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From Kyoto protocol to COPENHAGEN: A theoretical approach to international politics of climate change

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Industrialization, modernization and technological breakthrough are posing a greater challenge in contemporary international politics. They have paved a new dimension in the study of international relations and politics in the area of environmental security, cooperation and even interdependence. This paper is a critical theoretical approach to the study of international green politics, encompassing the nature of international cooperation at a collective level towards providing a better solution to the green gas emission. It analyses the politics that holds in the interplay among states as it relates to national interests, group identity and legalistic and moralistic approach to the study of international green politics. It is part of the findings of this paper that, despite the theoretical exposition of political variables from the angles of classical realism, the advanced capitalist countries especially the United States, still maintain the rationality of national interest and what can be economically termed as 'national wealth' rather than the collective bargaining of the united nations; not compromising the national interests with what is obtainable from the outcome of the collective cooperative principles of nation states as they relate to climate change (Kyoto protocol and Copenhagen summit resolutions). The paper concludes that, if the third world countries continue to slumber, the advanced economies of Europe and America will continue to machinate against their population in saving the climate and capitalize on that to create a new global economic and political hegemony, among other things. The paper recommends prudence in dealing with issues that relate to climate change and due consideration be given to the developing states interalia.

Key words: Kyoto to Copenhagen, politics of climate change, international green politics, theoretical approach, cooperation, dependency.

INTRODUCTION

While the issue of global climate change has become of collective concern, there is no nation or state within the international political realm that is not affected. One state can not solve the problem of global climate change without the call for cooperation in order to provide global environmental security. But the major concern is that, some advanced countries have maintained and still maintaining the position of national interest (political interest on a rational ground), while others relatively maintain a moralistic approach to the issue of global warming and climate change. This, however, is basically

the expression of what the realists called the "anarchic" nature of the global politics, as it lacks governance that will remote control the activities of states generally. But with the previous conferences ,seminars and summits organized by the United Nations, at providing a better solution to the issue, the constructivist are of the view that, international politics is taking a new dimension as there exists a shift from the classical realism to what nation states ought to do about the problem of climate change.

On the other hand, similarly, the issue of international

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green politics is not seen from the perspective of realistic ground, but rather as a legalistic phenomenon which has to do with international law, human rights and survival of humanity. The liberalists uphold the issue of climate change from this particular perspective and call for the implementation of the legal frame work, which is an outcome of agreement reached by the members of the United Nations within the framework of international politics.

The Kyoto protocol

This is an amendment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an international treaty intended to bring countries together to reduce global warming and to cope with the effects of temperature increases that are unavoidable after 150 years of industrialization. The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol are legally binding on the ratifying nations, and stronger than those of the UNFCCC. Countries that ratify the Kyoto Protocol agree to reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexa-fluoride, HFCs and PFCs. The countries are allowed to use emissions trading to meet their obligations if they maintain or increase their greenhouse gas emissions. The goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce worldwide greenhouse gas emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. Compared to the emissions levels that would occur by 2010 without the Kyoto Protocol, however, this target actually represents a 29% cut. The Kyoto Protocol sets specific emissions reduction targets for each industrialized nation, but excludes developing countries. To meet their targets, most ratifying nations, according to Larry (2009), would have to combine several strategies:

- (a). place restrictions on their biggest polluters
- (b). manage transportation to slow or reduce emissions from automobiles
- (c). make better use of renewable energy sources—such as solar power, wind power, and biodiesel—in place of fossil fuels

Most of the world's industrialized nations support the Kyoto Protocol. One notable exception is the United States, which releases more greenhouse gases than any other nation and accounts for more than 25% of those generated by humans worldwide. Australia also declined. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997. It was opened for signature on March 16, 1998, and closed a year later. Under terms of the agreement, the Kyoto Protocol would not take effect until 90 days after it was ratified by at least 55 countries involved in the UNFCCC. Another (Larry, 2009) condition was that ratifying countries had to represent at least 55

percent of the world's total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990.

The first condition was met on May 23, 2002, when Iceland became the 55th country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. When Russia ratified the agreement in November 2004, the second condition was satisfied, and the Kyoto Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005.

As a U.S. presidential candidate, George W. Bush promised to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Shortly after he took office in 2001; however, he withdrew U.S. support for the Kyoto Protocol and refused to submit it to Congress for ratification.

Instead, Bush proposed a plan with incentives for U.S. businesses to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 4.5 percent by 2010, which he claimed would equal taking 70 million cars off the road. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, however, the Bush plan actually would result in a 30 percent increase in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over 1990 levels instead of the 7 percent reduction the treaty requires. That is because the Bush plan measures the reduction against current emissions instead of the 1990 benchmark used by the Kyoto Protocol (Larry, 2009).

While his decision dealt a serious blow to the possibility of U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol, Bush was not alone in his opposition. Prior to negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution (Larry, 2009) saying the U.S. should not sign any protocol that failed to include binding targets and time tables for both developing and industrialized nations and that "would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.

THE COPENHAGEN DILEMMA

The European Union has rejected the new carbon emission targets tabled by the United States and China and said they were much too weak to prevent catastrophic climate change. The dispute between the three main players at the Copenhagen climate change summit overshadowed the first day of negotiations and dashed a hope that a deal on emissions was imminent. The EU called on Obama to announce a more ambitious target next week, when he arrives in Copenhagen for the last day of the conference on December 18. But the US insisted that the provisional offer made 10 days ago by Obama was "remarkable" and in line with what scientists had recommended (Ben, 2009).

Obama has proposed to cut its emissions by 4 per cent on 1990 levels by 2020, although he has said this is subject to getting the approval of Congress. The EU has made a legally binding commitment to cut its emissions by 20 per cent over the same period. It has also said it would increase the cut to 30 percent if other countries are committed to (Ben, 2009).

MATERIALS AND METHOD

This research work is a combination of both primary and secondary methodological adoption. The primary deals with an interview among Americans, French, the Spanish and Italians citizens on the issue of climate change policies. On the other hand, however, the secondary method is an outcome of library materials which suggest the utilization of text books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, government reports and others. Notwithstanding, the deconstructionists believe that, there is the need for a shift in international politics-theories from explaining the opened rationality and intentions of statesmen to what is called 'hiding intentions', but the realists stipulate that, in any explanation of international politics, the school of realism can not be discarded; while the liberalists theorists also think, realism is obsolete and can not be applied in explaining 'international politics of climate change' but rather, the UN (which supports the stand of liberal institutionalism) has proven that organizations and legal framework hold in a case that deals with climate change. Within the framework of liberalism, however, an extension emerged (neo-liberalism), which argues that, it is high time to have a shift from liberal institutionalism to neo-liberalism (which explains issues like slavery, colonialism, climate change etc). But for the constructivists, similarly, an explanation can only be provided within the arena of 'interest and threat', which signifies why states cooperate with some states (that are strong) and see others (weaker) as a threat in international politics. These three theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) are applied as a method to analyze the issues raised in this paper.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Cooperation in international politics of climate change

Cooperation in international politics (especially in the area of climate change) is said to take place (Charles, 1965) when "actors adjust their behaviors to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination". Policy coordination according Helen (1992) implies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce their negative consequences for the other states

One of the adherents of realist approach to the study of cooperation is Sterling (2002). Challenging the standard liberal explanations for international cooperation provide in the field of international relations, contends that despite numerous efforts and the passage of time, our understanding of the cooperative phenomenon remains woefully inadequate. Sterling (2002) argues that widespread explanatory reliance on what constitutes functionally efficient choices in global interdependence is deductively illogical and empirically unsound. The author's approach for explaining international cooperation comprises realist and constructivist insights and places the state, rather than the market, at the center of analysis.

One of the prominent schools of cooperation is the 'power based' school. The Power-based theories of cooperation focus on the importance of relative gains and security concerns to otherwise rational agents. The distribution of power and the presence of anarchy (the

absence of an authority to enforce contractual obligations) are paramount because these concerns never change and are external to the agents involved. Power-based theories are predominantly static and (Hasenclever et al., 1997) positivist. There are three power-based theories of international cooperation which are: (a). Hegemonic Stability Theory (b) Power-based Research Programme and (c) Realist Theory of cooperation best explains the international politics of climate change, drawing from Kyoto protocol to the dilemma of the summit of Copenhagen.

The Hegemonic Stability Theory

A hegemony is a powerful agent who provides public goods because it has the self-interest and the capacity to supply them. This provision generates free riders. According to hegemonic theory the weak exploit the strong. Hegemony can be coercive (imperialist) or benevolent (leadership). Hegemony is necessary to shoulder the costs of rulemaking and enforcement (second-order cooperation dilemmas). In return, they generally set the rules and others adjust. Olson (1965) and Snidal (1985) have noted that small groups can provide public goods by cooperating and sharing costs, instead of relying on a single hegemon. In addition, hegemony can vary according to issue-area (the environment, nuclear weapons, etc.) this brings the issue of the European Union helping the former colonies (hegemons) that are economically backward. EU leaders agreed Friday to commit euro2.4 billion (\$3.6 billion) a year until 2012 to help poorer countries combat global warming, as they sought to rescue their image as climate change innovators and bolster the talks in Copenhagen. Figure 1 shows the countries with highest pollution rate in the world.

Figures 1 and 2 show the reason why the developing nations must be assisted by the world most industrialized ones. This is largely because, the developing nations as shown in the figure contribute lesser amount of carbon emission but bear the highest burden and repercussion of climate change; hence, the calls for compensation or funding global climate change.

All 27 members of the European Union agreed to commit money to a short-term fund for poorer countries. Britain, France and Germany will each contribute about 20 percent of the money. Britain is promising the most at \$650 million each year — saying this reflects its links to former members of the British Empire affected by climate change. It is also pushing to raise that figure and the overall EU figure higher at the Copenhagen talks. It is in line with Neal (2009) who argues on this type of cooperation:

Apparently, things have calmed down after the "Copenhagen text" leak, which upset many poorer nations. You see, when it comes down to it... these




Figure 1. Per capita CO₂ emissions for 15 countries with the highest total industrial emissions (1995). Source: U N Population Division, *Annual Populations (The 1996 Revision)*, on diskette (U.N., New York, 1993).




Figure 2. Cumulative carbon-dioxide emissions (1950-1995). Source: U N Population Division, *Annual Populations (The 1996 Revision)* on diskette (U.N., New York, 1993).

15,000 delegates are not in Co-pen-hagen to discuss the climate. They are in Copenhagen to discuss the redistribution of wealth around the world. They just have to figure out how to package it and justify it ... all in the name of climate change.

Power-based research programme

According to power-based theories, cooperation does not result in mutual adjustment at all but instead requires the less powerful to adjust to the more powerful. In addition, power differences shape the following: (i) who gets to play the game? (ii) What are the rules? (iii) What are the payoffs? As a result, cooperation and institutions merely serve the interests of the powerful. Powerful players

extend their power through these means. Because differences in the distribution of costs and benefits always exist, even under conditions of absolute gains not everyone gains equally. The question of the reliability of assuming that structural power is translatable into bargaining power regarding outcomes (Hasenclever et al., 1997).

This explains what happens at the summit of Copenhagen; based on the power-based theory, it serves the interest of the powerful countries of Europe and America. Behind the smart suits, tinted windows, and Swiss fountain pens, there are delegates from poorer countries who struggled to attend the conference and struggled to have a voice amongst the well-polished rhetoric of the E.U. and American delegations. One such country is Sierra Leone (will, 2009). These poor countries

have very limited chances to be heard or even attend the summit. Will (2009) argues inter alia:

The state has never been able to afford to send a delegate to climate change conferences. They are part of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group representing the 49 poorest countries in the world. They rank 180th (out of 182) on the human development index and have a big deforestation problem. The seven delegates are funded by the UNDP and E.U. This funding covers the flight and a per diem allowance of \$200. Does not it sound like much? One day is the same as a delegates' monthly salary).

The extent to which \$200 disadvantages Sierra Leonean delegates becomes apparent when you analyze the cost of 'doing': Hotels in Copenhagen are \$300 a night. But there is a backpacker's hostel for \$34. **Food:** Government officials eat at the Bella Vista restaurant in the Bella Centre, which costs \$100. But there is a sandwich stall in the NGO section. Meeting rooms: The smallest comes in at \$14220 (the delegations entire budget) for 10 days. Even if they got one for free, catering costs \$162 per person per day. However the current imbalance in preparation and attendance is a stumbling block which desperately needs to be overcome. To show the disparity and the extent to which it transpires that the summit is not for the poor countries but rather for the rich, Will (2009) further states:

As America's delegates unwind in their hotel gym, Dr. Lansana will get on the bus and cross the border into Sweden to his hostel. His Sierra Leonean colleagues will be scattered around Copenhagen, comparing notes by text message and phone calls. In 12 days, he will spend the equivalent of his yearly salary on sandwiches and sleeping. The least he can hope for is an agreement at the end of it

Realist Theory of cooperation

The Realist theory of cooperation attempts to explain cooperation given states' overwhelming concern with security, independence, and autonomy. It is not merely relative gains that are a concern but a systemic intolerance for relative losses. All acts could result in the destruction of the agent, so power asymmetries trump all other concerns. In this scenario, absolute gains just do not exist. There is always the concern over "who will gain more?" The result is "defensive positionalism," or reluctant cooperation, wherein agents will cooperate only if they feel it is absolutely necessary. Rationality, in this case, is constrained by fear of destruction and the presence of anarchy (Hasenclever et al., 1997).

For Realists, institutions matter but only because they facilitate the necessary stabilizing exertion of power:

payoffs to other agents, sanctions, and norms of reciprocity (that makes accepting relative gains losses in the now or on a particular issue easier in expectation of compensation on other issues or in the future). With power, cooperation is rare at best, but without power it is impossible (Helen, 1992). This is typically the picture of the Copenhagen summit on climate change as captured by Louis (2009): "The row between the rich countries and the developing world intensified at the Copenhagen summit, as China and its supporters blamed America for "endangering the world" by refusing to hand over more cash."

This political process, however, is because some countries have no power (which makes cooperation impossible) from the stand of the school of realism. It was also reported by Neal (2009) that: a Sudanese diplomat went as far to say that rich nations are acting like the British Empire: "This is all based on the dominance and supremacy of developed countries. One could say the Empire has been doing this since the 16th Century, the Empire has always ruthlessly grabbed natural resources - the new resource is the global atmospheric space and carbon space."

Different from the argument of the realists, the liberal-institutionalists will argue that, cooperation is unconditional, due to the institutional cooperation of the members of the United Nations, from the Kyoto protocol to the Copenhagen (Robert, 1984; Axelrod, 1984). The neo-liberalists believe that the liberal theory is a good one at explaining not only unrestrained exploitation of the planet's ecology, but encompassing areas such as slavery, piracy, dueling, colonialism, slaughter of certain animals (Charles and Eugene, 2004) among other things, and emphasizes the prospects for progress, peace and prosperity (even in issues dealing with global climate change). While the realists give conditions for cooperation (although neo-realists believe in cooperation) neo-liberalists have given an unconditional state of cooperation because 'collaboration produces rewards that reduce the temptation to selfishly compete' (Charles and Eugene, 2004).

Still in the argument of liberal-institutionalists, according to Joshua and Jon (2009), while explaining the three analyses of Kantian liberalist views, they noted that: states could develop organizations and rules to facilitate cooperation; a responsive legislature to check the monarch and; trade promotes peace, increases wealth, cooperation, and global well-being. In other words, the European Union, the United States, the defunct Soviet Union and the developing states of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean transact businesses among themselves; hence, the avoidance of conflict in the long run (because governments will not want to disrupt any process that adds to the wealth of their states) and the need for cooperation arises (Schrodt and Gerner, 2004). This is not exceptional in states cooperating to solve the problem of global climate change in order to facilitate a

harmonious trade environment and sustainability.

For the constructivists, however, while dealing with the issue of climate change globally, there is still the need to consider 'persuasive ideas, collective values, culture and social identities'. The theory has been described as a challenge to the dominance of neo-liberal and neo-realist international relations theories (Hopf, 1998). Theoretically, constructivism is synonymous to idealism dealing with ideas which the constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influence states and non-state actors within the international system. For instance, by engaging in the "enabled" action of intervention, the United States reproduced its own identity of great power, as well as the structure that gave meaning to its action. So, U.S. intervention in Vietnam perpetuated the international inter-subjective understanding of great powers as those states that use military power against others (Hopf, 1998). The concept of constructivism was coined by Nicholas Onuf and later developed by Richard Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil, and John Ruggie. Alexander Wendt was more popular in the use of the concept in international politics (Robert and George, 2006).

From the above analysis, therefore, we can see why the US still refuses to go by the Kyoto protocols and refused to increase its level of emission reduction. This shows that, the US is still portraying its great power identity, and its refusal to go by what the other states require of her to go by. In a showdown between the world's two largest polluters, China accused the United States and other rich nations of backsliding on commitments to fight global warming (John and Cara, 2009). This is also an identity issue because China identifies herself with the developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean than the advanced economies of the world, despite her fast economic growth, industrialization and rapid growth of her gross domestic product (GDP). It is in line with John and Cara (2009) who pointed out pertinently to the constructivist arguments:

China and other developing countries are resisting U.S.-led attempts to make their cuts in emissions growth binding and open to international scrutiny rather than voluntary. China, the world's largest polluter, is grouped with developing nations at the talks, but the U.S. does not consider China to be in need of climate-change aid... China accused developed countries Tuesday of trying to escape their obligations to help poor nations fight climate change.

INTERDEPENDENCE

Globalization has facilitated commerce and trade; promotes economic interdependence in communication and

technological sectors. Industrialization is also one major sector that has intensified interdependence. According to Joshua (2003), the global threat of climate change (to natural environment) is a major source of interdependence and "a sustainable natural environment is a collective good, and states bargain over how to distribute the costs of providing the good". This, however, is generally termed "tragedy of the commons", politics that was involved in British shared grazing ground (Hardin, 1968; Joshua and Jon, 2009; Joshua, 2003) for many centuries ago. Robert (1991) is of the view that "much thinking about interdependence was shaped by events of the early and mid-1970s" when "America's détente with the Soviet Union, recognition of China, and withdrawal from Indochina reflected a series of changes in super power relations".

The eventual decline of détente, reduction in the power of OPEC according to Robert, coupled with the subsequent eruption of conflicts especially the Iran-Iraq war, has placed interdependence on the table of "reexamination" (Robert, 1991). He explains the globalist or institutionalist position of interdependence which leads to cooperation as a result of modernization, industrialization and communication on one hand, while on the other hand highlights the modification of interdependence having to do with more enduring aspects of realism and power politics.

The realists (Morgenthau, 1978) believe that politics, just like the society is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature, and men will challenge them only at the risk of failure; interest is defined in terms of power. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place; universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry and; the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. While exposing the self-help ideology of the school of realism, Dale (1996) wrote about state interest to maintain and acquire power:

Germany had been one of the few great powers trying to buck the trend towards protectionism in the early and mid-1890s. Recognizing that German industrial products could now match the goods of any state, Chancellor Caprivi set in place policies to expand German trade in Europe and overseas. Other great powers, however, indicated their opposition to any German penetration pacifique. Severe tariffs from the United States (McKinley tariff, 1890) and France (Meline tariff, 1892) were certainly worrisome. Even that bastion of free trade - Britain - indicated after 1895 that its fear of rising German

commercial strength would soon lead to a reversal of policy.

This shows that, no matter how worst the issue of climate change will be in international politics, states will always pursue their own interest first. Dale (1996) further argues in this respect:

In 1896, the British had raided the Transvaal region of South Africa, jeopardizing German commercial interests. In mid-1897, Canada slapped a discriminatory tariff on non-British goods, contrary to the 1865 Most Favored Nation treaty between Germany and the British Empire. Despite Germany's protest, the British, far from making amends, upheld the Canadian decision and then renounced the 1865 treaty in July 1897. Soon after this Joseph Chamberlain opened talks with British colonies on the possible formation of a general imperial preference system

The realists hold the view that the refusal of Bush to accept endorsing the Kyoto protocol deals with the aberration of the legalistic and moralistic nature of international politics. This is an epitome of what the realists called challenging the "objective laws" (Morgenthau, 1978). Still in this respect of international politics of climate change, the realist argues:

A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest are the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed (Morgenthau, 1978).

Prominent scholars of the realist school such as diplomat-historian, Carr (1939), geographer Nicholas (1942) John (1959), Raymond (1966), Hedley (1977) and Wight (1973), Arnold (1962) and Norman (1984), diplomat George (1951), journalist Walter (1943) and theologian Reinhold (1945) are of the view that the international system exists based on the self-help, due to its anarchic nature of lacking common government.

In another realist perception of the international politics of climate change, Waltz is of the view that, "international relations take place in an anarchic system that shapes

state behavior". He also believes that "states are unitary actors, who at a minimum seek their own survival and may aspire to greater power" (Robert, 1991). This also explains the US stand, despite the so called international interdependence, but it seeks for its own survival. A country with high technological breakthrough will suffer less impact of the climate change than those without technological advancement, and have no financial power to acquire such technologies (such as the developing nations).

And for the realists, interdependence is like a mere illusion if it tries to hold within power cleavages with different capabilities:

A world composed of greatly unequal units is scarcely an interdependent one. A world in which the Soviet Union and China pursue exclusionary policies is scarcely an interdependent one. A world of bristling nationalism is scarcely an interdependent one (Kenneth, 1979).

According to Robert (1991), "interdependence has waxed and waned", the reason is that the high level of interdependence and trade exchanges of the past did not prevent the world wars from taking place in history. Another reason for the consolidation of realism in the international politics of climate change, from the angle of interdependence is that, Robert (1991) also believes that with "inflationary pressures created by the twin oil shocks of the 1970s proved harmful throughout much of the world; and problem of unemployment, monetary instability and collapsing agricultural prices as a result of excessive subsidies all illustrate damaging effect; thus, interdependence has negative effect. While for Dale (1996), in analyzing the fragility of interdependence, maintains that the:

Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war. States concerned about security will dislike dependence, since it means that crucial imported goods could be cut off during a crisis. This problem is particularly acute for imports like oil and raw materials; while they may be only a small percentage of the total import bill, without them most modern economies would collapse. Consequently, states dependent on others for vital goods has an increased incentive to go to war to assure them of continued access of supply.

This may come against the assumption that, the global climate change will affect even the rich countries that look for raw materials and resources from the poorer countries, due to shortage of raw materials and mineral resources. This will in turn bring about crisis, insecurity and conflicts. The realists will then argue, despite interdependence, the ideology of "self-help" worked during the gulf war when the United States invaded Iraq to ensure constant supply

and benefit of oil. This is the basic argument that "states concerned about security" will dislike "dependence". This also explains why Washington refused to sign the Kyoto protocol and its reluctance to succumb to the yearnings of the global community of cutting her carbon emissions

For the liberalists and neo-liberalists, however, the issue of curbing global climate change is something of collective responsibility. Due to its universality, states must have a collective bargaining principles, and must all come together in order to deal with the issue. The core liberal position is straightforward. Trade provides valuable benefits, or "gains from trade," to any particular state. A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than war, so dependent states should prefer to trade not invade. This argument is often supported by the auxiliary proposition that modern technology greatly increases the costs and risks of aggression, making the trading option even more rational (Dale, 1996).

The liberalist analysis, accordingly, is based on the avoidance of conflict and war in international politics (especially on issues dealing with economic interdependence). Richard (1986) is of the view that states must choose between being "trading states," concerned with promoting wealth through commerce, and "territorial states," obsessed with military expansion. Modern conditions push states towards a predominantly trading mode: wars are not only too costly; but with the peaceful trading option, "the benefits that one nation gains from trade can also be realized by others." When the system is highly interdependent, therefore, the "incentive to wage war is absent," since "trading states recognize that they can do better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land"; so also in international politics of climate change. If states allow climate deteriorate, it will affect their economic and trade volume and thereby causing economic hardship in the world more than war could cause. Therefore, the liberalists believe that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading (Robert and Joseph, 1977).

It is also based on the canon of interdependence in international politics of climate change, that developing states called for a colossal amount of fund at the Copenhagen summit to help them deal with the problem of climate change which+ is engendered by the industrial activity of the industrialized states. In response, however, the developed nations are answering this question of financial aid. This is based on the primacy that the developed nations get the raw materials and resources that help their industrialization continue, and failure to consider will usher a bandwagon effect and every state must bear the repercussion. The money would help poorer countries protect their coasts, adjust crops threatened by drought, build water supplies and irrigation

systems, preserve forests and move from fossil fuel to low-carbon energy systems such as solar and wind power.

While for the constructivists, there is still a tendency for states to show and pursue identity and interest while considering threat in international politics. In the words of Checkel (1998), 'constructivism puts international relations in the context of broader social relations'. This implies that, despite the level of interdependence in international politics, there are those states that their relation is more broadened by their common interest and identity. In the argument of Joshua (2003), "constructivists reject the assumption that states always want more rather than less power and wealth, or the assumption that state interests exist independently of a context of interactions among states" but the constructivists' belief is that "complex cultures shape state behavior regarding international security and military force"

Constructivism will here explain why Britain worked with Russia to minimize German economic penetration in the Middle East. The British worked actively in 1907, they agreed with Russia to divide Persia into spheres of influence (Dale, 1996) as part of a campaign to restrict any extension of German power via the proposed Berlin-Baghdad Railway. The Russian ambassador reported to Moscow in August 1910, "England is less interested in what happens in Persia than in preventing any other Power, except England and Russia, from playing any role there. This applies particularly to Germany and Turkey" (Dickinson, 1926).

It also explains why England worked out a tacit deal with the Americans, giving them a sphere of influence over Latin American oil, in return for British domination of the Middle Eastern oil reserves. By these means, the Germans were effectively denied control over oil imports at a time when only 10 percent of Germany's growing oil requirements were supplied by internal production (Fiona, 1986; Hans, 1950). This will also bring the constructivists to argue why China (the world fastest growing economy) will align with the most backward countries at Copenhagen climate summit, and support them for their clamors on funding emission reduction against the United States and other richest nations of the world.

EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON CLIMATE CHANGE: REALISM OR LIBERALISM?

The way and manner through which resolutions from conferences on climate change have been handled by international community is quite unsatisfactory. Which school of international politics then, explains best, the dwindling nature of policies on climate change? Albeit, every school has some arguments to offer, but judgment can be given from the following basic facts on international summits on climate change , which almost

all centered on the issues of: the protection of the environment (environmental security); sustainable development; climate change and funding the control of climate change in the developing world. Some of these international gatherings prior to the Copenhagen's include:

a. the Bonn Climate Talks-June 2009: two key documents discussed at the Bonn talks in June were provision for a basis to intensify negotiations on further emission reduction commitments for Annex I Parties. One key document focuses on amendments to the Kyoto Protocol relating to emission reduction commitments of industrialized countries for the second phase of the Protocol (post-2012). A second document covers other related issues, including emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms, and land use, land-use change and forestry (UNFCCC, 2009).

b. Bangkok climate change talks-2009: it was on this talk that Obama (2009) pointed out clearly on his support to checking global climate change when he asserted:

It is true that for too many years, mankind has been slow to respond or even recognize the magnitude of the climate threat. It is true of my own country, as well. We recognize that. But this is a new day. It is a new era. Each of us must do what we can when we can to grow our economies without endangering our planet -- and we must all do it together. We must seize the opportunity to make Copenhagen a significant step forward in the global fight against climate change. We also cannot allow the old divisions that have characterized the climate debate for so many years to block our progress.

c. Barcelona climate change talks-2009: stressed the urgency for industrialized countries to raise their ambitions and, in particular, the importance of the U.S. announcing a clear, numerical mid-term emissions target. There was also a need, for industrialized nations to provide clarity on the amount of short- and long-term finance to which they will commit (Boer, 2009).

d. Accra climate change talks -2009: The latest round of United Nations climate change negotiations took place in Accra, Ghana, from 21-27 August. The Accra Climate Change Talks took forward work on a strengthened and effective international climate change deal under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as work on emission reduction rules and tools under the Kyoto Protocol. This is part of a negotiating process that will be concluded in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Over 1600 participants attended the Accra meeting, which was the third major UNFCCC gathering this year (UNFCCC, 2009). One basic thing to note is that, despite the colossal amount of fund spent by states to attend this conference, it was still a deadlock. James and Louis (2009) have reported Obama saying at the end of the summit, that it:

Hangs in the balance...We are running out of time. The time for talk is over. It is better for us to act than to talk. The question is whether we move forward together or split apart...We can do that, and everyone who is in this room will be a part of an historic endeavor - one that makes life better for our children and grandchildren...we can again choose delay, falling back into the same divisions that have stood in the way of action for years. And we will be back having the same stale arguments month after month, year after year - all while the danger of climate change grows until it is irreversible.

The Copenhagen climate conference "failed" long before it even opened (Charles, 2009). It may not "succeed" (as he believes) until long after it ends (the prophecy was true, because the summit did not succeed). For the moment, then, negotiators must satisfy themselves with something in between, which according to him, is the outcome of the summit. The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush had blocked progress on climate change for seven years, and would do so for one more. When President Obama assumed office, he had just 11 months to work with international partners to negotiate a successor agreement to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which had imposed modest emissions cuts on industrialized nations, and which the U.S. had rejected (Charles, 2009).

Table 1 represents the opinions of adults from five European countries and the United States on the issue of climate change, and their opinions on how it should be curbed, as well as the issue of funding the developing nations on cutting greenhouse emission. The responses obtained from the Americans show that they maintain a realist ideology of the American government of maintaining national interest first, before any international collective bargaining.

It can be seen, however, from Table 1 that more than half of adults in all 5 European countries believe that if there is no agreement in the climate change conference in Copenhagen in December, the world will be in a worse position for dealing with climate change. In the US the proportion of adults who agree with this is lower (45%) (Table 2).

The majority of Spaniards and a plurality of Germans, Italians and French all agree that developed countries should help fund developing countries in their efforts to cut down on emissions. In Britain the plurality is neutral to this assertion, while in the US the plurality disagrees with this (Table 3).

It can be seen from Table 3 that In Italy, Spain, France and Germany, just over half of adults agree that developed countries should be prepared to aid the developing ones to deal with the consequences of the climate change as they have not been responsible for as much of an impact. In Britain and the US, 2 in 5 adults are neutral, with 3 in 10 and 1 in 5 respectively saying that they agree. While rethinking the theoretical

Table 1. Countrywise contribution to emissions. “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If there is no agreement in the climate change conference in Copenhagen in December, the world will be in a worse position for dealing with climate change.”

Base: All EU adults in five countries and U.S. adults Great Britain	France	Italy	Spain	Germany	United States	
%	%	%	%	%	%	
Unweighted base	1126	1151	1060	1076	1033	1017
Agree (NET)	51	64	65	67	63	45
Strongly agree	18	27	29	33	25	17
Somewhat agree	33	38	35	34	37	27
Neither agree nor disagree	38	27	25	27	29	37
Disagree (NET)	11	9	10	6	8	18
Somewhat disagree	7	5	7	3	5	7
Strongly disagree	4	4	4	3	2	11

Source: financial times: Harris poll -monthly opinions of adults from five European countries and the US.

Table 2. Countrywise contribution to emissions. “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Developed countries, such as the US and EU member states, should help fund developing countries, such as China, in their efforts to reduce emissions.”

Base: All EU adults in five countries and U.S. adults Great Britain	France	Italy	Spain	Germany	United States	
%	%	%	%	%	%	
Unweighted base	1126	1151	1060	1076	1033	1017
Agree (NET)	31	37	39	58	42	23
Strongly agree	7	13	13	28	12	6
Somewhat agree	24	25	26	30	30	18
Neither agree nor disagree	39	28	29	26	32	32
Disagree (NET)	29	35	33	15	26	44
Somewhat disagree	17	20	18	10	16	19
Strongly disagree	13	15	14	6	10	26

Source: financial times: Harris poll -monthly opinions of adults from five European countries and the US.

Table 3. Countrywise contribution to emissions. “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Developing countries have not caused as much climate change, so developed countries should be prepared to give more aid to them to deal with the consequences.”

Base: All EU adults in five countries and U.S. adults Great Britain	France	Italy	Spain	Germany	United States	
%	%	%	%	%	%	
Unweighted base	1126	1151	1060	1076	1033	1017
Agree (NET)	31	52	54	53	51	20
Strongly agree	7	15	15	23	13	4
Somewhat agree	24	36	39	30	38	16
Neither agree nor disagree	42	32	27	30	32	40
Disagree (NET)	27	17	19	17	17	39
Somewhat disagree	17	10	13	12	10	23
Strongly disagree	9	6	6	5	7	17

Source: financial times: Harris poll -monthly opinions of adults from five European Countries and the US.

approach, however, the realists will argue that in international politics, states still look at their national interest

and try to acquire, maintain and preserve power. The United States, despite the yearnings of the international

community on cutting its emission to a reasonable level, it tries to show the world that, they can never dictate for her what to do against her national interest, therefore, the ecological anarchy continues. This is despite the US support at financing the developing states with \$100 billion annually by 2020, which according to Charles (2009), Japan has offered \$15 billion-three-year contribution to a "prompt-start" fund to support poorer nations', and \$11 billion pledged earlier by the European Union adaptation to climate change and switch to clean energy .on the other hand, similarly, the liberalists will also like to maintain that, the international system is far beyond the lines of war and conflict. They may also like to reason with the call by the UN (an international organization) and answered by all. This is an achievement in international politics, but states (due to different standpoints) must argue and deliberate on global issues that affect every state in the world, based on collective principle, which needs to be gradual. The constructivists, however, will present the fact that the molded interest and identity definition of China and the developing states has stressed the sharing of interest between China and the third world countries in international system. But the trend does not call for global polarization (as US +EU and China + developing nations), but rather, the EU has been even more responsive at considering the yearnings and aspirations of the developing nations.

THE PARADOX OF GLOBAL WARMING: PARKINSON'S AND MOSHER'S SUBMISSION

In the analogy given by Parkinson on the issue of global warming and climate in general, is a new discovery in the literature of earth science. She maintains a position that the digital or computer technology we rely on cannot precisely explain the real situation of our mother earth, but with some certain miscalculations and even prediction her argument, however, she also made the justification on the lack of feasibility of governments to contain green gases emission and global warming. The point here is that, global warming is better than global cooling, that is to say, is better for the world to be warmer than cooler. The implication or consequences of cooling is more menacing than that of warming (Parkinson, 2010).

On the other hand, however, while Chinese policy on population has discouraged birth rate in China, and polygamy practiced at a lower rate in many Muslim countries due to poverty and social factors, Mosher (2008) believes that, the West and America are in a big race at reducing the population of blacks in order to get their natural resources. For over half a century, policymakers committed to population control have perpetrated a gigantic, costly, and inhumane fraud upon the human race. They have robbed people of the developing countries of their progeny and the people of the developed world of their pocketbooks. Determined to stop population growth at all costs, those Mosher calls

"population controllers" have abused women, targeted racial and religious minorities, undermined primary health care programs (2008).

The irony of population control, similarly is that, the world is made to believe that, the higher the global population the higher the rate of industrial emission which contributes to the ozone layers and creates global warming. But the reality of this assertion is that, the American and European interest (the first theoretical approach) is to reduce racial and religious population especially in the developing world, to get their resources for their own development.

Conclusion

The issue of climate change has concurrently overshadowed the political sphere of international system. This is largely because; every human race is concerned about the future of the world today, and suggests an alternative way to avoid the consequences of global warming. But we must all be conscious of American and western machination in reducing third world's population in order to maintain American and western hegemony in the world, by sending contraceptives and family planning pills, in order to have more control and benefit of the world population. But the basic fact is that, if states continue to ignore the issue of climate change or dishonestly treat the case, stronger states will invade weaker ones in search of raw materials (which will be scarce as a result of global warming), economies will face an unprecedented recession, and the world will be ushered in to another historical phase that there will be not only systemic collapse, but also, the intervention of natural anarchy. Consequently, the first theoretical approach adopted in this research (on national interest) prevails in explaining the issue of global warming and climate change.

RECOMMENDATION

The following recommendations proffered, are significantly foundational that when adopted and implemented, will provide an impetus to the processes of curbing the difficulty of climate change in policy and in practice:

- (i). The US must drastically change her policy on global climate change and fully cooperate with the international community toward an agreed resolutions previously and concurrently proposed for a better stable global climate.
- (ii). A particular fund must be set aside by the developing sates to be committed towards R&D, which in turn, will provide a more advanced technology that will help at curbing the problem of global warming and climate change.
- (iii). States must honestly, for the sake of humanity (not selfish interest) consider cutting their emission level down

for the benefit of the entire universe).

(iv). the developing nations must be fully and effectively funded, to deal with the waxing level of climate change in their own regions.

(v).all resolutions and decisions taken (unanimously) must be subjected to monitoring and evaluation under the watchdog of the United Nations. Breach of any agreement must be seriously dealt with, and it must be seen as crime against humanity.

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