

Full Length Research Paper

The politics of actor involvement in local economic development in Ghana: Empirical evidence from the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai-Osudoku District Assemblies

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The main objective of the article was to examine the forces that shape the behaviour of the actors in the local economic development implementation process in Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai-Osudoku District assemblies. Using qualitative data from multiple sources combined with multiple case studies, the study found that the three Metropolitan, Municipal and District assemblies implemented somewhat different LED strategies with multiple actors' involvement. Lack of due diligence, weak and lack of institutional independence, absence of political leadership commitment, and political expediency negatively impacted LED implementation in the Accra Metropolitan and Keta Municipal Assemblies while Shai-Osudoku District Assembly had smooth local economic development implementation. Dynamics such as the land tenure system, micro and macro politics, administrative and institutional procedures, and political leadership shaped the behaviour of the actors in the three assemblies. Based on these, the study recommends that politicians should desist from interfering in LED issues; governments should consider the interests of local government units' development needs in introducing local economic development interventions and broad consultations should be done before initiating local economic development initiatives.

Key words: Actors, local economic development, LED interventions, metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies.

INTRODUCTION

Decentralization is seen as the vehicle through which grassroots governance can be deepened in Ghana. As a result, both the *1992 Constitution* in Articles 35(6)(d) 240 (1) and 245(a) and the *Local Governance Act 2016* (Act 936) have made provisions for Ghana's local governance

and gave political, administrative, economic, social and developmental powers and authority to the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to create an enabling environment for development (Republic of Ghana, 1992: 36, 150, 152; Republic of Ghana, 2016: 19-

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20). The implementation of the economic vision for development regards local economic development (LED) as the main approach to attain the requisite local development because it has the capacity to:

- (i) Stimulate and transform the economies of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs),
- (ii) Create new jobs, and promote income-generating opportunities and infrastructural improvement for accelerated poverty reduction
- (iii) Align natural and human resources of localities to match both global and regional markets as well as the provision of employment opportunities that fits the people and the locality (Republic of Ghana, 2013:1, Government of Ghana and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2011: 3; Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002: 24).

LED has generally been defined as a partnership between the public, private, non-governmental organizations and local government units (LGUs) with the principal goal of creating local employment through the utilization of available local resources (Republic of Ghana, 2013: 1-2; 2014: 3; World Bank, 2003: 1; The United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2005: 2). The above definition highlights the fact that LED implementation involves multiple actors with its associated complexity of joint action. This study therefore seeks to examine the political dynamics that characterized the actors' involvement in the LED implementation process using three local government units (LGUs) in Ghana.

Statement of the problem

Though substantial ink has been poured on LED globally, in Africa and Ghana, the focus fell on the emergence, strategies, beneficent outcomes, challenges, and the nexus between LED and poverty reduction and the role of actors in promoting LED. Most of these studies used the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Some also used LGUs as the unit of analysis but used a maximum of two. This study introduces innovation and fills the literature gap in LED by interrogating the political dynamics that shaped the actors' participation in the LED implementation process using a multiple case study approach of three of Ghana's LGUs namely: the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA).

Objectives of the study

The article is guided by four-fold objectives. These are to:

1. Briefly discuss the LED strategies implemented in the three MMDAs,

2. Discuss the actors and their roles in LED implementation in the three MMDAs,
3. Examine the interaction between the local governance structures and the actors, and
4. Examine the dynamics that shaped LED implementation in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

LITERATURE REVIEW

General Studies on LED

LED like other social science and development terminologies has no single universally-accepted definition. Scholars define it based on the purpose of deployment. Some of these definitions concentrated on the strategies, actors and the end result which is to reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of the natives (World Bank, 2003; UNHABITAT, 2005). This article briefly reviews definitions which are focused on the actors.

The World Bank sees LED as a process by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation (World Bank, 2003:1). The International Labour Organization (ILO) on its part defined LED as a participatory development process that encourages partnership arrangements between the main private and public stakeholders of a defined territory enabling the joint design and implementation of a common development strategy, by making use of the local resources and competitive advantage in a global context, with the final objective of creating decent jobs and stimulating economic activity (ILO, 2004). These two definitions echo the significance of actors. The study will add up by examining the factors that shaped the behaviour of the actors in the process.

On LED strategies, classical scholars on LED like Matulef (1987) posit five strategies: economic revitalization, support for economic revitalization, project coordination, financial assistance and capacity building. Feiock (1987) limits the tools to four, namely, promotion, service coordination, business nonfinancial assistance and incentives. Eisinger (1998) adds to the strategies by identifying supply-side policies and demand-side policies as the two broad strategies of LED. The supply-side refers to traditional incentives to attract economic activities into a locality. The demand-side policies include efforts to discover, develop, expand or create new export markets for local goods and services, strategies to promote new business creation and small business expansion and governmental assistance to new product development and market expansion through subsidizing research and development and through strategic investment. He refers to the supply-side as traditional and the demand-side as entrepreneurial. Clarke and Gaile

(1989) take the discussion on the strategies further by distinguishing between conventional and entrepreneurial approaches. The former refers to public interventions to attract economic activities and the later represents greater government flexibility, innovation and risk, efforts to stimulate new enterprise, use of government authority to shape market structure and opportunity, joint public-private ventures and public strategic investment.

From these classical authors on LED strategies emerged contemporary authors such as Helmsing (2001, 2003) who identify three new generations of LED initiatives, namely, community economic development, enterprise development and locality development and it is from these initiatives that LED programmes, interventions and strategies are derived. Strategies such as “One Village One Product” (OVOP) in Malawi, beekeeping in the West Nile in Uganda, tourism, Multi-Purpose Community Centres (MPCC) in South Africa have been examined in Africa (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010; Enzama, 2008; Edoun and Jahed, 2009). Rogerson and Rogerson (2010) advised that the effectiveness of the strategies requires an enabling local business environment for small enterprise development. Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005) expand the discussion on enabling environments by enumerating economic hardware, economic software and organizational capacity or “orgware” as the enabling environments in LGUs which allows for the flourishing of LED.

On the dividends derived from LED, Helmsing (2002, 2003) categorized the beneficent outcomes into social and economic. Socially, LED strategies empower local societies and allow for local dialogue and citizens’ participation. It also makes local institutions more transparent and accountable thereby strengthening the growth and development of civil society organizations (CSOs). Sustainable and decent employment, income generation and poverty reduction are some of the economic benefits (Masuku et al., 2014; Ramukumba, 2012).

Lack of resources, inadequate qualified personnel, human hindrances such as attitude to work, inadequate information systems, lack of systematic feedback and the absence of clear-cut responsibility, absence of poverty reduction targets and integration of the various LED partners, land availability, lack of government capacity, poor governance, data shortcomings, lack of funding, conceptual impression and theoretical underdevelopment, poor LED networks and unsustainable knowledge platforms, among others are some of the challenges to LED (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007; Hofisi et al., 2013).

On the actors in LED, Yatta (2015), Helmsing (2003), Rogerson and Rogerson (2010), Nyawo and Mubangizi (2015) identified local government and their institutions, community organizations, local producers and their associations, and their roles in the promotion of LED.

Rogerson and Rogerson (2010) advised that the actors, especially small towns and LGUs should be strengthened to make them attractive and viable, and there should be engagement between LGUs and entrepreneurs to ensure local sourcing and supplier linkages. The Republic of Namibia (2008) extends the studies on the actors by classifying the actors into two categories, viz; public and social actors. The former comprises state-owned enterprises (SOEs), regional and traditional authorities while the latter consists of employers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and faith-based organizations. Nyawo and Mubangizi (2015) intimated that the lack of cooperation between the LGUs and other actors, politicization of the LED, and unnecessary bureaucracy negatively affected the actors in attaining LED objectives.

On the politics of LED, Wolman and Spitzley (1996) indicated that the various actors in the LED process pursue different interests. They indicated that politicians are engaged in LED programmes because of the electoral success that they stand to gain, credit claiming and the avoidance of blame. The natives’ interests in the LED process are always aimed at safeguarding their economic and social survival. This is because most LED projects bring about the need for relocation. Entrepreneurs’ interest is linked to the availability of economic incentives and the returns on their investments. Wolman and Spitzley (1996) espouse that the decision of each actor in the LED process is partly based on the expected action of the other players.

Ghanaian studies of LED

Ghanaian studies on LED have focused on the factors that influenced the adoption of LED, the policy perspectives, actors and institutional frameworks, strategies, financing, the typologies of LED and the challenges (Agbevade, 2018; Mensah et al., 2013a; Mensah et al., 2013b; Mensah et al., 2017; Oduro-Ofori, 2016; Akudugu, 2013; Akudugu and Laube, 2013; Ofei-Aboagye, 2009).

Agbevade (2018) hints on the fact that different historical contexts and diverse situations such as unemployment, poverty and infrastructure deficit as well as national government policies are some factors that influenced the implementation of LED in Ghana’s MMDAs.

On the policy perspectives, Mensah et al. (2017) analyze the policy trajectory of LED implementation in Ghana from the pre-independence era to date and describe the period preceding 1987 as the “lost decades of LED implementation” because development plans were mostly top-down with little or no input from the grassroots and these development plans were sectorial rather than territorial. The period from 1988 where Ghana

started implementing decentralization, the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, the passage of various Acts of Parliament and national development frameworks that promoted the role of MMDAs in local development and preparation of the National LED policy and its operational Manual by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) as the period of “policy maturity” were considered. Mensah et al. (2013a) similarly identify the 1992 Constitution, District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), Ghana Vision 2020, Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1), and Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 2) as some legislative policies and frameworks of LED. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), MMDAs, MLGRD, Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Services (GRATIS) projects, rural banks and traditional authorities were the institutional frameworks for LED implementation in Ghana (Mensah et al., 2013b). Oduro-Ofori (2016) indicate that though these frameworks supported MMDAs in the promotion of LED, they failed to specifically stipulate what the MMDAs were supposed to do and how. In addition, the frameworks also failed to provide sanctions to MMDAs which did not actively get involved in LED.

With respect to the actors, Oduro-Ofori (2016) identifies local government units (LGUs) and institutions such as the Business Advisory Centre (B.A.C.), Agriculture Development Unit, the Office for National Culture, Departments of Town and Country Planning, Cooperatives, Works and Community Department as well as Sub-Committees such as Development Planning, Culture, Tourism and Agriculture as directly involved in LED promotion at the various LGUs. In spite of these arrays of institutions, LED could not be effectively implemented due to lack of institutional coordination between the local government institutions (Mensah et al., 2013; Oduro-Ofori, 2016).

On the LED strategies and initiatives, Ofei-Aboagye (2009), Mensah et al. (2013b), and Oduro-Ofori (2016) identified micro-credit provision, agro-processing, structural development, health and educational activities, upgrading the skills of artisans, human resource development and infrastructure provision as LED interventions. In the views of Oduro-Ofori (2016), LED has had minor impact due to the focus on “hardware” aspect of LED which was infrastructure instead of the “software” aspect which encompasses training programmes, access to credit and other intangible strategies that promote LED.

Agbevade (2018) intimated that the sources of financing LED programmes in Ghana could be classified into three main categories namely; inter-governmental transfers, donor or private sector funding and internally-generated funds. He further posits that the ability of an MMDA to attract funds was largely determined by factors such as the strategic nature and category of the MMDA, its leadership, political and personal commitment of some

top level staff to LED implementation, the available economic development incentives and the immediate returns that investors expect to gain from their investments.

On the typology of LED programmes, scholars had varied views. While Mensah et al. (2017) identify five variations of LED in Ghana; namely, central-government led LED, local-government championed LED, local organizations and local NGO-spearheaded LED, international organization-initiated LED and individual-led LED, Akudugu and Laube (2013) on their part states traditional LED and contemporary LED as the variations.

With respect to the role of international organizations in LED implementation in Ghana, Akudugu and Laube (2013) and Mensah et al. (2017) identified the ILO, GIZ and UNDP as actors. Whereas Akudugu and Laube (2013) see the actors as drivers of LED in Ghana, Mensah et al. (2017) opine that these international organizations have reinvigorated the spirit of LED in Ghana. Both sets of authors intimate that though these organizations used different approaches, they however had the search for endogenous development based on local actors, resources and capacities as their prime focus.

Akudugu and Laube (2013) analyzed the enabling environment for LED implementation in Ghana. They identified that the environment for LED implementation was disabling because of the intact power relation between the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) which made LED a top-down development prescription, imposition of LED intervention on the citizens by the MMDAs, political pressure, weak private sector, inadequate human and financial resources and capacity, varying rationalities and interests of actors hence LED not flourishing.

Lack of finance, inadequate agricultural assistance, poor road network, market accessibility, inadequate technical and incompetent human resource ineffective coordination among the District Assemblies (DAs) and development partners, improper targeting of beneficiaries and lack of capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of the programmes, top-down approach to implementation, and poor formulation of national LED policy that was incapable of providing strategic direction for LED promotion were identified as bottlenecks to LED implementation in Ghana (Mensah et al., 2013; Akudugu, 2013).

Justification of the study areas and their profiles

Ghana has a three-tier district categorization namely, the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) (Republic of Ghana, 2016). For a geographical area to be designated either as a Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly (MMDA), the area must have a minimum

population of 250,000, 95,000 and 75,000 people, respectively. In addition, the area must have the economic viability to provide the basic infrastructure and other development needs from the locally generated resources (Republic of Ghana, 2016:13). Ghana has a total of 216 MMDAs with the breakdown as follows: six (6) Metropolises, forty-nine (49) Municipalities and one hundred and sixty-one (161) Districts. For a meaningful comparative analysis, it is imperative that MMDAs are selected across the three categories.

The AMA was established in 1988. The AMA as it exists now was created in 2012 with Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 2034 following the carving out of the La Dadekotopon Municipal Assembly. It is the district capital, the regional capital for the Greater Accra Region as well as the national capital and the economic hub of Ghana. The centrality of economic activities in this assembly culminated into the low level of unemployment of 7.2% as compared to 38 and 30.8% in the KeMA and SODA respectively.

The Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) with Keta as the municipal capital is one of the 25 administrative districts in the Volta Region. It was carved and created out of the former Anlo District by L.I. 1475 in 1989. It was upgraded to a municipal status in 2007 with L.I. 1868. It lies within Longitude 0.30°E and Latitudes 5.45°N and 6.005°N. It is located to the east of the Volta estuary, about 160 km from Accra.

The Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA) is situated in the South-eastern part of Ghana in the Greater Accra Region. The SODA was created following the L.I. 2137 in June, 2012 which mandated the splitting of the Dangbe West District Assembly into two districts namely, the Ningo Prampram and Shai- Osudoku District Assemblies. Table 1 presents some statistics on the three MMDAs.

METHODOLOGY

The study used qualitative data collected from both primary and secondary sources. Qualitative research approach was chosen over quantitative approach due to the following nine reasons (Bryman, 2012):

1. It provides for the importance and significance of the researcher's views which provides the orientation for the study.
2. It allows for close relationship between the researcher and the researched and makes the researcher understand the study through the respondents' eye.
3. It makes room for concepts and theories to emerge out of the data collected.
4. It is flexible in that it is attuned to unfolding events over time and to the interconnections between the actions of the respondents of social settings.
5. It is invariably unstructured. This enhances researchers' ability to arrive at how actors/respondents understand concepts emerging from data collected.
6. It allows for the understanding of values, beliefs and behaviour within the context of the study.

7. It provides the study with rich data due to the prolonged engagement and involvement with the research setting.
8. It is characterized with the meaning of the actions of the actors involved in the study, and
9. Respondents are always studied in their natural environments.

A multiple case study approach was adopted. Data for the study were collected between April 2017 and March 2018 using different sampling techniques due to the multiple populations. In the case of the MMDAs, each of the Planning Officers, Directors of the Business Advisory Centres and Directors of Finance and Budget were interviewed. The LED scheduled officers were also interviewed as well as other private sector actors in the LED process. The instruments used for data collection were face to face interviews and review of official documents. Member checking was used to ensure data reliability and validity.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF THE STUDY

LED strategies implemented in the three MMDAs

The MMDAs adopted different strategies in the implementation of LED. The AMA implemented both public private partnerships (PPPs) and business development programmes as its LED intervention, the KeMA implemented both traditional handicraft and non-traditional LED initiatives and the SODA implemented software and hardware LED. Comparatively, the AMA's PPPs and hardware interventions implemented by the SODA are similar since they were aimed at infrastructure provision. In addition, both the AMA and SODA leveraged on the available lands to woo investors to their respective localities. The AMA for instance, offered lands as its equity to the PPPs and the SODA also offered land and enabling environment for companies such as the Golden Exotics Company Ltd (GEL) and Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd.

The business development programmes by the AMA, software LED by the SODA and the non-traditional LED interventions by the KeMA are also similar because the end results were to develop the capacities of the indigenes and their business establishments through resourcing them to be capable both financially and skills-wise. In addition, the three MMDAs implemented LED programmes aimed at value addition. For instance, the capacity development programmes at Keta and Srogbe for making beads and weaving bags from straw and raffia (*ketsi*) enabled the natives to utilize the natural resources by way of value addition. The capacity development programmes for mango farmers in Dodowa and Agomeda and for rice farmers in Asutauare ensured that the beneficiaries got the maximum yield from their farming activities (Fieldwork, January, 2018). Furthermore, both the AMA and SODA sought to take advantage of national and international markets. This was done in the SODA by the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) through the establishment of business linkages between the mango farmers and the business

Table 1. Key statistics of the Study Areas.

| Name of MMDA/Areas of comparison | AMA | KeMA | SODA |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Land size | 139,674 km ² | 753.1 km ² | 968,361 km ² |
| Population | 1,665,086 | 147,618 | 51,913 |
| Level of Unemployment | 7.2%, | 38% | 30.8% |
| Level of poverty | 10.6%, | 10% and 14.9% | 23.2% |
| Average number per household size | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.4 |

Source: Compiled by Author from various publications of the Ghana Statistical Service.

world whilst that of the AMA was done by fusing quality control measures, advertising and marketing into the product and training programmes. The KeMA's capacity development programme had no direct intention of taking advantage of the marketing opportunities; however, it had a separate initiative of creating marketing opportunities through attending and exhibiting LED products at trade fairs in the country (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

A critical examination of the LED interventions also revealed some differences. For instance, whilst the AMA's LED programmes were focused on PPPs and the indigenes taking advantage of both national and international markets, the KeMA was concerned with indigenous capacity development, value addition to the natural resources and the provision of marketing opportunities for the products of the LED beneficiaries locally and nationally. In terms of infrastructure provision, while the AMA used PPP arrangements, the GEL which is a company in SODA spearheaded the infrastructure provision as part of its (GEL) corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Even though the KeMA and SODA used their available natural resources for the implementation of LED initiatives (Appendix Table 2a), there were some variations. In the KeMA, apart from the bag weaving which made use of the natural resource endowment of the municipality, the other initiatives such as batik, tie-dyeing, hair dressing did not use raw materials from the locality. In contrast to the KeMA, the SODA took advantage of the water-logged and fertile nature of the land for rice production to undertake large scale rice production and also leveraged on the 22 kilometer stretch of the Volta River that washes the north-eastern portions of the district to promote fish (*tilapia*) farming in the district.

In terms of financial accessibility as a LED intervention, the partners of the AMA in the Accra City Car Parks Ltd., (Appendix Table 4a) namely, Merchant Bank (now Universal Merchant Bank Ghana Ltd (UMB)), First Africa Group, Labour Enterprise Trust, ELGA Ghana, OMNIA, and Seth Adjei and Consortium provided a total of US\$ 5.5 million for the project in 1997 and the Social Investment Fund (SIF) funded the business development services programmes whilst the KeMA and SODA relied on the use of Microfinance and Small Loans Centre

(MASLOC) (a government initiative to boost local entrepreneurship) and financial institutions (Dangbe and Shai Rural Banks) respectively (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

The actors in the led intervention process and how they facilitated the implementation of LED

The three MMDAs had actors collaborating with them in the implementation of their respective LED programmes. The actors in the three MMDAs are classified into primary and secondary actors (Table 2). Table 2 shows that both the AMA and SODA had seven sets of primary actors, whilst the KeMA had four.

Comparing the primary actors in Table 3, the AMA, KeMA and SODA were the key LGUs responsible for the implementation of LED within their respective jurisdictions. The AMA and the SODA initiated and hosted the implementation of LED whilst the KeMA only hosted the LED initiative and left the initiation and implementation to the Municipal Coordinator (MC) of the Business Advisory Centre (BAC) of the municipality. The AMA was the only assembly that had the Public Investment Division (PID) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning responsible for the coordination of its LED interventions whilst the coordination in SODA and KeMA was done by the SODA and KIS together and BAC respectively.

For financing of LED interventions, the AMA had partners who joined forces to fund the Accra City Car Parks project (Appendix Table 3a) and the SIF financed and served as the implementing agency for the business development services programmes while the Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) was the sole financier of LED interventions in the KeMA. The SODA had the GEL which financed projects as part of its CSR in the district. With respect to the delivery of capacity development programmes, the AMA had four (4) consultants, the KeMA had the Adidome farms in addition to the individual resource persons as facilitators whilst the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) facilitated for the SODA. The GEL and Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd of the SODA and the Accra City Car Parks Ltd of the AMA were the corporate actors directly involved in employment

Table 2. LED actors in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

| Name of MMDA | Primary actors | Secondary actors |
|--------------|--|---|
| AMA | AMA, Public Investment Division of Ministry of Finance, UMB, First Africa Group, Labour Enterprise Trust and contractors, Social Investment Fund | Transaction Advisors (TAs) 1. Ernst and Young 2. Shawbell Consulting Ltd 3. Deloitte and Touché 4. Kwame Ansah and Associates 5. CPCS International 6. PKF 7. C-Nergy Capacity development facilitators 1. J.S. Addo Consultants Ltd 2. Project Management Consultants Ltd 3. Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI) |
| KeMA | KeMA, BAC, REP, Adidome Farms, Indigenes | Capacity development facilitators |
| SODA | SODA, KIS, GEL, Sheenfeel, Indigenes, MiDA, GRIB. | Hopeline Institute, Wienco /Copa Connect, ABIANS, International Water Management Institute, Sustainable Farming Group, University Research Centre |

Source: Fieldwork, January – February, 2018.

Table 3. The primary actors and their roles in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

| Name of MMDA | Name of primary actor | Role in LED implementation |
|--------------|---|--|
| AMA | AMA | 1. Initiated the LED process 2. Provided land for PPP initiatives |
| | Public Investment Division (PID) of Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning | 1.Coordinated the implementation of PPPs 2. Did due diligence and ensured that everything was set for PPP implementation |
| | Universal Merchant Bank | Provided funds for the implementation of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd |
| | First African Group | Provided funds for the implementation of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd |
| | Labour Enterprise Trust | Provided funds for the implementation of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd |
| | Social Investment Fund | Financed and implemented the business development service programmes |
| KeMA | KeMA | Hosted the implementation of LED programmes |
| | BAC | Initiated and championed the implementation of LED |
| | REP | Funded all LED programmes in the KeMA |
| | Adidome Farms | Organised capacity development programmes for LED beneficiaries in poultry farming |
| | Indigenes | 1. Initiated the demand for LED programmes 2. Participated in capacity building programmes as trainees |
| SODA | SODA | 1. Initiated the LED process through need identification 2. Funded LED projects 3. Monitoring and evaluation 4. Gave approval |

generation as a LED initiative.

In the area of indigenes' involvement in the LED

process, the KeMA and SODA had their indigenes involved in the process. This made the LED programmes

Table 3 Contd. The primary actors and their roles in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Kpong Irrigation Scheme (KIS) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initiated LED programs through baseline surveys 2. Provided land and year-round irrigation services to rice farmers and GEL 3. Implemented, monitored and evaluated LED programmes related to rice farming |
| GEL | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provided infrastructure to the community 2. Generated employment opportunities |
| Sheenfeel Company Ltd | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generated employment opportunities |
| MiDA | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity development programmes for mango farmers in Agomeda and Dodowa |
| GRIB | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Input supply 2. Mechanization services 3. Market price negotiation 4. Agro-business support services |
| Indigenes | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initiated the LED process by making a demand on the KIS 2. Beneficiaries of LED interventions |

Source: Fieldwork, January – February, 2018

to be demand driven, bottom-up and timely. The involvement was through programme initiation and participation in the capacity development programmes. In the case of the AMA, the interventions were top-down with no involvement of the indigenes hence participants had challenges such as poor timing, little information about the programmes and low participation for the business development services interventions. The low participation was evidenced by only ninety-four (94) individuals participating in the business development services programme in the AMA (AMA, January, 2012). The non-involvement of the indigenes in the LED process in the AMA also resulted in the reluctance of the indigenes to release land for the PPP projects (Fieldwork, February, 2018). The SODA was the only MMDA among the three which had a primary actor providing agricultural input support services. This stemmed from the fact that most of its LED interventions were agriculture related.

In the case of the secondary actors, the AMA had seven transaction advisors (TAs) and three capacity development facilitators and SODA had six actors while the KeMA had one (Table 4).

The TAs performed the following two key roles in the LED implementation process:

- Undertook ten feasibility studies for all proposed PPP projects in the Accra metropolis (Appendix Table 1a). These enabled the AMA to decide whether the PPP projects were worth implementing and
- Assisted in the procurement process following the laid down regulations in the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships (2011) (Republic of Ghana, 2011) and the provisions of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663).

After the procurement process, the TAs were engaged in negotiations, commercial and financial close (Fieldwork,

January, 2018). These roles performed by the TAs aided the implementation of LED initiatives in the AMA because, due to the feasibility studies, the AMA committed itself to PPPs that had value for money. The PPP processes, however, were truncated at the procurement stage due to three main reasons. Firstly, during the due diligence stage, the PID revealed that the AMA did not have land title for all the lands labeled for its PPP initiatives. Secondly, there were administrative and institutional breaches from the AMA. As a result of political expediency, the AMA did not follow the due process in PPP implementation including receiving approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Fire Service, land documentation and equity on board. The PPP projects ended at the Approval stage (issuance of procurement documentation, proposal evaluation and report submission to the Public Investment Division of the Ministry of Finance).

It emerged that the AMA did not only project identification, but failed to submit a developed concept note to the PID and registered the projects before recruiting the TAs to conduct the feasibility studies and submitting the procurement documentation to the PID. In spite of these breaches, the PID gave conditional approval to the AMA to continue with the PPP process with the proviso that it regularized the administrative and the PPP process since 2016 was an election year and there was the urgent need to implement tangible projects to woo the electorates to vote for the incumbent government (National Democratic Congress (NDC)) (Fieldwork, February, 2018). Thirdly, there was a change in government after the 2016 general elections which saw the incumbent NDC losing political power to the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP). The NPP having won political power needed to reward its financiers and

Table 4. Secondary actors and their roles in AMA, KeMA and SODA.

| Name of MMDA | Name of secondary actor | Role (s) |
|--------------|--|--|
| AMA | Transaction Advisors (TAs) | Undertook ten feasibility studies and assisted in the procurement process |
| | Capacity development facilitators | Facilitated the capacity development programmes for LED beneficiaries |
| KeMA | Resource persons | Facilitated the capacity development programmes for LED beneficiaries |
| | Hopeline Institute | Machinery services |
| SODA | Wienco/Copa Connet | Inputs/credit, marketing of produce and extension services |
| | ABIANS | Input credit and marketing of produce |
| | International Water Management Institute | Field trial and demonstration on mixed organic fertilizers (Fortifier Compost) |
| | Sustainable Farming Groups | Input support, marketing, machinery hire and extension services |
| | University Research Centre | Field trial on nutrient management |

Sources: SODA, Ministry of Food and Agriculture Department, November, 2017 and Fieldwork, January, 2018.

economically empower its “foot soldiers”. As a result, all PPP project processes were put on hold for review (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

In the KeMA, the secondary actors were the resource persons who facilitated the capacity development programmes. Their roles aided the implementation of LED because they equipped LED beneficiaries with the requisite skills for hair dressing, cream production, batik, tie-dyeing, and beads making. In the case of SODA, the secondary actors were mainly into the provision of agricultural support services such as chemicals, fertilizers and agro-business services.

The roles played by both primary and secondary actors in the three MMDAs facilitated the implementation of LED. For instance, after the AMA identified a specific project for PPPs with the prior approval of the General Assembly, the transaction advisors undertook feasibility studies and also engaged in negotiations and the PID ensured that the AMA got value for money through due diligence. The PID through its due diligence role partly contributed to the truncation of the ten PPP projects which saved the AMA from land litigation challenges (Fieldwork, February, 2018). In the KeMA, the actors were also involved in the process. Since most of the LED initiatives were demand driven, it implied that the beneficiaries were actively involved in the selection of the LED programmes to be implemented. Once the demand was presented, the BAC then prepared a budget which was sent to the REP (the financier of LED projects in KeMA). When approved, the LED initiative was then implemented.

The case of SODA was not different from the other two Assemblies as there was an active involvement of all the actors. For example, in the case of rice farming initiative, the LED initiatives were mostly demand driven, thus the rice farmers requested for what they wanted. In addition, the KIS and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Department of SODA jointly initiated the kind of initiative

to undertake. Furthermore, the General Assembly, the planning officers, engineers and other departmental heads were also involved in the process. The planning officers also initiated the process for budgetary allocation for LED, the finance office put the figures together and then it got approval from the General Assembly. The engineers and other departmental heads including the planning officer(s) undertook monitoring and evaluation of the implemented LED programmes.

The KIS' involvement took the form of baseline surveys to identify potential projects, rice varieties and the demands of the rice farmers. It also included project identification, education and sensitization of the local citizens on the benefits of the project, initiation, management and implementation, monitoring and evaluation to identify lapses in projects and recommendation of appropriate interventions to help improve the project. The active involvement of the KIS was attributed to it being a government agency and was bound to implement government policy of poverty reduction through initiation of projects at the door step of the populace. GRIB was also involved in the entire process of LED pertaining to rice farming.

On mango farmers, the Dodowa farmers indicated that LED programmes were imposed on them. Their Agomeda counterparts however, intimated they were involved in the process from 2003 to 2012 at the instance of the assembly member of the electoral area. However, with a change of the assembly member due to electoral defeat, they were no more involved in the process. This implies that in SODA, the involvement of the LED beneficiaries was diverse. The Golden Exotics Ltd was also involved in the LED process through their CSR. This company identified the needs of the community or sometimes got requests from the SODA before undertaking infrastructure improvement programmes.

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that all the three MMDAs had different combinations of actors involved in

the LED process. For instance, in the AMA and the SODA, they were involved in the adoption and implementation of LED but in KeMA, the opposite was the case as LED implementation was entirely left in the hands of the Business Advisory Center (BAC). In addition, among the three MMDAs, the SODA had the highest level of involvement of the actors in the LED process as all the actors saw the need to improve the economic and infrastructure development of the area. In both KeMA and SODA (rice farmers), the LED initiatives were demand-driven. In terms of infrastructure provision, whilst the AMA determined the kind of infrastructure to provide before advertising for transaction advisors, the SODA mostly gave room to the Golden Exotics Limited (GEL) to determine the kind of projects to embark on as corporate social responsibility (CSR). On balance, the actions of the actors did facilitate the implementation of LED in the KeMA and SODA while their inactions hindered the continuation of PPP projects in the AMA.

Interaction between the actors and the local governance structures

Local governance structures refer to the rules, regulations and institutions within which the MMDAs and the LED actors operated. These structures either promoted or hindered the effective implementation of LED.

In the AMA, the structures promoted the implementation of LED. This was because the structures allowed for TAs to apply through the procurement department of the AMA and the TAs also did their feasibility studies and made their recommendations. However, the AMA failed to continue its PPPs because of reasons such as:

- (i) Change in government in 2017,
- (ii) Weak state institutions. This is referred to as the inability of state institutions to achieve their stated objectives due to lack of capacity to design and implement policies. The weak institutions in this context encompass inadequate human, institutional, regulatory and financial capacities. These weaknesses have made the institutions to lack independence (the capacity to take policy decisions with interference from politicians).
- (iii) Inability to obtain land title for the ten sites earmarked for the projects (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

In the KeMA, the structures hindered the implementation of LED due to power play. This was because, LED budgets presented as part of the Assembly's budget never made it to the General Assembly for discussion. Lack of leadership commitment from the Municipal Chief Executives (MCEs) and Municipal Coordinating Directors (MCDs) from 1988 to 2016 to the implementation of LED as a vehicle for local development accounted for this hindrance (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

In SODA, all the actors (KIS, GRIB, Golden Exotic Company Ltd, Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd and the LED beneficiaries) indicated that the local governance structures promoted their activities. The KIS for instance, gave the reason that they were all government institutions and understood the "language of public sector management". However, there were instances where the actors in SODA faced challenges with the leadership of the Assembly not siding with their suggested LED programmes.

In comparative terms, whilst lack of due diligence, weak and lack of independence of state institutions and political expediency hampered the implementation of LED in the AMA, the functionaries in the KeMA itself rather hindered the implementation of LED. In SODA, there was effective interaction among all the actors. The impact of the personalities on LED in KeMA resulted in difficulties in LED financing and the assembly not implementing hardware LED interventions whilst the challenges in the AMA resulted in the truncation of all the PPP projects except the Accra City Car Parks Ltd. SODA however, experienced a smooth implementation of LED initiatives.

The dynamics in LED programme implementation

Local governance in Ghana is influenced by political, economic, cultural, geographical, leadership, and natural resources (for example land) factors. The political factor is important because whatever happens at the national level politically impacts the local governance system through the political recruitment process (hiring and transfer of central and local government personnel) and the transfer of fiscal resources from the center to the periphery. For instance, a change in government equally affects the leadership of the various MMDAs.

The study found that due to political expediency coupled with 2016 being an election year, in the AMA's bid to secure the votes through infrastructure provision, the Assembly did not adhere to the administrative process for the implementation of PPPs. In addition, the change in government in January 2017 following the defeat of the NDC by the NPP in the 2016 general elections halted the continuation in the PPPs. Though Article 35(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 stipulates that ... "*a government shall continue and exercise projects and programmes commenced by previous governments*" (Republic of Ghana, 1992:36), due to political transition, the new Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) requested for a review of all the PPPs. The review process is ongoing since August, 2017 (Fieldwork, February, 2018).

The issue of land tenure system also exacerbated the dynamics. Most lands in the Accra metropolis are owned by families and clans and therefore, the AMA must acquire them from the owners before use. However, the AMA did not have the land titles to the ten lands

proposed as PPP sites (Fieldwork, February, 2018).

In the KeMA, the Municipal Chief Executives (MCEs), Municipal Coordinating Directors (MCDs) and assembly members from 1988 to 2016 did not have the required commitment and will to implement LED programmes. As a result, LED did not receive much executive support. However, with the change in government following the 2016 general elections and the subsequent appointment of a new MCE and the transfer of new MCD to the KeMA in August, 2017, LED had started receiving greater attention. This was evidenced by the MCE contributing GH¢ 2,000.00 in October 2017 from his personal resources for the commencement of a leatherwork training for the youth of the municipality (Fieldwork, January, 2018). In addition, LED started receiving attention in KeMA in August 2017 as a result of the NPP government's flagship rural industrialization programme christened "One District One Factory (1DIF)". It was also found that LED activities were vibrant in the municipality during the election period because politicians injected a lot of money into community-based organisations (CBOs) to boost their chances of winning elections either as constituency executives, parliamentary candidate or Members of Parliament (Fieldwork, January 2018).

The SODA had a mixed experience as far as the dynamics were concerned. For instance, between 2003 and 2004, the Dodowa mango farmers indicated that the then District Chief Executive (DCE) and District Coordinating Director (DCD) showed interest in LED programmes. However, with election 2004 in which President Kufuor was returned to power, both DCE and DCD were changed. The new officials did not give the necessary attention that their predecessors gave to the LED. On the other hand, a change in the Assembly member of the Agomeda electoral area in 2014 due to electoral defeat resulted in the Agomeda mango farmers no longer participating in LED activities that directly affected their mango businesses.

It is clear that the AMA had administrative, procedural, institutional, land tenure system as well as politics impacting the implementation of its LED intervention. The KeMA had politics through political recruitment and political leadership in terms of style, interest and approach impacting the implementation of LED. The dynamics impacting LED at SODA were not different from that of the AMA and KeMA because political leadership and recruitment as well as micro politics also brought some dynamics in the implementation of LED. Putting the AMA, KeMA and SODA together, the implementation of their LED interventions was shaped by national and local politics through political recruitment and resource allocation.

Conclusion

The study pointed out that all the three MMDAs pursued

similar LED interventions such as capacity development programmes; however, the use of PPPs as a driver of infrastructure provision was implemented by the AMA while infrastructure provision was championed by GEL in the SODA as part of its CSR. The KeMA did not record any infrastructure provision in its LED programmes.

In addition, micro and macro politics and leadership shaped LED adoption and implementation in the three MMDAs and brought some dynamics in resource allocation towards LED. Finally, the AMA had issues with land acquisition, procedure, due diligence and environmental, health and safety permits which severely hampered the implementation of PPP projects.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. LED intervention implementation should not be tied to the tenure of office of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and DCDs at the MMDAs; rather, it should be continued even when there is a change in leadership at the MMDAs. Related to this recommendation is that the central government should desist from interfering in recruitment through transfers at the local governance level. This does not augur well for the continuation of LED policies.
2. The independence of state institutions such as the PID should be protected. This should be done by ensuring permanent tenure for the key officers. Their independence will allow them to apply rules and regulations without fear or favour.
3. Politicians at all levels should desist from the over-politicization of LED interventions. They should rather make those resources available to the MMDAs to facilitate the implementation of LED.
4. Central government's involvement in the implementation of LED should not be driven purely by the electoral fortunes it stands to gain, but rather should fall within the general development plan of the nation and the MMDAs in particular.
5. The MMDAs as the lead state institution at the local level should allow for broader stakeholder consultation at all the stages of the LED process. Some of the stakeholders to engage include the traditional authorities, CBOs, indigenes, NGOs, private business entities etc. The consultation process provides the opportunity for all the actors to make inputs into the interventions thereby making room for total ownership of the LED programme and the generation of the needed support (political, financial and land) for the implementation of the LED initiatives.

From the foregoing discussion, the article highlights the following which have implications for LED, local governance and politics in Ghana:

1. The existence of actors in the implementation of LED is not sufficient for its successful implementation. The

actors must be willing to cooperate with each other and they must also have the requisite resources and capacities in the right mix, at the right time and deployed for the right purpose.

2. Local governance structures impact LED implementation in diverse way; either positive or negative depending on how the actors relate with the structures.

3. The success of LED depends a lot on the commitment of LGU leadership and political commitment in promoting, marketing the resource endowment and the economic potential of the locality to the outside world. The marketing assists not only in attracting the needed investment into the area but also show cases the MMDAs' products and the economic potential to outsiders.

4. The implementation of LED was impacted by not only local level politics but national politics as well.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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APPENDIX

Table 1a. Summary of AMA PPP projects.

| Item | Project | Transaction Advisor | Estimated Land Size in acres | Estimated Value in US\$ | Contractor after Request for Proposal (RFP) |
|------|---|----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| 1 | Mallam Market | CPCS International | 5.84 | 17,680,000.00 | |
| 2 | Makola/31 st December Market | Deloitte and Touché | 7.5 | 29,046,600.00 | Excellent and Wilson |
| 3 | Tuesday Market | Kwame Ansah and Associates | 4.08 | 24,345,862.00 | Pro Design Ltd |
| 4 | Salaga Market | Kwame Ansah and Associates | 1.27 | 4,055,946.00 | |
| 5 | London Market | Kwame Ansah and Associates | 0.7 | 2,766,986.00 | |
| 6 | City Corner Residential Housing | C-Nergy | 7.27 | 307,436,607.00 | Excellent, Buddos and Sino Ltd |
| 7 | Convention/Community Center | C-Nergy | 3.77 | 156,558,513.00 | |
| 8 | Mallam Atta Market | Ernst and Young, Ghana | 12.08 | 89,000,000.00 | |
| 9 | Katamanto Market | Shawbell Consulting | 10.71 | 25,200,000.00 | |
| 10 | PWD and Kwasiadwaso | PKF | 11.4 | 50,700,000.00 | Consiki with EBID |
| 11 | Accra City Car Parks | - | 0.4 | 5,500,000 | Seth Adjei and Consortium |

Source: Public Investment Division of MOFEP and Fieldwork, January, 2018.

Table 2a. LED initiatives in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

| Name of MMDA | Led programme | Classification | Intervention |
|--------------|---|--|---|
| AMA | PPPs | PPPs | Partnership with the private sector for infrastructure provision |
| | Business Development Services | Business Development Services | Capacity development programmes |
| KeMA | Traditional handicraft and Non-traditional handicraft | Traditional handicraft Bag weaving with straw and raffia, leatherworks, beads making, batik, tie and dye. | Capacity development programmes, access to finance, creation of marketing opportunities |
| | | Non-traditional Hair dressing, cream production, tomatoes puree poultry farming, creation of enabling environment, business linkages | |
| SODA | Software LED and Hardware LED | Software LED Creation of enabling environment, easy permitting for businesses Hardware LED Provision of infrastructure | Capacity development programmes and private sector involvement |

Source: Fieldwork January, 2018.

Table 3a. Shareholding structure for financing the Accra City Car Parks Ltd in the AMA.

| Name of actor | Amount in US\$ | Equity in Percentage |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| AMA | 550,000 | 10 |
| UMB | 594,550 | 10.81 |
| First African Group | 2,051,500 | 37.3 |
| Labour Enterprise Trust | 1,217,150 | 22.13 |
| ELGA Ghana | 748,000 | 13.6 |
| OMNIA | 128,150 | 2.33 |
| Seth Adjei and Consortium | 210,650 | 3.83 |
| Total | 5,500,000 | 100 |

Source: Accra City Car Parks Ltd, February, 2018.

Table 4a. Cost of implementing capacity development programme in the AMA in January, 2012.

| S/N | Name/Type of Intervention | Cost in US Dollars |
|------------|--|---------------------------|
| 1 | Technological improvement for SSEs Development | 19,798.57 |
| 2 | Enhancing local and national for SSEs | 15,782.50 |
| 3 | Creating enabling environment and dialogue | 17,245.53 |
| 4 | Promoting SSEs development | 14,680.98 |
| | Total | 67,507.58 |

Source: Social Investment Fund, March, 2018.