

*Full Length Research Paper*

# **Farmer-pastoralist conflicts management approaches in Sub-Saharan Africa: Insights into their strengths and pitfalls**

**Mabebe Erasmus Ntumva**

Department of Agricultural Extension and Community Development, Sokoine University of Agriculture, P. O. Box, 3002,  
Morogoro, Tanzania.

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**This article provides a critical review of the different theoretical perspectives on the existing conflict management mechanisms. Focus has been paid on the dynamics surrounding these mechanisms in relation to the changing contexts and times. The primary aim is: First, to identify what is already known about the available conflict-management mechanisms for handling farmer-pastoralist conflicts including the current direction of the research; second, to develop a relevant synthesis framework that can: (a) reflect the strengths and pitfalls of the available conflict management mechanisms in relation to the changing nature of the conflicts, (b) inform the development and analysis of case study research on the relevance of the existing mechanisms for conflict management in relation to the nature of the conflicts; third, to clarify key areas of discussion and further inquiry on conflict management mechanisms to which this review might usefully contribute. The article draws from critical literature, theoretical and case study analysis to gain an insight into dynamics surrounding farmer-pastoralist conflicts management approaches. The central question guiding this discussion is ‘what dynamics surround farmer-pastoralist conflict management mechanisms across varying contexts and times in sub-Saharan Africa? The article concludes that there is hardly any single mechanism capable of addressing the different causes of the farmer–pastoralist conflicts and more so in varying contexts and times. This situation suggests complementarity as perhaps a relevant approach for meaningful farmer-pastoralist conflicts management.**

**Key words:** Conflicts, farmer-pastoralist, conflict management, traditional institutions, collective action, traditional mechanisms, natural resources, decentralization, policies, interventions.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Farmer-pastoralist conflicts are increasingly attracting attention among scholars and other stakeholders across sub-Saharan Africa. Broader part of peace and security literature attach this attention to the devastating effects these conflicts have caused to the livelihoods, security,

and economies among communities in most countries (Mbah et al., 2021; Benjaminsen and Boubacar, 2021). By farmer-pastoralist conflicts, this study refers to the violent and non-violent competition over land resources occurring between sedentary farmers and mobile pastoralists. While

E-mail: [mabebenumva@yahoo.com](mailto:mabebenumva@yahoo.com). Tel: +255745142067.

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the level of devastation caused by these conflicts differs country wise, they have gone as far as mutating into insurgency in countries like Nigeria (Mbah et al., 2021), Mali (Benjaminsen and Boubacar, 2021) and ethnicity (Arab pastoralists and black farming communities) in Darfur (Mamdani, 2009; Adisa and Adekunle, 2010; Bromwich, 2018). Ostensibly, this later development has caused even more security and economic concerns to the community in the Sahel region and across Sub-Saharan Africa. In response to this devastation the world is witnessing emerging debates aiming to establish the underlying causes and multidimensional nature about the conflicts in question.

For instance, supporters of environmental security paradigm link farmer-pastoralist conflicts to the environmental scarcities (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Peluso and Watts 2001; Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar 2016). They consider an increase in population and land degradation as factors behind land resource scarcity and therefore violent competition between farmers and pastoralists. Another paradigm centres around climate change claimed to cause drought, desertification, migration, and conflicts particularly in the Sahel region (Adano et al., 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Haan et al. 2016). Yet, emerging perspectives on what underlies these conflicts are centred around political ecology theory (Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016). According to this perspective, farmer-pastoralist conflicts are a result of inequalities in land distribution attributed to socio-political structures of the society (Bromwich, 2018). Supporters of this perspective cite unequal power relations and political dynamics bequeathed from both colonial and post-colonial legacies on land governance (Lund and Boone, 2013), and the recent turn into modernization of agriculture in Africa (Soeters et al., 2017). At this juncture we have witnessed land tenure regimes changing from pre-colonial customary ownership through colonial-privatized ownership to liberalized-ownership in 1980s and beyond. In this regard, the juxtaposition of the conflict nature we see are inexorably making the nature of farmer-pastoralist conflicts even more complex and multidimensional- a situation seeming to pose a dilemma on how these conflicts should be resolved sustainably.

In parallel with the increasing debates about the underlying nature above and the seeming dilemma on proper addressing mechanisms, there has been an equal emergence of the debates over how best these conflicts could be managed or addressed. Reviewing these debates is very important to understand how different conflict management mechanisms have been used to address various resource conflicts in different social and political contexts. With the farmer-pastoralist conflict over land resources being one typical case of resource conflicts involving farmers and pastoralists, engaging with the broader context of such literature makes a noticeable

contribution to the understanding of the different mechanisms in place and their relevance in respect to what underlies the nature of these conflicts.

In connection to this, a survey of the various peace and conflict literature reveals that there are diverse perspectives on different mechanisms perceived to have played a role in the management of natural resource conflicts (Cousins, 1996). Many of these perspectives have centred on the roles of traditional mechanisms (Cousins, 1996; Adjei and Adebayo, 2014), community initiatives/collective action (Fisher, 2014; Ratner et al., 2017), statutory mechanisms (Doyle, 2012; Sarpong-Anane, 2014), policies and decentralisation programmes (Fisher 2014; Ratner et al. 2017), and the role played by multilateral organizations (Fratkin, 2014; Badru 2018; Collins et al., 2018b). Despite some research evidence in the literature indicating that some of these mechanisms have either been applied in isolation or a combination of two or more in different farmer-pastoralist conflict management undertakings, a growing concern is that such conflicts have continued to persist, which is perhaps one of the reasons why there have been debates sparked over their relevance depending on the nature of the conflicts in question.

The study is guided by a research question on why continued persistence of farmer-pastoralist conflicts in varying context despite continued attempts by different stakeholders to mitigate them. To achieve answers to this main question, literature on existing debates and varying perspectives was reviewed to; first, determine various mechanisms that have been used to manage farmer-pastoralist conflicts, second analyse strengths and pitfalls of each mechanism and third, to ascertain the relevance of each mechanism in the recent socio-political context that has witnessed a tremendous increase in land liberalization and strengthened individual property rights.

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study is part of my PhD dissertation conducted at the University of Bradford-UK from 2016 through 2020. It draws broadly on the literature about farmer-pastoralist conflict dynamics and management mechanisms in selected case studies across Sub-Saharan Africa. To achieve this, relevant resources including articles, eBooks and statutory documents were accessed through the summon search engine of the University of Bradford Library, google scholar search engine, academia.edu network of scholars and physical books/statutory documents. Accessed resources were systematically reviewed to get insight into debates and perspectives on farmer-pastoralist conflict dynamics and management mechanisms. This involves a review of environmental security and political ecology theories to establish the complexity nature of farmer-pastoralist conflicts (see the introduction section above). Then other theories involving social capital, solidarity, collaboration, liberal peace, institutional and development theories were reviewed and applied directly or indirectly to enhance even more insightful analysis and understanding of the dynamics surrounding farmer-pastoralist conflicts management mechanisms on the one hand but

also adapt the analysis and discussion into context and defined framework. With the framework of these theoretical explanations, more debates and perspectives about farmer-pastoralist conflicts and management mechanisms were critically reviewed to allow some research gaps to surface and then analysed qualitatively to deduce implications to fill the realized gaps. Specifically, the study used thematic analysis to deduce volumes of literature into themes and then critically analysed within the help of interpretivist philosophy. This allowed deductive reasoning, hence arriving into insightful implications regarding dynamics surrounding farmer-pastoralist conflicts management mechanisms. Checks and balances and ultimately credibility were enhanced through the use of multiple resources including articles, books, statutory documents and varying theoretical narratives.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### The role of traditional mechanisms

One of the recent overarching debates has been over the application and relevance of the traditional approaches to conflict management and resolution. For the sake of this study, the traditional conflict management mechanisms are referred to as those defined by Boege (2006: 5) as those “institutions and processes that developed independently in the context of pre-modern societal structures in the global south and have been practiced in that context over a considerable period of time”. In other words, communities have often developed their processes for managing conflict at the local level, often based around the authority of clan leaders and exercised through traditional courts or community meetings. Within the context of this definition, some scholars argue that traditional approaches have played a remarkable role in addressing various social- and resource-related conflicts dating back to the pre-colonial stage (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014). Apparently, development of such mechanisms and processes emanates from the truth that communities live in constant conflicts among themselves as individuals or one group and another due to, among many other things, the incompatibility of interests on the use of environmental resources (LeBillon and Duffy 2018). In this context, the maintenance of peaceful coexistence and social harmony needed contextualised mechanisms and processes of conflict management and resolution. Boege (2006), in this regard, considers them as context-specific due to what he posits as their nature, processes and practices differing from one place to another across the whole Global South. This situation creates a sharp contrast from the modern/western approaches, as according to him, they have been relying on adversarial systems and also operate in a standardised format across the world.

The function of traditional conflict management can be grounded in social capital and solidarity theories. According to Ostrom and Ahn (2009), it is the societal ties and networks that bind communities together towards the pursuit of common interests. They identify key attributes

in achieving this as investing in trustworthiness, functioning networking and formation of informal rules that control the group behaviours. What does this imply for the traditional conflict management mechanisms? It means that being traditional by nature, they operate within the context of socially shared values, beliefs, culture and norms that no single individual would want to be excommunicated from. These are the binding glues of the community. In this regard, traditional conflict management elders work towards the protection of this social bondage against breakage or towards the maintenance of the broken ties by individuals or groups committing acts that are against the norms, culture or attributes that establish trust or bind the community together. In a context like this, compensation for the affected can be decided on or sanctions against wrongdoers offered only to heal the affected party and maintenance of the distorted relations and not with the intention of harming the offender (Faure, 2000).

While explicitly or implicitly guided by ideas from the theory above and the theory of social solidarity by Emile Durkheim, which portrays society as a social order within which individuals are restrained (Hawkins, 1979: 156-159), several scholars have written that traditional mechanisms have focused on setting rules/norms that govern the smooth utilisation of the commons resources in order to enhance sustainable utilisation on the one hand and prevent unnecessary conflicts between users (Chikaire et al., 2018; Khadiaghala and Mati, 2011). Giving an example of Nigeria, Khadiagala and Mati (2011) argue that among the applied methods are hospitality meetings where the traditional head of families, clans, communities, neighbours and/or traditional healers act as mediators in the negotiation for peaceful coexistence and reaching agreement on resource utilisation between farmers and pastoralists. Notably, where conflicts between farmers and pastoralists erupt, with crop damage and injuries being some of the outcomes, conflicting parties are mediated and where possible compensations are awarded to the deserving party, not because of the need to punish, but to make sure that the social order and relations are maintained (Faure, 2000; Boege, 2006).

Elsewhere, in some parts of Sudan, Khadiagala and Mati (2011) have reported on how the “Goodiya” system plays a crucial role in handling farmer-pastoralist conflicts locally through a series of local and Islamic religious doctrines. They also report on a Nigerian case where similar farmer-pastoralist conflicts have been managed by traditional mediators, who are in most cases chiefs or respected elders, while guided by the customary doctrines believed to be shared among the local communities. In the case of punishment, a social sanction is applied to ensure that disputants comply with the decisions of the mediators in fear of being excommunicated from the social community activities or in fear of hazards that might plague the family particulars

when the traditional healers and diviners are involved (Faure, 2000).

Some researchers consider that traditional approaches remain relevant in the present day because they build on established cultural rules/norms which regulate the governance and utilisation of the commons such as land, water and forests to enhance sustainability but also prevent potential conflict among users (Chikaire et al., 2018). These attributes enable the local leaders/communities to manage conflict effectively because they provide the framework within which individuals are expected to behave in order to maintain what the social capital and social solidarity theories contend to be social ties and order. In other words, traditional conflict-management practices are built on the shared values, assumptions and commitments regarding equitable utilisation of the commons (land sharing), the breach of which is subject to punishment or social sanctions. The primary custodians of these rules/norms as suggested in various studies may be family heads, chiefs, a given local community or whichever has been improvised as traditional institutions concerning which level of the institution the land belongs to (Sarpong-Anane, 2014; Chikaire et al., 2018).

In what can be seen as a form of traditional land-use plans aiming at coping with scarcities and conflicts, communities have been improvising their local systems that separate grazing land from farming land (Moyo et al., 2008). For instance, if a particular village consists of both pastoralists/agro-pastoralists and farmers, a particular piece of land in a particular direction would be designated for communal grazing only without allowing any farming activities. Equally, another piece of land in a different direction would be designated for subsistence farming activities only, and the livestock would not be allowed to access it. As the literature further suggests, even within the allocated communal rangeland/grazing zones, traditional institutions have been ensuring that they are utilised in a selective manner/rotational grazing under the organization of traditional pastoral rules in order to give space for vegetative growth for serving the livestock during the stress seasons (Niamir 1991; Adams et al. 2003; Moyo et al., 2008). By so doing it becomes apparent that traditional conflict management mechanisms have been playing a significant role in the management of scarcity and potential conflict that might arise out of unregulated farming and grazing practices.

Niamir (1991) gives a typical case of Zaghawa pastoralists in Chad where there has been a collective agreement to alter grazing between the north and south of Sahara in different seasons for the same purpose of maintaining grazing reserves. He also highlights a case where the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania possess out of the modern regulations that guide them to graze outwardly, particularly during wet seasons, while preserving conducive grazing areas during the dry season. Although this may contribute to the lesser

encroachment of the croplands and ultimately conflicts, Adams raises some questions over its effectiveness as according to his views the extraordinary vast numbers of livestock kept may affect the arrangement. In other words, there is barely any adequate literature showing the extent to which this arrangement has been successful given the overambitious urge to increase the number of herds.

This situation means that traditional mechanisms are increasingly becoming ineffective for dealing with more current circumstances and challenges (where actors are managing much larger herds over larger areas of land). Apparently, this is attributed to the nature of the traditional institutions of being built on family hoods, clan hoods, chiefdoms and community hoods—a situation implying that they are suited to the localised and small-scale conflicts (Faure, 2000). Nevertheless, this knowledge makes a positive contribution to our examination of the potential of various traditional practices in preventing potential conflict between farmers and pastoralists.

The second approach, as argued by various theorists, is the actual application of the community rules/norms/beliefs/values to solve the actual conflicts emanating from the actual utilisation of resources (Abe and Ouma, 2017). Regarding this, studies have shown that this often occurs when the rules governing the utilisation of the commons (grassland, water and forests) are violated or when there is a direct livestock-crop damage conflict (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014; Sarpong-Anane, 2014).

For instance, when farmers have encroached a communally recognised grazing land or where the livestock have damaged crop fields, the disputing parties may often be called before community meetings or respective traditional authority chiefs or respected village elders where their conflicting interests will be reviewed. Involvement of the community members through meetings underpins what Faure (2000) accounts, that, by nature, these kinds of approaches aim at transparently solving the conflicts in order to win the trust and legitimacy of the community towards the maintenance of the societal order/solidarity. This step is often followed by mediated negotiations where the side found to violate the norms/order of the community become subject to sanctions or punishments that are often in the form of reparations or compensation for the damages (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014). Although in most cases these compensations do not suffice the loss/damage incurred, the agreement is reached in a mutual consensus that ensures the continued relationship between the disputing parties (Sarpong-Anane, 2014; Akov, 2017). This is a positive move towards sustainable peacebuilding.

Most recent theorists, however, have expressed concerns about the relevance of these approaches in a situation where the nature and context of the conflicts keep on changing (Buckles and Gerett, 1999). For example, Shettima and Tar (2008) argue that the current farmer-pastoralist conflicts are caused by many structural

factors including environmental changes, political exclusion, population increases and power differences among resource-user actors, a situation they believe has reduced the viability of traditional mechanisms. Instead, these mechanisms are increasingly seen as only capable of addressing petty and superficial conflicts such as those involving livestock-crop damages while not being able to address what is really behind such conflicts (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014).

In a situation that appears to have raised further scrutiny among actors is the fairness of the decisions that have been made when dealing with conflicting parties. This is due to the evidence that most of the decisions reached in, for example, crop-damage cases, have often prompted pastoralists to pay for compensation even when such damage has been prompted by the blockage of the livestock paths or expansion of crop fields into the traditional grazing areas (Shettima and Tar 2008). For example, in the case of Niger, "the pastoralists need to pass through the passage on their way to river Niger especially in the dry season, but irrigated market gardening and cultivation on the banks of the river has blocked such passages" (Shettima and Tar, 2008: 177). It is thus apparent that destruction of crops on one of the farms would amount to the value of compensation when the case is taken to the traditional conflict management institutions or even the formal institutions. This situation raises questions about the power of the pastoralists in the traditional conflict management on the one hand but also indicates the increased dominancy of the biased policies on agriculture that seem to have equally affected how the traditional institutions work. Despite these criticisms, this review has a potential contribution to the understanding of how these approaches could prevent what is seen as lower-level conflicts/proximate from escalating into major and extensive ones.

Using the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan as a case, Sen et al. (2014) say that peace between the Arab-speaking pastoralists and non-Arab farmers who were involved in periodic conflicts over land, water and grazing rights was possible because of the role played by traditional authorities in the 1970s. However, it has been argued that the restructuring programmes adopted by the Sudan government after that made the traditional approaches powerless amid the newly empowered statist approaches. In other words, the literature suggests that restructuring programmes had paved the way for liberalised land tenure rights that are recognised and protected by liberal policies and laws while undermining the role played by the traditional structures. According to Sen et al. (2014), this move has in part contributed to the escalation of the deadly farmer-pastoralist conflict, which also mutated into political and religious sentiments. Although it is difficult to establish the distinguishing line between the undermining of the traditional conflict approaches and other conflict-causing factors such as

climate change, particularly in the Darfur region, this review helps us understand the contribution and weakness of traditional approaches with the view of setting out the grounds for much more relevant approaches in handling conflict involving farmers and pastoralists.

More insightful analysis of the literature, however, reveals that amid the increasingly divided opinions over what causes traditional conflict management mechanisms to seem powerless, many scholars seem to point to the increasing modern resource tenure regimes and the dominance of the western property right protection systems as partly contributing factors (Tyler, 1999). Evidence shows that in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, local farmers and pastoralists have failed to protect their commons land through traditional approaches, following the registration of the grabbed lands by private firms/individuals (Homewood et al., 2004). This means that decisions made by traditional authorities are non-legally binding, therefore leaving behind looming tenure insecurities among the poor farmers and pastoralist commons land users; situations which have paved the way for the increasing scarcity, competition and ultimately conflict between them.

Still, however, as suggested in the previous paragraph, this is not a sufficient reason for undermining the role the customary approaches play in the peacebuilding process in conflict-prone areas as they are capable of addressing cultural sentiments associated with the conflicts at hand (Sarpong-Anane, 2014; Sen et al., 2014). For example, to make pastoralists get rid of the long-held culture of keeping large herds of cattle (for prestige, the symbol of wealth and respect) may need an equivalent intervention of the traditional authorities that are part and parcel of that culture. However, how this potentiality is being exploited by other mechanisms in addressing farmer-pastoralist conflict is something that needs further investigation.

More generally, traditional mechanisms are increasingly considered by some studies and development actors as mechanisms that are rich in several critical success factors in resource conflict management. Some of the highlighted factors include the wisdom, experience and diligence of the traditional institutions (elders, chiefs, clan heads and priests) which are increasingly being perceived as core values for carrying out negotiation and mediation within the framework that guarantee consensus and continued relationship among disputants (Faure, 2000; Khadiagala and Mati, 2011). Despite this, however, their low level of ability to address much more deep-rooted structural causes of the conflicts, as already highlighted in the previous paragraph, still raises questions among scholars. Many studies show that they are instead being linked to crop damage-related and family land conflicts, where compensation for the loss becomes the much-anticipated outcome of the conflict

management process (Shettima and Tar, 2008). Nevertheless, unveiling their potential in the management of the perceived lower-level conflicts could contribute to the understating of how best they could be used to address the much more protracted farmer-pastoralist conflicts.

### Collective action approaches

Perhaps, one of the pieces of available evidence in the literature signifying the collapse of traditional mediation and conciliation is the emerging attention paid to the use of the collective actions in the resource governance and management of related conflicts. Collective action approaches have their background in what Ostrom and Ahn (2009: 20) call collective actions theories of the second and third generations that are built on the three critical attributes of the social capital theory, namely: “trustworthiness, networks and formal and informal rules of institutions”. The core assumption behind these theories is based on the cooperation among individuals and various networks while regulated by the self-established institutions/rules in pursuit of shared interests that could not be pursued independently by individual actors without causing conflicts with the rest of the interested actors. Based on these theoretical lines of thinking and for this review, collective action approaches have been considered to be the deliberate creation of institutions or mechanisms for organising and managing interests and conflicts. In most cases, they are ad hoc-based, and they differ from the traditional and state institutions in the sense that they are the integrated processes that may involve actors and processes from traditional, civil and state institutions.

Based on this assumption, many scholars who have written extensively in this area agree that collective action approaches emerged as an alternative approach for containing resource-use conflicts (Ratner et al., 2013; Ratner et al., 2017). In other words, such conflicts need similar integrative approaches which involve a wide range of benefiting stakeholders, the success of which, however, depends on the key attribute of the social capital advanced by (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009) as trustworthiness among actors. Thus, from Fisher (2014) and Ratner et al. (2017)’s viewpoint collective actions are integrative approaches that bring together diverse stakeholders from the community, traditional institutions, government institutions, and interest groups from domestic and/or external organizations in the management of natural resources and conflict management. In his perspective, Cleaver (2012) credited these approaches as more grassroots-focused, integrated planned approaches which bring on board the inherent social values and connectedness to form a collective action approach he calls bricolage institutions.

Why is collective action considered viable, and what differentiates it from the traditional approaches? A critical examination of the literature shows that the collective actions have a wide range of legitimacy from the community which results from equivalent broad representation and collaboration (Ratner et al., 2017). Perhaps what differentiates it from traditional approaches is its richness in the broad representation of actors from grassroots levels, formal and informal institutions, and the applicability of the combined formal and informal rules in the pursuit of a conflict of interest, be it resource sharing or conflict management. Because of this, Buckles and Gerett (1999) view them as unique and enabling features in conflict management as they appear to be best positioned in facilitating the harmonisation of competing interests among resource-use actors. For instance, it is evident in the literature that farmers, pastoralists and conservation authorities possess varying interests when it comes to the use of land, water and forest resources.

Based on collective action theorists, therefore, the three groups may sit down, discuss and agree on the best way and rules to govern the use of the resources without jeopardising each other’s interests (e.g., agree on the livestock routes, livestock drinking water points and/or adjust the boundaries of the protected land to alleviate the grazing land scarcity the pastoralists experience). Most importantly, representation and collaboration, which are critical features in collective actions, have been acknowledged by various scholars as entities comprising of multiple actors with a variety of skills, experience and expertise in negotiation but also the long-held sense of social neighbourhood and cooperation in resource governance which are vital in conflict prevention or management (Cleaver, 2012; Fisher, 2014).

A few studies have attempted to examine the usefulness of collective action approaches in resource governance and related conflict management. The first case, as reported by Cleaver (2012), involves the collective governance initiative of 5,000 hectares of the government’s reserved land involving reindeer keepers and nearby settled communities in Sweden. Her account insists that in a village with a history of conflicts over property rights among different actors, the collective action approaches in managing the land resource appeared to be a suitable form of conflict management. For her what was behind this success and sustainability was the formation of bricolage institutions which borrowed principles of formal governance but, more importantly, the native cultural traditions of social togetherness, spiritual attachment to the environmental resources and a sense of neighbourhood in the past.

Reporting on the second case, Cleaver also refers to the Zimbabwean scenario of village community water management. Her study seems to acknowledge the communities’ improvised institutions (bricolage institutions) for village water management as being

successful because of a broader representation of different water user groups. Similar to the Swedish case, Cleaver also reports the community norms regulating the use and maintenance of the nature reserve as features behind the success. This viewpoint has equally been emphasised by Atlger (2003) whose study acknowledges that collective action has often shown positive gains in the management of natural resources many actors have an interest with, and that this has often been enabled by the social networking of local actors, civil societies and state institutions in the improvisation of rules that regulates the behaviour of actors towards the use of the resources in question. Most importantly, as Atlger further argues, collective actions enable communities to adapt to climate change, scarcity and therefore reducing the potential for the escalation of the conflict over scarce resources through collective governance and improved access. Despite the acknowledgement of these mechanisms which involve the collaboration of actors with diverse interests, there are concerns over how social inequalities (in terms of the decision-making power and actor representation) are being managed in order to achieve the desired results.

Detailing the concerns above, several scholars argue that the level of inequalities in terms of power among actors has been one of the main hindrances for the success of many collective action approaches in resource governance and conflict management. In other words, actors with more powers in terms of material possession and political representation can drag down the weaker actors in terms of decisions (Cleaver, 2012), a situation which erodes the critical pillars of the social capital (trustworthiness and meaningful networking) that are essential for any meaningful collaborative initiatives (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). In this regard, Ostrom and Ahn (2009) continue to argue that, in typical collective action, there is a risk of a segment of actors using the social capital to collude over particular interests that benefit them at the expense of the rest of the actors, a situation which would fuel inevitable grievances and conflicts.

Other scholars argue that in certain circumstances collective actions do incite even more resource-related conflicts, particularly when they come with decisions or rules that favour the stronger party's interests while undermining those of weaker and marginalised groups (Suliman, 1999; Tyler, 1999). Suliman (1999) gives a case of the eruption of armed conflict between the Nuba farmers and Baggara Arab pastoralists in the Kordofan state of Sudan. According to his study, the conflict was incited by the government's action to back the invasion of the Nuba farmland by the Arab pastoralists and agricultural investors, while doing little to enable the opposing groups to cooperate in finding a joint and sustainable solution. Apparently, in a situation like this, collective action can be counteractive in the sense that it can facilitate the seemingly deprived groups (the

marginalised pastoralists) to mobilise themselves through their lines of identities and production systems to revolt against such bias or resort to violence as an alternative way of winning back their interests. Echoing a similar sentiment, Ostrom and Ahn (2009) iterate that, if not carefully managed, the collective undertaking can lead to grievances and conflicts when a few actors use it for their gain against the interests of the majority of the less powerful actors. Despite these pitfalls collective action theories remain relevant in the understanding of the dynamics surrounding farmer-pastoralist conflict management in Kilosa District.

Although most studies seem to acknowledge the use of collective action theories as the most appropriate way of managing resources and conflicts, the insight into how this is being enhanced has not adequately been provided. However, referring to particular cases, Ratner et al. (2017: 883) argue that: "Collective action initiatives such as water user associations, community forestry organizations, and farmer cooperatives provide rules and norms to guide behaviour regarding resource access, use and benefits". For Ratner et al., therefore, such institutions need to be valued and nurtured by respective stakeholders as they view them as the most appropriate institutions for managing resources, behaviour and conflicts. However, still, this account does not reveal why conflicts between resource user groups have continued to exist even in areas where such institutions are being implemented.

### **Decentralisation of natural resource governance**

Most scholars possess a shared view linking decentralisation of natural resource governance with effectiveness in related conflict management. Such views are based on the policy narrative that decentralisation shifts decision powers to local leaders and beneficiary groups at the grassroots level (Collins and Mitchell, 2018a). According to (Pedersen, 2012; Ratner et al., 2017), communities with such powers can make or amend rules that regulate the access and use of natural resources, and manage related conflicts in their locality without relying much on the state. Both works reiterate that, while developing countries have been decentralising such powers, they have, on the other hand, failed to disburse sufficient resources to enable full implementation (Collins et al., 2018b).

This situation suggests that there are neither sufficient budget allocations nor enough empowered local leaders and community members to be able to turn paper-based decentralised authority into practical reality. Decentralisation is not embraced to enhance effective natural resource governance and management of related conflicts but to pass off budgetary costs from the central government (Ratner et al., 2017). This implies that

important decisions regarding rural land governance and conflict management are still being influenced by state/district officials in principle while, in reality, they do not accord with the underlying values and cultural dynamics of the grassroots communities (Pedersen, 2012). Regarding this, (Collins et al., 2018b) Tanzanian case observation reveals that, until recently, village leaders have been relying on directives from the district state authorities over land governance issues, sometimes contrary to what the land acts of 1999 would require them to do. This is a clear indication of the lack of capacity or resources to get the reforms implemented according to the law. Therefore, rural farmers and pastoralists are denied sufficient opportunities to exercise powers over their culturally suited land use and control, a situation which may contribute to the perpetuation of conflict.

However, proponents of decentralisation as a tool for effective conflict management argue that, when power is sufficiently devolved, sufficient financial resources are disbursed and community members are empowered accordingly, the potential for minimisation of resource-related conflict improves (Pedersen, 2012; Ratner et al., 2017). Perhaps in a stronger tone, Ratner et al. (2017: 892) emphasise that “delegation of conflict resolution authority or official recognition of the legitimacy of local institutions can similarly enable positive collective action at the local level to seek out negotiated solutions to resource conflicts”. This review therefore sets ground for further enquiry on whether local leaders or community members at the grassroots level possess such authority in handling land conflict involving farmers and pastoralists.

### **The policies and programme mechanism**

Empirical evidence seems to show that government policies and programmes are essential tools for the management of natural resource conflicts (Tyler, 1999; Ratner et al., 2017; Collins et al., 2018b). Several policies have been formulated for such purposes whenever the need arises. Their purpose is to regulate how resources are being accessed, used and controlled in a bid to enhance sustainability on the one hand and prevent or reduce conflicts among users on the other hand (Castro and Nielsen, 2003), for example, in an attempt to curb the unsustainable land use and conflicts among actors, many of the post-independent governments are under the influence of Gareth Hardin’s thesis on the tragedy of the commons-instituted pastoral development policies for modernisation of livestock keeping (Fratkin, 1997; Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2013; Fratkin, 2014). The main focus as further iterated by these scholars was on the development of the rangelands and livestock infrastructures such as roads and water dams in order to curtail the unrestricted use of the commons resources/

mobility and also to indirectly prevent the pastoralists from maintaining the large size of the herds.

Pavanello and Scott-Villiers (2013) emphasise furthermore that with such policies as above in place, the land degradation and potential desertification would be controlled. Subsequently, because of this, the scarcity of the natural resources would be controlled; a situation which seems to be an essential step in preventing competition and potential conflict with other natural resource users, particularly the subsistence farmers. Equally, in countries like Tanzania, several policies have been formulated aiming at maintaining sustainable land use and curb land-related conflicts among actors including farmers and pastoralists. Examples of these policies include the Land Policy of 1997 (URT 1997; Shivji 1998) and the national livestock policy (URT, 2006), and the decentralisation policies empowering those at local authority level to be able to govern the land and manage related conflicts (Pedersen, 2016).

While there may be no doubt about their contribution to prevention and reduction of resource-related conflicts, concerns have been raised as to their potential to exacerbate more conflicts or revive the dormant ones (Tyler, 1999; Castro and Nielsen, 2003). Tyler suggested that one factor leading to this counterproductive behaviour is the unilateral process that ignores the broader involvement of farmers’ and pastoralists’ interests. He argues that the government and its technocrats assume they have all the information about the local situation for particular policy changes while in reality, people at the receiving end are not thoroughly involved. This viewpoint is evidenced by an extensive body of literature addressing how the implementation of such policies has contradicted local people’s interests while proliferating conflict (Tyler, 1999; Pedersen, 2012). For example, Pavanello and Scott-Villiers (2013) argue that, while Hardin’s idea of establishing sedentary pastoralism is unquestionably viable in the prevention of degradation, scarcity and conflicts, it has been widely resisted because it contradicted the indigenous culture and tradition. Above all, because they are under a government established structure as they further argue, this implies the crippling of the traditional arrangement of transhumance systems that were important in the management of the commons and in coping with climate change/drought. Thus, in respect of these sentiments and Tyler’s argument, policies have failed to bear the intended fruits because of the lack of involvement of the target beneficiary from the inception to the implementation stage.

However, there are cases such as demarcating lands for environmental conservation or protection of water sources where the government’s unilateral actions may be justified and may receive international actors’ endorsement (Tyler, 1999; Walsh, 2012). Nevertheless, despite the probable contribution of such measures to



reduce water scarcity for both farmers and pastoralists in the future, legitimacy from the affected groups is still paramount to ensure sustainability. In other words, while implementing such policies, responsible institutions need to create awareness among the surrounding communities or even provide them with alternative sources such as allocation of new grazing lands or digging water dams.

According to Tyler, considering and addressing alternative communities' interests improves legitimacy, which may reduce the counterproductive effects of such policies. In contrast, the evidence shows that most implementations have been carried out unilaterally in many developing countries. For example, the action of the Tanzanian government to forcibly evict hundreds of Sukuma pastoralists and more than 300,000 livestock from Ihefu wetland in 2006, under the guise of protecting the Ruaha River and Usangu Game Reserve ecosystems, did not go by without reciprocation (Walsh, 2012). Such unprecedented eviction led to conflicts in their new destinations such as Morogoro, Lindi and Coast regions despite the seemingly good intentions of the policy.

Further evidence shows that, in a situation where policy changes aim to redress realised discrepancies and local resource users' needs and interests, the inequality gap between the marginalised and favoured groups widens (Buckles and Gerett, 1999). One of the reasons given in the literature centres around the idea that quite often policies are made in order to explicitly or implicitly favour some groups' interests while excluding those of others (Tyler, 1999). As views from various scholars suggest, this is the source of many grievances and conflicts among actors with diverse interests, particularly when the contested resources are increasingly becoming scarce. For instance, while Tanzania's agricultural and livestock policy changes seem to aim at promoting agricultural expansion and modernised livestock keeping respectively, they have on the other hand downplayed the transhumant mode of production (URT, 1997; URT, 2006; Benjaminsen et al., 2009), a practice some scholars claim to be credible (transhumant) for the management of the commons and adaptation to climate change led-scarcities (Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2013). This means therefore that this policy vision brings about the subsequent impacts to the customary access rights to the commons grazing land, a situation (Homer-Dixon, 1999) calls structurally created scarcity, perhaps due to the fact that while such policies aim to address potential conflicts they end up diverting the rights to resources away from the marginalised pastoral communities.

Moreover, it is an inevitable fact that among many other aims, the adoption of new land laws and policies in the 1990s in Tanzania aimed to solve land-use and tenure conflicts among rural communities, including both farmers and pastoralists (Shivji, 1998). Although there may be

some detectable levels of appreciation and most of the customarily owned land has been formalised, the truth of the matter is that the changes have led to even more conflicts, after turning land into a commercial and marketable entity (Collins et al., 2018b). Such a state of affairs jeopardises the existence of the communities' lands while subjecting farmers and pastoralists to competition for the little available land and ultimately to the violence and conflict. In Ratner et al. (2017)'s viewpoint and in what may guide the assessment of the case study, the approaches that undermine the fundamental interests of the target beneficiaries in the first place, precipitate more conflicts among diverse actors rather than help to manage them.

Although not directly related to farmer-pastoralist conflicts, some other examples may widen our understanding of the contribution of the policy changes to natural resource conflict management and the unintended consequences they may bring. In Nepal, while the government instituted policies to regulate water utilisation in a bid to avoid conflicts, the move contradicted customary water utilisation practices and interests, a situation which precipitated conflicts after failure to secure people's legitimacy (Ratner et al., 2017). Moreover, Ratner et al. argue further that, while the move to formalise land tenure in post-genocide Rwanda aimed to reduce conflict between settled communities and returnees from exile, and also improve agricultural productivity, it created grievances because of the disrupted ancestry line of tenure inheritance. Elsewhere, in Myanmar, the move to register community-owned forests aimed at protecting them against human activities such as large-scale agricultural investments led to the deprivation of the communities' customary rights over access and use of the forest and forest products (Woods, 2010). This state of affairs led to the conflict between forest conservation authorities and the surrounding communities who are the immediate beneficiaries of the neighbouring resources. These revelations underscore previous assertions that any policy change regarding the use of particular resources has implications for the prevention or management of the farmer-pastoralist related conflicts. Perhaps what contributes to the understanding of the case being studied is how such anticipated externalities are managed in order to lead the changes to the desired outcomes – a state of peace between farmers and pastoralists.

### **The national statutory and procedural mechanisms**

As already discussed in the previous section, farmer-pastoralist land conflicts are complex and multi-dimensional by nature (Boone, 2013b). Such complexity is believed by (Fisher, 2014) to be caused by the social, policy, political or administrative context in which the

conflicts occur. Thus, while some may be easily managed through local means, or merely through negotiation and mediation, many of them according to Fisher require equivalent administrative or statutory procedures. His line of argument is centred on the claim that the governance, use and allocation of a particular resource, and land resources, in particular, is often subject to the overlapping laws or administrative procedures, management of which may require the appropriate hierarchical administrative level of a particular institution (Fisher, 2014). He gives an example where, “the governance of public lands in the western United States typically involves overlapping jurisdictions at the municipal, county, state and federal levels, with multiple intersecting bureaus and department at each” (Fisher, 2014: 8). In this regard, managing any related land conflicts would inevitably require a thorough consultation and review of such overlaps. However, it is Fisher’s concern that sustainability of peace obtained through these approaches is subject to contestation because legal or administrative procedures give little room for the parties to effectively take part in or influence the anticipated resolution.

These forms of conflict management are claimed to originate from the western liberal ideologies which allow standardised law procedures to decide upon who has the right and who has not (Doyle, 2012). In particular, these are government institutions such as the local government offices, land tribunals and courts accompanied by their respective law-enforcing institutions such as the local militia, the police and the prisons. In their view, (Fisher, 2014; Sarpong-Anane, 2014: 5) characterise them as institutions which use litigation/legal procedures to get the conflict solved with little regard to the impact on the future relationship between opposing parties on the one hand, and also social cohesiveness. In most cases, decisions made by these institutions are mutually exclusive, meaning that the legal system adopted allows a clear demarcation between who has rights and who has not, while at the same time accompanied by the punishment/sanction for the loser and reward for the winner. While decisions based on these approaches are based on substantial evidence presented by the accuser, they still need to leave no reasonable doubt in implicating the accuser in committing a particular offence (clear legal procedures) (Fisher, 2014; Sarpong-Anane, 2014).

In this regard, there is much scepticism over the fairness of the decisions formal approaches would take when dealing with conflicts based on tenure rights in a context where the vast majority of African rural land is not registered. This scepticism is underscored by what many suggest as overreliance on the documented and statutory evidence, such as title deeds, while disregarding the fact that the vast majority of rural land is not registered (Askew et al., 2013; Peters, 2013). While it is evident that farmers and pastoralists own a significant proportion of

this land through customary means (Peters, 2013), it is highly likely that a state-centric model of conflict management poses a threat to tenure rights when farmers and pastoralists try to defend themselves against any form of appropriation. In one of the court rulings in Tanzania for example, the Barbaig pastoralists of Hanang district lost swaths of acres of traditional grazing land to the National Agriculture and Food Cooperation (NAFCO) for wheat cultivation in what appeared to be the undermining of the customary mode of land tenure (Mwaikusa 1993). While the ruling recognised the rights to property ownership according to the Tanzanian constitution, which prevents any deprivation without appropriate compensation (Mwaikusa, 1993), the same court held that one is entitled to compensation when there is evidence of physical development such as bush clearing and cultivation (Lobulu, 1998).

Furthermore, Askew reiterates that “discrimination against and ridicule of pastoralists and other indigenous minorities by the authorities and the press is taking institutional form in legislation and judicial precedents that undermine and devalue the livelihood, human rights and economic contributions of indigenous communities who are viewed as backward by many in positions of power” (Askew et al., 2013: 123). He emphasises that their lawsuits against deprivation of land rights always end up in failure and disappointment. Some examples are the Maasai pastoralists of Kenya who lost a lawsuit of 1913 in the high court and the 2010 lawsuit against the eviction of Maasai pastoralists from Loliondo-Northern Tanzania which they lost (Askew et al., 2013). As such, according to Askew, a sense of paranoia is created among pastoralists against demanding their rights through courts. Although courts have been credited for the protection of individual tenure rights, the current state of affairs suggests that under the current context of increasing land liberalisation it is highly likely that farmers and pastoralists will continue to lose their land before the statutory structures (Maganga et al., 2016). The result is land scarcity which culminates in competition and conflicts between the two land-user groups.

### **The role of multilateral organizations**

The role played by multilateral organizations in conflict management has increasingly attracted attention from different scholars; some seeming supportive while others are critical of their successes. While those with supportive perspectives credit them as useful, particularly in aspects of community, financial and technical empowerment (Fratkin, 1997; Collins et al., 2018b), those with critical perspectives appear to raise concerns about their sustainability because of two significant aspects. First, the phasing out of the project phase which goes away with the direct financial incentives the participants

used to enjoy. Second, the approaches used are considered top-down by nature or give little room for local engagement and improvisation; a situation signifying that the project lacks a sense of ownership due to the neglect of cultural aspects regarding resource utilisation.

As reported in the literature, the main actors in various interventions aiming at addressing the land conflict between farmers and pastoralists in different countries include the World Bank, USAID and United Nations Development among others (Fratkin, 1997; UNDP-Sudan, 2006; Fratkin, 2014; Collins et al., 2018b). Most of those interventions, particularly those facilitated by the World Bank, were implemented in the broader framework of the modernisation programmes launched in the 1960s, which among others focused on the displacement and resettlement of the African rural population (Thomas, 2002; Badru, 2018). For instance, Fratkin (2014) reports that as an attempt to modernise livestock keeping and curb drought-induced conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Ethiopia, the government – in collaboration with the World Bank – invested 500 million US dollars in establishing permanent water sources for pastoralists in drought-affected areas.

However, following the increasing policy focus on agriculture, pastoralists were never given priority in those areas but rather were further displaced into drought areas to pave the way for resettled agriculturalists (Thomas, 2002; Fratkin, 2014; Badru, 2018). For example, Badru (2018) has reported how the displacement of 56,000 pastoralists led to the disruption of their long-held livelihood system while causing unanticipated land pressure in their new destinations. More surprisingly, the seemingly biased approaches in addressing land conflicts have witnessed a further 3.6 million hectares in Ethiopia being put under investors' possession by 2011, often at the expense of the pastoralists' rangelands (Fratkin, 2014). However, as these arguments seem to suggest, and based on the inherent culture of pastoral mobility and the vast herds being kept, it is hard to be sure that the pastoralists would settle down just because they have a permanent water source without the guarantee of extensive pastureland.

Elsewhere in Africa, developmental theory perspectives continued to state that livestock mobility and consequently conflicts with other land users could be curbed through empowerment on rangeland management and livestock commercialisation programmes (Fratkin, 1997, 2014). This viewpoint means enabling pastoralists to make use of the grazing land more sustainably by adopting several recommended husbandry practices, such as farrowing some grazing areas to allow grass rejuvenation, keeping reasonably few livestock, using recommended husbandry practices, and selling in order to invest in other businesses. Emerging perspectives have suggested that such narratives became dominant in many development interventions, particularly after the

emergence of Gareth Harding's the popular tragedy of the commons thesis (Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2013).

While this has been the basis for several governments' and development partners' (e.g. World Bank and USAID)-led livestock empowerment programmes during both the colonial and post-colonial era in Africa, evidence shows that the impact has often not been as expected. For instance, in a bid to curb land conflicts and integrate livestock in the national economy through commercialisation, some ranching programmes were established in Kenya and Tanzania's Maasai land in the 1960s and 1970s (Fratkin, 1997). Accompanying these programmes – as studies further suggest – were the establishment of water dams, cattle dips, slaughter hubs, butcher shops, markets, feeder roads to ease transportation and associated education programmes for sustainable resource management (Fratkin, 1997). Similar evidence indicates that, approximately 1.3 million hectares were demarcated for such programmes in Senegal where close to 4,000 beneficiaries were involved in training programmes (Fratkin, 1997). As stated above, the contribution of these programmes to anticipated reduced conflict between farmers and pastoralists has hardly been realised, probably because of some of the aspects below, among others.

The first aspect could be the nature of the political economy inherited by respective countries after independence. For instance, while the World Bank and USAID's supported group ranches seemed to be relatively successful in Kenya after Maasai pastoralists' acceptance of the project, the situation was the opposite in neighbouring Tanzania (Fratkin, 1997; Homewood et al., 2004). Evidence shows that Kenya adopted a capitalist mode of economy where the privatised model of the economy was well integrated with its land policies and practices, and therefore simplified the adoption process (Van Arkadie, 2016). In other words, there was hardly any free land for the livestock as the majority of it was under private ownership, hence the introduction of group/individual ranches could, therefore, have been an opportunity for the pastoralists to own land which was increasingly becoming scarce.

Whereas in Tanzania, research evidence shows that the Ujamaa policies discouraged privatisation of land and encouraged collectivised governance and utilisation of resources (Homewood et al., 2004; Lal, 2015). Attempting to curb pastoral mobility and conflicts between farmers and pastoralists through ranches and promote commercialised livestock keeping implies going against this policy and a seemingly favouring a situation for utilising the land as a shared resource for all. In other words, studies show that pastoralist mobility in Tanzania was more guaranteed due to the ready availability of land as common property and a public entity (Fratkin, 1997). This viewpoint means that the encroachment of grazing or farming land was never halted by this programme, and

conflicts have continued to escalate instead. Nevertheless, this contributes to our understanding that the effectiveness of the particular intervention is dependent on the nature of the political economy in place.

Second, it appears that the well-established infrastructures such as roads, markets and water dams became even less beneficial to the pastoral mode of economy contrary to being part of the sustainable solution. Some studies claim that these infrastructures attracted farmers and other migrants who started agricultural activities and settlement in the pastoralists' designated areas (Fratkin, 1997). While favoured by the increasing focus of the government's policies on agricultural expansion and investment, the new migrants have been purported to cause a further increase in proximity between livestock and cultivated crops on the one hand and also to further marginalisation of the pastoralists (Fratkin, 1997; 2014). These circumstances are being looked upon by many scholars as precipitators of the conflicts rather than solvers. However, still, analysing conflict management from development programmes' perspectives at this stage is very important for the understanding of how selective interventions (aimed at farmers or pastoralists alone) may fail to contribute immensely to the alleviation of the conflicts between them.

Further literature has shown that foreign interventions have also featured in the quest for land policy changes with the assumption that some of the land conflicts including those involving farmers and pastoralists could be managed through adjustment of policies; in particular, anticipated reforms aimed at protecting the security of customary tenure through amendment of the existing legislation in order to eliminate earlier reforms-led inequalities and exclusions (Boone, 2017; Collins and Mitchell, 2018a; Boone, 2019). In what has been credited as a success, the 1990s Ghana and Tanzania reforms are said to have evidenced the protection of the customary tenure rights through new land acts that give power to local authorities for control and distribution of the land according to local priorities (URT, 1999a; URT, 1999b; Collins and Mitchell, 2018a). Most importantly, some studies stress that this seemingly decentralised land governance has contributed notably to the securitisation of the smallholder farmers' and pastoralists' land tenure through legal means and have since been perceived to reduce evictions and displacement (Boone, 2017; Collins and Mitchell, 2018a).

However, some studies show that there have been increasing concerns about the evidence of increasing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in different countries despite the reforms in place. Some express their scepticism whether the associated customary land legislation, which allows land titling and registration, could reduce conflicts, as according to their views, they have

instead exposed land to market predation and therefore contributed to its increasing scarcity (Boone, 2017). They argue that registration of the customary land encourages self-willing transactions because of the increased market value and legal transferability. For example, in a case where a farmer decides to sell the land while he still has some family members depending on him, he may often decide to open a new farm in a pastoralist's occupied land which is often perceived to be idle due to the transhumance nature of livestock keeping. This situation may have implications on the size of the pastoralists' land and the livestock-crop proximity, a situation which creates tension and conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. In a broad context, Boone (2019) put it that willing land transactions implies that more village land continues to shrink as the involved farmers, coupled with their increasing population, seek alternative pieces of land for farming. In his view, this has widely contributed to the proximity of these two groups, competition, fierce interactions and conflicts as they struggle to exploit land resources for the furtherance of their livelihood wellbeing (Boone, 2017).

The truth about this sentiment may need further empirical evidence as contrasting perspectives have associated this poor implementation and interference of the village decisions by the district authorities in respective countries. In Tanzania for example, under the village land acts of 1999, any land to be allocated to an individual or firm from outside the village must be agreed upon by the village authorities and the village general assembly (URT 1999b). This power enables them to put their priorities into consideration, including the assurance that there is enough land for farming and livestock keeping before they make decisions. However, studies show that some directives have been coming directly from higher authorities (district or state) on the size and particular land to allocate and to who it should be allocated, a situation which has been perceived to infringe on the rights of the local peoples over farming or grazing land (Pedersen, 2012; Collins et al., 2018b). This scenario triggers questions like: are communities empowered enough in their powers and roles in land governance? Has there been sufficient budget allocation for the implementation of the suggested reforms? Has it been disbursed timely and adequately? Is there any contradiction between the laws that protect the customary tenure, and the parent land laws? What are the implications of all these for the farmer-pastoralist conflicts? Thus, answering such questions would help us to understand areas in which these reforms have been successful and where they have shown weaknesses and therefore be in an excellent position to devise relevant mechanisms for redress.

While the World Bank pioneered these recent reforms, studies show that other organizations run parallel initiatives aimed at empowering communities on inclusive

land governance as one of the perceived therapies for conflict alleviation (Pedersen, 2012; Collins et al., 2018b). In essence, assumptions were put forward that community governance of land resources would provide an opportunity for all land users to participate in decision-making regarding how the resource should be distributed to serve parties' interests without causing conflict or where conflicts are involved, they could be managed amicably. For example, referring to a case in Darfur in the 2000s, UNDP-Sudan (2006) reported the involvement of UNDP and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in various programmes to facilitate local institutions' capacities in lobbying and advocacy for the change of the policies perceived to be a source of inequalities and conflicts between farmers and Arab pastoralists (UNDP-Sudan, 2006). However, studies suggest that the realisation of the intended objectives has often faced some difficulties as follows.

First, is the raised concern that the nomadic style of the pastoralists hampers successes because they keep on migrating from one place to another, particularly during the dry season, in search of water and pasture (Mwaiikusa, 1993; Elhadary and Planning, 2010). In such circumstances these interventions appear to be more biased to farmers' sedentary production which, unlike, the pastoral production, it gives them ample opportunity not only to participate but also to take part in various administrative structures. Thus while the above strategies may lead to inclusive decisions on better management and utilisation of land resources, the truth is that the interests of the pastoralists are rarely reflected because of the nature of their mobility production system that denies them such an opportunity particularly in Sudan (Elhadary and Planning, 2010). From Elhadary's viewpoint, this is the pretext of poverty and subsequently conflicts.

Second, is the new, widely shared perspective that empowerment programmes, particularly on customary land security in the rural areas (land formalization), contribute immensely to the loss and therefore prompt even more scarcity (Elhadary and Planning, 2010; Maganga et al., 2016). A scholar with such a perspective has argued that many of these external interventions have ended up contributing to the registration of the customary lands, marking them as slightly formal and recognised by law (UNDP-Sudan, 2006). While this may be regarded as a positive achievement towards solving the land tenure problem and ultimately associated conflicts, concerns have been raised that such registration has contributed to the rise of land value and marketability (Boone, 2019), things considered to encourage fast-tracking land grabbing (Elhadary and Planning, 2010; Maganga et al., 2016). Moreover, land registration appears to be incompatible with the pastoralist culture of mobility in search of the grassland and water they perceive as shared resources that can be accessed without restrictions.

Third, the evidence further suggests that, while the international actors' interventions are valuable for addressing farmer-pastoralist conflicts over land resources, there are cases where government priorities act as setbacks. This is mainly because particular interventions are often based on an agreement with the respective government, which is arguably based on national priority as it was in the case of the soil conservation project in the northern Sudanese state in the 1970s (UNDP-Sudan, 2006). In this country, as the UNDP-Sudan further suggests, the UNDP-led soil conservation project focused more on improving smallholder agricultural production just because it was one of the development priorities of the country. Among reasons different studies have noted as the setbacks in bringing peace between farmers and pastoralists, is the increasing habit of many governments in Africa to frame pastoralism as a primitive and environmental destructive kind of production which does not require special attention in government priorities (Berger 2003; Benjaminsen et al., 2009).

According to the literature, widespread cases are showing the impact of such selective intervention. Collins et al. (2018b) for example have argued that in Tanzania, most of the development programmes focus on agricultural sector improvement while paying little attention to the livestock sector as was the case for the Kilimo Kwanza (agriculture first) programme which aimed at increasing productivity for both small-, medium- and large-scale producers (Collins et al., 2018b). Equally, in neighbouring Kenya, Berger (2003) argued that the increasing isolation of the pastoralists' interests in the country's development has resulted in the progressive loss of grazing land (for agriculture and nature protection particularly in Samburu) while prompting the inter-pastoralist group competition and conflict but also migration that has resulted in conflicts with other sedentary crop producers. In this regard, therefore, one can conclude that interventions that focus on the interests of farmers while neglecting those of the pastoralists have little chance of avoiding conflicts between the two groups.

## Conclusion

This article examined the various theoretical perspectives on the farmer-pastoralist conflict management mechanisms in various contexts across Africa. Particular attention has been paid on the relevance of a particular mechanism in relation to the nature of the farmer-pastoralist conflicts. Much as the causality of the conflicts is multidimensional, the review of the conflict management mechanisms reveals several gaps in addressing this multidimensionality. In other words, while one mechanism appears relevant in addressing specific causes of the conflicts in a given context, it appears inappropriate for a different cause and context. For

example, while traditional mechanisms are portrayed as relevant for addressing cultural causes, they are seen as only capable of lower-level conflicts including crop damages, and more so considered insignificant in the current resource conflict dynamics. Others such as policies and programs, decentralisation programs, and collective action mechanisms appear to be relevant for addressing some structural aspects such as inequitable land access rules affecting farmers and pastoralists. However, the unilateral nature, actors' power differences and rare involvement of the grassroots actors (farmers and pastoralists) appear to limit their effectiveness. The statutory mechanism, on the other hand, appears relevant for addressing conflicts through legal and administrative frameworks. However, their litigation process appears to undermine the cultural and customary rights tied with the nature of the farmer-pastoralist conflicts. External interventions with key players such as the NGOs and the World Bank are portrayed as empowering in terms of customary tenure rights, development projects and natural resource governance. However, many of their approaches have attracted even more land transactions, while explicitly or implicitly depriving the poor (farmers and pastoralists) of their land ownership rights. This concludes that there is no single mechanism capable of addressing the different causes of the farmer-pastoralist conflicts and more so in varying contexts and time. This scenario suggests application of more than one approaches in a complementary manner if we are to achieve promising results in the management of farmer-pastoralist conflicts across varying socio-political contexts.

## CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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