Review

Domestic rebellion in Africa: Between intelligence failures and the failure of governance

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Political rebellion has remained a major staple of Africa’s political economy. The rebellion is multifaceted and multifarious. Consequently, several explanations are competing for attention in the literatures. This paper examines the upsurge of political rebellion in Africa in the recent time. It argues that the surge and spread of political rebellion in Africa is largely a function of the failure of governance and less the failure of security and/or intelligence.

Key words: Africa, rebellion, intelligence, governance, democracy.

INTRODUCTION

Africa has remained a violent-ridden continent in the psycho-political map of the world for a number of decades. Indeed, to the outside world, poverty, diseases, civil disturbances, revolt, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, domestic rebellion and in recent time terrorism are the core features of the continent. Disappointedly, the wave of democracy which is expected to neutralise the storm of rebellion has not been able to do so. Rather the third wave of democracy has brought with it the rising tide of rebellion characterised by election instigated political violence in various forms and magnitudes as witnessed in Congo 2006, Nigeria 2007, Kenya 2008 and Zimbabwe 2008 among others. In these states, election instigated rebellion have claimed thousands of lives and inestimable properties were destroyed. In some cases the number of lives that were lost equates or surpasses those that were lost in situation of wars. Indeed, the third wave has posed new challenges to political order and stability in Africa. This is so because the wave of democracy experienced in African states is nothing but an imposed and/or artificial wave. Worse still, globalisation in its various contexts has been a liability rather than asset to Africa.

Some of the biggest burdens to many African countries and their economies are civil wars, coups and refugees (Heleta, 2007). Solomon and Swart (2004) point out that “no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the African continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between states.” Hundreds of thousands of people died not only from bullets but poverty, hunger and diseases. Thousands were internally displaced and avoidably become refugees in their own land. Only a tiny number of these wars have been between countries; most have been internal- battles for power and wealth within states, usually between different ethnic groups and geopolitical regions and between and among contending elites. Indeed political authority in African states faces serious challenges and caustic corrosion than ever before. It is indeed a Herculean task to convince an average African, that the state defined as the constitutional order is worthy of obedience, loyalty and total allegiance. In essence, political rebellion in Africa is a symptom and consequence of the endemic crisis of legitimacy. The crisis of legitimacy confronting governments in Africa has debilitating consequences-separatist demands, wars, rebellion, insurgency etc. Millions of Africans have been displaced internally and more are still facing the threat of been displaced. The complexities of the African phenomenon have raised a number of fundamental questions: What factors precipitates rebellion and insurgency in Africa and which one is preponderant? How will Africa fashion a governmental system in such a way that rebellion would be minimised and violence reduced to a manageable proportion? Is rebellion a symptom and consequence of state and institutional or intelligence failures? How could the intelligence network forestall rebellion against the state? The irresolute and endemic rebellion and chronic crisis of
legitimacy characterising African states has called for a number of theoretical thinking and explanations.

The major thesis in this paper is that rebellion in African states is notably a symptom and consequence of state failures and the inability of the state to nip the violence in the bud before escalation or deterioration is partly a failure of intelligence.

POLITICAL REBELLION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS

Rebellion and insurgency are forms and types of political violence. Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors—including competing political groups as well as incumbents—or its policies. The concept, according to Jenkins and Schock (1992) distinguishes two types of non-institutionalised collective actions by citizens: Social protests aimed at limited issues such as changing the policies of authorities or particular personnel; and rebellion dealings with fundamental issues such as who governs and what is the structure of authority. As argued by Gurr (1989) cited in Jenkin and Schock (1992) the former are generally non-violent and may include legal means of action while the latter, because of their direct challenge to authorities, are disruptive and entail violence.

Rebellion according to Boswell and Dixon (1990) is defined as a high level of political violence directed against the state by the civilian population. This definition is inundated with a lot of ambiguities and problems. The first problem is that of operationalisation; for example what constitute low or medium level of political violence and how can one differentiate low level political violence from a high level political violence. Perhaps the main distinguishing features are the intensity, the level of destruction and the scale of the violence. Secondly, the definition suggests that an act of rebellion could not be carried out or committed by others except the civilian population. This is not true as rebellious acts could be committed singly by the military or conjointly by military, paramilitary and a segment of the civilian population. Therefore, rebellion also includes members of paramilitary forces who take up arms against an established government whether democratic or undemocratic.

In this regard, Wikipedia defined rebellion as a refusal of obedience or order. It may, therefore, be seen as encompassing a range of behaviours from civil disobedience and mass non-violent resistance, to violent and organized attempts to destroy an established authority such as the government. In fact the concept is often loosely employed to describe all forms of disobedience to authority. In this sense rebellion could be seen as subsuming a “number of terms that fall under the umbrella of ‘rebels’ and they range from those with positive connotations to those with pejorative connotations” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebellion). Examples include: Mutiny, which is carried out by military or security forces against their commanders; non-violent resistance or civil disobedience, which do not include violence or paramilitary force; resistance movement, which is carried out by freedom fighters, often against an occupying foreign power; revolt, a term that is sometimes used for a more localized rebellions rather than a general uprising; revolution, which is carried out by radicals, usually meant to overthrow the current government; subversion, which are non-overt attempts at sabotaging a government, carried out by spies or other subversives; terrorism, which is carried out by different kinds of political or religious extremists and uprising, which is carried out by militant. It is important to note however that most armed rebellions are purposed to change state policies, state leadership, ideology and sought to establish a new government in their place. It is usually designed to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state and incumbent. Therefore, in the context of this study, rebellion is construed as any armed violence conducted by the military, paramilitary and/or civilian population directed at an established state or authority, whether legitimate or illegitimate, in order to redress real and/or imagined injustices, pursue personal or group ambitions or in extreme cases designed to depose the incumbent and establish a new government or state or both. Insurgency is treated in this study as a form of armed rebellion.

An insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. While the goals of the rebels, and insurgents and terrorist may be similar, perhaps the distinguishing features are: The nature and intensity of the agitation, method and strategy of pursuing the grievances. Indeed, political violence is complex and multidimensional. Its complexity has raised a fundamental question of what types or forms of political violence should be considered rebellious. Rebellion is a political act. According to Mandani (2004), political act can make sense when they are linked to collective grievances. Whether they are acts of terror, rebellion or of resistance, there is need to recognise a feature common to political acts—they appeal for popular support and are difficult to sustain in the
absence of it. In this regard one can identify two broad categories of conflicts in African development- socio-political conflict and natural resource conflict.

DOMESTIC REBELLION IN AFRICA: SOME THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

The level of destruction to lives and properties associated with political violence-domestic terrorism, civil disobedience, ethno-political and religious crisis, insurgency and guerrilla warfare- in Africa and its attendant consequences has attracted academic and intellectual curiosity in recent time. Indeed, the focus of recent writings has been on how Africa will escape the quagmire of persistent and endemic political violence, hunger and diseases. Domestic conflicts have received a serious attention (Ogundiya, 2009; Carey, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Numbers of paradigmatic approaches and theoretical thinking have emerged. These include the theory of colonial conquest, modernization theories, dependency theory, frustration aggression thesis and relative deprivation thesis etc.

Relative deprivation, as defined by Gurr (1970) is a group’s perception of discrepancy between ... its value expectations and... Its value capabilities.” Therefore, it is the difference between what a group believes it should receive and what it believes it will receive. The theory simply states that those who are the most deprived or frustrated, either in absolute terms or relative to their expectations, are the most likely to participate in political conflicts. One of the commonly used indicators of relative deprivation is income inequality. The link between relative deprivation and rebellion has been considered blurred. Dudley and Miller (1998) argued that conceptually relative deprivation and income inequality are quite different. While income inequality is an inherently objective concept, relative deprivation because it is based on group perception is obviously subjective. They argue further, that using income inequality as an indicator of relative deprivation presents empirical problem because it ignores noneconomic sources of relative deprivation. Despite, evidences abound where perceived injustices have served as bases for political agitation and disorder more especially in multiethnic societies where the centre must be occupied by a group. This has been the bases for ethnic agitation in Nigeria. Deprivation whether perceived or imagined is a potential source of political violence in Africa.

To the theorist of colonial conquest the conflicts and violence rampant in Africa may be traced partly to the historical European colonial expansion and tendency to lump nations together as States. Nigeria for example, comprises 450 nations, Cameroon’s has 350, Ethiopia 80 and Kenya has 42. All African states contain more than one nation. Most nations are generally characterized by distinct language, culture, history, and territorial bases and self-government. Such nation’s peoples believe that

States have only as much legitimacy as is bestowed voluntarily by those incorporated into them. Hence modern African States are susceptible to internal political rebellion and violence. This leads many analysts to question the viability of democratic pluralism. Cultural identities more than ideology builds democratic bottom-up political systems in African States1 (Brown, 1987). At independence, the colonial master were only able to territorially integrate the various diverse nations but failed to politically integrate them. This has prompted Obafemi Awolowo, one of the foremost Nigerian nationalists to describe Nigeria as nothing but “mere geographical expression”.

Another theory which is widely used to explain political rebellion is rational actor or resource mobilisation approaches. To Dudley and Miller (1998) “deprivation and discrimination by themselves do not lead directly to rebellion. Coleman (1990) in a similar allusion elucidates: When a number of self-interested persons are interested in the same outcome, which can only be brought by effort that is more costly than the benefits it would provide to any of them, then, in the absence of explicit organisation, there will be a failure to bring about that outcome, even though an appropriate allocation of effort would bring it about at a cost to each which is less than the benefits each would experience. Some scholars have argued that state responses to communal grievances are crucial in shaping the course and outcomes of minority conflicts. The fundamental contention here “centres on the form of government.” Dudley and Miller hypothesised: At high and low levels of repression, little violent activity on the part of groups is expected. In situations of high levels of repression disadvantaged groups are less likely to rebel given the large expected costs of participation in a failed rebellion. Cases of low repressiveness should also exhibit low level of rebellion because alternative channel for expressing dissatisfaction exist and violence is unnecessary. Rebellious activity is, therefore, associated with relatively moderate levels of repression. Another source of domestic conflict is the diffusion of conflict otherwise known as Galton’s problem. This has to do with the contagious nature or epidemiological effects of conflict. Hill and Rothchild (1986) maintained that “political conflict by one group can serve as an educational tool for other groups: Demonstrations, protests, economic costs and the like are very visible educational tool for other groups: Demonstrations, protests, economic costs and the like are very visible political tools that can be easily copied by others for their own purposes.” The spread of domestic rebellion in Africa against colonial rapacity in the 1960s, incessant mutiny and military coups in the 1970s and the authoritarian takeovers in the 1980s and early 1990s authenticates this thesis. A good example is the extension of Liberian civil war to Sierra Leone in 1991. However, domestic violence in Africa is multi-causal and multidimensional. For

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1 The author wish to appreciate one of the anonymous reviewers for this point and for providing the reference.
instance Lodge (1999) provided 7 broad typologies of and/or explanations for armed rebellion in Africa:

1. Ethnic competition for control of the state;
2. Regional or secessionist rebellions;
3. Continuation of liberation conflicts;
4. Fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority;
5. Warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse;
6. Border disputes; and
7. Protracted conflict within politicised militaries.

One of the major sources of deadly protracted armed conflict in Africa is the cut throat ethnic competition for the control of political space, states power and resources. Several examples of such cases include the destructive wars in Burundi and Rwanda, “both featuring struggles for ascendancy between the culturally similar Tutsi and Hutu groups” (Lodge 1999). Over 100,000 people were recorded dead in Burundi in 1993 in the fight which ensued in a coup attempt by the Tutsi dominated army after the electoral victory of a mainly Hutu political party. In Rwanda the death of President Habyarimana in a plane crash triggered genocidal massacres of Tutsi communities by the Hutu army. Up to a million died in 1994. Another example is the Liberian political imbroglio which lasted more than a decade and the incessant ethno-religious violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Since the resurgence of ethnic rebellion in the oil-rich region more than 10 thousand people have lost their lives and inestimable properties have been destroyed.

One more dimension of domestic conflicts in Africa is regional and secessionist rebellion. Nigeria recorded its first separatist demand in 1966 when Isaac Adaka Boro declared Niger Delta a separate and independent republic. In 1967, civil war broke out when Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu pronounced the birth of the Biafran republic from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. More than one million people died. The horror of the war is still fresh in the memory of Nigerians. The demand for justice and equity in the distribution of resources by the South-South geopolitical zone has degenerated into resource war or disguised ethnic war in Nigeria. About 10 thousand people have died in the protracted conflict. In recent time the most protracted and deadliest of these rebellions in the continent is the civil war in Sudan. Lodge (1999) documented the history of the rebellion in the following words: The modern phase of the war was prompted by a government decision during 1981 to disband the regional administration that had governed the southern part of the country…The imposition of Sharia laws by the Khartoum government in 1983 added impetus to the smouldering rebellion of the newly formed Sudanese peoples’ liberation movement (SPLM). Regional rivalries have helped to sustain the conflict in Sudan”. In West African sub-region, regional rebellions included the two year Tuareg uprising in Northern Niger, ending with a peace treaty in 1994; intermittent local insurgencies in southern Chad; and the Casamance secessionist movement in southern Senegal.

Furthermore, domestic rebellions in Africa are symbolic of the continuation of liberation struggles. A basic example is the protracted character of the Angolan civil war attributable to the complexities of a liberation struggle “which featured three popularly based movements competing for ascendancy”. To Lodge (1999) it is a “reflection of an especially fragmented colonial economy and the historic cultural divisions between Bakongo business elite in the North, a creolised intelligentsia in the coastal capital and the leadership of a relatively prosperous peasant community which developed along the Bengual railway”. Several conflicts in Africa today are continuation of unresolved political agitations among the various competing groups. Therefore, the opposition to the state authority by the fundamentalist religious sects is growing in Africa. In Nigeria, typical examples are the Maitashine riots, the Zango Kataf and recently the 2009 Boko Haram rebellion. Militarised Islamic opposition movements are active in several other North African countries, including Egypt and Libya. In Northern Uganda for example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by prophetess Alice Lekwana in 1987 seeks to establish a government in Kampala based on the “Ten Commandments” (Lodge, 1999). Another typology of domestic rebellion in Africa is warfare arising from state degeneration or collapse. According to Rothchild, (1995); ...the weak state plagued by incapacity and immobilism, may deteriorate from within... Because the state is unable to offer effective leadership, it loses credibility as a political and economic manager, its effectiveness or collapse is more a consequence of its decline and general incapacity to govern than an inability to cope with the pressures of powerful counter elites. This assertion has some validity in explaining domestic rebellion in Africa. The Liberian civil conflict, Sierra Leone, Congolese, Sudan, Ivory Coast and Angolan debacles developed in countries in which state institutions had been weakened by decades of corrupt predatory government and elite factionalism. In Liberia and Kenya, it was a case of economic deterioration and sit-tight syndrome of the incumbent head of government.

The Sierra Leone case is a bit different because Charles Taylor was said to have sponsored the rebellion to discourage the Freetown government from participation in Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It is estimated that the Sierra Leonean war displaced over two million people. Other typologies of conflict in Africa are protracted conflict within politicised militaries as evidenced in the Nigerian civil war and June 1998 mutiny in Guinea Bissau; and border disputes caused by the artificial boundaries inherited from colonial masters. The
border disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon fall within this category. Sporadic fighting between Nigerian and Cameroonian soldiers caused an exodus of over 5000 refugees.

Generally, rebellion in Africa is a function of the dependent nature of the economy, colonial legacies, state incapacitation, politicised ethnicity, pandemic corruption, personal and group ambitions, inequity in the distribution of state resources, foreign influence and collaboration, irresponsible leadership and bad governance. However what is particularly worrisome is the fact that most of these conflicts are often spontaneous and occur without warning. It seems that many African countries suffer from the poverty of information and preparedness to nip violence in the bud and lacks the ability to surmount the escalation and prolongation of violence after it has broken out. Therefore, while the upsurge of violence could be seen as a consequence of bad governance, the inability of government to detect and have prior information about the outbreak in terms of “how”, “who”, “where”, “when” of the crisis, in most cases are blamed on the failure of security and/or intelligence. In this regard therefore the upsurge, escalation and prolongation of rebellion in Africa are a symptom and consequence of security and intelligence failures.

### Escalation of rebellion in Africa: Between intelligence/institutional and the failure of governance

Africa’s dilemma is always multifarious, multi-causal, and multi-dimensional and at the same time intertwined. Because of its complexities mono-causal explanation is untenable. While some scholars focused on the analysis of the dynamics and characteristics of intra state violence in the general form of civil war, some analyses how political institutions influence the outbreak of violent and large scale internal dissent in Africa, others tries to understand what factors motivate rebels and facilitate their violent activities whiles others are preoccupied with the activities and strategies of the rebels and the response of the state (Carey, 2007). As a result, many factors have been implicated in the understanding of the occurrence and proliferation of rebellion and rebellious groups in the continent. The first explanation is that rebellion, its occurrence, escalation, intensity, duration and termination relies heavily on the nature and quality of intelligence community in terms of its ability to detect, curtail, control or nip the violence in the bud through accurate information gathering, analysis and timely response. Therefore, the first thesis here is that the occurrence and escalation of domestic rebellion in Africa is a function of intelligence or security failures. To dispute or establish the authenticity of this thesis there is a need to examine though in brief, what intelligence is and what constitute intelligence failures. To Kruys (2006) “intelligence is understood to mean the process of gathering or collection of information, and the analysis or collation of that information to turn it into intelligence”. According to other theoretical exposes intelligence can be divided into 4 different types of activity namely, collection, analysis, covert action and counter-intelligence. In his apt description of intelligence Kruys (2006) further said that: Intelligence, like warfare, is not a science but an art. If a science at all, it is certainly far from an exact science. It is an intellectual endeavour which requires much training, common sense, experience, team work, technological expertise and the ability to communicate the product to the user, to name but a few of the basic requirements. It also requires intellectual bravery to give the result of the intelligence assessments to the user, without the tendency to be vague, so as to excuse faulty intelligence predictions in the future. It remains a human endeavour prone to mistakes. Intelligence failures are thus to be expected, but good tradecraft, and above all sound analysis, can lead to success. Intelligence failures according to Reynolds (2009) can be put into a number of categories: Overestimation-This is characterised by a determination to overemphasize information, leading to a false conclusion; Underestimation-This is the syndrome in which the intelligence services or the political leadership completely misread the enemy's intentions; Over-confidence- Here, one side is so confident of its ability that it projects its reasoning onto the other side and believes that since it would not do something itself, nor will the other side; Complacency- This happens when you know the enemy might do something, though you are not sure what or when, and yet you do nothing anyway; Ignorance-When there is virtually no intelligence, you are at the mercy of events; Failure to join the dots-This is the failure to make connections between bits of intelligence to make a coherent whole. It is more easily identified afterwards than at the time.

With respect to Africa, the question is related more to the accessibility of information because of the nature of the physical and political terrain; interpretation and analyses of the gathered information, administrative bottlenecks, political will; and human and material resources required for the implementation of decisions. In terms of geography, rebellions in the relatively vulnerable early stages are difficult to uncover in Africa. Most government in Africa lack systems to collect intelligence about what is happening on the ground especially in the rural areas distant from the capital and whose terrain is difficult to access. Many rural areas in Africa lack police post. This explains while it was difficult for the Kenyan authority to discover the terrorist cells of Osama Bin Ladin network until after the bombing of the U.S embassy in 1998. Moreover, intelligence and police services appear to be so inadequate in Africa that rebellion can occur without notice. For instance in Nigeria violence can
break out without notice. A number of reasons could explain this. Firstly, it is apparently difficult to distinguish elite crisis from political crisis. In an economy that is critically ailing, (high unemployment, low gross domestic product (GDP), high inflation, high poverty etc.) mobilising against the state is one of the simplest tasks that could be done by the aggrieved political elite. This has been the situation in Nigeria. In this regard there is little or no political violence in Nigeria without ethnic and/or religious colourations including the agitation in the Niger Delta region. Because of high level of unemployment and poverty, inducing and mobilising youths in the name of religion and the guise of ethnicity is not uncommon in Africa. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2002) points out that, young men are thought to be more likely to take up arms when income opportunities are worse for them in agriculture or in the formal labour market, relative to their expected income as a fighter. They further, argued that civil wars are fundamentally driven by such economic opportunities rather than political grievances.

In another dimension the economic misfortunes of African states also impacted on the capability, commitment and dedication of the security personnel. For instance Herbst (2000) contends that “the declining economy fortune of many African states has caused atrophy in the security forces. States approaching collapse do not maintain their police and military services and may not be paying their soldiers”. This is responsible for the inefficacous performances of the military to douse the flame of insurgency. Indeed the major factors which frustrate accurate intelligence and poses serious security challenges in Africa include:

1. Multiplicity of reports;
2. Africa’s political terrain as a challenge;
3. Africa’s geographical terrain;
4. Administrative and bureaucratic cumbersome;
5. Personal interest of leaders;
6. Porous borders;
7. Politicisation of security rather than securitisation of politics;
8. Poor funding of security organisations;
9. Suspicion and lack of trust among African states;
10. Poor availability and unreliability of data and/or information;
11. Technological backwardness and poor training;
12. Overdependence of African states both politically and economically;
13. Weak institutions and a host of others;
14. Lack or inadequate political will etc.

Considering the factors one paramount point to note is that what could be regarded as intelligence failures in Africa is more of administrative failures and the failures of governance. The polity is over politicised. Sentiments, politics, ethnicity and religion always overshadow rational thinking and objective decisions in matters concerning state policies. For example, in Nigeria the intelligence reports from the state security service (SSS) had forewarned, three months earlier, Boko Haram incidence in the North Eastern part of the country. Boko Haram (which means western education is sin) was meant to stage a holy war to install a government based on Islamic principles in the country. In the report, the SSS have detailed how Mohammed Yusuf, reportedly killed in action in Maiduguri during an encounter with the security forces, had organised and structured his group, which had three specific objectives in its alleged terrorist mission. In it, it was stated, among others, that: “Yusuf planned to infiltrate security agencies to get information on government plans against them (the group).” The second action plan was that, “Yusuf planned attacks on security outfits - SSS and Police - to get weapons for their use.” And the third detailed plan of attack was that, “Yusuf planned to instigate crisis between his Sect and others, to justify launch of his full-scale war” (Guardian August 2, 2009). Whereas a common cause for failure is simply that the information is not forthcoming or that it is inaccurate. Unfortunately in Nigeria as in most of African countries the problem is that of a double jeopardy. Information is generally hard to come and where they are available they are bedevilled by common bureaucratic problems. Wide lag accounted for enormously distorted information and inaccuracy in the response of the security agents. Unfortunately ethnic sentiments usually override rational thinking and political leaders (outsider and insider elite) used religion and ethnicity as potent political weapons. Occasionally the virus of ethnicity and religion has also contaminated the various security organisations in the state.

Certainly it could be held with little fear of contradiction that the blame for the upsurge and escalation of political rebellion in Africa should be properly located at the door step of the policy makers. This could be viewed from different perspectives: Poor governance, negligence, over-politicisation of issues, poor funding of the intelligence community and a host of other factors. This is further compounded by mistakes in the analytical process. The importance of certain data may be ignored or misinterpreted, or the mistake may be an error in judgement, as this takes place in any other intellectual endeavour. Poor access to sophisticated technology impairs information gathering and accurate analysis. Compounding the problem is lack of trust and the drive for superiority among the intelligence communities. The situation with Nigeria is not different with other African countries. Oftentimes, the outside elite use religious sects and other primordial groups to wage war against the inside elite. What is germane to note in the case of Nigeria is that, though reckless in certain instances, the security personnel have demonstrated some commendable competence in the handling of domestic crisis. Like in the rest of Africa political corruption, religious bigotry,
cut-throat competition and excessive politicisation and ethicizing of issues and the infiltration of all these into the security communities have worsened the situation.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that political rebellion has become an endemic feature of African politics. The devastating effects has been enormous- wars, poverty, hunger, diseases and general underdevelopment. Generally, rebellion in Africa is a function of bad governance characterised by inequity, deprivation, primordial sentiments, corruption compounded by overdependence of the economy on advanced capitalist states. Equally importantly, the third wave of democracy has disappointedly compounded the problem of governance and stability in Africa. The western type of democracy, imposed by the advanced countries, as both conditionality for loan and international legitimacy, is yet to make sense among the contending elites in Africa. Then to what extent could one blame the surge of domestic violence in African states on security failures? It is the study’s contention that though the security network within African states faces myriad of problems, the bulk of the blame for the occurrence, escalation, intensity and the spread of domestic rebellion is largely administrative and political. Put differently the occurrence of rebellion in Africa is associated with the problem of governance at all levels of government.

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