This study explores the impact of joint auditors on tax evasion practices, guided by agency theory and stewardship theory. Our research utilizes a dataset of 225 observations from 27 publicly traded U.S. companies, analyzed through binary logistic regression to assess the relationship between joint auditing and tax evasion. The results indicate that U.S. companies listed on stock exchanges with joint auditors are significantly less likely to engage in tax evasion, suggesting that joint auditing may act as a deterrent. Additionally, the study finds a significant negative correlation between the expertise of the audit committee and the incidence of tax evasion. This implies that stronger audit committees, characterized by greater expertise, are associated with lower rates of tax evasion. These findings highlight the potential effectiveness of joint audits and proficient audit committees in mitigating tax evasion, offering valuable insights for both regulatory bodies and corporate governance practices.

Keywords: C?-auditors, tax evasion, audit c?mity expertise, listed American companies