Empowering traditional rulers and grassroots mobilization for rural development in Cross River State, Nigeria

Isokon, Brown Egbe*, Obeten, Ude Bassey and Tangban, Egbe Ebagu

Department of Social Work, University of Calabar, Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria.

Received 7 July, 2017; Accepted 27 September, 2017

This research empirically examined the impact of empowerments of traditional rulers on rural development in Cross River State, Nigeria. In order to guide the study, two research hypotheses were formulated. A survey design was adopted for the study and questionnaire was the main research instrument used to collect data from the respondents. Five hundred and twenty government certificated traditional rulers (respondents) were randomly sampled from the study area. For the purpose of sampling, the cluster and purposive sampling methods were adopted. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Scheffe Post Hoc Test were used to test the research hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance, using the appropriate degree of freedom. The results revealed that all the hypotheses were significant. That is, poor incentives given to traditional rulers as well as non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution have significant negative influence on grass root mobilization for rural development in the study area. On the basis of these findings, it was recommended among others that traditional rulers should be adequately empowered financially, socially and materially; as this would go a long way to influence their effectiveness in grass root mobilization for rural development. Besides, it would help them exercise power and achieve their own goals as well as raise their interests to bear on social responsibilities. It would also pave way for happy, enthusiastic, energetic, hardworking, self-reliant, courageous, purposeful, optimistic, trust-worthy, friendly, and patriotic behavior towards rural development.

Key words: Empowering, traditional rulers, grass root, mobilization, rural, development.

INTRODUCTION

It is generally argued by scholars and development experts that traditional rulers constitute the pivot of rural development. This is so because the mobilization of the people for rural development depends largely on the quality and skillfulness of traditional rulers. Agwu (2009) attested to this by stating that grass root mobilization is one of the onerous roles traditional rulers are known for. Thus, empowering traditional chieftaincy institution is...
critical to effective grass root mobilization for rural development.

Empowerment of traditional rulers is a basic catalyst of grass root mobilization for community productivity and perhaps, could be viewed in the same platform with skills, human resources and strategies in rural development efforts. As traditional rulers perform their roles, there is always a constant craving for better conditions and satisfaction of both their personal and community needs. From the aforementioned premise, empowerment of traditional rulers may imply the ability of the government and the subjects to meet the needs of traditional rulers in order that they can mobilize the people effectively. Mubaazi (2013) supporting this view identified empowerment as primarily engendering human effectiveness.

Given the critical role traditional rulers play in grass root mobilization for rural development in any society, especially in rural areas, it is therefore worrisome that some tradition carry out such tasks without commitment and passion; often rendering their services with some form of belligerence, lack of interest and not minding the consequences their actions will have on the community. The growing discontent about rural poverty and perhaps lack of social amenities or infrastructural facilities like good roads, portable water, electricity and schools at our rural setting could sometimes be blamed on traditional rulers for not living up to their responsibilities. This situation has no doubt created serious impediments in the level of performance of traditional rulers in recent times. The traditional chieftaincy institution is becoming more and more frustrated, thereby causing a continuous decline in their productivity.

As a matter of fact, some of the previous studies had blamed government policies while some blamed it on the ineptitude, inefficiency and even on the corrupt attitude of traditional rulers. Little or no attempt has been made to investigate whether empowerment variables like traditional rulers’ poor incentives paid to traditional rulers and non resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution rulers is responsible. It is in view of the foregoing that it is necessary to fill some of the gaps in the existing literature by examining the impact of empowerment of traditional rulers on grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State, Nigeria.

Objectives of the study

(1) Determine the influence of poor incentives on traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development;
(2) Determine the influence of non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution on grass root mobilization.

Research questions

(1) To what extent do poor incentives influence traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development?
(2) How does non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution influence grass root mobilization for rural development?

Research hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated to guide the study:

(1) Poor incentives do not have significant influence on traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development;
(2) Non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution do not have significant influence on grass root mobilization for rural development.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Concept of empowerment

The process of empowerment consists of identification of an unsatisfied need and the establishment of goal which satisfies the need. Zhause and Bench (2010) see empowerment as the condition responsible for variation in the intensity, quality and direction of on-going behavior. According to these scholars, most, if not all behaviours are caused by the individual's attempt to satisfy needs. Empowering people means to provide or do things which are likely to satisfy human drives and desires thereby leading the persons to act in a desired manner. The decisions arising from human motives are generally based on needs whether consciously, sub-consciously or instinctively felt. To Mubaazi (2013), empowerment has to do with the forces that maintain and alter direction, quality and intensity of behavior. Empowerment may be incentives, stimuli or outcomes which prompt behavior and evoke a state of arousal to act. Empowerment could be in form of money, environment conditions, etc. Alhoy and Ukel (2008) view empowerment as incentives or other mechanisms that start and maintain voluntary activity directed towards the achievement of some goals. Peterson (2014) sees empowerment as capable of igniting, propelling, poking, spurring or energizing direct and sustain behaviour towards goal attainment. Dame and Lobo (2010) defined empowerment as anything that spur a person's desire to engage in some activity. From the foregoing, it is clear that people are empowered in order to solve their needs. Ejimofor (2014) noted that when people are empowered, it promotes their psychological wellbeing and enables
optimal functioning.

Lovell (2013) opined that an empowered person is easy to spot by his/her agility, dedication, enthusiasm, focus, zeal and general performance and contribution to the group or collective objectives and goals. Empowerment arouses people to do a particular thing or behave in a particular way. People who are appropriately empowered strive to achieve challenging goals involving moderate risks, their primary reward being a job well done.

Ejimofor (2014) noted that when people are highly empowered, it promotes their psychological wellbeing and enables them to function optimally. Lovell (2013) opined that empowered persons would reveal such characteristics as agility, dedication, enthusiasm, focus, zeal and general performance. Lovell (2013) further stated that empowerment is important and is an end in itself and is therefore desirable in nature.

Asumazo and Swerba (2014) conducted a study to determine the impact of empowerments on the reduction of poverty among households in Honduras and Mexico. The report shows that the Honduran empowerment covers some 30,000 households and provides a cash transfer equivalent to 4% of their average consumption, while the Mexican empowerment programme extends to 5 million households providing cash to a value of 20% of their average consumption. The evaluations so far have shown that the empowerments increased consumption by poor households, although the impact is often limited depending on the number of beneficiaries and the amount of the transfer. The result also revealed that empowerments have been successful in raising school attendance and health service utilization (for example health clinic visits up by about 20% points in Honduras and Mexico).

In a study to determine the factors that make empowerment successful in Mexico, Whesh and Odimba (2016) reported that the amount of cash involved the design and enforcement of the conditions, the duration and sustainability of the programme, the efficiency of targeting and the transparency of its administration were responsible. Laird et al. (2010) stated that administering an empowerment programme that hands out cash tends to be cheaper than one that delivers goods to its beneficiaries. A more difficult and sometimes costly part can be to identify (target) the needy. Allimatasu et al. (2016) opined that empowerments are social assistance programmes aimed at reducing motivating organizational efficiency.

Incentives and grass root mobilization for rural development

Incentives have to do with such things as bonuses, special project/work assignment, pay, opportunities for career development, achievement, and promotion to higher places of responsibility (Murray, 2008). Udensi (2012) conducted a study to establish the impact of incentives on human development. The findings of the study showed that the provision of incentives (as a form of empowerment) had some significant impact on human development. The findings also showed that the incentives provided engendered efficiency and enhanced productivity output. This finding was supported by Ukeje (2008) when they reported that community members in Udi in Anambra State demonstrated unalloyed commitment to community projects as a result of government incentives they received.

Ibingha (2012) found out that non-payment of certain benefits and the smallness of those paid were source of discontentment and consequent poor work in a community project in Obubra Local Government Area of

Concept of traditional rulers

Traditional rulers simply refer to individuals appointed, selected or elected to pilot and cater for traditional chieftaincy activities. They are sometimes called traditional chiefs, traditional chieftains, traditional leaders, kings and queens, etc., and in Nigeria, traditional rulers are classified into four categories, namely, paramount rulers, clan heads and village heads (Ojua and Isokon, 2017). Their major role is to enforce the rules, norms and values of their people (Ekpen and Uzor, 2013). Dominic and Tanko (2015) assert that traditional rulers represent the embodiment of a people’s rich culture, as agents of development, as well as catalyst of change. Traditional rulers are considered as repositories of local socio-political authority (Nlerum and Sachs, 2003). On the same vein, Afigbo (1972) sees traditional rulers as people that perform religious, legislative, executive and judicial functions. Traditional chiefs are not only the custodian of culture and traditions, but also serve as the political power-base of the people at the grassroots, mobilizing them for community development (Jalong and Faji, 2011).

Before the advent of British rule in Nigeria, traditional rulers were the sole authority that governs the different communities that constitute the present-day Nigeria. Local administration was centered on traditional rulers who were revered and regarded by their subjects to possess supernatural powers (Mahmud, 2008). In the present-day Nigeria, traditional rulers formed the nucleus of governance at the grass root level. According to Mahmud (2008), the geographical spheres of authority of traditional rulers were essentially localised and no traditional ruler ever had jurisdiction over the entire geographical area of modern Nigeria. Also, traditional rulers play prominent roles in the contemporary local government administration. Apart from occupying the position of chief executives of their localities, they also serve as advisers to local government authorities (Egule and Bassey, 2010).
Cross River State, Nigeria. This view was also supported by McIncho (2013) who said that because of the non-payment of incentives such as bonus plan, compensation allowance, profit sharing and extra pay for work done, the entire Niger Delta communities revolted against the government and the multinational companies exploiting oil in the area. Gilbrish and White (2007) maintained that some monetary benefits serve as a means of rewarding outstanding performance and sustaining effective job performance. A study conducted by Osibiano and Garuba (2006) showed that there was a significant relationship between financial incentives and positive work performance. Bassey (2009) opined that the competence of community leaders can be improved through incentives they received.

Sawner and Ben (2016) assert that financial incentives have a direct effect on poverty by providing an immediate additional income for the poor. They can make their own choices as to how to spend or save this money. It is also expected to have a positive impact on the recipients' health, education or other socio-economic well-being, depending on the condition applied (Mallow et al., 2008). Financial incentives thus offer a two-pronged approach to combating poverty, through cash as well as by building-up human capital through improved health and education, thereby helping to break the transmission of poverty from one generation to the next.

Some incentives are designed to target certain groups within the population rather than everyone. For example, employees may be given incentives in order to motivate them to put in their best in the workplace. Other targets may be residents of particular poor areas, such as slums, incentives inform of empowerment may be offered to farmers, business men and women (Beinta et al., 2009).

Resource allocation and grass root mobilization for rural development

In his attempt to justify government financial allocation for rural development in Nigeria, Frank (2009) maintained that for the sake of fast tracking rural development in Nigeria and as a way of reducing the rate of rural urban migration of our youths, increased government financial allocation to local government is imperative. To him, rural development in Nigeria require consistent and regular government attention, stressing that most of the infrastructures needed to develop the rural areas are within the role of the government for their provision. He further adduced that the search for sustainability plans for rural development is contingent upon the fact that local governments in Nigeria today need adequate budgetary allocation.

On his part, Effiong (2010) stated that pressure from many quarters always want government to fund the traditional chieftaincy institution. This is especially so because traditional rulers are the nexus of rural development. In the hierarchy of leadership, tradition is ranked closest to the rural people, and therefore knows their felt needs more than any other leadership group. He agreed with those who argued that the resources allocated towards rural development in Nigeria is inadequate and the government should do something about it. Ekpene and Uzor (2013) argued that most of the resources allocated to local governments are not channeled towards rural development, but diverted to other areas of need and that is why our rural areas had never experienced any meaningful change year in and year out.

Edem (2009) stated that the issue of rural neglect has posed great challenge to development experts. It has become somehow worrisome that the resources allocated to local governments in Nigeria are not adequate to cater for rural development. The resultant effect being that some rural areas lack basic social amenities and some of them do not have access roads, pipe borne water and electricity. In other cases, the resource allocation to local government is presided over by politicians and public servants who have little or no knowledge of how to implement rural development plans (Edem, 2009).

It was against this backdrop that scholars like Odong (2010) and Andre (2005) opined that traditional rulers by virtue of their office should be in charge of rural development implementation, arguing further that without the special roles of traditional rulers in grass root mobilization, rural development would be a mirage. On his part, Zummen (2007) argued that in some countries, it was the rural folks that carry out rural development with or without government support. To him the traditional institution is more effective in rural development than the local government in Nigeria. He further stressed that all the bottlenecks associated with government bureaucracy would disappear if traditional institutions are empowered to implement rural development plans.

However, scholars like Shera and Okon (2006) demanded effective and increasing government and community participation in rural development. Franklin and Anderson (2011) were of the view that traditional institutions should be allocated with sufficient resources that would enable it embark on rural development. According to them, the traditional chieftaincy institution should be at the center stage of its plan and execution. This suggestion rests on the belief that traditional chieftaincy institution can mobilize the people for rural development than any other body. Tanmiben (2007) stated that the reason for the poor resource allocation to local government in Nigeria such that it found it difficult to effectively carry out rural development is because the federal and state government is not sensitive to the plight of the common man and how many people are dying by rural impoverishment. Mamgbe (2010) posited that the allocation of resources for rural development is governed by political consideration rather than necessity.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research area is Cross River State. It is one of the thirty-six (36) states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Cross River State is situated in the South-South Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria. Its capital is Calabar and has eighteen administrative units known as local government areas. These are: Abi, Akamkpa, Akpabuyo, Bakassi, Bekwara, Biase, Boki, Calabar South, Calabar Municipal Council, Etung, Ikom, Obudu, Odukpani, Ogoja, Obanliku, Obubra, Yakurr and Yala. Cross River State epitomises Nigeria’s linguistic and cultural plurality, having several ethnic groups. However, 26 major ethnic groups are identified, namely: Efik, Ejagham, Yako, Assiga, Agoi, Agbo, Bahumono, Itigidi, Betti, Membbe, Adun, Etung, Olulomo, Ofutop, Nkim/Nkum, Abanajum, Nseke, Boki, Yala/Yache, Igde, Ukelle, Ekajuk, Mkube, Betti, Bekwara and Utugwanga. Efik ethnic group are found in Calabar Municipality, Bakassi, and Odukpani local government areas. Ejagham group occupies Odukpani, Akpabuyo, Biase and Akamkpa Local Government Areas. Yako, Assiga and Agoi groups jointly constitute Yakurr local government area while Agbo, Bahumono and Itigidi ethnic groups are found in Abi Local Government Area. Membbe and Adun ethnic groups are found in Obubra Local Government Area. In the northern part of the state are several sub-ethnic groups, among which are Etung, Olulomo, Ofutop, Nkim/Nkum, Abanajum, Nseke and Boki which occupies Ikom, Etung and Boki Local Government Areas. Also, Yala/Yache, Igde, Ukelle, Ekajuk, Mkube, Betti, Bekwara and Utugwanga ethnic groups occupy Yala, Obudu and Obanliku Local Government Areas (Figure 1).

The population of Cross River State is estimated at 2.89 million people (NPC, 2006). The research design used in conducting this study was the descriptive survey method while the research instrument used to elicit information from the respondents was a consolidated questionnaire. The population of the study consist of government certified traditional rulers resident in Cross River State.
Table 1. Sample distribution of respondents, senatorial districts, LGAs and communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senatorial district</th>
<th>LGA</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Obanliku</td>
<td>Sankwala</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Becheve</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Okpoma</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Okuku</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Etung</td>
<td>Agbokim</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nsofang</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Itigidi</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ediba</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Odukpani</td>
<td>Oban</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New-Netim</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calabar South</td>
<td>Anangtigha</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uwanse</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nigeria. The total population of government certified traditional rulers as at June, 2017 was 7254, comprising paramount rulers, clan heads and village heads.

The cluster and purposive sampling techniques were used to select the sample from the study population. The cluster samples were drawn from the three senatorial districts: North, Central and South Senatorial Districts. That is, in each senatorial district two (2) local government areas were selected through the use of simple random sampling technique. In other words, from the lists of all the local government areas (LGAs) making up each of the senatorial district (each senatorial district is made up of not less than five LGAs).

The Hat and Draw system of the simple random sampling method was used to draw two LGAs from each of them. Altogether, six LGAs were selected for use in the study. Next, a list of communities for each of the selected LGAs was constructed (each LGAs has not less than 10 communities). From each list, two communities were selected using the same Hat and Draw system of the simple random sampling technique for each of the six selected LGAs. Altogether, twelve (12) communities formed the clusters from which the sample for the study was drawn.

To draw respondents, the purposive sampling method was adopted. This involves the process of selecting those members of the accessible population, who have the knowledge of the phenomena under study (Ndio, 2004). Here, the subjects (certificated traditional rulers) used for the study were those who can give information on the subject matter. Therefore, a total of 725 respondents, representing 10% of the total population of the total population of traditional rulers in the study area participated in the study. The research hypotheses and the statistical procedure adopted for the analysis of data were Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Scheffe Post Hoc Test. A breakdown of the sample distribution is shown in Table 1

RESULTS

Hypothesis one

H₀: Poor incentives do not have any significant influence on traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development.

H₁: Poor incentives have significant influence on traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development.

The independent variable is poor incentives, which was categorised into three levels: low, moderate and high, while the dependent variable is grass root mobilization for rural development. Poor incentive was measured with five items and any subject who scored from 5 to 8 was classified as being low while those that scored from 9 to 16 were classified as being moderate and those who scored from 17 to 20 were classified as being high. The hypothesis was analyzed using one-way analysis of variance tested at .05 level of significance. The result of the analysis is shown in Table 2.

The result in Table 2 shows that the mean score of 19.512 was obtained for the 211 subjects who measured low in poor incentives to traditional rulers. This is greater than the mean score of 15.863 obtained for the 285 subjects who measured moderate in poor incentives to traditional rulers and this is also greater than the mean score of 11.583 obtained for the 229 subjects who measured high in poor incentives to traditional rulers. This shows that the more the poor incentives received by traditional rulers, the less effective they became in carrying out grass root mobilization for community development. The implication of this was that their mean scores differ and their difference was statistically significant since the calculated F-ratio of 52.334 obtained was higher than the critical F-ratio of 3.09 at 0.05 level of significance with significant value of 0.000.

Thus, the F-ratio is significant and the null hypothesis
which stated that there is no significant influence of poor incentives on traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State was rejected. Since traditional rulers’ grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State was significantly influenced by poor incentives, the source of the difference was determined using Scheffe Post Hoc Test multiple comparison analysis to check for the source of the difference. The result is shown in Table 3.

From the result of the Scheffe Post Hoc test in Table 3, it was observed that the result is significant when comparing subjects who measured low in poor incentives to traditional rulers with those who measured moderate in poor incentives to traditional rulers as regards their grass root mobilization for rural development (MD=3.648; p<0.05). It was also observed that the result is significant when comparing subjects who measured low in poor incentives to traditional rulers with those who measured high in poor incentives to traditional rulers as regards their grass root mobilization for rural development (MD=7.928; p<0.05). Based on these, it was concluded that the source of the difference was basically from all the categories.

**Hypothesis two**

This hypothesis states that non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution does not significantly influence grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State. The independent variable is non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution which was categorised into three levels: low, moderate and high, while the dependent variable is grass root mobilization for rural development. Non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution was measured with five items and any subjects who scored from 5 to 8 were classified as being low while those that scored from 9 to 16 were classified as being moderate and high, while the dependent variable is grass root mobilization for rural development. The result in Table 4 shows that the mean score of 17.447 was obtained for the 215 subjects who measured

Table 2. One-way Analysis of Variance of poor incentives to traditional rulers and grass root mobilization for rural development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poor incentive</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>19.512</td>
<td>3.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>15.863</td>
<td>4.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>11.583</td>
<td>3.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>15.409</td>
<td>4.777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source of variance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sum of squares</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Mean square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>1626.042</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>813.021</td>
<td>52.334*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>11216.27</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>15.535</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12842.312</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 0.05 alpha level, p<0.05, Critical F=3.09.

Table 3. Scheffe Post Hoc Test for poor incentives to traditional rulers and grass root mobilization for rural development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incentive</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>19.512</td>
<td>3.648*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>15.863</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>19.512</td>
<td>7.928*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>11.583</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>15.863</td>
<td>4.280*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>11.583</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level, p<0.05.
Table 4. One-way analysis of variance of non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution and grass root mobilization for rural development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-resource allocation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>17.447</td>
<td>5.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>16.347</td>
<td>3.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>12.907</td>
<td>4.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>15.409</td>
<td>4.777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sum of squares</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Mean square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>751.014</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>375.507</td>
<td>19.190*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>14128.096</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>19.568</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14879.11</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 0.05 alpha level. p<.05, Critical F=3.09.

Table 5. Scheffe Post Hoc Test for non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution and grass root mobilization for rural development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-resource allocation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>17.447</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>16.347</td>
<td>4.540*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>12.907</td>
<td>3.440*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>16.347</td>
<td>3.440*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>12.907</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level, p≤ 0.05.

low in non-resource allocation. This is greater than the mean score of 16.347 obtained for the 266 subjects who measured moderate in non-resource allocation and this is also greater than the mean score of 12.907 obtained for the 244 subjects who measured high in non-resource allocation. This shows that the more the traditional chieftaincy institution is denied resource allocation, the less effective they become in grass root mobilization for rural development. The implication of this was that their mean scores differ and their difference was statistically significant since the calculated F-ratio of 19.190 obtained was higher than the critical F-ratio of 3.09 at .05 level of significance with significant value of 0.000.

The F-ratio is significant and the null hypothesis which stated that non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution does not significantly influence grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State was rejected.

Since grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State was significantly influenced by non-resource allocation, the source of the difference was determined using Scheffe Post Hoc Test multiple comparison analysis to check for the source of the difference. The result is shown in Table 5.

From the result of the Scheffe Post Hoc test in Table 5, it was observed that the result is not significant when comparing subjects who measured low in non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution with those who measured moderate in non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution as regards their grass root mobilization for rural development (MD=1.100; p>0.05). But, it was observed that the result is significant when comparing subjects who measured low in non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution with those who measured high in non-resource allocation as regards their grass root mobilization for rural development (MD=4.540; p<0.05).

It was finally observed that the result is also significant when comparing subjects who measured moderate in non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution with those who measured high in non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution as regards their grass root mobilization for rural development (MD=3.440; p<0.05). Based on these, it was concluded that the source of the difference was basically from subjects who measured high in non-resource allocation to
traditional chieftaincy institution in Cross River State.

DISCUSSION

Poor incentives to traditional rulers and grass root mobilization for rural development

The first finding revealed that poor incentives to traditional rulers significantly influence grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State, Nigeria. This result supports the work of Ibingha (2012) who reported that non-payment of certain benefits and the smallness of those paid were source of discontentment and consequent infighting among traditional chiefs in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. This result also supports Mchintoch (2013) who reported that the non-payment of fringe benefits and monetary compensation such as bonus plan, profit sharing and land compensations led to revolt against the government and multinational companies operating in Niger Delta area. It further agrees with the findings of Gilbrish and White (2007) who reported that incentives serve as a means of rewarding outstanding performance and if this is not forthcoming, the morale of those involved is always down which in turn affects their work efficiency, satisfaction and commitment.

In Cross River State, it was observed that traditional rulers who are certified by government were usually paid monthly stipends.

Financial incentives are rarely provided to traditional rulers and these affect the implementation of their primary responsibility which is grass root mobilization for rural development. Although traditional rulers are expected to carry out the task of mobilizing their subjects for rural development, the zeal and passion needed to perform this task is low due to the inability of government to provide needed incentives. It was also observed that apart from their monthly stipends which sometimes are delayed for up to two or three months before they are paid, the traditional rulers have never received any other fringe benefits and all the entitlements that they had ever promised them.

The growing discontent among some traditional rulers could be seen from the prevalence of chieftaincy disputes, communal clashes, and neglected infrastructural developments in rural communities across the state. Some of the inter or intra feuds and conflicts which could have been settled or resolved were left unattended to. Also, is the rate at which some traditional rulers abandon their role as traditional rulers and delve into partisan politics. Some traditional rulers have tactically abandoned their duties and taken to other businesses just to survive, which is not in the best interest of the subjects and the community in general. This situation has no doubt created serious impediments in the mobilization of the subjects for rural development.

Non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution and grass root mobilization for rural development

The second finding revealed that non-resource allocation to traditional chieftaincy institution significantly influences grass root mobilization for rural development in Cross River State, Nigeria. This result supports Frank (2009) who reported that the development of our rural communities is contingent upon the fact that the government gives it attention and adequate budgetary allocation. The current study also agrees with Effiong (2010) who reported that the resources allocated to local government for rural development is inadequate.

In the study area, the government has never made any resource allocation in her budgets to traditional chieftaincy institution to carry out rural development. This is in spite of the fact that traditional rulers are recognized as the most viable institution to mobilize the subjects for rural development. This non resource allocation has resulted to traditional chieftaincy institution to become incapacitated in carrying out some of the basic social amenities, such as the provision of tarred roads, portable water, electricity among others. It was also observed that the allocation of resources on rural development is governed by political consideration rather than necessity. That is, government only embarks on rural development when those in government have interest and is selective.

Conclusion

The study specifically found out that traditional rulers in Cross River State have never been adequately empowered to enable them implement their primary objective of rural development effectively. Apart from the poor stipends they receive, the traditional chieftaincy institution has not been sufficiently funded or allocated with appropriate financial resources to mobilise the subjects for rural development. This is a task they would have been most comfortable in doing if they were empowered. This inability of the government to empower traditional rulers has resulted to untold neglect of rural roads, and poor farming methods. It further implies that because of the non-allocation of resources to the traditional chieftaincy institution, the rural populaces are faced with many challenges and are unable to live meaningful lives, unlike the urban dwellers.

Therefore, it is recommended that traditional rulers should be empowerment adequately, as this would go a long way in influencing their effectiveness in grass root mobilization for rural development. When traditional rulers are properly empowered, this would pave way for happy, enthusiastic, energetic, hardworking, self-reliant, courageous, purposeful, optimistic, trustworthy, friendly and patriotic behavior. On the other hand, when traditional rulers are not empowered, they
may become depressed, sad, suspicious, lazy, highly aggressive, inconsiderate, rebellious, tactless and low in achievement attainment. Besides, the government needs to demonstrate the necessary political will in empowering traditional rulers with adequate incentives.

CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Ekpen E, Uzor T (2013). The role of traditional rulers in rural development. MOFINWS 8(7):231-246.
Ibninga GI (2012). The concept of empowerment and managing the poor in Nigeria. Lagos: Longman Nig. Ltd. pp. 100-103