

Full Length Research Paper

# Muslim/Christian politics of religion in Nigeria: The *Shari'ah* application and the religious foundations of global Muslim engagement with modernity

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Received 19 June, 2013; Accepted 27 November, 2013

Contrary to the traditional modernist theories that development and progress can only be achieved through the western secular modernizing project, many Islamic societies are rejecting modernism and the modernization project, to borrow (Arnason 2003), "as an organic globalizing process" but not "as a globalizing civilization in the plural." This paper differentiates between Islamic modernity and western modernity, and within this theoretical framework, demonstrates how Muslims in Nigeria differ from Christians on the *Shari'ah* Application and the relation between religion and state. It also examines how this engagement reflects global Muslim commitment to progress and development without submitting to a uniform, integral and singular modernist theory. The paper, while comparing this engagement with modernity in both Nigeria and Malaysia, submits that the politics of religion playing out in Nigeria where many Muslims and Christians denigrate and resent each other in the "name of God" amidst their rivalry for the control of the country's resources could be brought to an end if Nigeria adopts the Malaysian model of modernity which has fused religion (Islam) and development, while rejecting some aspects of western modernity like western democracy, comprehensive secularism, liberalism and Greek rationality.

**Key words:** Politics of religion, modernism, Global Muslim societies, religious foundations and Islamic modernity.

## INTRODUCTION

The global Muslim perception of modernity, despite the existence of differing Muslim groups with differing and at times competing views, is unified to a very large extent by certain principles of the Islamic faith in the world today as can be seen from the contemporary Muslim engagement with modernity in many Muslim countries, especially Malaysia.

This paper, using Malaysian Islamic modernity model will show how Islam can contribute to Nigeria's modernization/development project without the socio-political and economic conflicts currently unfolding in the name of religion between Muslims and Christians. To do

this, this study will first define and explain the term modernity. This will include an examination of the two major components of modernity. A brief discussion of Muslim countries that have rejected modernity and adopted what can be categorized as Islamic modernity will follow.

The study will then provide an analysis of the Islamic modernity model that has been implemented in Malaysia and how this can serve as a framework to end the politics of religion playing out in Nigeria.

The findings of the study will be summarized in the conclusion.

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### **Understanding modernity and its postulates**

Modernity can be defined as the diffusion of rationality in all spectrums of human life. It is the consideration of human intellect and reason as the sole sources of epistemology, morality and politics.<sup>1</sup> In line with this definition, modernity has two major components, the intellectual and the political. The intellectual component involves the use of human reason, experiment and observation in acting and decision-making to the neglect of religion, tradition and authority.

A major postulate of the intellectual component of modernity is comprehensive secularism, which erects a barrier between the Church and the state. Accordingly, comprehensive secularism intends the establishment of a state that is "wholly detached from religious teaching or practice," a state that is irreligious.<sup>2</sup> It is this brand of comprehensive secularism that has been described as "the most powerful philosophy of secularization in the nineteenth century" that was put into practice by Marxism in the then Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> Comprehensive secularism is a systematic and relentless all-out struggle to stamp out and eliminate religion. This was the case in the Soviet Union, Ataturk's Turkey, as would be discussed shortly, and to some extent, in China.

The political component of modernity is premised on western democracy, recognizing the sovereignty of the people and making their votes count in the formation of government. Thus the first postulate of the political component of modernity is popular sovereignty on which, the legitimacy of the modern state is founded. This, together with citizenship rights and separation of powers form the pillars of the political component of modernity that naturally leads to liberalism. The liberal creed is founded on humanism. Liberalism entails the belief in the superiority, sanctity and freedom of the human agency in the pursuit of happiness. John Stuart Mill as cited in *the secularization of the European Mind* observes that liberalism is founded upon the freedom of conscience as "an indefeasible right" such that a human being is accountable to nobody for his religious belief.<sup>4</sup>

It is in the light of the above that Glubb's observation that modernity is usually regarded as Westernization or Europeanization can be understood. Many Westerners and Europeans usually view modernity as emulating them in embracing the various components of modernity, especially western democracy. Hence when they demand Muslims in particular to adopt modernity, they in fact, imply that Muslims should "endeavor to be more like" them.<sup>5</sup> This is more so as the West today believes that

democracy is a form of government that every country must adopt.

In line with this perception of modernity, many people, especially modernist scholars and theorists equate modernity with modernization and Western civilization. To these modernist scholars and theorists, the non-Western and underdeveloped societies must necessarily replicate the modernization processes through which Western societies became developed and as these societies achieve progress and development, the more, they must mimic Western culture. At this juncture, it is important to observe that many scholars oppose the traditional modernization/development theory. Some argue that modernity was heralded by the European Renaissance which was a renewal of the ancient pagan Greece and Rome. This renewal, especially of Greek rationality, the hallmark of European Enlightenment that was embraced by many nations of the West without making the slightest discrimination brought an end to the traditional Christian civilization and heralded the prevailing modern materialistic world, promoting the centrality of money and worldly possessions while antagonistically thwarting or distorting the expression of the spiritual, religious and Godly.<sup>6</sup>

According to Alasdair, a critic of modernity, Christianity lost its social context and became immersed in the social context of the Enlightenment, particularly in respect of morality, which may explain the reasons why many Christian beliefs have lost their religious and moral significance in the face of Enlightenment.<sup>7</sup> One explanation for this is the way secularization has advanced in Christendom as Christianity loses its interpretative power. However, this has not occurred in the World of Islam. In fact, it appears the more the Muslims are exposed to modernization and development, the more their religious devotion increases. This may be confirming the assertion of Ali Shariati, a pre-revolution Iranian scholar and critic of Western civilization, in his *Civilization and Modernization* that the Muslim World cannot experience or embrace western modernization because of the pagan roots of the Enlightenment.<sup>8</sup>

This is why secular modernization has not occurred in Muslim societies. In the words of Ernest Gellner (1992), "there is one dramatic and conspicuous exception to all this: Islam. To say that secularization prevails in Islam is not contentious. It is simply false." To him, Islam is as strong now as it was a century ago and in some ways, it is probably much stronger.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. Touraine, *Critique of Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1995).

<sup>2</sup> Owen Chadwick, *The secularization of the European Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 66.

<sup>4</sup> Chadwick, *The secularization of the European*, p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> J. B. Glubb, "The Conflict between Traditionalism and Modernism in the Role of Muslim Armies" in Carl Leiden (ed.), *The Conflict of traditionalism*

and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1966), 9.

<sup>6</sup> M. Lings, *A Return to the Spirit*. (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2005), 60-64.

<sup>7</sup> A. MacIntyre, "Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?" In A. Loades and L. D. Rue (eds.), *Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion* (La Salle: Open Court, 1991), 571-574.

<sup>8</sup> See A. Shariati, *Civilization and Modernization* (Houston, Texas: Free Islamic Literature, 1979).

<sup>9</sup> E. Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), 5.

Why is Islam resistant to secularism? Gellner argues that out of the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Islam is most resistant to secularism because it is closest to modernity due to its universalism. To him, the holistic message of Islam makes it applicable to the community. The Islamic principle of 'the community will not agree on error' gives the Muslim community a political authority of communal consensus. This combined with the theoretical absence of clergy makes Muslim theology egalitarian and Islam a universal worldview that allows Muslims to construct their values and practices.<sup>10</sup>

While some Muslims may have fallen prey to the traditional modernization theory, as suggested by Gellner, most Muslims have not been attracted by the glitters of westernization and secularization. He argues that the more Islamic societies achieve development and progress, the more they tend to increase their religiosity and faithfulness to the Islamic social norms unlike Jews and Christians.

Thus, in the wake of striving for progress and development, many Muslims and Muslim countries conceive of modernity not as Westernization. To them, development and progress are not synonymous with embracing the West and Western modernity by using western categories and standards.<sup>11</sup> This is because, while a major thrust of modernity is rationalism and the incompatibility of religion with human reasoning, many Muslims reject the consideration of reason and rationality as the sole criterion of modern development. Thus, these Muslims rather than mimicking the West adopt "Islamic modernity." It is therefore pertinent here to examine this Islamic model of modernity and how it is been implemented in some Muslim countries.

### ***Islamic modernity in some Contemporary Muslim countries***

Islamic modernity can be defined as the diffusion of Islamic principles and values in both the intellectual and political projects of modernity. This can be best understood within the theory of multiple modernities, which postulates that development and progress are not synonymous with embracing Europeanization or Westernization.<sup>12</sup> Therefore Muslim societies can make Islamic ideological and cultural values such as *tawhid* (divinity of Allah on whom rests absolute sovereignty), *Khilāfah* (caliphate which carries no theocratic or prophetic privileges), *Shurā* (consultation guided by the *Sharī'ah* (Islamic Law) to arrive at and bound by political decisions) and *'adalah* (justice for all, including non-

Muslims in rights and duties) the basis of both their intellectual and political projects of modernity.

Consequently, while some Muslim countries, such as Iran, Turkey and Egypt uphold such pillars of modernity like empowerment of women, elections, voting, mass education and urbanization, they also embrace or are re-embracing Islamic values which include emphasis on following the *Sharī'ah*, introduction of Islamic institutions such as Islamic Banking, Islamic Insurance, *halāl* food and the adoption of the Islamic dress, especially *hijāb* as would be seen these contemporary Muslim countries.

Contemporary Iran is the first Muslim country to engage with Islamic modernity as an alternative model to Western modernity. The country, which shared a lot in common with Turkey during the post-World War One eras of the Reza Khan Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah is today championing Islamic modernity. During this post-War period, the Shahs, inspired by the "success of Atatürk's Turkey;" pushed through western-style modernization through education, western dress, the press, industry, urbanization, political consciousness and empowerment of women. According to Anasri, like in Turkey, secularization and westernization were equated to development and progress in Iran.<sup>13</sup>

After many years, despite the principal features of modernity during the Shah era, such as secular feminism and the abandoning of the Islamic female dress, general increases in levels of education, especially female education and the mass urbanization of the Iranian society, the whole world was shocked by the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 and its reverberating effects in the revivalism and reassertion of Islam in the world today. Pre-revolution scholars of the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 like Shariati had predicted the collapse of western modernity in Iran because of its ideological and structural un-Islamic defects.<sup>14</sup>

Following the Islamic revolution of 1979, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, Islamic feminism which takes Islamic modernity and not western secular modernity as its sources of legitimacy was born in the Kiyān Cultural Institute with *Zanan*, the Iranian women's revolutionary magazine that uses Islamic texts to demand rights granted women by Islamic Law. Abdul Karim was the guiding and intellectual inspiration for this magazine.<sup>15</sup>

This Islamic Feminism which has its intellectual base in Kiyān Cultural Institute has succeeded in using the Islamic imperative to fight against many anti-woman practices in Iran. By 1982, Islamic Feminists pushed through the appointment of female lawyers as advisers in family courts, and two years later, in administrative justice courts, as well as appointment to the posts of Assistant to

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 5-8.

<sup>11</sup> Johann P. Arnason, "Civilizational Patterns and Civilizing Processes" *International Sociology*, 2001, 16/ 3: 387-405 and his *Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical traditions* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, "Civilizational Patterns," 387-405.

<sup>13</sup> A. M. Ansari, *Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 24-39.

<sup>14</sup> See Shariati, *Civilization*.

<sup>15</sup> R. Wright, "An Iranian Luther Shakes the Foundation of Islam" *The Guardian* 1 February, 1995.

the Public Prosecutor and Magistrates. In 1991, this Islamic model of modernity won for women bills allowing their early retirement age, granting them custody rights, ending the prejudicial treatment of women in higher education, and in the selection of University courses, as well as appointment of women into the *Majlis* and the provision of nurseries for working mothers.<sup>16</sup>

The juristic re-reading of the Iranian Civil Codes that discriminates against women in Iran by *Zanan* culminated in the 1992 Divorce Amendments, which annuls a supposedly Islamic divorce laws that grant men powers to abuse women. The 1992 Divorce Amendments curtailed men's right to divorce, granted women financial domestic provisions known as *ujrat al-mithl* or standard wages for housework and ended the subordinate position of women in the name of men's *qawamah* (male headship) of the family, domestic violence as well as gender inequities that exist in the hitherto Islamic penal codes of fixed punishments, retribution and discretionary punishments.<sup>17</sup>

To the Iranian thinker, Abdul Karim Soroush Islamic modernity as alternative to the secular modernist model is a form of "democratic religious government," which is a solution to the perceived gulf between Islam and modernity. According to his analysis, there can only be impasse between Islam and some components of western secular modernity, especially in the areas of Islamic values, ethics and religious principles. He argues further that as for the institution of governance, Islamic humanism is not at variance with the rights and duties of the governed and their representatives once Islamic values are maintained.<sup>18</sup>

That Islamic humanism is not at variance with the rights and duties of the governed and their representatives have been maintained by many contemporary Muslim scholars. To AbuSulayman, the principles of freedom and equality are the consequences of the Islamic teaching on justice. Hence, a person is free in Islam "to act according one's own moral convictions, to make ideological or intellectual choices, and to take decisions on the basis of these convictions and choices."<sup>19</sup> He explains further that the system of *Shurā* in Islam provides that people sit together and deliberate issues of concerns and are bound by conclusions in the light of the principle of justice.

Similarly, Turkey is a shining example of Muslims who reject the wholesale adoption of the Western modernizing project. Post World War Turkey, which used fascist and

arbitrary military tactics to push through Ataturk's secularization and westernization project with Western style dress and other European innovations imposed on the people, is however today re-embracing the cultural values of Islam. This re-adoption of Islamic values, especially the *hijāb* that were banned for half a century in Ataturk's secular Turkey is similar to what is happening today in Egypt, Iran and Malaysia and Nigeria.<sup>20</sup>

This can be best seen in the behavior of many Egyptian educated women who are today reclaiming the Islamic dress that was earlier rejected by their urban and educated grandmothers. This Islamic modernity or Muslim engagement with modernism in Egypt is today confirmed by the gradual re-adoption of *hijāb* that was discarded in Husni Mubarak's secular Egypt. This new adoption of *hijāb* is being championed by the Muslim Brotherhood which came into power, for the first time in July, 2012 and is demonstrated by the first TV station exclusively run by veiled Muslim women.<sup>21</sup>

To these Muslim countries, modernity does not involve secularism, which presupposes the absence of religion in the public arena or separation of Church and state. In Malaysia, as would be seen shortly, Islamic modernity, while adopting Islam as the official religion also offers equal opportunities for all religions in state patronage and participation in the public arena. Herein lies a pertinent lesson for Nigeria.

### **Malaysian Islamic Modernity and the Politics of Religion in Nigeria**

Malaysia, which can today be regarded as the best model for the fusion of political modernity and the entrenchment of Islamic cultural values as by the late 90s, many Muslim scholars had come to terms with the projection of the country as an Islamic state, appears the most suitable model for Nigeria.<sup>22</sup>

For one, Malaysia and Nigeria shares a lot in common in terms of their multicultural and religious composition. A Muslim mosque, Chinese temple, Indian temple and Christian Church are located at a distance of a few hundred meters from each other in Malaysia just as Muslim mosques, Christian churches and African Traditional temples exist together in many places, especially Southwest Nigeria. Secondly, there are many in Malaysia, both Muslims and non-Muslims who consider the idea of Islamic modernity as antithetical to the ideals of secularism and plural society which the country represents just as we have them in Nigeria. In fact, this is

<sup>16</sup> H. Afshar, "Islam and Feminism: An Analysis of Political Strategies" in Mai Yamani (ed.), *Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 201-216.

<sup>17</sup> Ziba. Mir-Hosseini, "Stretching the Limits: A Feminist Reading of the *Shari'ah* in post-Khomeini Iran" in Mai Yamani (ed.), *Feminism and Islam*, 285-316.

<sup>18</sup> See A. Soroush, *The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience: Essays in Historicity, Contingency and Plurality in Religion* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

<sup>19</sup> AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, *Crisis in the Muslim Mind* tr. Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo (Herdon Va: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), p. 89.

<sup>20</sup> T. Atabaki and E. J. Zürcher (eds.), *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Ataturk and Reza Shah* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 11-279.

<sup>21</sup> The Nation, "Egypt Launches TV Station Exclusively Run by Veiled Muslim Women" *The Nation News*, July, 2012:49.

<sup>22</sup> New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 1997 cited in I. O Uthman "Muslim Women in Nigeria: the Position of FOMWAN and Lessons Islamic Malaysia" *JOAS, Journal of African and Asian Studies*, 2009, 18: 245-265.

the position of the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS).

However, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia like the Nigerian Constitution does not declare the country a secular state. In similar vein, both the constitution of Malaysia and Nigeria makes provision for what has been termed "legal pluralism" that is "the provision to establish native court systems in addition to the existing common law and *Shari'ah* law."<sup>23</sup> In recognition of the two countries' plurality, the *Shari'ah* does not have any status of superiority and neither is it an independent law in the two constitutions.

All these provisions would appear to justify the Muslims' position that these countries are not secular but rather multicultural, religious and pluralistic. In addition, they also confirm that there is a basis for comparison between the two countries, such that the Islamic modernity model in Malaysia may be applicable in Nigeria. Unlike Nigeria, which is divided along religious and ethnic lines, Malaysia is today using the Islamic impetus to unite its multi-religious and multicultural people and develop its society. How this has been achieved and how this can be of immense benefit to Nigeria form the focus of the remaining part of this paper.

Today, long standing multi-religious and multicultural prejudices and biases among the people<sup>24</sup> have been weakened by some provisions of the Malaysian Federal Constitution to bridge the educational and economic imbalance between Muslims and non-Muslims. These provisions include the adoption of the Malay language as the official national language while providing a means for the preservation of the cultures and languages of peoples of other religions and races in Malaysia. The idea of using the Malay language as the official national language and medium of instruction in all national schools is aimed at uniting all races in the country by bridging the communication gap between the non-Muslim and Muslim Malay communities. The introduction of the new economic policy (NEP) from 1970 to 1990 that grants Malays 30% equity in all economic, commercial and industrial operations in the country is also believed to have contributed to increasing interaction and inter-dependence between Muslims and non-Muslims in general, and Malays and Chinese in particular.<sup>25</sup>

Malaysia is most relevant today as the best model of the Islamic alternative paradigm of progress and development because of the entrenchment of Islamic cultural values in the country. Islam is, according to the Malaysian Federal Constitution, the official religion of the

country while other religions are allowed to be "practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the federation."<sup>26</sup> The era of Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981 to 2003), coincided with Islamic resurgence in the Middle East which has been defined by Chandra Muzaffar as: a description of the endeavor to re-establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere. It is an attempt to re-create an Islamic ethos, an Islamic social order in the vortex of which is the Islamic human being, guided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, the ascension of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad to the prime minister-ship of Malaysia in 1981 was a watershed in the boosting and entrenchment of Islamic cultural values in Malaysia. His vision was characterized by the need to give Islam and Malays, a greater role in political and economic structures of the country. He sought to transform the Malay mindset and inculcate Islamic values in the economic and political development of the country.<sup>28</sup> In strengthening the position of Islam in every sector of the Malaysian educational, economic, technological, cultural, and political development plan, the government of Dr. Mahathir enlisted the cooperation and support of the global and national leadership of the Islamic resurgence. For instance, Dr. Mahathir brought into his government, the national Islamic youth leader, the president of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, thus bringing to the ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), a renewed Islamic appeal.<sup>29</sup> In short, the twenty years of the government of Dr. Mahathir laid the groundwork for Islamic resurgence or Islamization of all sectors of the country. For the first time, the entire spectrum of Malaysians became open to "Islamic input" and Islamic Banks, Islamic insurance companies and the use of the media for the propagation of Islam were officially instituted. All female news casters on radio and television stations were mandated to wear the *hijab*.<sup>30</sup> In 1983, the International Islamic University, (IIUM) was established to advance the Islamization of Knowledge project.

The post Mahathir era saw a further attempt at strengthening Islamic values in Malaysia by his

<sup>23</sup> Abdul Rashid Moten, "Malaysia as an Islamic State: A Political Analysis" *IKIM Journal of Islam and International Affairs*, (2003), vol. 1, no. 1 pp. 1-69.

<sup>24</sup> N. Z. C. Jen-T'chiang, 'Advocacy on 'inhumane practices'' and Roslizawati Mohd Ramly and Muhammad Khairi Mahyuddin, 'Muslims and non-Muslim relations: Bridging the gap and Building respect', in Ab Rahman, A. et al. (Eds.): *The World Today: Current Global Issues*, (Malaysia: Universiti Sains Islam, Malaysia, 2007), 5.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> A. Ibrahim, "The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia" in A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique and Y. Hussain (eds.), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, 1985), 214.

<sup>27</sup> C. Muzaffar, *Islamic Resurgences in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1987), 2.

<sup>28</sup> O. Bakar, "Islamic and Political Legitimacy in Malaysia" in S. Akbarzadeh and A. Saeed (eds.), *Islam and Political Legitimacy* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 127-149.

<sup>29</sup> D. Camroux, "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation, Co-option, and Confrontation," *Asian Survey* (1996), 36/9: 852-868.

<sup>30</sup> M. A. Haneef, "The Development and Impact of Islamic Economic Institutions: the Malaysian Experience in K. S. Nathan and M. H. Kamali (eds.), *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 82-99.

successor. Islam *Hadhari* approach was launched by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia after Mahathir, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in 2003 to propel the development and progress of the country on the basis of Islamic principles. Islam *Hadhari* is in short a means of renewal (*tajdid*) to revert the *Ummah* back to the fundamental principles that were used to establish the past Islamic civilization. It dictates the concept of life as service to God, work as worship, humans as vicegerents of Allah and the obligation to seek strength in every aspect of life and a broader understanding of *jihad* as encapsulating all aspects of life such as the pursuit of knowledge, mastery of science and technology. It also seeks economic prosperity for all based on an Islamic culture that balances the needs of this world and the next, *farḍhu kifayah* and *farḍhu ain* based on the statement of Allah to seek the home of the hereafter without forgetting the 'lawful enjoyment' in this world.<sup>31</sup>

Badawi summarized this project into ten key points: Faith and piety in Allah, a just and trustworthy government, a free and independent people, a vigorous pursuit of knowledge, balanced and comprehensive economic development, a good quality of life for the people, the protection of the rights of minority groups and women, cultural and moral integrity, the safeguarding of natural resources and the environment and strong defence capabilities.<sup>32</sup> In his capacity as both the Prime Minister of Malaysia and the Chairman of the Organization of Islamic Countries, Ahmad Badawi (2007) promoted the Islam *Hadhari* approach throughout his regime to the whole world and to Muslim countries in particular.

Another further development of the post-Mahathir era was the introduction by the former deputy of Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim of the KeAdilan Party (Justice Party) that went into alliance with a few opposition parties to form Barisan alternative (Alternative Front), headed by him, and now the de facto leader of the opposition alliance named Pakatan Rakyat (PKR) or People's Pact that launched its own version of economic development for the country, called New Economic Agenda (NEA), which replaces the importance of race with needs.<sup>33</sup> Malaysia, therefore, in its efforts to develop for over three decades, has been implementing a model of modernity that promotes Islam while projecting multiculturalism and pluralism which give enough space for all to practice their religions and beliefs.

In short, as Nigeria today, a wealthy country with abundance of both human and natural resources, confronts many socioeconomic and religious problems, there is need for the country to adopt the Malaysian Islamic model is obvious for many reasons.

Nigeria's adoption of the western economic model in

<sup>31</sup> (Q28: 77).

<sup>32</sup> See D.S.A.A. Badawi, *Islam Hadhari Approach: towards a Progressive Civilization/Selected Speeches*, by Dato Seri Ahmad Abdullah Prime Minister of Malaysia (Malaysia, Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, 2007).

<sup>33</sup> M. Mohamad, "Malaysian Democracy and the End of Ethnic Politics?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, (2008), 62/4: 441-459.

the form of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980s and 1990s, which was rejected by Islamic Malaysia during the same period, has not bettered the nation's economy. SAP has negatively impacted middle and low-income households. This failure of SAP, which was born out of the liberalization programme of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was meant to solve the development problems of Nigeria was a result of the terms and conditions attached to loans received from the above neo-colonial bodies. The negative implications of SAP on third world countries, according to Lingam, include loss of employment; as a result of removal of subsidies by government which led to increased cost of goods and services, closure of many public offices and high inflation.<sup>34</sup>

Hence, social amenities and services in Nigeria became unaffordable for many households after the introduction of SAP. This is not without its attendant repercussions on the family health most importantly, the women and children, in particular, the girl-child in the family. Many people were forced to eat less, especially nutritious food. Women suffered the most of all. Osemeobo posits that 80% of the women in the rural area in Nigeria can be classified as poor, with their household income from all sources, being less than \$1 per person per day.<sup>35</sup>

Coping with these impacts has led women to assume domestic responsibilities as well as different home survival strategies in Nigeria. Some women must work longer hours, engage in labour-intensive work, and thus are forced to take more occupational risks than necessary. Working longer hours, however, has not guaranteed them more pay because of the effects of the ongoing economic meltdown.<sup>36</sup>

The need for adopting the Malaysian economic model, especially in restructuring economic imbalance between Muslims and non-Muslims, as done by Malaysia above is further necessitated by the economic dimension in most religious conflicts in Nigeria. The Major Gideon Orkar led coup of 1990 reflected this economic dimension. Its religious dimension could be seen when the leader of the coup mentioned the excision of the five core Muslim states in the north. Interestingly, the leader of the coup came from the middle belt area that may be regarded as the Christian/Bible belt region of Nigeria. He also accused those states that were to be excised of domination over the other parts of the country. More so, it

<sup>34</sup> G. A. Adesina-Uthman and I. O. Uthman, "Women and Home Survival in Nigeria and Malaysia: A Comparative Analysis and Lessons for Contemporary Nigerian Muslim Women" *Journal of Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology in Practice*, 2011, 3/1: 5-12 also in <http://www.interestjournals.org/JRPGD> *Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development*, (ISSN: 2251-0036) Vol. 2/2: 022-027.

<sup>35</sup> Cited in *ibid*.

<sup>36</sup> I. O. and G. A. Adesina-Uthman, "The Role of Zakah and Waqf Management in Poverty Alleviation of Muslim women in Nigeria" Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim and Rafikul Islam (eds.) *Management of Resources in Muslim Countries and Communities: Challenges and Prospects*, IIUM Printing Sdn Berhad 2012, 233-252

came on the heels of many allegations against the Babaginda regime, first over the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) issue. Though the regime's attempt to join the OIC was purely to obtain economic assistance from the Islamic Development Bank, the Christian Association of Nigeria accused the regime, in an open letter, of being a principal agency of Islamization in Nigeria barely two months before the above mentioned coup. The open letter of the Christian Association of Nigeria shows that its problem was with over perceived lopsided political appointments.<sup>37</sup>

Therefore it may not be wrong to contend that there is indeed both "political" Islam and "political" Christianity in Nigeria which arises as a result of the fight for the so-called Nigeria 'national cake' as seen when even some Nigerians, who are never religious, at least in the formal sense, begin to identify with Islam or Christianity for political ends like getting government's sponsorship for pilgrimages either to Mecca/Medina or to Jerusalem/Rome. What is sadly very clear is that these pilgrimages are not sponsored for religious, but political motives. This has led to the occurrence of some state governors in South Western Nigeria, paying for Christians and their concubines to go on pilgrimages to Mecca in recent times.<sup>38</sup>

Again, the need for Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, in particular and other non-Muslims in general, to embrace the culture of multiple religions and peaceful coexistence as well as the need to remove religious prejudices, biases and other barriers to socio-political, economic, educational and military development and advancement of the country, is today confronting Muslims and Christians. This may also call for adopting the Islamic modernity model in Malaysia where Muslims and Buddhists, Muslims and Christians, Muslim and Hindus are engaging in interfaith networking, cooperation and dialogue. Interfaith Dialogue entails engagement with the *other* in religious interchange, communication and discussion that involve people of different religions e.g. Muslims and Christians and Muslims and African religionists (AFRELISTS) in Nigeria. This is despite the fact that there has been some forms of Muslim/Christian relations in the country such as the establishment of the Islam in Africa Project which later became in 1987 the Project for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA).<sup>39</sup> The project which started with the lofty objectives for Muslims and Christians to understand one another and employ indigenous resources to foster a better understanding between them, has sadly not succeeded in stamping out the mutual suspicion that exists between adherents of Islam and Christianity.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *African Concord*, February 5 1990: 36-37.

<sup>38</sup> This is based on the author's personal experience during the *hajj* exercise when some people claim Muslim names to take part in the exercise.

<sup>39</sup> See J. Crossley, "The Islam in Africa Project," *International Review of Mission*, 61, 150-160.

<sup>40</sup> Akintunde E. Akinade, "The Precarious Agenda; Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria", Public Lecture, 2002.

Similarly, the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) also founded by the government of Olusegun Obasanjo (2000) in its apparent determination to promote the ideals of peaceful coexistence, especially among the various religions in Nigeria,<sup>41</sup> has also not succeeded in addressing serious religious and socio economic issues, which divide the Muslims and Christians of Nigeria.

For these and other similar projects to achieve their lofty objectives, there is a need to emulate the Malaysian Islamic modernity model, where the establishment of the Interfaith Committee (IFC) as a vibrant interfaith council, is seen as a desideratum for peace in this age of globalization. This is an age where the Information Communication Technology (ICT) ensures global networking on the internet, face book and other online resources, which can blow any religious crisis out of proportions as confirmed by the Prime Minister during the launching of the World Interfaith Day on 14 February 2011.<sup>42</sup>

This vibrancy must be replicated in Nigeria by giving the current NIREC in Nigeria constitutional and legal strength. This power must include criticizing the government because it has an important role to play in sustaining and improving upon the religious and social harmony currently missing in almost all walks of life of the country. The current dialogical exchange among scholars which NIREC is focusing on is not what is necessary in Nigeria today. The gathering of scholars 'to compare and discuss the finer points of their intellectual traditions,'<sup>43</sup> has always been going on in Nigeria, especially at the behest of the Catholic Church. The contention here is that it is not the dialogue between eminent scholars of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Nigeria and the Christian Association of Nigeria as currently occurring that can provide the religious impetus for Muslims and Christians in Nigeria to collaborate and work together for the development projects of the country.

To borrow from Kenny 'in interreligious relations we need two eyes': one to see the failure of governance in Nigeria, the other to see the hungry and angry Nigerian Muslim and Christian masses.<sup>44</sup> What this suggests is that there is a need for a form of Muslim/ Christian dialogical involvement in keeping watch over the government as well to cater for the welfare of the poor. It is these two eyes that explain the prevalence of a large degree of peaceful co-existence and accommodation among Muslims and the *other* today in Malaysia. It is only these two eyes of dialogical action by NIREC that will

<sup>41</sup> Olusegun Obasanjo, *Address to the Nation on the Sharia Crisis*, Wednesday March 1, 2000.

<sup>42</sup> Malaysian Television Station, Channel Two, 8.30 p.m. News, 14 February 2011.

<sup>43</sup> Charles B. Jones, *The View from Mars Hill: Christianity in the Landscape of World Religions* (Cambridge: Cowley Publications, 2005), 168.

<sup>44</sup> Joseph Kenny, "Interreligious Dialogue in Nigeria: Personal Reminiscences of 40 Years", in, Anthony A. Akinwale (ed.), *All that they had to live on. Essays in honor of Archbishop John Onaiyekan and Msgr. John Aniagwu*, (Ibadan: The Michael J. Dempsey Center for Religious and Social Research, 2004), 191.

bring forth peace as Ezzati (2002) states 'the openness and dialogical nature of' religion can be embraced in open invitation and discussion with the *other* while eschewing all forms of force and coercion.<sup>45</sup>

Also, as Muslim women who can mostly be found among the Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) are reflecting seriously upon the teachings of Islam as they become disenchanted with Muslim cultural values, practices and systems, the Malaysian Islamic model will serve them best on how to make leadership inroads into all fields in Nigeria.<sup>46</sup> They must learn from Islamic Malaysian development model for gender empowerment which has devised approaches not only in maintaining Islamic decorum but also eliminating practices that are harmful to women.

Nowhere can Nigeria benefit better from the Islamic modernity model than in the empowerment of Malay women. In fact, in line with many commentators that had expressed their marvel at how Malaysia is grasping with the concept of a modernity and Islam as a religion,<sup>47</sup> it is rather shocking that in this modern Islamic state, the Muslim women who are usually portrayed as backward and oppressed by a patriarchal Islam and therefore they need to be emancipated are in fact playing leading roles in all sectors of the 'Islamic Malaysian' Society. The visibility of Malay Muslim women who make up about half the Malaysian population today could be said to reflect what I have termed as the contemporary phenomenon of "authentic Islamic feminism."<sup>48</sup>

The Malay Muslim women while upholding the Islamic dress on the one hand in their social, business, academic and official public engagements, are also protected by the country's Islamic laws from the imposition of the face-veil, segregation from the public spaces, domestic violence and other harmful practices in the name of Islamic Law. Today Malay Muslim women enjoy basic constitutional rights.

They enjoy the freedom to vote, run for office, pursue education and hold administrative and political positions as notable as university presidents and government

ministers. Contrary to the claim of the Norwegian Professor, Ingrid Rudie, the Islamic revival in the 1980s that brought about the Malaysian model of development has not curtailed the rights of Malay Muslim women. The emergence of Malay women in administrative and political positions has changed the power relations in the family and society.

Thus the equations of power in Malaysian families actually changed and women took lead in not only the domestic realm but also in many administrative and political positions. Malaysian Muslim women took over the reins of power in marriage.<sup>49</sup>

With the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) enacted in 1994, Muslim women could seek protection from domestic violence as well as receive legal remedies for cases of domestic violence such as lack of maintenance, denial of children's custody, irregular divorce, assault and beating. In addition, before a man can marry a second wife, he has to obtain permission in writing from the *Shari'ah* court with evidence that he can satisfy certain conditions, such as maintenance. "Maintenance (*al-Nafaqah*) is the right of one's wife and children to get food, clothing and a residence, some other essential services and medicine, even if the wife happens to be a rich lady."<sup>50</sup>

An example of this is which a *Shari'ah* Judge did not entertain Wan Mohd Yusof and Abdul Wahab's applications for second wives in 1990 because they could not satisfy any of the stipulated conditions.<sup>51</sup> Hence, the applications for the practice of polygamy have decreased. So also, the Islamic Malaysia recognizes the wife's rights to maintenance, divorce, *Mut'ah* or consolatory gifts after divorce without just cause, her share of jointly owned property, inheritance, custody of children and protection from violence including statutory rape. Zaleha Kamaruddin, a professor of Islamic Law and currently, the rector of the International Islamic University, states that the Malaysian Muslim woman is better off than her colleagues elsewhere.<sup>52</sup>

Unlike the Malay Muslim women, Nigerian women still suffer many violations of their human rights. One of the most common criminal violations of the rights of Muslim women in Nigeria today and which Islamic feminists in Nigeria have condemned as extremely dishonorable though executed in the name of protecting the *Sharaf* (honor) of the family, is the punishment of a Muslim woman for adultery or fornication on the basis of pregnancy outside marriage. The rampancy of judicial

<sup>45</sup> A. Ezzati, *The Spread of Islam: The Contributing Factors* (London: ICAS, 2002), pp. 76-77.

<sup>46</sup> Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, "Muslim Women in Nigeria: the Position of FOMWAN and Lessons from Islamic Malaysia" *JOAS, Journal of Oriental and African Studies*, Greece, vol. 18, pp. 245-265.

<sup>47</sup> R. K. Khuri, *Freedom, Modernity and Islam- Toward a Creative Synthesis*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 6.

<sup>48</sup> My "Feminism in Postmodern Society: An Islamic Perspective," *Journal of Islam in Asia*, 2: 2 (2005), 131-150, *The Muslim Women of Nigeria and the Feminist Discourse of Shaykh al-Albani* (Kuala Lumpur: The International Islamic University, 2008), 84-87, "A Triadic Re-Reading of Zaynab al-Ghazzālī and the Feminist Movement in Islam" *Islamic Studies*, 49(1): 65-79 & also my "Rereading of Zaynab al-Ghazali's Representations of Muslim Women and Islamic Feminism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" *The Islamic Quarterly UK*, Vol. 55, No 3, pp. 215-232, also in *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, USA, 2011 Vol. 3, No. 11, pp. 407-415, at <http://www.academicjournals.org/ijasa/PDF/pdf2011/Nov/Uthman.pdf> are some of the few works that focus on this burgeoning Islamic Feminism.

<sup>49</sup> Ingrid Rudie, *Visible Women in East Coast Malay Society: On the Reproduction of Gender in Ceremonial, School and Market* (Oslo, Norway: Scandinavian University press 1994), pp. 202-289.

<sup>50</sup> A. R. I. Doi, *Shari'ah: the Islamic*, Lagos: Islamic Publication Bureau, 1984, p. 204.

<sup>51</sup> Junight Johar, "Wife Battering: Its Legal Protections Under Domestic Act (1994) and its Impact in the marriage," in Zaleha Kamaruddin ed. *Islamic Family Law: New Challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University, 2004), Vol. 11, p. 49-62.

<sup>52</sup> Zaleha Kamaruddin ed. *Islamic Family Law: Issues 2000* (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University, 2001), p. 1-30.

misdemeanor, irregularity, anomaly, discrepancy and violation of Islamic norms and values in applying punishments to Muslim women in *Sharī'ah* Courts in Northern Nigeria constitutes a major abuse of the human right of Muslim women in Nigeria which *Hajiya* Bilikisu Yusuf, a former National *Amīrah* (President) has described as a flawed implementation of the *Sharī'ah* by the authorities.<sup>53</sup>

Instances of such judicial violations of Islamic norms and values which occurred in Nigeria have been addressed by many studies. A case in point is that of Bariya Ibrahim Magazu who was found pregnant without being married and who named three men as her possible impregnators. The *Sharī'ah* Court in Tsafe prosecuted Bariya and convicted her of *zinā* (illegal sexual intercourse) in September 2000 under the *Sharī'ah* Penal Code of Zamfara State, on the evidence of pregnancy outside marriage. She was then sentenced to 100 lashes for the crime and another 80 lashes for *qadhf* (false accusation of *zinā*) because there were no witnesses to identify any of the three men she named as her possible impregnators.

The case was later appealed, following feminist and public outcry on technical grounds which include the invalidity of the severity of punishment meted out to Bariya since section 95 of the *Sharī'ah* Penal Code of Zamfara State. By virtue of this section, Bariya should not have been found guilty of any offence under the Act. However, even if the courts insist on a guilty verdict, it could not dispense the punishments for both fornication and false accusation.<sup>54</sup>

The right of a man to divorce, unfortunately, has been another way by which many Muslim women are abused today. According to *Hajiya* Bilikisu Yusuf, the divorce rate in *Sharī'ah* States in Northern Nigeria is alarmingly too high. According to these Muslim women, even in Southwest Nigeria, the Customary Courts are not faring better as the manner men constantly divorce women is a big constraint to the protection of women in marriage, child support and other forms of fair treatment.<sup>55</sup>

One of the abuses of women's rights in Islam is the way many girls are married off by their fathers when they are still minors or virgins (never-previously married daughters) though marriage in Islam is a pure contract and not a sacrament between the contracting would-be husband and wife. The notion of the father's power to

enforce the marriage of a minor or virgin daughter is in vogue in Nigeria, particularly in the North where early or child marriage is associated with *Vesico Vagina Fistula* (VVF). In addition to Female Genital Mutilation, (FGM), VVF has accounted for many cases of violence against women. There are many cases of underage girls that are married off to old men by their parents.<sup>56</sup>

Perhaps the greatest area where the Malaysian Islamic model would be useful to Nigeria is in respect of the right of Muslim women to wear the *hijāb*. This is because many Nigerian Muslim women are today denied the use of the *hijāb* in government offices, secondary schools and even higher institutions.<sup>57</sup> What is unfolding on the *hijāb* in Nigeria is replica of debates revolving round the veil in modern society. In more recent times, sociological studies that seek to engage real-life experiences of women who wear the veil have come to the fore and Nigerians can learn a lot from the findings. Theodore and Hannan's collection of articles have shown how the British approach of allowing religious groups to maintain their individual identities within the overarching framework of British Law is right and can avert the polarization between two opposites, the Muslim world and the West. The failure to allow Muslim girls use Nigerian school is actually contributing to the polarization between Muslims and Christians in the country.<sup>58</sup> Hence as observed by Malika Ghamidi, the prohibition of the veil in France and elsewhere in Europe is a challenge to modern conceptions of democracy, secularity and feminism.<sup>59</sup>

## Conclusion

The analysis of Muslim engagement with modernity in this paper shows that while the Western modernization project is one approach to development and progress, the Islamic model can also support development and progress through the use of the Islamic imperative to provide social justice, well-being, comfort and high standards of living as well as good governance and an educational system of quality etc that guarantee not only right to life but also qualitative living, religious freedom, material comfort, dignity, work and intellectual capacity as, is currently being offered in some contemporary Muslim countries, such as Malaysia. Through the Islam *Hadhari* approach in Malaysia, the Islamic model of modernity is being used to inspire its people towards the good of humanity, progress and development, an approach that values substance and not form, sustainable progress based on Islamic values and not unbridled materialism and human capital development of just

<sup>53</sup> Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, "Muslim Women and the Islamic State Between Political Activism and the Islamic Law: An Analysis of the *Jilbāb al- Mar'ah al-Muslimah fī al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah* of Shaykh al- Albānī" *IKIM Journal of Islam and International Affairs*, (2006) vol. 2, no. 1 pp. 117-145.

<sup>54</sup> Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, "Muslim Women in Nigeria between Postmodern Feminism and Religious Fanaticism: the case of the Islamic Law" in M. A. Folorunsho et al (eds.), *Revisioning Modernity in the Eyes of Religion*, (National Association for the Study of Religions and Education (NASRED) pp.60-70, and Uthman, "Muslim Women and the Islamic State," pp. 117-145.

<sup>55</sup> Ibrahim Olatunde Uthman, "Muslim Women and Domestic Violence in Nigeria: The position of the Shari'ah" in AbdulRazaq Kilani (ed.), *Beyond the Veil: Muslim Women in Sub Saharan Africa*, (Lagos: Global Da'wah Communications) pp.50-96.

<sup>56</sup> Uthman, "Muslim Women and Domestic Violence," pp. 73-74.

<sup>57</sup> Uthman, *Muslim Women of Nigeria and the feminist Discourse*, pp. 1-261).

<sup>58</sup> Theodore Gabriel and Rabiha Hannan (ed.), *Islam and the veil: Theoretical and regional contexts*, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), pp. 1-33.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 142-147.

natural resources alone. This will no doubt be of great benefit in resolving the crises of religious politics playing out in Nigeria. Consequently, the paper recommends the adoption of the Malaysian Islamic modernity model for use in Nigeria because Malaysia is today similar to Nigeria in composition as well as a modern state that has adequately conjoined modernity and Islam, especially as far as plural legal systems, democracy, the leadership roles of Muslim women and balancing Muslim/Christian relations for economic development projects are concerned.

### Conflict of Interests

The author(s) have not declared any conflict of interests.

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