

Full Length Research Paper

Cross-national content analysis of the coverage of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict

Petya Eckler¹ and Yusuf Kalyango^{2*}

¹School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, Iowa, United States.

²Institute for International Journalism, Ohio University, Scripps School of Journalism, 205 Scripps Hall, Athens, OH 45701, United States.

Accepted 8 February, 2012

This study compares media framing of the Russia-Georgia conflict across leading news outlets in Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia. A content analysis of 288 stories from eight news media outlets in these countries examined two major frames – reactionary depiction and partisan alignment. Results show that Russian and Ukrainian news outlets covered the conflict through the partisan alignment frame but with different categories from it. Romanian news outlets covered events with a reactionary depiction frame, while the Bulgarian news outlets covered the conflict with both frames.

Key words: Media framing, conflicts, Russia, Georgia, reactionary depiction, partisan alignment.

INTRODUCTION

On August 8, 2008, after a long period of escalating tensions, Georgian and Russian military forces clashed in Georgia's separatist region of South Ossetia. The conflict lasted for only five days and some called it a "little war," by the standards of modern warfare, but one that "shook the world" (Asmus, 2010: 4). This war was significant for the wider Black Sea region, Europe and the European Union, and the United States for many reasons. The war raised concerns about Russia's militaristic approach to its neighbors and Georgia's future regional and global alliances (Asmus, 2010; Filippov, 2009; Tagliavini, 2009a). It was the first time in history that the European Union intervened actively in a serious armed conflict (Tagliavini, 2009a). Georgia was an important U.S. ally and this war affected both U.S. Georgian and U.S. Russian relations (Asmus, 2010; Mitchell and Cooley, 2010). Finally, the conflict showed the inadequacy of the international peacekeeping

arrangements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia established in the 1990's (Asmus, 2010; Tagliavini, 2009a). The war was not only significant but also highly controversial on the issue of which side launched it and the reasons for the initial attack. Russia referred to its military actions in Georgia as a "peace enforcement operation," while Georgia called them an "aggression." The international community, on the other hand, including the EU, was unwilling to use any formal qualifications of the conflict (Tagliavini, 2009a).

Since the war concluded, many political science scholars have examined the short-term and long-term political, economic and social ramifications of it (for example, Allison, 2008; Filippov, 2009; Mitchell and Cooley, 2010; Whitman and Wolff, 2010). But far fewer researchers have addressed the media aspect of the war (for example, Salovaara-Moring, 2009). As in many other armed conflicts, much of the justification for going into war and the continued reasoning behind it plays out on the pages of the national and international press (for example, Fahmy, 2010; Hayes and Guardino, 2010; Lee, 2010). The same could be expected to occur in this

*Corresponding author. E-mail : kalyango@ohio.edu. Tel: (740) 597-3335. Fax: (740) 593-2592.

conflict. To examine that, a cross-national content analysis was conducted of leading news outlets in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. Russia was chosen for this analysis because it was a side in the conflict and a major influence on the foreign policy in the region and on the other three countries included here. This is not a study of how two sides of a conflict (Russia and Georgia) are presented in the media. Instead, the researchers were interested in how Russia particularly presents the war and, given its strong influence in the region, how other proximate countries compared their presentations. Ukraine was chosen because of many similarities with Georgia as discussed in details subsequently. Romania and Bulgaria were selected because of their mixed relations with Russia in recent history and their different relationship with Russia as compared to Ukraine. All three countries have much at stake in the stability of the region and are more affected by Russia's foreign policy than the European countries farther to the West.

The goal of the study was to examine the framing of the conflict and possible cross-national differences. Two major frames were examined: reactionary depiction and partisan alignment. A reactionary depiction frame refers to information which makes emotionally charged assertions in support of one side of the conflict, while condemning the other. A partisan alignment frame refers to the editorial decision by news gatekeepers to profess their loyalty to one side of an issue. According to Coe et al. (2008), bias may occur due to media ownership, co-optation or the desire to follow market interests in media alignment

THEORY

The theoretical framework of this study is framing theory. Framing has been defined as the selecting of some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more or less salient in a communication text, such as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993: 52). Entman emphasized the importance of using a framing paradigm when conducting content analysis because that would preclude a researcher from treating all negative or positive items in a text as equally salient or influential. He argued that, "unguided by a framing paradigm, content analysis may often yield data that misrepresent the media messages that most audience members are actually picking up" (Entman, 1993: 57). Frames help not only readers but also the media, some argue, as they offer a way to situate themselves as a static institution in an otherwise changing environment (Durham, 1998: 113).

Framing is achieved through emphasizing certain ideas, and also through the overall importance

granted to an issue. Thus, the essence of framing is sizing, according to Entman (1991: 9), which includes the magnifying or shrinking of elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient. The first and most critical sizing choice is the overall salience of an event in the news flow, which is determined by the amount of coverage and its prominence, and those choices convey the importance of that event (Entman, 1991). One of the most successful ways to marginalize a group in the media is simply to cover it as little as possible (Ashley and Olson, 1998). While some have implied that the framing theory enjoys clear-cut definitions and understanding among researchers (Gamson, 1985), others have asserted that it has often been defined casually, leaving much to assumptions, and have urged for the creation of a common theoretical paradigm (Entman, 1993). Scheufele (1999: 103) built on this idea and called it "theoretical and empirical vagueness" He concluded that the fractured paradigm as described by Entman still existed and that as a result of the numerous approaches to framing that currently exist, the comparability of empirical results across studies is rather limited. Therefore, future research should integrate previous findings into a consistent model and fill in the missing causal links to develop a complete model of framing in political communication (Scheufele, 1999: 118).

Nowhere is the issue of news framing more critical than in the coverage of wars and conflicts because during those times, the importance of the news media grows as people turn increasingly to them (Kolmer and Semetko, 2009). The mass media for some has become an essential part of modern warfare (Hiebert, 1995). Most recently, the framing of the Iraq war by American and foreign media has attracted much scholarly attention (Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Fahmy and Kim, 2008; Kolmer and Semetko, 2009; Maslog et al., 2006; Peng, 2008). One of these studies compared coverage by Al-Jazeera and media outlets in Germany, the United States, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, South Africa, and found that framing depended on the country's position towards the war. For example, although military action predominated everywhere, countries that did not support the war devoted more attention to its political aspects (Kolmer and Semetko, 2009).

A content analysis that compared the coverage of five Asian countries, on the other hand, found that divisions in the coverage lay along the lines of religion and sourcing (Maslong et al., 2006). An examination of the visual representation of the war found that rather than pictures of actual combat, photos in the British and American press contained allied troops, dead Iraqi civilians, U.S. and British political leaders and encounters between the allied troops and civilians. Direct pictorial coverage was extremely rare and only presented in the British press. The authors were

surprised to find however, a huge emphasis on the human cost of the war through a focus on the Iraqi civilians (Fahmy and Kim, 2008). Framing studies have also examined other recent conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide (Alozie, 2007), the Gulf War of 1991 (Esser, 2005), and the Bosnian war in 1992 (Ruigrok et al., 2003).

The present study analyses the media framing of another recent conflict – the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. The study applies Entman's discussion of the size of news coverage as one framing technique by presenting the overall number of stories on the conflict in the four different countries. Entman's (1993) discussion of framing as presenting causal interpretations and moral evaluations of reality is applied in the conceptualization of the two chosen frames: reactionary depiction and partisan alignment. For example, the reactionary depiction frame contains a category called "aggressors or invaders" in which it is explicitly reported that a particular country started the war or launched the military offensive and hostility against another, thus pointing towards a cause for the conflict. The partisan alignment frame contains the "labeling the good or bad" and "demonizing the troops" categories which present moral evaluations of reality.

HISTORY AND MEDIA BACKGROUND

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's, Russia remained an important player in world affairs, although, its strength diminished considerably (Kort, 2006). Internal turmoil was fueled by a failed economy, the challenges of building a democratic system, the necessity to redefine Russian foreign policy, economic and territorial problems.

Russia struggled to redefine its place on the foreign arena since the fall of the USSR. It used frameworks such as the Commonwealth of Independent States to develop strong ties with Ukraine and Belarus and maintained good relation with the majority of the other former Soviet Republics, while becoming actively involved in Georgian internal affairs and in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia's relation with the West suffered as a result of NATO advancement into Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1990's (Riasanovsky, 2000) and the enlargement of the European Union (Asmus, 2010). During Putin's regime, the relations between Russia and some of its neighbors, such as Ukraine and Georgia, deteriorated due to the mismatch between the internal politics of the two countries and Russian priorities (Stent, 2008).

Ukraine and Georgia have consistently distanced themselves from Russian politics and sought closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, including NATO membership (Stent, 2008). Russia soon learned to use

economic factors, such as oil dependency, to achieve its geopolitical interests in the two countries (Lo, 2003). The early 2000's saw increased cooperation between the United States and Russia, but relations soon deteriorated as a result of the Iraq war of 2003, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, American involvement in the Caucasus region and particularly Georgia, and the U. S. recognition of Kosovo as an independent country in 2008 (Asmus, 2010; Monaghan, 2008; Tagliavini, 2009a).

The background of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 comprises of three overlapping sets of "historically complex relations" (Tagliavini, 2009b). One is the relationship between Georgia and Russia. The second is the internal conflict between Georgia and the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A third complicating factor comes from external powers and their competing interests in the broader geopolitical region of the Caucasus (Tagliavini, 2009b).

The relationship between Russia and Georgia has endured for centuries. Russia annexed Georgia into its tsarist empire in 1801 until 1917. From 1918 to 1921, Georgia enjoyed a brief period of independence until the Bolsheviks established the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921, which later became part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federation together with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1936, this entity was dissolved and all three republics were incorporated into the USSR (Tagliavini, 2009b). In April 1991, the Georgian Parliament proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union. Relations since then have fluctuated between tense and warm reflecting domestic changes within both countries and larger geopolitical influences of outside actors.

Georgia's "most challenging heritage" of the Soviet past is seen in its three autonomous provinces of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara (Tagliavini, 2009b). In the early 1990's, Georgia alienated the minority populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia through ethnocentric moods and slogans such as "Georgia for Georgians" (Tagliavini, 2009a: 13). "Nationalism and even chauvinism from all sides" and "questionable political actions" fueled tensions, which led to a military conflict between Georgia and separatist forces in South Ossetia (1991 to 1992) and Abkhazia (1992 to 1994) ended with Georgia's loss of control of large parts of both provinces (Tagliavini, 2009a: 13). For the following 15 years the conflicts managed to stay frozen by maintaining a minimum of stability. In August 2004, Georgia and South Ossetia were again on the verge of a large-scale armed conflict, but the tension dissipated and clashes were prevented. Independent international observers have pointed out that one of the weaknesses of the peace process between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the 1990's conflicts and prior to 2006

was that the three parties focused heavily on external influences and players and did not pay enough attention to building mutual trust and fostering reconciliation (Tagliavini, 2009a: 29). Disputes between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia persisted over the role of Russian peacekeeping forces in the breakaway regions, the “passportisation” of residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Russian passports and citizenship, the spy scandal in 2006, and incidents of violation of Georgian airspace.

Two supra-regional events in the early 2008 overshadowed the bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia and contributed to the war in August. One event was Kosovo’s declaring of independence and its official recognition by around 50 states that year alone, among them the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and 18 other European Union members. Russia voiced continuous and strong opposition to this development. Interestingly, Georgia was also opposed to Kosovo’s independence despite its disagreement with many other of Russia’s foreign policies. The second event was NATO’s welcoming of Georgia and Ukraine as possible future members and setting them on a Membership Action Plan (MAP), which “deeply irritated” Russia (Tagliavini, 2009b).

As the disagreements between Russia and Georgia escalated over the years, so did the mutual rhetoric. Over the long history of their relationship, both countries developed “an ‘enemy image’ and negative stereotypes of each other” (Tagliavini, 2009b: 7). In 2008, Russia referred to its military actions in Georgia as a “peace enforcement operation,” while Georgia called them an “aggression.” The international community, including the EU, was unwilling to use any formal qualifications of the conflict (Tagliavini, 2009a: 22). The framing analysis presented here aims to illuminate the presence or absence of some of these narratives in the media of Russia and countries of the larger region. Before that analysis is presented, however, a brief introduction was needed on the state of the media in each of the chosen countries. Subsequently, the mass media in Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, before August 2008 was briefly described. This can give the reader the necessary background to understanding the context of the news stories examined here.

Media in Russia

In 1990, a landmark media law was passed in the Soviet Union, which guaranteed freedom of speech in journalism and the creative arts (McNair, 1993: 46). This law not only declared the press and other mass media free, but also banned censorship and gave citizens the right to establish media organizations and thus, relinquished the state’s monopoly on the mass media

(Quigley, 1991). The beginning of the 1990’s is often seen as the Russian media’s “golden age” (Belin, 2002; McNair, 1994) because they were given unprecedented freedom and transformed into a “Fourth estate” (McNair, 1994). However, financial difficulties in the media industry after the collapse of the USSR led many outlets to seek the support of corporations, wealthy individuals and political patrons, which limited their ability to maintain an independent editorial policy later in the decade (Belin, 2002). The strenuous economic situation of the media was coupled with the reassertion of state power in the late 1990’s, which affected both state-owned and privately owned media (Belin, 2002). Generally speaking, however, Boris Yeltsin (president in 1991 to 1999) did not obstruct or close down media which took independent or oppositional stance (Simon, 2004). Between 2000 and 2008, President Vladimir Putin was in power and his presidency drove the media towards less pluralism and more self-censorship (Belin, 2004). The war in Chechnya was the first testing ground for the new government-media relations, which started before his election, and became the first major lost battle for independent reporting. The government set up policies to control access to information and punish those who broke the law. A Russian Information Center was established in 1999 to filter developments in the conflict, while most news organizations were restricted direct access (Belin, 2004).

The preservation of “informational integrity” (Simons and Strovsky, 2006) and the Doctrine of Information Security passed in 2000 have been used as a rationale for the state to curtail the rights of the news media. Ten years after the law granting freedom of speech and banning censorship, a new government told the public and the media industry that only the state can provide reliable information and therefore, state-owned media should dominate the information exchange (Simon, 2004). This doctrine was about “ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation,” preservation of spiritual values and patriotism (Simons and Strovsky, 2006). Becker (2004) described the Putin regime’s control of the media as more sophisticated than that of the former soviet state, allowing most of the media to function freely, while controlling the main instruments of communicating information. Another aspect of Putin’s influence was his fight with the oligarchs and their media holdings. The media empire of the tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, which comprised the NTV television, the daily newspaper “Segodnya”, and weekly magazine “Itogi”, was shut down in 2001 (Simon, 2004). The businessman Boris Berezovsky was forced to leave the country and his television channel TV-6 was liquidated after years of not making profit; but Berezovsky claimed that the decision to shut his media empire was political (Simon, 2004). An offshoot of TV-6 was formed soon thereafter, called TV-S, which was backed by oligarchs and several

key political figures from the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. That station was closed on 2003 by the government due to debts. In all these cases, the government's political and economic motives towards the oligarchs intersected with their media ownership and eventually affected the existence of several major news outlets which provided independent, and often critical, coverage of the Kremlin.

Self-censorship became more prevalent during Putin's presidency. While state control of the media was not as severe as during the soviet regime, journalists generally chose to abstain from direct criticism of the president (Belin, 2004). The president's office encouraged this type of "self-regulation," while concealing media harassment as part of the fight against terrorism (Simons and Strovsky, 2006). Criticism against local and regional authorities was also discouraged. In 2008, two journalists were forced into psychiatric hospitals for criticizing local authorities, and three journalists from Novaya Gazeta remained behind bars for attacks on regional or federal authorities. Journalists who reported for the opposition during the 2008 elections were harassed and faced criminal and civil charges. Four journalists were killed in 2008 and 71 killed between 1993 and 2008, with an overall trend of lower numbers than the peak in the early 1990's (CPJ, 2012a). The majority, but not all, of these murders were confirmed to be related to the journalists' profession, and the perpetrators were rarely found or brought to justice. Based on the background of many of these cases, the murders could be related to criminal, business or political circles on a national or local level. War, corruption and politics were the most popular beats of the victims, with 38% of them covering war, and 34% covering politics or corruption. Crime was the next most popular beat with 25% (CPJ, 2012a). Reporters without Borders (2008) ranked Russia 141st out of 173 countries for its lack of democratic transparency. The Russian media market also exhibited some positive signs. The ad market grew four times between 2001 and 2006 (Russian media, 2008) and Russia had the fastest growing Internet penetration in Europe in 2008 with a 27% change from the previous year (Block, 2008).

Media in Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine

The media in Eastern Europe have undergone tremendous changes since the fall of communism. Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine have experienced long and complex transitions towards democracy. Romania and Bulgaria are former members of the Communist Bloc, whereas Ukraine is a former Soviet republic. Despite the different experiences and political directions in these countries, the news media have faced similar problems.

Romania

Throughout the 1990's, freedom of expression and access to alternative sources of information remained constrained (Gross, 2002; Hall, 1997). The constitution guaranteed press freedom but legal constraints still existed. Criminal libel laws were often used to prosecute journalists, but actions against the media declined after the opposition was elected to government in 1996 (Rubin, 2001). In early 1990's, private media were launched before appropriate laws were adopted to govern the industry (Gross, 2002). Consequently, the privatized media resisted government attempts to use them as instruments for state political propaganda, although, some members of the secret police (Securitate) continued to influence the independent media (Hall, 1997). Economic challenges and state influence have to some extent limited the independence of the press (Rubin, 2001). The economic recession which plagued the country in the first half of the 1990s also affected newspaper publishing in Romania (Rubin, 2001: 77).

Meanwhile, many partisan news organizations, which were owned by or connected to various political parties, were also suffering economically, which affected the overall performance of the media and stifled their watchdog functions (Gross, 2002). The market was oversaturated by these partisan private media and many were not profitable. Compromises over the large debts some media companies owed to state-owned banks allowed the government to push its own agenda through the press (Jakubowicz, 2007).

Freedom house has cited harassment instances by government officials displeased with certain investigative reports. Reporters without Borders placed Romania 49th, Bulgaria 59th, and Ukraine 87th out of 173 countries in its 2008 Worldwide Press Freedom Index. No journalists have been killed in Romania since 1992, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. In 2006, a law which had decriminalized defamation and libel was adopted, reassuring journalists that they would not be imprisoned for such offenses. However, the decision was overturned by the constitutional court on grounds of unconstitutionality. Journalists face harassment from the government when they investigate issues regarding national security. Media control and manipulation of news content come from both the state and private actors.

Bulgaria

The press played a major role in the country's transition to a democratic society (Nikolchev, 1997). Newspapers were the fastest growing medium in the early 1990s and by mid-1990s a great number of independent papers

had political backing (Nikolchev, 1997). Newspapers loyal to political parties outnumbered independent ones, although it was unclear how many were receiving financial support from politicians (Gross, 2002). Powerful media conglomerates owned by the German company WAZ Media Group dominated the national press.

Legislation guaranteeing press freedom was slow to develop. In the early 1990's, the news media opposed bills which were meant to empower the state to indirectly influence and control them, including the right to put a temporal or permanent ban on publications (Nikolchev, 1997). Similar to Romania, the state-owned broadcasting company was a constant subject of inter-party fighting. Bulgaria had a law against defamation which the government often used to suppress press freedom. Journalists continued to be prosecuted and imprisoned for defamation and libel during most of the decade (Gross, 2002). Press intimidation remained an issue during this period.

In the early 1990's, the news media were largely free from government intervention to ban the dissemination of information despite the lack of free flow of information and expression of opinions (Nikolchev, 1997). While the situation has improved in recent years with constitutional guarantees and less government interference, journalists face intimidation aimed at protecting various interests. Freedom House ranked the Bulgarian press as partially free. Threats against the independence of the press and journalists include economic uncertainty, political interests, and partisanship. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports two deaths of journalists with unconfirmed motives. Both journalists reported on issues of organized crime before their death.

Ukraine

The creation of an independent press has faced numerous challenges, especially since socio-cultural pluralism and a civil society were non-existent in Ukraine (Jakubowicz, 2007). During the regime of President Leonid Kuchma, who dominated Ukrainian politics in the 1990's, the media were forced to promote his interests. Press advisories were used by the presidency to guide coverage (Jakubowicz, 2007). The press was forced to support the president during the 1996 elections, and outlets which refused were attacked by the state. Harassment and self-censorship among journalists dominated the policies of Kuchma's presidency until 2004, although legal standards for press freedom had been set earlier. The Soviet Law of the Press, adopted in 1990, allowed the development of the first independent newspapers and magazines (Ivanov and Lange, 2008). Additionally, different laws were adopted on access to information in 1992, television and radio in 1993 and for the print media in 1996 (Ivanov and Lange,

2008). Libel is no longer a criminal offense after a 2001 amendment modified the criminal code.

The situation had changed somewhat since the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. The press advisories had disbanded and editorial boards received less pressure (Ivanov and Lange, 2008). Journalists were still vulnerable to abuses from various interest groups due to the weak justice system and widespread corruption (CPJ, 2007). The Ukrainian parliament had passed legislation to protect press freedom, but the state has not adequately applied it. Access to public information is still a major problem and dependency on the oligarchs or the government remains common. The murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze in 2000 was never resolved, although, the president made it a priority during his campaign (Reporters without Borders, 2008). Ten journalists were killed in Ukraine between 1995 and 2004, the majority (60%) covering corruption, followed by crime (40%), according to CPJ (2012b). This background aims to provide the reader with an understanding of the historical and institutional backdrop against which the studied content was developed and to put the findings of this paper in perspective.

The four countries examined in this study were chosen for specific reasons. This is not a study of how two sides of a conflict (Russia and Georgia) were presented in the media. Instead, the researchers were interested in how Russia particularly presents the war and, given its strong influence in the region, how other proximate countries were compared in their presentations. The three other countries, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania were chosen because of their different history with the Soviet Union and different political affiliations and ambitions in 2008. Ukraine was similar to Georgia in many ways. It is also a former Soviet republic, which in 2008 and prior to that was orienting its affiliations and ambitions westward. Both Ukraine and Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership were welcomed by the alliance during the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, where a membership action plan was presented as the next step for them. Both countries also opposed the independence of Kosovo, which was in line with Russia's position. Bulgaria and Romania were chosen because they were not Soviet republics but maintained very close relations with the USSR. In 2008, they were members of NATO and the European Union, which placed them in a more westward orientation than Ukraine. Yet, while Romania and Bulgaria have many commonalities in terms of their membership in supranational organizations and other foreign policy, they also have notable differences. On the issue of Kosovo, Bulgaria supported the country's independence, while Romania opposed it. The study explored the following research questions:

RQ1: How did the media in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria,

and Romania frame the coverage of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war?

RQ2: Was coverage of the Russia-Georgia war in the four countries based on the reactionary depiction frame or the partisan alignment frame?

METHODS

This study is a cross-national comparative content analysis of 288 hard news stories and features from eight major news outlets in Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Russia using a priori content sampling procedure (Weber, 1990). The news outlets represent leading newspapers and national news services chosen because of their far-reaching readership and appeal.

In Bulgaria, the chosen news outlets were *BTA* (Bulgarian Telegraph Agency) and *Novinite*. *BTA* is the country's news agency, which is an "autonomous national news organization," whose director general is elected by Parliament and whose operation is financed from the sale of its services and through allocations from the state budget. *BTA* is equivalent to *ITAR-TASS* in Russia, which is also included in this study. *Novinite* was chosen because it is the largest English language media outlet in the country through its news website and is privately owned.

In Romania, the chosen news outlets were *Agerpres* and *Evenimentul Zilei*. *Agerpres* is the country's national news agency, the former Romanian Telegraph Agency. It is the equivalent of *BTA* of Bulgaria and *ITAR-TASS* of Russia. *Evenimentul Zilei* is Romania's best-selling national newspaper, which is privately owned. The *Evenimentul Zilei* stories coded for this study were translated in English.

In Ukraine, the chosen outlets were *Ukrinform* and *Kyiv Post*. *Ukrinform* is the country's national news agency, which is state owned, and is the equivalent of Bulgaria's *BTA*, *Agerpres* of Romania and *ITAR-TASS* of Russia. *Kyiv Post* was chosen for analysis because it is the country's leading English-language newspaper and is produced by a team of Western and Ukrainian journalists. Similar to other outlets, the *Kyiv Post* articles were coded in English.

In Russia, the chosen outlets were *ITAR-TASS* and *Novosti*. *ITAR-TASS* is the country's major national news agency and is state owned. *RIA Novosti* is another state-owned national news agency in Russia. National news agencies were included because most local media depend on them to access material beyond their local coverage and thus, news agencies serve as agenda-setters of the smaller media outlets in a country. Further, a country's news agency is often the most read media outlet among foreign media, which in turn help to shape public opinion about the war on the international arena. All the media chosen for analysis are the most read news outlets and have the most comprehensive foreign news and features coverage in these four countries.

Stories were collected from all eight news outlets between August 8 and 31, 2008 in an effort to capture a larger number and variety of items. Stories were accessed from the LexisNexis Academic database and the official online archives of these news outlets using keywords searches. Only hard news stories and features were collected. A total of 288 were found, which represent a census of the coverage appearing in these outlets during that particular time period. Of these 288 stories, 87 appeared in the Russian news outlets, 76 came from Ukraine, 63 from Romania and 62 from Bulgaria. The majority of the articles in the Russian news outlets came from *ITAR-TASS* – Russia's major news service.

Individual articles were coded based on two frames, reactionary depiction and partisan alignment, and 10 categories. These were

drawn from the war and conflict literature developed by Combs (1993) and Galtung (1986). The reactionary depiction frame was defined as information which makes emotionally charged assertions in support of one side of the conflict, while condemning the other. A partisan alignment frame was defined as demonstrating loyalty to one side of the issue. Although these two frames are not mutually exclusive, the same article could contain both, as they may be used as supportive elements in the same narrative. In those cases, both frames were coded either as somewhat present or visibly present. Further, other frames besides the two studied here could also be present in this coverage. The focus on these two frames does not presume that other frames are not used.

The five categories used as indicators of the reactionary depiction frame were: 1) human suffering, which refers to physical or mental anguish, pain, torment, injury, or distress caused by the war or its aftermath; 2) infrastructure destruction, which includes reporting ruins of basic facilities and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society, such as communications systems, power lines, schools and post offices; 3) aggressors or invaders, which indicates that a news outlet explicitly reported that a particular country started the war or launched the military offensive and hostility against another; 4) civilian property damage, which includes destroying or denting property in residential areas or communities; 5) casualties and deaths, which is defined as an account of the people killed or injured during the conflict, both military and civilians.

The five categories used as indicators of the partisan alignment frame were: 1) labeling the good or bad, which refers to stories that provide a positive or negative spin on the conflict and thus describing it as brutal or as the best offensive action taken; 2) demonizing the troops, which refers to portraying one side of the conflict as cruel, evil, or ruthless; 3) arousing anti-war sentiments, which is defined as coverage meant to stir opposition to either party's decision to start the conflict and the view that violent conflict was not acceptable and should never have taken place; 4) opposing the war for domestic interest, which refers to coverage that contends against/resists/attempt to antagonize the basic reasons given for going to war as a way of protecting or advancing the interest of that particular country; 5) slanting to echo success or defeat, which is defined as presence of bias for purposes of appeasing the audience, by reporting that one side is winning or has an advantage towards victory in that conflict.

The unit of analysis was the individual article and the coding unit for the 10 categories was the paragraph. In each article, coders were instructed to determine whether the two frames were present through their 10 categories and what their prominence in the article was, based on a 5-point scale with 1 representing a clear no presence and 5 representing a visible presence. The reactionary depiction indices yielded an overall mean of 2.74 and a standard deviation of 1.81 (Cronbach's alpha = 0.763) and the partisan alignment indices yielded an overall mean of 2.58 and a standard deviation of 1.61 (Cronbach's alpha = 0.726).

Two coders were trained independently, and both spoke Russian and another Slavic language. Intercoder reliability of 100 news articles (25 from each country), which represented 35% of the overall sample, produced an acceptable Scott's *Pi* of 0.87 for human suffering, 0.93 for infrastructure destruction, 0.84 for aggressors or invaders, .91 for civilian property damage, and 0.89 for casualties and deaths. Reliability testing of the partisan alignment frame produced an acceptable Scott's *Pi* of 0.84 for labeling the good or bad, 0.76 for demonizing Russian or Georgian troops, 0.81 for arousing anti-war sentiments, 0.79 for opposing the war for domestic interest, and 0.86 for slanting to echo success or defeat. This analysis only included hard news stories and features. The overall correlation strength of this reliability was

Table 1. Percentages of the focus of news articles in the Russia-Georgia conflict.

Variable	Categories	Romania	Ukraine	Bulgaria	Russia
Reactionary depiction	Human suffering	23	8	24	7
	Infrastructure destruction	16	9	12	11
	Aggressors/invaders	5	3	5	1
	Civilian property damage	9	6	8	3
	Casualties and deaths	26	8	18	10
Partisan alignment	Labeling good/bad	5	4	4	17
	Demonizing troops	3	21	21	21
	Anti-war sentiments	4	19	6	3
	Opposing war	4	17	1	2
	Echo war success/defeat	5	5	1	25

The difference between the 10 categories of the reactionary depiction frame and the partisan alignment frame is significant at, χ^2 (df = 9) 19.81, $p = .013$ for Russia and Ukraine. And also significant at, χ^2 (df = 9) 16.37, $p = .021$ for Bulgaria and Russia.

validated by the coefficient of determination (Riffe et al., 2005) for the reactionary depiction at 0.88 and at 0.81 for partisan alignment.

RESULTS

Research question 1 asked how the media in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania framed the coverage of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Research question 2 asked more specifically whether coverage in the four countries was based on the reactionary depiction frame or the partisan alignment frame. The two questions will be addressed concurrently because their answers are interconnected.

Russian and Ukrainian news outlets framed the coverage of the Russia-Georgia conflict through the partisan alignment frame but with different categories from it. The Ukrainian news outlets were preoccupied with demonizing Russian troops (21%), arousing anti-war sentiments (19%), and opposing the war for domestic interest (17%). The Russian news outlets tended to echo their success or Georgia's defeat (25%), demonize Georgian troops (21%), and label the good or bad (17%). The chi-square test from the two Russian and two Ukrainian news outlets indicated significant differences $\chi^2 = (1, N=163) = 89.863$, $p < 0.000$ in framing the conflict with a reactionary depiction vs. partisan alignment frames.

Romanian news outlets covered events of the Russia-Georgia conflict with a reactionary depiction frame, while the Bulgarian news outlets covered the conflict with both frames. The Romanian news outlets focused more on casualties and deaths (26%), the human suffering of Georgians (23%), and the infrastructure destruction (16%), all part of the reactionary depiction frame. The

Bulgarian news outlets focused on the human suffering (24%) and casualties and deaths (18%), as part of the reactionary depiction frame, and on demonizing the Russian troops (21%), as part of the partisan alignment frame. The chi-square test from the two Bulgarian news outlets and the two Romanian news outlets indicates significant differences $\chi^2 = (1, N = 125) = 96.117$, $p < 0.000$ in framing the conflict from reactionary depiction and partisan alignment tones.

In terms of the comparative coverage of the specific categories (Table 1), human suffering was heavily covered in the Romanian (23%) and Bulgarian (24%) outlets, but not in the Ukrainian (8%) and Russian (7%) ones. Casualties and death were also represented stronger in the Romanian and Bulgarian coverage (26 and 18% respectively), but not in that of Ukraine (8%) or Russia (10%). Three of the studied countries, Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, engaged in a similar amount of demonizing of the troops (21%) but in different directions. Ukrainian and Bulgarian outlets demonized the Russian troops, while Russian news media demonized the Georgian troops. Anti-war sentiments and opposition to the war for domestic interest were predominant only in the Ukrainian media outlets (19 and 17% respectively), while echoing success in the war or an opponent's defeat was predominant only in the Russian coverage (25%).

DISCUSSION

This cross-national study of the conflict between Russia and Georgia examined how the media in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania framed the coverage of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war through reactionary

depiction and partisan alignment. The findings revealed interesting and significant differences in coverage in the various countries. Russia and Ukraine engaged in strong partisan coverage through the partisan alignment frame, Romania focused on the reactionary depiction frame and Bulgaria applied both frames but with a heavier focus on reactionary depiction. These differences could be explained with the countries' unique positioning related to the conflict and relations to Russia.

Russia, being a side in the war, was expected to engage in partisan coverage of the event as a way to justify its offensive and rally its citizens behind the cause. In times of war, the news media often become a target of persuasion, propaganda and limitations by the government because of their influence on the public (Kumar, 2006). Even media of countries with far larger press freedom than Russia have become willing or unwilling accomplices to the governments' cases for war in the past. The latest example of that is the failure of the U. S. media to detect the misinformation by the Bush administration during the Iraq war in 2003 and their implicit contribution to the public misinformation (Johansen and Joslyn, 2008).

Russia's propagandistic approach was especially evident of the fact that the heaviest theme in the coverage was that of Russia's success in the war and Georgia's defeat. Not only was this the most prominent of the 10 possible themes, but Russia was also the only one of the four countries that paid such a heavy attention to it. This was somewhat expected since Russia was the only one of the four countries in this study who was directly involved in the war. Furthermore, both Russian media outlets were state-owned, which makes it easier for the official government line to be presented in the coverage. Russia's depiction of the conflict in a light was favorable towards itself and hostile to Georgia as was expected. Regardless, including Russia in this content analysis was beneficial because it managed to first, support or deny the expectations of biased coverage. And second, allowed us to compare its coverage to that of the three other countries which in the past had been closely aligned but are now in various degrees of estrangement from Russia.

Ukraine also exhibited strong partisan coverage of the conflict. The studied Ukrainian media outlets engaged in demoralizing the Russian troops, thereby triggering anti-war sentiments and opposing war for their domestic interest. This type of coverage was also expected because Ukraine is the closest of the three studied countries to Russia and in fact it shares its eastern border with it. This geographical proximity to the conflict and one of its parties could explain the strong anti-war messages in Ukraine's coverage. Further, Ukraine is similar to Georgia in many ways. Both countries had aspirations for NATO membership and shortly before the war broke out, in April 2008, were welcomed by the

alliance to begin membership negotiations. Ukraine has also been in conflicts with Russia, which have been of economic, not military nature. A few months after the Georgia-Russia conflict, Ukraine and Russia engaged in a dispute of their own over the transfer of natural gas from Russia to Europe, which goes through the territory of Ukraine. The two countries clashed over the price of natural gas that Ukraine pays to Russia and Russia's allegations of unpaid debts and theft of gas by Ukraine (Osipovich, 2009). Similar disputes occurred in January, 2006 and March, 2008.

Romania had a strong reactionary depiction of the war. This demonstrated that the studied news media for the most part attempted not to take sides in the conflict by labeling one of the parties or presenting the information in a way that would benefit one of them, as was done by Russia and Ukraine. The focus was especially on the human suffering, casualties and deaths of the war. In that respect, Romania showed the strongest attention to casualties and infrastructure destruction among the four countries, and the second strongest attention to human suffering after Bulgaria. In fact, the report of the independent fact-finding mission of the EU on the war pointed unequivocally in its very beginning that wars always result in human tragedy. "After fighting has ended, there is a sad record of killings, and other losses of intense suffering, dreams and hopes were shattered in many cases forever" (Tagliavini, 2009a: 10). Only the Romanian and Bulgarian media focused on the human cost of the war.

Bulgarian news media outlets also displayed a strong reactionary depiction of the war but in addition they demonized the Russian troops similar to Ukraine, which is somewhat surprising given that Bulgaria is not in direct conflict with Russia. For centuries, Bulgaria had close cultural ties with Russia, which grew even stronger since World War II when the country became part of the Soviet Block. Relations, however, have cooled since the dissolution of the USSR. Since then, a number of Russophobic ruling parties have shaped Bulgaria's reserved foreign relations with its former closest ally. The two most recent prime ministers of Bulgaria prior to the war in 2008, Simeon Saxe-Coburg and Sergey Stanishev restored the balance and placed bilateral relations on a purely pragmatic basis (Tzenov, 2008). One sign of the good standing between the two countries was that Putin visited Bulgaria twice during his term in office. Both the Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov and Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev said that "bilateral relations had now reached their peak in the past twenty years" (Tzenov, 2008).

Overall, results support findings from media analyses of previous conflicts that framing depends on the country's position toward the war (Kolmer and Semetko, 2009). In addition, the heavy emphasis on the human cost of the war that was discovered in the coverage of

the Iraq war (Fahmy and Kim, 2008) was observed here in the coverage of the two countries that were less involved with the conflict – Romania and Bulgaria. This conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia was not the first of its kind. As pointed previously, a similar event occurred in the early 1990's. But unlike then, the 2008 war was "fought on the battlefield but also on live television" (Tagliavini, 2009a: 31) and had major implications for many international actors: the countries in the wider Black Sea region, Europe and the European Union, and the United States. Historical analysis of the background of the conflict showed that it was preceded by "years of provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats" (Tagliavini, 2009a: 31). Use of "increasingly aggressive language" and "churning of emotions" was noticed in the region before the conflict erupted (Tagliavini, 2009a: 34). Some of these elements were also found in our media analysis during the war itself. The report also urged the media to "provide a fair and balanced view of all sides involved, as well as of their history and actions" (Tagliavini, 2009a: 35). This report came out long after the war ended and after the media coverage we studied was published. And as we see from the results of our analysis, coverage was hardly balanced or fair.

The EU report pointed that there were no winners in the war. Civilians in both countries were wounded or killed. Both Georgia and Russia hurt their image internationally. The European community also suffered because the threat of violence had returned to its politics (Tagliavini, 2009a: 31). The coverage in Romania and Bulgaria came closest to this observation by pointing repeatedly the human costs of the war and the infrastructural destruction.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The results were based on a limited number of news media outlets. Future studies should expand the pool of media outlets that are sampled for inclusion. In addition, future research should expand on the countries included in the sampling and attempt to incorporate countries with various political relations with Russia and Georgia. One of the major conclusions from this study is that the positioning of countries regarding the conflict plays a major role in their media's coverage. Thus, examining the media coverage in countries with different geopolitical positions with regards to this war will also provide a variety of viewpoints about it.

It is important that scholars pay continued attention to the coverage of the ensuing developments, as that coverage could influence public opinion and foreign policy. This call has been made recently and reiterated in previous calls for further research in this important area (Johansen and Joslyn, 2008). To restate Kumar's

(2006) proposition, it is important that scholars continue to work to detect biases in international coverage, especially during war times, as that is when influences on the media are the strongest and most threatening to its freedom and independence.

REFERENCES

- Allison ROY (2008). Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to 'coerce Georgia to peace'. *Int. Affairs*, 84(6): 1145-1171.
- Alozie E (2007). Echoes of an African tragedy: A framing analysis of the Rwandan genocide. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association.
- Ashley L, Olson B (1998). Constructing reality: print media's framing of the women's movement, 1966 to 1986. *J. Mass Commun. Q.*, 75(2): 263-277.
- Asmund RD (2010). A little war that shook the world: Georgia, Russia and the future of the West. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-248.
- Becker J (2004). Lessons from Russia: A Neo-Authoritarian Media System. *Eur. J. Commun.*, 19(2): 139-163.
- Belin L (2002). The Russian Media in the 1990s. *J. Communist Stud. Transition Polit.*, 18(1): 139-160.
- Belin L (2004). Politics and the mass media under Putin. In Ross (ed.), *Russian Politics under Putin*, Manchester University Press, pp. 133-152.
- Block B (2008). Russia has fastest growing internet population in Europe, from http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2008/08/Russia_Internet_Growth.
- Coe K, Tewksbury D, Bond B, Drogos K, Porter R, Yahn A, Zhang Y (2008). Hostile news: partisan use and perceptions of cable news programming. *J. Commun.*, 58(2): 201-219.
- Combs J (1993). From the great war to the Gulf War: Popular entertainment and the legitimization of warfare. In R. Denton (Ed.), *The Media and the Persian Gulf War*, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 257-284.
- CPJ (2007). Attacks on the Press, Committee for Protection of Journalists, edited by Robert Mahoney, New York, NY.
- CPJ (2012a). 53 journalists killed in Russia since 1992/motive confirmed. Retrieved on Jan. 20, 2012 from <http://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/>.
- CPJ (2012b). 5 journalists killed in Ukraine since 1992/motive confirmed. Retrieved on Jan. 20, 2012 from <http://cpj.org/killed/europe/ukraine/>.
- Dimitrova DV, Connolly-Ahern C (2007). A tale of two wars: framing analysis of online news sites in coalition countries and the Arab world during the Iraq war. *Howard J. Commun.*, 18(2): 153-168.
- Durham FD (1998). News frames as social narratives: TWA flight 800. *J. Commun.*, 48(4): 100-117.
- Entman RM (1991). Framing U.S. coverage of international news: contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran Air incidents. *J. Commun.*, 41(4): 6-27.
- Entman RM (1993). Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *J. Commun.*, 43(4): 51-58.
- Esser F (2005). "Metacoverage" of Mediated Wars: Framing the News Media and Military News Management in the Gulf War Coverage of 1991 and 2003. Paper presented at the annual conference of the International Communication Association.
- Fahmy S (2010). Contrasting visual frames of our times: A framing analysis of English- and Arabic-language press coverage of war and terrorism. *Int. Commun. Gazette*, 72(8): 695-717.
- Fahmy S, Kim D (2008). Picturing the Iraq war: Constructing the image of war in the British and U.S. press. *Int. Commun. Gazette*, 70(6): 443-462.
- Filippov M (2009). Diversionary Role of the Georgia–Russia Conflict: International Constraints and Domestic Appeal. *Eur. Asia Stud.*,

- 61(10): 1825-1847.
- Galtung J (1986). On the role of the media in worldwide security and peace. In: T. Varis (ed.) *Peace and communication*. San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad para La Paz, pp. 12-34.
- Gamson WA (1985). Goffman's legacy to political sociology. *Theory Soc.*, 14(5): 605-622.
- Gross P (2002). *Entangled Evolutions: Media and Democratization in Eastern Europe*. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Jakubowicz K (2007). *Rude awakening: social and media change in Central and Eastern Europe*. Cresskill: Hampton Press.
- Hall R (1997). The dynamics of media independence in post-Ceausescu Romania. In: PH O'Neil (Ed.), *Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe*. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, pp. 102-123.
- Hayes D, Guardino M (2010). Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq. *Pol. Commun.*, 27(1): 59-87.
- Hiebert RE (1995). Mass media as weapons of modern warfare. In RE Hiebert (ed.) *Impact of Mass Media: Current Issues*. New York: Longman, pp. 317-326.
- Ivanov V, Lange N (2008). *KAS Democracy Report 2008: Ukraine*. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved February 3, 2009, from http://www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/2008/dr_ukraine.pdf.
- Johansen MS, Joslyn MR (2008). Political persuasion during times of crisis: the effects of education and news media on citizens' factual information about Iraq. *J. Mass Commun. Q.*, 85(3): 591-608.
- Kolmer C, Semetko HA (2009). Framing the Iraq War: Perspectives from American, U.K., Czech, German, South African, and Al-Jazeera News. *Am. Beh. Scientist*, 52: 643-656.
- Kort M (2006). *The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 1-502.
- Kumar D (2006). Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War. *Commun. Critical/Cultural Stud.*, 3(1): 48-69.
- Lee ST (2010). Peace journalism: principles and structural limitations in the news coverage of three conflicts. *Mass Commun. Soc.*, 13(4): 361-384.
- Maslog C, Lee ST, Kim HS (2006). Framing analysis of a conflict: How newspapers in five Asian countries covered the Iraq War. *Asian J. Commun.*, 16(1): 19-39.
- McNair B (1993). Reform and restructuring in the Soviet media: before and after the August 1991 coup. In J. Eldridge (Ed.), *Getting the message: News, truth and power*. London: Routledge, pp. 46-63.
- McNair B (1994). Media in post-Soviet Russia: An overview. *Eur. J. Commun.*, 9(2): 115-135.
- Mitchell L, Cooley A (2010). After the August war: A new strategy for U.S. engagement with Georgia. *Harriman Rev.*, 17(3-4).
- Monaghan A (2008). 'An enemy at the gates' or 'from victory to victory'? Russian foreign policy. *Int. Affairs*, 84(4): 717-733.
- Nikolchev I (1997). Polarization and diversification in the Bulgarian press. In PH O'Neil (Ed.), *Post-communism and the media in Eastern Europe*. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited.
- Osipovich A (January 20, 2009). Russia gas heads to Europe after Ukraine dispute ends. Agency France Press.
- Peng Z (2008). Framing the anti-war protests in the global village: A comparative study of newspaper coverage in three countries. *Int. Commun. Gazette*, 70(5): 361-377.
- Quigley J (1991). Freedom of expression in the Soviet media. *Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review*, pp. 269-292.
- Reporters without borders (2008). *Worldwide press freedom index 2008*. Retrieved February 15, 2009, from http://www.rsf.org/article.php?id_article=29031.
- Riasanovsky NV (2000). *A History of Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rubin EL (2001). Getting Past Democracy. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 149(3): 65.
- Ruigrok N, Scholten O, De Ridder J (2003). News coverage about the Bosnian war. Paper presented at the annual conference of the International Communication Association.
- Russian media (2008). Optimum Media OMD Group. Retrieved on Jan. 15, 2012 from http://www.interpartners.info/files/markets/THE_RUSSIAN_MEDIA_SCENE.pdf.
- Salovaara-Moring I (2009). Dead ground: time-spaces of conflict, news, and cultural understanding. *Commun. Rev.*, 12(4): 349-368.
- Scheufele D (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *J. Commun.*, 49(1): 103-122.
- Simon R (2004). Media, myth, and reality in Russia's state-managed democracy. *Parl. Affairs*, 57(1): 169-184.
- Simons G, Strovsky D (2006). Censorship in contemporary Russian journalism in the age of the war against terrorism: A historical perspective. *Eur. J. Commun.*, 21(2): 189-211.
- Stent AE (2008). Restoration and revolution in Putin's foreign policy. *Eur. Asia Stud.*, 60(6): 1089-1106.
- Tagliavini H (2009a). Independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia: report. Volume I.
- Tagliavini H (2009b). Independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia: report. Volume II.
- Tzenov A (2008). Bulgaria-Russia relations in the aftermath of Putin's era. Bulgarian National Radio. Retrieved March 15, 2009 from http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_English/Theme_Bulgaria_And_The_World/Material/BaRP.htm.
- Weber RP (1990). *Basic content analysis*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 2nd edition. Whitman RG,
- Whitman RG, Wolff S (2010). The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its implications. *Int. Affairs*, 86(1): 87-107.