This paper aims to study individual observational data (education, media consumption, gender, age, region, urban or rural dwellers, personal well-being, social trust, political trust, and interest in politics) and their influences on perceptions of trends in corruption in Nigeria. Perceptions of trends in corruption or corruption which was worse under previous military regimes or under the present democratic dispensation was measured based on the Afrobarometer survey responses to questions on political corruption in Nigeria. Descriptive statistics provided background information on the sample, while ordered probit logistics regression was used to examine the impact of responses on perceptions of corruption under different governments in Nigeria. The findings show that in Nigeria, perceptions of corruption under different regimes result from ethnic fragmentation, personal satisfaction, social trust, trusting of the president, and interest in politics. This study also finds that statistically significant variables have the probability to strongly influence perceptions of corruption under different regimes in Nigeria. Although this study does not claim to provide all the answers on trends in corruption, it forms a basis to which research on perceptions of corruption can be extended. Giving the limitation of this study, it is recommended that there is need for improved data in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Key words: Corruption, political corruption, perceptions of corruption, trends in corruption, bribery.

INTRODUCTION

Perceptions of the incidence of corruption, especially trends in corruption in Nigeria have been a major concern to both academicians and policy makers. Conferences and seminars have been organized to find solutions as to why people perceived more corruption, than they have actually experienced. It is a truism that corruption is tragic and its pervasiveness led to dismal economic performance of countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has been documented by analysts (Iroghama, 2005; Brownsberger, 1983; LeVine, 1975; Olaleye-Oruene, 1996) that corruption in Nigeria has been a bane of development. In appreciation of this fact, corruption fighting institutions, such as Independence and Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) were set up. Nigeria is not typical, in spite of these commissions, of its high level of corrupt practices, nor is it surprising that government till today is still fighting corruption after successive governments’ policy of containment or eradication of corrupt practices, but to no avail.

Nigeria has been ruled by successive governments, especially military regimes since independence from Britain in 1960. After independence, under the British influence, Nigeria patterned its government after the Westminster parliamentary system. Organized as a loose federation of self-governing states, the independent nation faced an overwhelming task of unifying a country with many ethnic nationalities and linguistic groups. An oil boom in the 1970s buoyed the economy and by the 1980s Nigeria was considered an exemplar of African democracy and economic well being.

In February 1999, after successive military regimes, presidential elections ushered in the fourth republic and General Obasanjo, a former member of the military elites who was imprisoned for three years for criticizing the military rule of General Sani Abacha, was declared president. Obasanjo’s commitment to democracy, his anticorruption drives, and his desire to recover billions of dollars allegedly stolen by the family and cronies of Abacha and other ex-military rulers initially gained him high praise from the populace, as well as the international community, but within two years, the hope of reform...
seemed domed as economic mismanagement and rampant corruption persisted.

With this in mind, a survey was undertaken in late 1999 by the Afrobarometer group (an organization that assesses data on markets, attitudes toward democracy, and civil society in several Sub-Saharan African nations) to investigate public perceptions to corruption during previous military regimes and in the current democratic dispensation. Survey respondents were asked if "corruption was a worse problem under the old military government than these days". The answers gotten from respondents were "strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or do not know." Hence, based on the survey, this study is an attempt to investigate factors that influence public perceptions to corruption during regimes. This study is not an attempt to explain the causes of corruption, nor that of political corruption, but a limited attempt to investigate the factors that led to perceptions of corruption in governments. This study is divided as follows. After the introduction, the consequences of perceived corruption are presented. This is followed by a review of the relevant literature, after which the data and methodology and model specification are presented. Furthermore, the data collected are analyzed and the results are presented. Finally, the conclusion of the study is given.

Consequences of perceived corruption

Corruption and notorious governmental inefficiency has characterized the nation state since independence. The media is awash with corrupt practice as there is not a single day that passes in Nigeria, without the media reporting government officials of plundering the nation’s wealth. Browsing Nigerian newspapers reveals such news items as “Nigeria loses 427 trillion [about $200] to corruption”, (2004, March 09, The Daily Times). How Nigerians perceived trends in corruption is central to the fight against corruption, as perceptions do affect it actually. Do they perceive low or high corruption under the present democratic dispensation or under the previous military regimes? Understanding this question is central to understanding how well the fight against corruption is presently perceived. Perceived corruption can pose serious problems for economic and political development, and even loss of political capital. For example, LeVine (1975: 51) declares, “Where political and economic resources are scarce, as in the case in most Africa countries, their dissipation or misappropriation are likely to have graver consequences than similar wastage in rich countries”.

With the issue of government handling corruption gaining currency within Nigeria, this paper focuses on perceptions of trends in corruption within the Nigerian context. In particular, this paper looks at how citizens perceived corruption during previous military regimes and in the current democratic dispensation. Thus, this process seeks to model factors that influence Nigerian’s perceptions of corruption during different governments. The influence of individual characteristics (observed from the Afrobarometer survey), such as: education, media exposure, personal satisfaction, among other variables, on perceived corruption will be examined, in order to predict the variables or factors that determine perceptions of corruption during political regimes. To this end, Afrobarometer survey tagged “Round One” conducted in 1999 to 2001 during the emergence of the Nigerian's fourth republic is used to examine these trends.

In order to test the predictive power of the observational data as contained in the Afrobarometer data, a variety of sources were consulted before choosing the explanatory variables used in the study. Education and age variables, for example, which were significant in the study by Lee (1981), were chosen in order to find out if levels of educational attainment significantly influenced perceptions of corruption in this part of the world. For political fragmentation, Brownsberger (1983) states that ethnic fragmentation impact corruption. Residency was influenced by Meier and Holbrook (1996). In this study, a number of theoretical plausible variables were experimented in the Afrobarometer data set, in order to see if the observed individual characteristics influenced perceptions of corruption in Nigeria. The extent to which these variables and others affect trends in corruption will be analyzed. Specifically, the following hypotheses are investigated:

H1: The greater the level of educational attainment, the greater the perceptions of trends in corruption.
H2: In a fragmented (heterogeneous) society, individuals will tend to conclude that whatever group is in power is self-serving and corrupt. Nigeria is made up of several ethnic groups, some of which do not cooperate with one another.
H3: People who lived in urban area perceive more corruption than those who lived in rural area.
H4: The more the media exposure, the greater the perceptions of trends in corruption. Most Nigerians get their information from media outlets.
H5: People who are highly satisfied with the economic condition perceive lower corruption, that is, personal satisfaction reduces perceived corruption.
H6: People with lower levels of social trust will perceive more corruption. Social trust here refers to the ability of citizens to have confidence that government officials are not inherently corrupt.
H7: People with higher levels of political trust will perceive less corruption. Although there is a difference between trust in ability and trust in honesty, Afrobarometer data did not address the difference between both. Trust, here, is the ability to control corruption.
H8: The frequency of contact with public officials is positively associated with levels of perceived corruption.

Since the study’s interest is the perceptions of corruption
in regimes, and not the causes of corruption, the dependent variable is perceptions of political corruption in regimes operationalized by the question posed in the Afrobarometer surveys, which is: "Is corruption a worse problem under the old military (or previous) government than these days?" This question was measured by asking respondents if they "strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or do not know." The study will attempt to investigate the effects of a variety of independent variables that have been shown in the literature, for example, age and education (Lee, 1981); ethnicity (Brownsberger, 1983; Mauro, 1995); and residency (Meier and Holbrook, 1996). In addition, new variables that are theoretically interesting are explored.

Literature review

In the literature on political corruption, competing theories of corruption are prominent. Some studies (Brownsberger, 1983; Kpundeh, 1994, Mauro, 1995) note that political fragmentation and flawed personality are the main factor that explained the endemic nature of corruption in Africa. For example, Brownsberger (1983), disputing cultural traditions, noted that Africans know the difference between polite graft and bribery and that the relationship between traditional gift giving, patronage and attitudes of reverence, are not present much in modern day corruption. He consequently concluded that much of the contemporary corruption seemed to come from Africans desiring to be wealthy as Europeans (the dazzling status of the white man), underdevelopment of interest group politics, and fragmentation of political life in Nigeria. He further notes: "[M]any in civil services have been corrupted, inwardly-weakened by dazzling inequality, divided loyalties and disorienting urban life, and the fragmentation of political life in Nigeria continues to channel loyalty away from the policy process and the abstract state back to self and tribe" (p. 231). Mauro (1995) further adds that "the presence of many different ethnolinguistic groups is also significantly associated with the worse corruption" (p. 693).

Some studies adduce cultural traditions, such as respect for elders (Werlin, 1972; Levine, 1975; Husted 1999), as the main factor that explains endemic nature of corruption especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Werlin (1972), analyzing the root causes of corruption in Ghana, strongly argued that increasing corruption in Ghana is not only a result of fundamental political disorder, but of "the persistence of traditional values which conflict with the requirements for a secular way of life" (p. 254).

Others have used market characteristics (Kpundeh, 1994; Leff, 1964; DeSoto, 1989; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000) to explain pervasive corruption. These studies have found out for instance that attempt by government to arrest market failures, through intervention, create incentive for corruption (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Still, others have used residency and effective bureaucracy (Meier and Holbrook, 1996) as the main factor to explain corruption. For example, these authors argued that the urban area, which informed electorates, and the size of the bureaucracy, as a measure of historical/cultural variables, affected the relative level of political corruption.

Iroghama (2005) examined the impact of ethnic fragmentation, economic well-being and level of democracy on perceived political corruption cross-nationally in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study, in an attempt to find out if the political and economic conditions of a nation have significant impact on perceptions of political corruption, indicated that political and economic conditions of a nation have significant impact on perceptions of political corruption and that there exist evidence of the role of democracy in reducing perceived political corruption. As the adoption of democratic principle increases for any given nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, perceptions of political corruption increases for a while, but later declines precipitously. Also, the study concludes that ethnic fragmentation contributed immensely to the perceptions of corruption cross-nationally in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In a study of why corruption is perceived to be more widespread in some countries than others by Treisman (2000), it was found that countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, and more developed economies were less corrupt. The study found evidence, particularly, that the low perceived corruption of former British colonies is explained entirely by the relative good government of the settlement colonies such as the USA, Canada and Australia. Experimenting further by distinguishing groupings of former British colonies according to the continent in which they are located, the study found evidence that those in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Western Europe, and North America are all less corrupt than non-colonies or former colonies of other powers.

Other studies, for example, Lee (1981), have suggested that education also has an impact on the level of corruption. Using a random sample of 1,065 household heads, Lee (1981) found that only 29.5% of the Chinese respondents regard corruption as a serious social problem. Further analysis showed that the perceptions of corruption as a social problem varied among different ages and educational groups. In general, the study found out that both the older and less educated groups tend to, less likely, regard corruption as a social problem; whereas others used market characteristics (Kpundeh, 1994; Leff, 1964; DeSoto, 1989; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000) to explain perceptions of corruption. These studies have found out for instance, that attempt by government to arrest market failures, through intervention, create incentive for corruption (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000).

As noted by these scholars, cultural predisposition, market characteristics, ethnic fragmentation, and other
factors as predictors of corruption have not been examined through highly aggregated data. A micro-level analysis using public opinion survey data (question by question) is important if empirical linkages are to be established. That is, what factors influenced respondents to perceive corruption differently in regimes? Afrobarometer surveys provide an opportunity to study the micro-level analysis that is not present with other data, such as that of transparency international (TI) data set. The TI data set is mainly a macro-level data set, in that it is mainly a ranking index that ranks countries, basically on interview of business managers and economic experts. Unlike the Afrobarometer survey data, which asked citizens about the countries analyzed and the micro-level opinions or individual opinions concerning what they think about variety of national issues, the TI data set, on the other hand, rank countries based on interviews conducted on business and from economic experts. Therefore, the study utilizes the Afrobarometer data to investigate the relationship between the observed individual characteristics and the perceived trends in corruption in Nigeria.

DATA AND METHODS

The study analyzes the Afrobarometer survey, tagged “round one”, conducted in 1999 to 2001 by a consortium of Africanist researchers, in collaboration with Michigan State University in the U.S.A, to investigate the relationship between observed characteristics and trends in corruption. The Afrobarometer survey series represents a large-scale of the cross-national survey research project designed to systematically map out mass attitudes to democracy, markets and civil society in more than a dozen Sub-Saharan African nations, including Nigeria over time. The survey research, from time to time are conducted in several Sub-Saharan African nations by interviewing different sets of citizen each time the survey is conducted. With this methodology, the survey is cross-sectional. For detail explanation of the survey methodology and the weight of the data set, sampling strategy was used (Afrobarometer.org).

The survey conducted in Nigeria asked respondents what they think about a variety of national issues. Although the survey did not contain strings of questions assessing perceptions of specific types of corruption, they did include items which provide a useful overall summary of perceptions of corruption during regimes. The question is: “Please state whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree that corruption under the old military government is worse than that seen these days.” As Figure 1 shows, public opinion is lopsided on the issue of whether corruption under previous military regimes is worse than corruption in the present government. Over 80% answered that they “agree” that corruption was a worse problem under previous military government than in present government.

Given that the dependent variable (corruption is worse problem now) has four ordinal categories (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree), parameters are estimated using ordered probit (Long, 1997). They are scored: “strongly disagree” = 1, “disagree” = 2, “agree” = 3, and “strongly agree” = 4. Model parameters are estimated using STATA 8SE’S “oprobit” routine. Individual level characteristics, as identified by the literature, and the interest of the researcher, comprise the independent variables, which are the predictors. In order to control for possible endogeneity, that is, if perceptions of trends in corruption are caused by the controlling variables, or the other way round, all variables of interest are used as control variables. Also, to control possible heteroscedasticity, occasioned by pooling data, robust standard error was calculated. Thus, the model is specified as:

\[
\text{CORRUPT} = f (\beta_0 + \beta_2 \text{EDUC} + \beta_3 \text{AGE} + \beta_4 \text{GENDER} + \beta_5 \text{REGION (NORTH, WEST, EAST)} + \beta_6 \text{URB} + \beta_7 \text{MEDIA} + \beta_8 \text{PERSAT} + \beta_9 \text{INTRPOL} + \beta_{10} \text{CONTGOV} + \beta_{11} \text{TRUSTGEN} + \beta_{12} \text{TRUSTPRE})
\]

where, CORRUPT = disagree/agree that corruption was worse under previous regimes; EDUC = levels of educational attainment of respondents; AGE = age in years; GENDER = sex of respondents; REGION = north, west and east (residency); URB = urban or rural area (where respondents lived); MEDIA = media...
consumption (sources of news media); PERSAT = personal satisfaction; INTRPOL = interested in politics; TRUSTGEN = social trust (computed from trust in relation to trusting people and other Nigerians); TRUSTPRE = trust the president; CONTGOV = contact government officials; and β's = parameters to be estimated.

**FINDINGS**

Of the 3,408 respondents interviewed for the study, 31.5% are from the Hausas/Fulanis in the northern part of Nigeria, 25.5% are from the Yorubas in the West, 16.7% are from the Igbo in the East, while the rest comprises other ethnic nationalities (Figure 2). The findings also revealed that almost half (43.9%) of the respondents have some form of secondary education, 25.3% have no formal education, 17% have elementary education and 13.8% have some university education.

Probit regression was conducted on the full sample, which consisted of all the respondents. Of the eleven individual characteristics of the respondents in Nigeria that were tested to determine whether perceptions of corruption are worse under the previous regime or not, only 6 were statistically significant as influences of perceptions of trends in corruption in Nigeria (Table 1) for various levels of statistical significance.

Using the northern region as the reference categories, perceptions of corruption were worse under previous regimes and were significantly higher in the western and eastern parts of Nigeria, respectively. When compared to their northern counterparts, western and eastern residents were significantly more likely (p < .01) to perceive that corruption was worse under previous regimes than in present regimes. On this regard, it is noteworthy that over 80% of Nigeria's past rulers are from the northern region. Therefore, fragmentation of political life could be channeling away loyalty to self and tribe (Brownsberger, 1983). Since the presidency has been monopolized by the northern military elites, people from other regions are more likely to perceive worse corruption from previous regimes than those from the north. Also, personal satisfaction, interest in politics, general trust, and trust in the president all significantly contribute to the perception of corruption which is worse under previous military regimes. For example, those who are highly satisfied with their personal condition, are more likely (p < 0.01) to disagree that corruption is worse under previous regimes. In other words, they are significantly more likely to agree that corruption is worse under previous regimes.

Regarding the magnitude of the effect of the variable “trust the president”, it is noteworthy that President Obasanjo, a former military president of Nigeria was sworn in as the new democratic president of Nigeria when the survey was conducted. As a former head of state and an anti-corruption crusader, President Obasanjo led the country to enormous growth and returned her to democratic rule in the second republic. Also, President Obasanjo helped established transparency international (TI). “Describing Obasanjo as a great leader, Eigen [chairman of TI] went down the memory lane narrating how he established TI with Obasanjo, stressing that only few believed in the body then” (Nigerian Vanguard, March 18, 2005). His second bid in public life as a civilian president could be seen by others as a sign of an effective administrator.

In order to fully account for variation in perceptions of trends in political corruption in Nigeria, macro-variables, such as, economic and political conditions of Nigeria must be accounted for in an analysis that deals with perceptions of political corruption. Moreover, including such is necessary when variation exist both in economic conditions.
Table 1. Ordered probit analyses of the perception that corruption was worse under previous regimes in Nigeria from 1999 to 2001 (Afrobarometer surveys).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>ß's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.013 (-0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.004 (-0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>-0.347 (0.047) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>-0.265 (0.060) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban or Rural</td>
<td>-0.045 (-0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media consumption</td>
<td>-0.032 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal satisfaction</td>
<td>0.056 (0.017) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>0.063 (-0.027) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust president</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.018) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in politics</td>
<td>-0.042 (-0.017) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact government officials</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKelvey $R^2$</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; (one-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 3. Educational level of respondents in Nigeria from 1999 to 2001 (Afrobarometer survey).

and political context. Thus, both the economic and political aggregate data of the same period which coincide with the period of the Afrobarometer study were specified in a separate model (Appendix A).

The economic variables analyzed were GDP per capita and National wealth index, where GDP per capita is the Nigeria gross domestic product of per capita annual growth rate in percentages and the National wealth index is the weighted average of three sub-elements: size of economy (GDP per capita), inflation and unemployment, and debt. A higher value indicates a greater level of national wealth. However, these data were reported to the United Nations (Figure 3).

The political variables analyzed were political rights, civil liberty and polity. Political right refers to the extent to which political systems offer voters the opportunity to choose freely from candidates, and the extent to which candidates for public office are chosen independently from the state. Civil liberty refers to the freedoms of citizens to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state. Political rights from the state.
Political rights and civil liberty are rated separately on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The polity index refers to the degree to which a nation is either autocratic or democratic. It is scored on a scale of -10 to +10. A +10 score indicates a strongly democratic state; while a -10 score indicates a strongly autocratic state (Freedom in the World Country, 2000 to 2001).

Probabilities

As straightforward interpretations can not be given to probit coefficients, because they are in ordinarily least square (OLS) regression, changes in probability of perceiving corruption to be worse under previous regimes were calculated when each significant predictor was varied from its minimum to its maximum value, while other predictors were held at their mean values. These probabilities were calculated using CLARIFY software for STATA (Tomz et al., 2003).

Figure 4 shows results of the probabilities. As the significant predictors move from strongly negative to strongly positive, social trust and personal satisfaction increases the probability of agreeing that there was more corruption in previous military regimes by six and seven percentage points, respectively. Other significant predictors which have effects are east (four points), west (seven points) and political trust (six points). When viewed generally, these probabilities indicate that the individual characteristics have the potential to positively or negatively influence perceptions of corruption as worse under previous regimes.

Conclusion

In this study, survey measure of the role of several individual characteristics was used to analyze the perceptions of corruption as worse under previous governments in Nigeria. The study's principal objective is to explain the influence of individual characteristics (observational data) on levels of perceived trends in corruption in Nigeria. Specifically, the study focuses on whether perceptions of corruption, which were worse under previous regimes, are due to characteristics of the individuals or not.

The study’s conclusions, regarding its findings, are that in Nigeria, perceptions of corruption, which were worse under previous regimes, are as a result of some individual characteristics, namely: region, personal satisfaction, social trust, trust the president and interest in politics. Particularly noteworthy, the region variable is consistent with the Brownsberger's (1983) theory of the impact of societal fragmentation on political life. The implication therefore, is that those that are from the same region as the president or head of state perceived low corruption during the reign of the office holder. As such, the pathway for this is obvious.

These respondents, who are from the same region as the president, see the head of state, as an effective leader. This conclusion could be indicative of the low and high attitudes of government in tackling the enduring nature of political corruption in Nigeria. The study also finds that statistically, significant individual level characteristics have the probability to negatively or positively influence perceptions of corruption, which were worse under previous regimes in Nigeria.

With reference to the aforementioned hypotheses, the study thus supports the following:

H2: In a fragmented (heterogeneous) society, individuals will tend to conclude that whatever group is in power is self serving and corrupt.

H3: People who are satisfied with the economic situation perceived low levels of corruption in regimes, that is,
personal satisfaction reduces perceived corruption.

$H_6$: People with lower level of social trust perceived more corruption in different regimes.

$H_7$: People with higher levels of political trust perceived more corruption in previous regimes.

The rest of the hypotheses are rejected, as they do not influence perceptions of trends in corruption during different regimes. Again, the purpose of the study has been to develop an understanding of the individual-level characteristics on perceptions of trends in corruption during different regimes. The specific research questions examined include what is the relationship between the individual-level characteristics and perceptions of trends in corruption during different regimes, that is, are perceptions of corruption worse under previous regimes? Different studies of political corruption (Lee, 1981; Werlin, 1973, Brownsberger, 1983; Treisman, 2000) have provided an array of findings. The present study provides a novel approach to modeling perceptions of corruption, in that it uses a range of corruption perceptions' questions to study the effects of individual-level characteristics on perceived political corruption.

One policy option that the result of this study suggests is: since those that are not from the same region as the president perceived high corruption, there is a need for all, and not just those who are not from the same region as the president, to see Nigeria as one entity. Doing so could enhance the unity of Nigeria and reduce perceptions of corruption.

One general limitation of this study is the low $R^2$ of the analyses. Perhaps, this could result from the fact that the Afrobarometer survey data captured lots of noise produced by interviewing many poorly uneducated people, or are indicative of the survey data generally, or could attest to the related lack of sophistication of the data gathering procedure. However, despite the limitation of these data, the study has been able to derive meaningful results that appear to be fairly dynamic. While caution is needed in drawing conclusion, it is clear that region, personal satisfaction, social trust, trust the president and interest in politics significantly influenced perceptions of corruption which were worse under previous regimes in Nigeria.

Thus, notwithstanding these data's limitation, the study was able to uncover an interesting and important relationship. Given the paucity of high quality data in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, it is less speculated that not much has been done at the micro level. Nonetheless, the results of this study justified the importance of the topic, as well as emphasized the need for better data.

REFERENCES


### Table A. Ordered a probit analysis of perception of corruption was worse under previous regimes in Nigeria, with economic and political variables, from 1999 to 2001 (Afrobarometer surveys).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables:</th>
<th>β’ s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.103 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.012 (-0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.057 (-0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban or Rural</td>
<td>-0.039 (-0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media consumption</td>
<td>0.075 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal satisfaction</td>
<td>0.031 (0.017)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>0.097 (0.008)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust president</td>
<td>0.042 (0.017)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in politics</td>
<td>0.009 (0.02)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact government officials</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.001 (-0.532)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National wealth index</td>
<td>0.025 (0.002)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>0.043 (0.148)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberty</td>
<td>0.052 (-0.012)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.001 (-0.532)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKelvey R²</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; (one-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.