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# The contributions and performances of Grenadian main NGOs after a natural disaster

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**In the times of natural disasters, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are usually the first to respond and remain the longest after the occurrence of natural disasters. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan created extensive damage in the Caribbean with total damages in Grenada estimated at US\$900 million, more than twice the country's GDP (OECS 2004). This massive level of damages required a full hand on deck to make rapid progress at rehabilitation. The main local NGOs (Grenada Community Development Agency, GRENCODA and Agency for Rural Transformation, ART) were instrumental in providing support to the government and international agencies in the implementation of projects aimed at the post hurricane recovery. This was a new experience for these NGOs. This paper reports on the experiences and lessons learnt by these NGOs in the implementation of community based public sector projects. Notwithstanding the success of the NGOs in their interventions in the Grenada disaster, greater success may have been achievable as financial dependency, obstruction by government, small staff, low wages, staff turnover and loose project management processes may have combined to contribute to reduce project success**

**Keywords:** NGO performance, Grenada, UWI, Trinidad

## INTRODUCTION

The impact of natural disasters on communities across the globe is massive and it is increasing. Natural disasters cause suffering to people around the world and can be particularly devastating for those living in developing countries, where the physical and social infrastructure are not fully in place. In the times of natural disasters, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are usually the first to respond and remain the longest after the occurrence of natural disasters. In Latin America and the Caribbean, estimated damage from natural disasters reached some US\$20 billion annually over a ten-year period. In 2004 Hurricane Ivan created extensive damage in the Caribbean and the USA. In Grenada, a comprehensive damage assessment prepared by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin

America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), put the total damages at US\$900 million, more than twice the country's GDP (OECS, 2004). The human and environmental destruction caused by hurricane Ivan to Grenada captured the attention of the international community and prompted an immediate and generous outpouring of emergency humanitarian assistance from individuals, aid organizations, foundations, governments and multilateral financial institutions. Beyond immediate humanitarian relief, Grenadians were then faced with the daunting task of rebuilding their country.

When a disaster like Hurricane Ivan strikes most local NGOs' contributions to the rehabilitation efforts are concentrated on providing shelters and basic construction material, food, clothing, medicine, household utensils and other basic survival items. Flexibility allows local NGOs to be innovative in ways that international NGOs or other international organizations like the UN cannot match. However, such flexibilities can lead to unpredictable consequences. In such circumstances, there are tendencies for NGOs' performance to be based not simply looking at project inputs and outputs, but rather the emphasis has

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turned towards measuring the overall impact of an operation (Glasser, 2008). The NGOs' performance can be evaluated by finding out if the lives of the people on the receiving end were changed for the better in any sustained way.

During the post-disaster period, government, local NGOs and donors all recognized that reconstruction should not be limited to rebuilding what had existed prior to the hurricane. Rather, it should extend to a broader transformation of the island, leading to long-term sustainable development and reduction of the environmental and social vulnerability such as that resulted from Hurricane Ivan's impact. In this regard, the slogan "Build back better" (Mitchell, 2004) was adopted as the mantra for the reconstruction effort. Consequently, post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction was characterized by a plethora of projects undertaken by the national government, donor community, local NGOs and local private sector individually or in collaboration.

The multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary nature of post-disaster reconstruction and development projects require continuous interaction, cooperation and partnerships among related institutions to achieve sustainable post-disaster reconstruction and development. The need for and importance of collaboration among NGOs in enhancing performance and accountability in disaster assistance efforts have long been recognized (InterAction, 1996). For example, a housing project funded by USAID in Grenada required the engagement of the national government which has overall responsibility for setting priorities; USAID which provided financial and technical resources to be utilized under its strict internal guidelines and the Agency for Rural Transformation (ART) which implemented the project, restricting itself to targeted communities. Notwithstanding the need for the collaborative approach, the wide stakeholder mix has the potential to be complicated given the inclusion of beneficiaries who may have inconsistent expectations to the different stakeholder groups. An informal survey of the hurricane recovery effort by the author found that stakeholders (NGOs, government departments, international donors and beneficiaries in the community) in the recovery process were often poorly informed about recovery plans and activities of each other. Specifically no one in the communities seemed to be aware of the full recovery picture. Such lack of information creates a sense of powerlessness and dependency. In addition, there was often a general lack of transparency shown by the government and among some NGOs about budgets, funding, and planning. As a consequence community participation in recovery remained rudimentary, and generally consisted of providing labor, participation in committees, and compliance with a set of rules decided by external agents.

Prior to 2004, local NGOs had no experiences in operating during any major natural disasters. Hurricane Ivan presented a useful opportunity to observe and

assess how the local NGOs performed under disaster situations and to identify the gaps that exist in their operations. Further, operating in this unfamiliar situation provided opportunities for these NGOs to distill from lessons learnt in order to improve their skills at coping with a variety of issues pertaining to social and management disciplines including; disaster prevention, mitigation and response policies and practices, emergency planning process, public administration, social work, hurricane resistant designs, mental health, gender-based violence in emergency shelters and agricultural rehabilitation. This paper reports on the experiences and lessons learnt during participation of the main local NGOs in implementing post-disaster recovery projects in Grenada. This is important as historically great emphasis has been placed on the efforts of international organizations in post disaster periods, while the contributions of local NGOs were trivialized or sidelined. An evaluation of the NGOs' capacity and performance in the period is undertaken as an essential first stage in a capacity building process that aims to develop sustainable organisations that can effectively achieve their objectives and contribute to the development process. Further, a companion paper reviewing the management style of the Grenada NGOs is under preparation.

### **The role of NGOs in disaster recovery and development**

The literature on NGOs is multifaceted and covers economic, political, social and managerial dimensions. There is a sizable literature on the economics of the non-profit sector that consists of theories of the role of NGOs and of their behavior (Hansmann, 1987). NGOs' roles range from advocates for the poor to implementers of government programmes; from agitators and critics to partners and advisors; and from sponsors of pilot projects to mediators. Further, while NGOs and civil society have always been a major force in grassroots local activism, they now play an increasingly important role in all aspects of development. Thus these organisations are key actors in the worlds of politics, industry and commerce, influencing both development agendas and policy implementation.

It is difficult not to notice that a 'new', highly publicized international order is evolving during this first part of the twenty-first Century involving governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. It may be argued that this new international order is not new to the Caribbean region as the 18th Century plantation economy that existed in the region shared some similarities. Nonetheless, this 'new' world order is characterized by increased globalization, with uneven distribution of resources and a scarcity of funds for development projects in the developing world.

Consequently, as powers of national state wither away

the world over, non-governmental and grassroots organizations (NGOs) are required to shoulder greater responsibility for the social, cultural, political, and economic development of society. Accordingly, donor agencies are increasingly aware of NGOs' significance in sustaining social and economic infrastructures. Around the world there is an increasing commitment to deliver social services through NGOs. Generally, there are five main reasons for the rise of developmental NGOs (Billis, 1993; Salamond and Anhier, 1999, and Lewis, 2001). One of these is the sense of disillusionment among many development agencies with the record and performance of prevailing 'government to government' developmental assistance, which is frequently characterized by a lack of clear results, wastage, inefficiencies and a high level of corruption. A second reason for the increasing role of NGOs in development is that governments in the developing world are recognizing that the size of the problems facing them, including the environmental issues and disaster reconstruction and development, are beyond their means. Consequently, a new pragmatism which requires a genuine involvement of NGOs is being displayed. In most of the recent development projects funded by Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), the role of NGOs has been incorporated in the nexus to articulate peoples' interest and promote peoples' participation in the development process (Saeed, 2004). It is now estimated that over 15% of total overseas development aid is channeled through NGOs.

The new prominence and significance of NGOs have created a unique operational space for individuals, groups and local communities to organise for self-empowerment. This is particularly so in the aftermath of natural disasters and during the long-term recovery process. The ability to design and implement sustainable and well functioning projects is vital. Further, the increased number of natural disasters within the region recently and the specialization of international disaster relief programmes, suggests that local NGOs must try to integrate their reconstruction activities aimed at post disaster recovery efforts within the overall grass-root development strategy so as to make maximum use of local talents, techniques and construction practices in the process. Experience has shown that in the aftermath of a natural disaster, governments and NGOs have different emphasis. According to Delaney and Shrader (2000), national governments have presented reconstruction plans that place a heavy emphasis on public infrastructure, while NGOs and other actors in civil society have tended to prioritize housing, agricultural production, and have also used the opportunity for strengthening community involvement in managing projects. In Grenada, the response by the local NGOs during the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan confirms to this observation. Whereas the government was interested in the macro situation like the total number of houses constructed or the total acreage of export-crop under rehabilitation, the

NGOs (GRENCODA and ART) responses were visioned on the long-term sustainability of communities.

### **People management challenges during implementation of disaster recovery projects**

NGOs operating in a disaster reconstruction and development environment face a number of challenges. Human resources management or "people management" is one issue that NGOs need to address as NGOs tend to attract unique personalities. While NGOs wish to enhance their organisational capacity to improve their service to affected communities, donors are also increasingly looking at NGOs' organisational capacity to spend their grants effectively. Many NGO's that are action and/or advocacy driven have two types of people: activists and systems people. Activists generally reject systems, yet without these said systems there will be gross inefficiencies and effectiveness. When the activists run the organizations they can drive others crazy. On the other hand if systems people run it, they drive everyone out.

In the Grenadian NGOs there is some stability and continuity at the leadership level. Low leadership turnover enhances the institutional memory within the organisation. However, the NGO sector faces a problem of retaining capable younger staff members. Similar experiences have been found in Thailand by Vichit-Vadakan (2001). Younger recruits often move on to other jobs, preferring more mainstream jobs with more clearly defined career paths. Clark (1991) argues that career advancement opportunities are seldom available to NGO staff because of their smaller organizational scale. Thus the sector finds itself constantly needing to train new staff members. A 2002 Report on employment in the NGO sector reported increasing staff turnover, and an increasing difficulty in new staff recruitment (NCVO, 2002). There is a prevailing view that NGOs should be staffed with volunteers, and paid staff should be kept to a minimum. Such an approach, however, contributes to the less than ideal state of pay and career advancement in the sector (Vichit-Vadakan, 2001). The NGOs in Grenada benefit from volunteerism, the boards of directors and management committees function on a total voluntary basis, in cases where local professional consultants are involved in projects up to 75% of the performance is volunteered by friends of the organisations. The ability to attract and retain professional consultancy volunteers is, however, diminishing. Nevertheless, to be efficient NGOs must attract the best-qualified staff to fill vacant positions. Unfortunately smaller NGOs as reported by NCVO (2004) rarely have the resources for a designated HR function. A key challenge, therefore, is how to proactively include the HR functions, recognizing that a little investment can save a lot of time and expense later.

In the last 10 years NGOs have been going through a

transforming process as the nature of work is changing from stable, repetitive activity to a series of changing and challenging projects. This is typical in project work that is disaster related. Such projects involve NGO activists working with existing colleagues, and some require them to confidently join and lead project teams. In many cases they have to manage the pressure of multiple and complex projects. NGOs now recognise that this fundamental shift in the nature of work and pressure for adequate accountability needs new skills and approaches at both the management and operational levels. In the developed world NGOs routinely use training providers for upgrading their project management capability and boost the organisation's performance. Generally this approach is not readily available to local Grenadian NGOs.

## METHODOLOGY

This study was restricted to the two main local non-governmental organizations namely Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCODA) and Agency for Rural Transformation (ART). Data on the current approaches to project management was obtained through structured conversations with some staff members, observation of NGO workers on the job, focus group discussions with field staff, the use of questionnaires and review of internal documents. Interviews were also held with a government department-Ministry of Agriculture, an international donor partner-PADCO and the two main NGOs- GRENCODA and ART. These interviews were geared towards an understanding of the dynamics of these agencies as key stakeholders of reconstruction and development particularly within the project contexts. The questionnaires were administered to as wide as possible to stakeholders including:

1. Board members (past and current)
2. Employees (past and present)
3. Management (past and present)
4. Target groups and Beneficiaries (past and present)

These participants came mainly from GRENCODA and ART but included members from two minor NGOs namely; Grenada Save the Children Development Agency (GRENSAVE) and the Grenada National Organisation of Women (GNOW).

Since Grenadian NGOs are relatively small organizations, the inclusion of past stakeholders can improve the quality of the sample population by widening the institutional memory of individual organisations. Current stakeholders may have a more positive outlook on the organization than past stakeholders. The past stakeholders would generally tend to be less bias as they can respond using a high level of reflection. Two focus group meetings were held with GRENCODA and ART. GRENCODA has a monthly review session with its entire staff, where projects are reviewed and the general work of the organization is discussed. The surveys were carried out using a number of questionnaires. The work of Nkamuhebwa (1999) on community based organisations provided a framework for developing these questionnaires. The survey covered the organization's: internal performance, relations and image; performance in achieving its objectives, internal functioning, resources, role, strategy i.e. it's an attempt to determine an organization's overall strengths, weaknesses and development needs. While the questionnaires are rather detailed for a study of this kind the potential benefits to the organizational improvement can be tremendous. A summary of the questionnaires' organization can be found in Appendix

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The information collected was analysed so as to inform an understanding of the management performance within these organizations, particularly during the post natural disaster.

### Grenadian NGOs

The establishment of the local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) generally was by necessity, the product of ideas, aimed at serving targeted groups within the society. Moreover, these local NGOs succeeded in receiving wide popular support by virtue of their tendency to address important and attractive issues that draw attention among the masses. But ideas alone are not sufficient to fulfill the targeted group interests, and are certainly not sufficient to establish and manage NGOs. Perhaps one of the main reasons for the failure of some NGOs that stood for noble and relevant, is the misconception of their leadership that the importance of the concept in itself is sufficient to sustain an organization's affairs and to guarantee its growth and development.

The management of the development NGOs in Grenada reflects` their origins and founding philosophies. For example, The Agency for Rural Transformation (ART) was founded during the socialist revolutionary period (1979-1983) with support from the government and sympathetic socialist oriented international NGOs during the early 1980s. The Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCDA) has its roots among key social activists after the collapse of the Grenada Revolution. As such, both these organizations are based on a socialist philosophy. A third mainstream NGO, The Grenada Citizen Advice and Small Business Agency (GRENCASE) was established in 1997. It was strongly supported by the government and its primary function is to address the issues of unemployment and lack of economic opportunities with specific focus on the youth. Since, the passage of Hurricane Ivan, a number of local community-based and faith-based organizations were formed to deal with specific community issues and problems.

Prior to Hurricane Ivan, the key Grenadian NGOs and not-for profit organizations mobilized themselves into an umbrella NGO group - Inter Agency Group of Development Organizations (IADGO). Although this body is heterogeneous in terms of varying ideological and religious grounding, the common goal of improving the standard of living of the Grenadian poor has been a cohesive force which allows the organization to be recognized by the government as a major social partner in national development.

### Responding to the challenges of post Hurricane Ivan

The Hurricane Ivan disaster affected the local NGOs, who

**Table 1.** Projects/ intervention undertaken by the agency for rural transformation.

| Project                                       | Beneficiaries                       | Type          | Donor  | Project duration                  |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------------|--------|-----------------------------------|
| Grenada Rural Enterprise Project (GREP)       | 50 persons                          | Supply driven | IFAD   | 5 yrs                             |
| Sustainable livelihood- Construction training | 50 persons                          | Demand Driven | UNDP   | Phase I and II –<br>3 months each |
| Return to happiness                           | Children from 2 communities         | Supply driven | UNICEF | 6 months                          |
| Grenada Relief and Development Project        | Women and children                  | Supply driven | CDCP   | 6 months                          |
| Cash for work                                 | Small farmers, women and unemployed | Demand driven | Oxfam  | 5 months                          |
| Mattress making                               | Homeless                            | Demand driven | CIDA   | 6 weeks                           |
| Catalyst project                              | Poor - Après Toute                  | Supply driven | FAO    | 3 months                          |

in addition to undertaking their own recovery felt mandated to intervene and initiate support in the recovery efforts in their target communities. Unfortunately, local NGOs which were already cash strapped before the disaster lacked the financial resources for their desired interventions. It was therefore necessary for these local NGOs to enter into partnering relationships with international agencies who expressed interest in the thematic areas of the NGO's intervention mandate. Consequently the local NGOs became project implementers for international donors.

Nonetheless, projects were identified by the local NGO, based on needs assessment in the communities in which they operated. In the case of the Agency for Rural Transformation, the community needs were identified by the community's elders based on three fundamental criteria:

- i. Those fit and capable;
- ii. Those willing to work; and
- iii. Vulnerable families.

Some of the projects/ intervention undertaken by the Agency for Rural Transformation were involved in seven new projects (Table 1). GRENCODA undertook 15 projects in education and training, housing, agriculture, community tourism and social welfare. These projects were supported by 24 organisations with 68% of the \$2.0 M being contributed by UNDP, USAID, Oxfam, Christian Aid and Resources Foundation - Johnson and Johnson. These included the cases where projects were jointly supported by USAID and Oxfam and collaboratively implemented by GRENCODA and ART.

Typically, criteria like these are not defined objectively using tools like weighted criteria matrix. Instead, subjective expert-knowledge of the communities was applied in determining beneficiaries. This approach to project identification resulted in large number of projects. However the ability of the NGOs to wider intervention/participation in recovery process was constrained by financial resources, by lack of staffing and differences between the opinions of the local NGOs and donor agencies in what is considered important or a priority. In order to deal with the

overstretched workforce available for project management all the NGOs turned to the volunteerism of local professionals who had some historical working association with the NGOs. Prior to Hurricane Ivan Grenada NGOs partnering was essentially of a bilateral nature. In the post disaster period, these NGOs were now often involved in multilateral relationships. For example Table 2 shows the NGOs multilateral relationships.

An assessment of the success of the projects was carried out by reviewing "end-of-project" reports, interviewing project leaders and project beneficiaries showed that there was a high success rate of projects undertaken by the Grenada NGOs. All the projects undertaken were completed. Eighty percent of the projects were completed within time and budget and satisfying the scope. There were only slight overruns in 12% of projects and time overrun in about 8%. The interview of beneficiaries revealed full client acceptance.

### Impact on inter-agency implementation

Notwithstanding the success of projects undertaken by Grenadian NGOs, there were a number of issues that the NGOs had to address. The NGOs recognized that they are vulnerable to the changing donor attitudes and priorities. These changing attitudes and priorities are manifested in the preoccupation at different times with issues such as gender, civil society, environmental sustainability and good governance. Although these are important issues for the Grenadian NGOs and do contribute to their main goal of poverty reduction, a pre-occupation with some of these issues often distract from the urgency of the recovery process and that there is a great danger that disaster relief interventions will be tailored to meet the demands of donors, rather than being dictated by the disaster imperatives. The local NGOs have admitted that it is often easier to meet the donors' quantifiable demands, but this may be done by compromising actions that accord with sound humanitarian principles.

A second issue was that as project implementers NGOs

**Table 2.** Matrix showing the collaboration between NGOs, Government and donors in post-Ivan projects

| Partners projects               | GRENCODA | ART | Government | USAID | CIDA | UNICEF | UNDP | OXFAM |
|---------------------------------|----------|-----|------------|-------|------|--------|------|-------|
| Land clearing                   | X        | X   | X          |       |      |        |      | X     |
| Farm rehabilitation             | X        | X   |            | X     |      |        |      |       |
| Return to happiness             | X        | X   |            |       |      | X      |      |       |
| Housing                         | X        | X   | X          | X     |      |        |      |       |
| Cash for work                   | X        | X   | X          | X     |      |        |      | X     |
| Skills training in construction | X        | X   |            | X     |      |        | X    |       |

needed to continually adjust staff size to fit funds allocation and time set by donors. This generally, requires negotiation skills on the part of the NGO. Such skills were often lacking in-house and the NGOs had to depend on the goodwill of professional volunteerism. Further, this places administrative demand on the NGOs for which they were not usually well prepared. Additionally, this leads to the shifting of resources away from longer term strategic imperatives. A third issue that the NGOs faced was the reluctance of donors to cover core administrative costs. Donors are increasingly demanding that their support go directly into projects and required NGOs to obtain resources elsewhere to meet administrative activities. The inability of these NGOs to find resources to fund administration and operation means that required development funds were sometimes refused. According to Carroll (1992), this situation leads to under-administrated and under-managed NGOs and contributes to the misconception that NGOs can do good work with almost no operating costs or overheads. The performances of the NGOs were also affected to a lesser extent by;

- i. Short and demanding timeframes
- ii. Limited suppliers on the island.
- iii. The building boom in other islands which placed pressure on the availability of both skilled and professional labour in the reconstruction sector. This was particularly so for project management skills; given that before Ivan, the region had shortage of project management skills.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The role of NGOs in the development process of developing countries has expanded as international donors; in some cases lose confidence in national governments due to poor governance and their failure to deliver services effectively and efficiently. This expanded role is due in part to NGOs' ability to mobilize communities; and the NGOs' comparative advantage over public and private institutions in promoting micro development initiatives. This is a result of their ability to touch base at grassroots level and their freedom in organizing themselves.

However, this new expanded role has not, necessarily, been accompanied by an improvement in skill and competencies, services or performance which are prerequisites for the sustainability of these NGOs.

After the passage of Hurricane Ivan in Grenada, the local NGOs' attention concentrated on the affected population and consisted of actions such as road clearing, providing food and basic construction materials, repair and construction of houses, the provision of seeds or fertilizers to jump start a new cycle of agricultural production and the like. In many cases the resources to facilitate the provision of these initiatives were mobilized through the NGOs' networking with friends of NGOs and other regional and some international NGOs. Experiences from Hurricane Ivan suggest the need for more and more post disaster reconstruction activities to be managed by local NGO's as project implementers.

This new demand on the NGOs and the resulting greater use of donor funding will result in increase demand for project management expertise within these NGOs. Unfortunately, NGO's in small island states like Grenada have very limited personnel with formal project management training. Moreover, they also suffer from the absence of a well developed formal project management culture which is usually associated with the ability to facilitate the design and implementation of projects. Further, for long-term projects partnered by local and international NGOs, the experience has shown that local NGOs were usually required to continue managing projects after the international NGOs leave, except in the cases where international NGOs generally had existing development programs or worked through local NGOs to complete the interventions.

To address the short coming of low capacity which can drastically limit their ability to contribute to rehabilitation and developmental efforts in disaster situations, NGOs can build on the current ad hoc way that they seek the assistance of local professionals in the community by developing a register of committed persons who can be called upon at short notices to provide volunteer professional services in project management. This effort should particularly target returning professionals who have retired from jobs in North America and Europe and who through an informal survey indicated willingness to serve

in this way. Local NGOs' involvement in disaster management in Grenada at the time of Hurricane Ivan was still at an embryonic stage - it was limited to disaster preparedness activities since the main issues stressed were purely technical geared to reducing vulnerability of the poor. This is not to say that the NGOs were not aware that disaster management is necessary. These NGOs recognized that disaster management was too large for them to handle alone and that the greater investments which are required for such involvement were not internally justifiable during a long period of relative disaster calm.

The essential role of NGOs in building the resilience of local communities to disasters and supporting local-level implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action is well established (UNISDR, 2008). Similarly, as found from the Grenadian experience of Hurricane Ivan, local NGOs and CBOs have a key role in helping communities respond and cope with the aftermath of a disaster. NGOs tend to talk more about preparing for disasters than preventing them. This was true of the local Grenadian NGOs. Nonetheless, from these experiences, it seems reasonable that to complete the thread of disaster management, the NGOs should be reconsidering how they can make disaster reduction an integral part of their operations so that if and when the next major disaster comes they can be better ready to effectively intervene. The local NGOs' successful participation in delivery the planned outcomes of projects in the post disaster period was in part due to strong the leadership of these organization and the participatory approach to management by these NGOs. The participatory approach to project implementation, being the established culture of these NGOs is conducive to wide stakeholder participation in the project management process. The presence of highly charismatic CEOs tends to strengthen this participatory culture which has its origins in a common local belief that the work of NGOs at the grassroots level requires a social consciousness that is consistent with left-leaning political charisma.

In addition, to strong charismatic leadership, the local NGOs ability to effectively intervene was due to their ability to respond fast, the ability to be flexible, the ability to reach far and difficult areas - maneuverability and their presence in the communities. Both GRENCODA and ART were among the first organizations to get to communities and to be able to mobilize clean-up groups' hours after the passage of the hurricane and to be involved in replanting in the agricultural sector. As the local NGOs are not harnessed by typical bureaucracies of national government or of international agencies who have to consider the host government concerns, they are able to take and make quick decisions. Success was also due to these NGOs' ability to mobilize through existing networks and created ones, thus having a positive influence on the local organizational capacity which helped government and international donors to channel aid more quickly and effectively,. This did not however stop some new NGOs

attempting to build their specific disaster training on top of already-existing local organizational structures.

The local NGOs must continually strive to meet the highest standards of good governance: transparency, accountability, sound management and ethical behavior. The local NGOs can only continue to be credible advocated and watchdogs of business and government if the community continues to believe that they are upholding the very standards that they expect the public and private sectors to meet. Nonetheless as was experienced during the post disaster period, greater transparency and accountability demanded by NGOs bring their own challenges in the evolving relationship between civil society and government. But good governance will prove to be the best insurance policy for the long-term resilience of the non-government sector (Heintz, 2006). During the disaster situation, there was a tendency to avoid sticking to internal regulations meant to facilitate transparency and accountability to satisfy urgency. While this can be justifiable in some cases, local NGOs need to review how they would operate in future disaster situations to ensure the maintenance of high standards. This is important as shortcomings during the unguarded moments can remain in memory and impact negatively on the NGO's operation at a later date. The success of NGOs appears, also, to be strongly influenced by the image that the NGOs portray. In the case of the Grenada NGOs, there is a question mark on how well they have communicated their vision, activities and achievements to the public. In too few cases they have done quite well. Perhaps they have been too internally focused.

The Grenada NGO sector needs to be aggressive at marketing themselves as a companion activity to re-engineering their project management processes. In the future unless these NGOs can use the wide and intimate knowledge of the social workings of local communities in conjunction with the trust that these local communities have in them, to provide related services to both government and international organizations, their funding base would dwindle reducing their survival rate. In this regard, it is recommended that both GRENCODA and ART re-engineer themselves and their operations to become less of a primary provider/handler of community based development projects and more of third party project implementers. The Grenada local NGOs also tend to be involved in a wide range of activities; women's issues, HIV/AIDS, adult basic education, rural issues, early child development, disability, environment, gender and legal aid, land issues, farmers issues, voter education issues and poverty eradication. While all these issues are inter-related, the current approach of spreading their efforts among these issues is diluting the efforts of the NGOs as project officers tend to be handling too many issues and are being unable to give quality time to key issues. NGOs must be encouraged and supported in the roles they do best and deepening their involvement where they have a competitive advantage. It is therefore recommended that

through the umbrella grouping of NGOs, the IADGO, NGOs can work towards establishing consensus on the specific areas on which each would concentrate. It is further recommended that where the national government or donor agencies are interested in obtaining expertise of local NGOs for implementing projects or where there are request for proposals open to local NGOs for projects involving multiple thematic areas, that these NGOs should deepen the current collaboration through the creation of consortium through which such tasks can be more efficiently undertaken.

Inspection of internal documents shows that the local NGOs are well respected externally as often their views on local and regional issues are requested by international and regional organizations like, DFID, CIDA and CARICOM. Further the leadership of these organizations are frequently invited to contribute at regional and international fora on development. This good standard of the NGOs in the wider civil society movement provides a window of opportunity for these NGOs to meet their mandate by having intermediary roles in development work as service providers for regional and international agencies. Notwithstanding the success of the NGOs in their interventions in the Grenada disaster, greater success may have been achievable as financial dependency, obstruction by government, small staff, low wages, staff turnover and loose project management processes may have combined to contribute to reduce project success. The Grenadian NGOs since the beginning of the decade of 2000 are finding themselves taking an ever-increasing share of development work as Western aid budgets are slashed and national and regional government involvement with aid programmes reduced. As they do this, they are forced to grow and to assume new responsibilities, taking more important and wide-ranging decisions - in many cases, without having had the chance to step back and review the options before them and the best ways of maximizing the impact they make.


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
**Appendix A:**

The first questionnaire consisted of 25 questions which sought to provide an understanding of the culture of the organisation. The key themes in this questionnaire were staff behaviour and awareness, leadership and organisational practices. The weighting of the themes are summarized in Figure 1.




**Figure 1.** Questionnaire on Organisational norms, mission and values-distribution of questions.

The second questionnaire addressed general management and consisted of 28 items on the general management practices are reviewed. The main issues covered in this questionnaire were governance, leadership, resources and procedures. The distribution of questions according to these issues are summarised in Figure 2.



**Figure 2.** Distribution of questions-management of the organisation.

A third questionnaire comprised of 19 items, which cover the project outcome issues of relevance, environmental appropriateness and capacity building. Figure 3 shows a summary of the distribution of the issues in the questionnaire.



**Figure3.** Distribution of questions-project output.