activities are interwoven. They are virtually two sides of the same coin. The major actors of party funding wield enormous influence in candidate selection. Nigeria as explained below provides good illustration of this hypothesis.

### **"Godfathering" party funding and candidate selection in Nigeria**

Aside other constitutional and statutory laws governing party funding and candidate selections, Section 225(1-5) of 1999 Constitution requires political parties to submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) their statements of assets and liabilities, annual statements and analysis of their sources of funds and expenditure. Parties are also prohibited from receiving and using funds from outside Nigeria. INEC was also empowered to audit the account of all parties and submit financial account report to the National Assembly. Similarly, Section 90 of 2006 Electoral Act clearly states the regulations of party finances. Specifically, it requires the National Assembly to approve a grant for disbursement to all political parties contesting elections and provides annual grants to all registered parties as financial assistance for their operational activities. The procedure for sharing annual grants is that: 10% of the amount will be shared equally to all registered parties, while 90% is shared in proportion to each party's number of seats in the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives).<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, Section 93(1-12) stipulates the limitations of election expenses. This is in order to limit the influence of money during electioneering activities. For example, the election expenses are restricted as follows (and any violation is punished by prescribed fees):

	₦ 'm	\$'m <sup>5</sup>
1. Presidential candidate	3.7	500

<sup>4</sup> With this grant distribution principle, it means that apart from the shared 10% more than two-thirds of political parties would not get any grant from the lump sum of 90%. Only few parties have representatives in the National Assembly. It also implies that the bigger parties will continue to grow bigger by feeding fat from government statutory grants.

<sup>5</sup> The exchange used is ₦136.08 to \$1, which was the closing rate as at 31<sup>st</sup> December 2003. See figures in other tables.

2. Governorship candidate	0.73	100
3. Senatorial candidate	20	0.15
4. House of Representative Candidate	10	0.073
5. House of Assembly candidate	5	0.037
6. LGA Chairmanship candidate	5	0.037
7. LGA Councillorship candidate	0.5	0.0037

Moreover, Section 93(9) limits individual and corporate donation to any contesting candidate to ₦1million (\$7.349m).<sup>6</sup> In addition to this, both the Constitution and Electoral Act contain clauses that aim to make party funding and candidate selection relatively transparent (CDD, 2007). Party membership is the most reliable and major source of party funding, especially during the heydays of mass party organisation. According to recent studies, party membership is rapidly declining. However, this is contrary to what is obtained in Nigeria. Empirical research has shown that there is higher rate of party membership for PDP, ANPP and AD (Kura, 2008). This trend was explained by clientelistic methods being adopted by the respective parties to expand their membership. It is claimed that parties distribute their membership cards free-of-charge to prospective members. In some areas, powerful party patrons would buy or get large bulk of the cards and distribute free-of-charge to members of his/her constituency (Adamu, 2006). According to Musa (Interview, 2006), the PDP is not only offering its membership cards free, but additional bonus (either monetary or otherwise) are offered to any person that registers with the party. He argues that this is making it difficult for other parties to charge membership card. The implication of this is that the rate/percentage of any party's membership is proportional to the amount of largesse it distributes. The patronage provided by parties to potentials or registered members include: sponsoring people for pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem, providing animals for sacrifices during traditional and religious festivals, contributions for naming and wedding ceremonies and funerals, providing food items and so. For example, Ali Modu Sherrif, Governor of Borno State was reported to distribute more than ₦1billion (\$3.7m) to ANPP members across the state. According to Olugbode (2007) about ₦300 thousand (\$2.205) was distributed to each of the 3,800 polling units, except Maiduguri metropolis, which got higher than that amount. The

<sup>6</sup> The institutional limitations to election expenses and individual and corporate donation are laudable policy initiatives to control the influence of money in politics. However, even to casual analyst, the contradictions in the Electoral Act are too glaring. For instance, while these sections provide these limitations, Section 93(8b) defines election expenses to mean any material and financial expenses incurred from the date when the dates of elections are fixed. By implications, all other expenses incurred before then are not part of what the Electoral Act conceptualises as electoral expenses. While, this is problematic, to date, as per as this researcher is concerned, no individual or even political party has duly submitted the report of its election expenses, let alone donations from individual or corporate bodies to the electoral commission. Election expenses and donations are the most guarded secret of individual politicians and political parties. In fact, none submission of election report by particularly the PDP has been a subject of contention between the party and INEC.

largesse was distributed to party members for Eid El-Kabir festival. One beneficiary was cited to have said "we got our share on the very day of Sallah celebration and I bet you that most of our party supporters and even ordinary people of the state who benefited were able to buy and slaughter their rams before the evening of that Saturday [Sallah day]" (cited in Olugbode, 2007). Similarly, in Katsina State, the Governor, Ibrahim Shema provided Sallah gifts to all the pilgrims from the state. The amount of N80 million (\$0.6m) was distributed to 6,200 pilgrims to complement their basic travelling allowances (Karofi, 2007). These examples are only the tip of the iceberg and represent the norms rather than exception generally in the country. The difference might be in terms of the nature, amount and scope of the patronage.

Accordingly, there are two principal sources of party funding in Nigeria: (i) external and (ii) internal. The external source is basically the annual statutory allocation from the government. While, the internal sources include party membership dues, donations from individuals and corporate bodies, fees from fines and levies, sales of party materials (party constitution, manifesto, magazines, emblems, souvenirs, etc) and so on. The external source is insignificant compared to the activities of political parties. This is especially, because the sharing formula seems to favour the major parties, which have representation in the National Assembly. This means that the PDP would approximately takes more than half of any allocation. The external source is as problematic as the internal. For instance, Musa (Interview, 2006) contends that:

*[...] Even in the case of government funding, there is serious disparity. For example, between 2003 and 2006, when the PRP got ₦11 million (\$80.835), The PDP got over ₦1 billion (\$7.3m). This is because the payment was based on the strength of representation at the National Assembly. The PDP has over 400 members, while PRP has only one member. As a result of this disparity, the financial strengths of the parties is that out of 30 [50] registered parties, only 7 are represented at the National level, including the PRP. Initially, there was a time when the government granted equal nominal amount. That was very small. [...]*

In fact, due to parties' over reliance on state funding, many could not conduct their congress and convention on time waiting for INEC to distribute allocations. Given the regulatory powers of INEC, it could decide which party would get the allocation, when and how. In the case of AD, apart from state allocation being a major source of crisis within the party, it has also, at a time been a source of acrimony between the party and INEC.<sup>7</sup> Thus, internal

<sup>7</sup> The issue of government grants has also been a source of internal problems with other parties (see Okocha, 2006). In fact, arguably many parties were created simply to serve as sources of getting statutory allocation from the government. Thus party leaders only meet to share their bonus. Nearly  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the 50 parties are heard up or visible, not to talk of conducting congresses or

**Table 2.** Examples of selected donations to individual party candidates.

No	Individual candidates/group	N 'm	\$ 'm
1	Obasanjo/Atiku	Over 5.5b	40.4
2	Governor James Ibori	2.3b	16.9
3	Governor Bola Tinubu	1.3b	9.6
4	Ghali Na'Abba	150	1.1
5	Bukola Saraki	160	1.2
6	Lucky Igbenedion	500	3.7
7	Great Ogboru	200	1.5
8	Chibodom Nwuche	500	3.7

Source: see end of Table 5.

party funding is the major source of finance, especially to the major political parties. Despite having higher membership rate, the major parties attract donations from individuals and corporate bodies. Importantly,

*[...] those parties that controlled government at the national level, state or local government level are stealing a lot of money from public funds to finance the parties. This is being done either directly or indirectly. That is either through withdrawal of money from Central Bank in the case of party controlling the Federal Government or through award of contracts, which is never performed or through programmes waivers, such as waivers of import duties. Such parties which have big and powerful members who are contractors, Commission agents or appointees in the public service also contribute from what they have been able to steal through the waivers [and favours]. Now for parties that have no control of government at any level, they get funds from the contributions of those leading members of the parties. This amount is never enough to run and organise a political party (Musa, Interview, 2006).*

Those parties in power, either at local, state or federal government have direct access to public funds, with which they use for patronage and for funding party activities. Suberu (Interview, 2006) argues that even the contribution from individual party members are from those who are privileged to have access to parties that are in government, and who enjoy patronages from the governments. Hence lots of resources are then channelled back to support the party. This means therefore that patronage and clientelistic networks are the major

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national convention and participation in local and national elections. In fact, Tola (2008) argues that many of these parties are hardly functional. Many of them after registration by INEC fall behind the minimum standard expected of parties in Nigeria. He maintains that most of the parties "close shop after collecting the INEC grants or financial assistance from governors and after a dismal showing in general election. Besides, some of the parties operate largely like business enterprises, seeking financial or other kinds of dividends. This explains why there is a lull in their activities after any general elections. Most of the national secretaries of the parties visited in Abuja and environs have become shadows of their past" (see also Kura, 2008).

channels of party funding in Nigeria. Tables 2-5 provide examples of donations from individuals to contesting candidates, *vis-à-vis* or parties *per se*.

The tables provide examples of the nature of internal party funding in Nigeria. The tables show that internal party funding is the most important source of party finance in the country. Most of these donations are coming from individuals who enjoy or potentially want to enjoy patronage from government. These examples represent only those donations/contributions that were declared publicly. Presumably, more of these kinds of contributions have gone unrecorded. It was against this startling funding scenarios that the 2006 Electoral Acts pegs individual donations to only N100 thousand (\$735 thousands). The implication of this is that huge donations directly to parties or indirectly to individuals are not even reported. This is partly the reason why all the parties, especially the PDP disallowed INEC to neither audit its account nor send annual account report to the commission.

Apart from this system of funding exacerbating corruption, it also undermines transparency, accountability and responsiveness of party governments. Party organisations become personalised by powerful patrons. The personalisation of party organisation is arguably visible in candidate selection processes. Those patrons who contribute hugely to party funding and fully control their political terrain tend to crudely manipulate the selection processes to the extent that only their anointed candidates are selected both for party offices and national election candidates. These powerful political patrons or their agents, perhaps because of the magnitude of their influence on the parties and party candidates are popularly called *godfathers*. Thus, today, *godfatherism* has become a household name. The influence of the godfathers in candidate selection is captured eloquently:

In almost all the states of the [Nigerian] federation, only candidates anointed by political godfathers in Abuja or in the state won [gubernatorial primaries and congress and conventions] (*NewsWatch*, 2006).

There are also relevant institutional mechanisms governing candidate selection, which differ from one party to another. For example, as part of the institutional designs for the formation, registration<sup>8</sup> and activities of parties in Nigeria, the Political Party Decree No. 35 of 1998 empowers electoral commission (INEC) to regulate, register and supervise their activities. Among other conditions, INEC requires constitution and rules of any party to importantly provide election on democratic basis of its principal officers, executive committees, electoral candidates or other bodies periodically. To comply with this condition, respective parties have enshrined in their various constitutions and electoral rules about "democratic" basis for selecting party officers and nominating electoral candidates. Theoretically, parties have emphasised internal democracy as guiding principles for

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<sup>8</sup> See party constitutions.



**Table 3.** Obasanjo/Atiku.

No	Contributors	N 'm	\$ 'm
1	Friends of Atiku	1b	7.3
2	Aliko Dangote	250	1.8
3	Emeka Offor	200	1.5
4	21 PDP Governors	210	1.54
5	Group from Europe	144	1.0
6	Rivers friends of Obasanjo/Atiku	150	1.1
7	Grand Alliance	Boeing 727 and 2 luxury buses for campaign	-
8	Another Group	Two luxury buses	
9	Construction companies in the country	200	1.5
10	Dr. Samson Uche (businessman)	50	0.37
11	PDP caucus in Senate	12	0.088
12	Principal Staff of the Villa (Aso Rock)	10.6	0.078
13	AVM Shekari	10	0.073
14	First Atlantic Bank	10	0.073
15	Ministers	10	0.073
16	Otunba Fasawe	6.5	0.048
17	PDP National Working Committee	3.6	0.026
18	Dr. Ngozi Anyaegbunam	0.5	0.037
19	Dr. Gamaliel Onosode	0.1	0.0074
20	Corporate Nigeria (pledges)	2 billion	14.6

Source: see end of Table 5.

**Table 4.** List of contributors to James Ibori.

No	Contributors	N 'm	\$ 'm
1	Vice President Atiku Abubakar	34	0.25
2	Olorogun Michael Ibru (on behalf of Ibru family and friends)	250	1.84
3	Mr. Peter Okocha (on behalf of Delta North Professionals)	200	1.47
4	Chief Willy Oki	200	1.5
5	Olorogun John Oguma	120	0.88
6	Chief Mike Omeruah	120	0.88
7	Chief Newton Jibunor	100	0.78
8	Chief Nam Okechukwu	100	0.73
9	Alhaji Inuwa Umoru	100	0.73
10	Bube Okorodudu	10	0.073
11	Mr. Tony Anenih (Jnr) (on behalf of friends of Ibori)	50	0.37
12	Anonymous donor	35	0.26
13	Mr. Terry Wayas	35	0.26
14	Austin Odili	30	0.22
15	Chief Tony Anenih, Chief Lucky Igbiniedion and others	26	0.19
16	Zenith Bank	25	0.18
17	Mr. Wale Tinubu	20	0.15
18	Alhaji Abdulrazaq Abdulraham	10	0.73
19	Chief Diepreye Alamiyesiegha	10	0.73
20	Akintola Williams	10	0.73
21	Core Group	10	0.73
22	Chief tom Ikimi boat worth	7	0.05
23	Chief Edwin Clark on behalf of Ijaws of Delta State	5	0.037
24	Delta State House of Assembly	6	0.044
25	Chief Emeka Offor	5	0.037

Source: see end of Table 5.

**Table 5.** List of contributors to Bola Tinubu.

No	Contributors	N 'm	\$ 'm
1	Mr. Wale Tinubu	100	0.74
2	The gov's friend	150	1.1
3	The dep. Gov's friends	76	0.56
4	Femi Otedola, M.D of Zenon Oil & Gas	10	0.073
4	Prince Albert Awofisayo, chairman of Continental Pharmaceutical Ltd	10	0.073
5	Chief Remi Adiakwu Bakare	10	0.073
6	Chief Ayoku, the Babalaje of Lagos	10	0.073
7	Alhaji & Alhaja K.O. Tinubu & children	10	0.073
8	Friends of the Lagos State executive secretaries	10	0.073
9	Senator Tokunbo Afikuyomi	5	0.037
10	Mrs. Stella Okoli	5	0.037
11	Lady Joy Udensi	10	0.073
12	Friends of Lagos State permanent secretaries	2	0.015
13	The Tinubu family	1	0.007
14	Chief Abiodun Kasumu	1	0.007

Source: Okoro (2003).

their organisational activities.

Evidences have shown that internal and external party rules are only used as window-dressing. Often informal arrangements become the substantive rules of the processes. Empirical studies have shown that lack of internal democracy has largely contributed to factions, crises and conflicts that besieged the major parties since 1999 (Kura, 2008). In contrast to democratic procedures, parties employ "dubious" tactics in their candidate selections and nomination process.

Hence, the so-called conventions, primaries and congresses are mere pretexts to celebrate the appointment of "anointed" candidates. Often, because of the relationship between party funding and candidate selection, the boundary between the two arguably is controversial and unclear.

Financial "donors" (godfathers) of any party take over and/or hijack its control. They manipulate all its major activities. They determine who is selected, nominated or appointed to occupy which party or government office. Godfathers have become the *owners* of parties.

Abubakar<sup>9</sup> (2006) while expressing dismay over the influence of godfathers states that:

*I am particularly concerned about the emergence of godfathers as a directing principle in our political affairs. The concept of godfathers as 'owners' of political parties or section thereof is a threat to the development of democracy.*

Godfathers must not be allowed to substitute themselves

<sup>9</sup> Abubakar Atiku was the former Vice President of Nigeria from 1999-2007. He was one of the founders of People's Democratic Party (PDP), but left the party as a result of internal problems with the President. He later formed Action Congress, on the platform of which he contested the 2007 presidential election but lost the PDP candidate, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.

for members of political parties or indeed for the voting citizenry during elections by determining who gets nominated to contest and who wins elections.

Godfatherism is therefore the main defining character of party politics in Nigeria. 'Godfather politics' or 'godfatherism' is a fairly new term coined to explain the power of an individual over the machinery of a political party, its constitution, statutory laws, and the Nigerian constitution. Literally, godfathers are defined as people who have the economic and political power to personally determine both who are nominated to contest elections and who wins the elections (Ibrahim, 2003). Godfathers are individuals who have enormous economic wealth, through which they acquire formal and informal political power to determine the scheme of political affairs within and even outside their geo-political jurisdictions. In Nigeria, patrons (godfathers) have hijacked politics at the local and national levels, thereby making people more subjective to political manipulation. Although godfather politics can be seen in terms of a patron-client relationship, it is more embedded in neo-patrimonial and clientelistic African politics.

In Nigeria, information from personal observation revealed that majority of the people regard the godfather phenomenon as a huge challenge to democracy and to healthy development of political parties (Fieldwork Diary, 2006; Gambo, 2007). In fact, godfathers are a major "plague of party politics in the country" and are specifically responsible for factionalism, acrimony and conflict within the major parties (International IDEA, 2006). Conversely, godfathers and their godsons (political clients) are staunchly in support of this political practice.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Godfather and godson are used here for both masculine and feminine gender. The researcher is not aware of any term used specifically for women godfathers or godsons.

For instance, Reverend Jolly Tanko Nyame, a two-time (1999-2003, 2003-2007) Governor of Taraba State, noted that: “[o]ne thing in politics is that you must believe in godfatherism. If I did not believe in it, I would not be in daddy’s place” (*The Sun Newspaper*, 2004). Similarly, the power of a godfather in Nigerian politics is underlined by the following statement made by an apologist of godfatherism:

*Whether you like it or not, as [a] godfather you will not be a governor [of a state or a chairman of a local Government], you will not be a President [of Nigeria], but you can make a governor [of a state, a senator, a member of a House of Assembly and Representatives], you can make a president. This is the power of a godfather (Cited in Ibrahim, 2003 emphasis added).*

Moreover, in an interview, a former chairman of a Local Government Council in Nigeria stressed that one of the ways through which most politicians finance their political activities (campaign rallies and political mobilisation) is through “getting *ubangida* (godfather)”. He maintained that in politics in Nigeria, or perhaps anywhere in Africa, there is a need for *ubangida* (godfather).

So your *ubangida* would be supplying campaign monies and even pocket monies<sup>11</sup> for your daily political spending. This is because the *ubangida* believes that he is investing. So, immediately you win the election, he [the godfather] would be coming to you to reap his investment (Nuru, Interview 2006).

The problem with this undemocratic arrangement between the godfathers and godsons is that when an election is won, the godfather either becomes the *de facto* chairman, or governor or uses carefully calculated tactics of siphoning the resources of the local government or the state to himself or his cronies (Nuru, interview, 2006). From this evidence, godfathers rather than political parties are the driving force of party politics. Though political parties are used as intermediaries between godfathers and godsons to get the latter into political leadership, parties are soon relegated to the background. The governor, chairman or whoever the godson might be would be more answerable and accountable to the godfather rather than to his political party and political constituency. By extension, this means that the godfather controls the political party, its machineries, as well as the chairman or the governor. This point was elaborated by a participant of a FGD, when he argues that the “rich people are using political parties as their business organisations” (FGD, 2006; Gambo, 2007; Ibrahim, 2007; Abubakar, 2006). According

to Gambo (2007), godfathers are the major financiers of parties and electoral candidates, and use parties as an “astutely thought out investment outlet to be recovered through frivolous and bloated government contracts, appointments of cronies into choice public offices and other prebendal returns by the beneficiaries”. Godfatherism has led to the personalisation of parties, siphoning of public resources, embezzlement, mismanagement and outright theft. The magnitude of the mafia-style phenomenon of godfathers also is demonstrated by how the godfathers decide party nominations and campaign outcomes and, according to Ibrahim (2007), when candidates resist, the godfathers use violence to deal with the situation. This makes free and fair elections extremely difficult and raises the potentials of violence in elections. The implication of this for political party institutionalisation and democratic governance is highly deleterious.

Godfather politics has permeated the whole Nigerian state. From Borno to Oyo, Anambra to Taraba, Kwara to Gombe states, the story is the same. It has also permeated local politics and political parties. However, it is vital to note that the magnitude and intensity of godfatherism differ from one state to another, perhaps from one region to another. The cases of Anambra, Kwara and Oyo states empirically distinguished themselves (Kura, 2006). These states presented a clear case of how godfathers become the major party funders and who have absolute control of their respective political terrain determine the political fortunes of their anointed candidates. The states also provide examples of when the pact between the patron and client (godfather and governor) failed and led to impeachment. The case of Kwara shows that despite the failure of the informal arrangement, the governor was able to successfully end his first term but he could not win the second term election. Though all parties have procedures for their activities, they are often jettisoned by godfathers and political barons. In other words, the political significance of parties has become no longer determined by popular support like in other countries, such as US, UK, South Africa, Botswana etc, but by administrative manipulation by the godfathers through all necessary means. For example, Ibrahim (2007) argues that these godfathers are mainly interested in controlling the party machines instead of presenting popular candidates for healthy electoral competition. Indeed, owing to the control of the party organisations, godfathers-political parties have various ways of eliminating popular candidates from the so-called party primaries. These include:

(i) A declaration by powerful political barons, state governors, godfathers, and others that those entitled to vote must support one candidate and other aspirants must withdraw. Since these people are very powerful and feared in their communities, their declarations carry much weight. (ii) Zoning and other procedures exclude unwanted candidates by moving the party zone out of the

<sup>11</sup> Pocket money here means all the money that a contesting candidate require for his daily political engagements, such as meetings, and ‘helping’ people, usually in the form of requests for money for naming and wedding ceremonies, cultural troupes, sport teams, and so on. These are usually outside major political events, such as mobilisation tours, and campaign rallies, purchasing of party and INEC forms, hiring legal practitioners, and financing his political group, and so on.

'Consensus' has become a household name in Nigerian political system since 1999. It is a political vocabulary introduced to convince someone sometime forcibly - to step aside in their political ambition for their opponents. In fact, most of the local and national primary elections organised by political parties were simply seen as window-dressing. This is perhaps why at most party primaries more problems were created than solved. Ironically, this is where godfathers play a significant role in making sure the candidates they are supporting win the party primaries. The consensus process is usually done in stages: the first stage is the lobby and pursuit of the opponent candidate (irrespective of his leadership credentials and popularity), who has no 'strong' godfather to support him, to step down in the contest for his opponent. If the candidate appears difficult to convince, the second stage is to promise him official position if election is won and all expenses already committed in the course of campaign and rallies, would be settled by the godfathers. The third stage would be to contact his parent depending on the level of opposition under contention. The fourth stage is to contact the traditional ruler of his area to intervene to convince him to step down. The traditional ruler in the discharge of this duty would either be paid or do it as the father of the area, or even for both reasons. The fifth and final stage, if all previous stages appear unsuccessful would be to go for the primaries. The political manoeuvres would start at the preparation of the primaries, especially in deciding or electing the delegates. The majority of the participants that made it into the party delegates list would be paid all their financial expenses, and a substantial amount would be given to each delegate to vote for a prepared and predetermined choice. Based on this seemingly undemocratic arrangement in the conduct of party primaries, it is therefore not unexpected that most party primaries and conventions create more problems that they solve, leaving parties divided and factionalised (Fieldwork Notes, 2006).

**Figure 1.** The process of consensus in party candidate selection in Nigeria.

seat or position in question to an area where the excluded candidate is not local. (iii) Candidates who oppose the godfathers' protégés are often subject to violence by thugs or security personnel. (iv) Money, a significant factor in party primaries, is used to bribe officials and induce voters to support particular candidates. Since the godfather generally has more money than the "independent" candidates, many of the latter are eliminated because they cannot match his spending. (v) What Nigerians call "results by declaration": An aspirant wins a nomination or election, but polling officials disregard the results and declare the loser the winner (Ibrahim, 2006b; 2007:5; Mamah, 2006).

In addition to the above, the financial supports from godfathers are not directly channelled to the party organisation for its activities and development. They are directly given to 'potentially' winning candidates, with the hope of enjoying political patronage. This helps in furthering clientelistic alliances completely outside the party organisation, but which are detrimental to the development of political parties. These external alliances proved to be stronger than the party organisations.

The exclusive control of party funding by godfathers through clientelistic networks and political alliances was made 'easier' by the failure of the parties to source a substantial part of their income from membership dues and other statutory fees from elected party members, such as legislators, governors, chairmen, councillors and party members holding political appointments. As for the membership fees, which all parties charge only ₦10

(\$0.07), the extent of poverty deprives people from registering with parties let alone providing extra contributions. In several instances, membership registrations are either done free-of-charge or political elite buying large quantities of cards and distribute to his/her constituencies. Political parties generally generate meagre amount from membership registration and other dues (Figure 1).

As indicated in the above discussion, given the enormous power of the godfathers, in some states, they appoint or at least claim to appoint all electoral candidates of the state and made them to win their elections. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2003 elections in Anambra state, Chief Chris Uba in an interview proudly stated that:

*I am the greatest godfather in Nigeria because this is the first time an individual single-handedly put in position every politician in the State.... It is not just the Governor [that I sponsored]; there are also three senators, 10 members of the House of Representatives and 30 members of the House of Assembly... I sponsored them...and this is the first time in the history of Anambra state that one single individual would be putting every public officer in the state in power (Interview, Sunday Champion, June 8, 2003).*

Similarly, at his 79<sup>th</sup> birthday celebration, Chief Lamidi Adedibu who is the godfather of Oyo politics (Kura and Marquette, 2007; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007)

arrogantly stated that:

*I am employing this occasion of my 79<sup>th</sup> birthday anniversary to announce on behalf of the Deputy Governor of Oyo State, Executive members of the PDP in Oyo State, wards, local and state executives, the two PDP senators in the Senate, 9 Federal Honourable Members, 20 operating members of the Oyo State House of Assembly, 351 PDP councillors and 33 council chairmen and all eligible voters at the primary election, that we are in favour of continuity of Bayo-Akala come 2007 (Thisday, 2005).<sup>12</sup>*

This sums up the power of the godfather of Ibadan politics, and represents a typical example of how a godfather behaves in Nigerian politics. Similar examples of this kind of political godfatherism and the hijacking of political parties and people can be found in many parts of Nigeria. In sum, irrespective of whichever candidate selection methods employed by parties, godfathers have other crude (informal) methods of counteracting them. Whether acclimation, affirmation, zoning, endorsement, consensus, declaration or even election, the outcome would be that only candidates anointed by godfathers 'will see the light of the day.' It is a little wonder therefore, that an individual(s) could proudly 'single-handedly' sponsor the election of all electoral candidates in a state. Not only this, by extension any candidate anointed by a godfather must win an election.<sup>13</sup>

## Conclusion

Political party funding and candidate selection are complex issues and as well very central in building credible party institutions. The importance of these issues is also premised on how they influence the character of democracy as a whole. They are more crucial than other activities of political parties. The lack of internal democracy and the seeming crises that besieged Nigerian political parties are contextualised and explained by the pattern of party funding and candidate selection. Lack of systematic party funding and candidate selection procedures made parties susceptible to elite manipulation and absolute control. However, there is an ostensible tension between the interests of the major party funders and the institutional designs guiding funding and candidate selection. Political parties in Nigeria lack viable source of funding. This makes it relatively easier for party funders – godfathers to control candidate selection process. Central

as it is, controlling candidate selection process for party officers and electoral candidates is tantamount to controlling the machineries of party organisation and apparatus of government. The disastrous implication of this is translated directly and indirectly into the development of a "clientele" democracy defined by the interplay of patron-client forces. In other words, it leads to the development of a democratic system of government that serves the interests of powerful political elites – godfathers. This is the dilemma of political parties, *vis-à-vis* democratisation process in Nigeria.

## Conflict of interest

The author has not declared any conflict of interest.

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<sup>12</sup> Largely, Adedibu has succeeded in this mission. Adebayo-Akala became the Oyo state Governor after 2007 elections, his son was elected into the National Assembly, and obviously many of his candidates won the elections.

<sup>13</sup> Irrespective of the quality of candidates and their popularity, godfathers employ all necessary strategies in order to ensure that their anointed ones are 'elected'. These strategies range from conventional use of money, manipulation of election officials, crude electoral malpractices, such as stuffing of ballot boxes, use of security agencies, thuggerism and violence.

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