

Review

Reinventing developmental state in Nigerian Southwest: Agenda and caution for the agents of change

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Either due to good leadership or autocracy, one thing stands out, 'developmental state' was a success in most of Asian countries, while its discredit is loud in Africa. As a case of all-round failure, virtually all strata of the society have had their blames in the historical trivialization of political participation, governance and development in Nigeria. While some politico-economic paradigms, contingent upon certain conditions are promotive of development than others, depending on prevailing systems, almost all paradigms can fail as well. Following a regionally contagious shift in political alignment and development orientation, this paper, adopting analytic approach, assesses the attempt at reinventing developmental state paradigm by the new 'progressives' in Nigerian southwest. It argues that what presently obtained can still fail if challenges bothering on 'intergovernmental relations', 'institutional rationality and tenacity', targeting of social bases of development, and 'motives of the cult of leadership' are not prudently availed.

Key words: Developmental state, democracy, development planning, cult of leadership motives, poverty, intergovernmental relations, social bases of development, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

Irrespective of ideological persuasion, development remains the primary goal of people and nations. It determines the selective interstate relations and logics of collaboration among intra and interstate actors. As noted in India of mid-60s, rapid economic expansion greatly facilitates "resolution of difficult political, economic and social problems inherent in underdeveloped societies". Where altruistically pursued, it helps to "reconcile divergences of interests and stimulates support and

participation from the people" (Government of India Planning Commission, 1964).

Difficult as it was in the past, externalities of development have grown so complex in the contemporary times to effectively stall the realization of developmental goals that are not carefully planned and well implemented. Analysts have argued that the failure of previous attempt at staging 'developmental state' in Africa, as against its success in Asia, (Kristof and WuDunn, 2000) was due

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principally to its ill-informed characterization. No nation, without an efficient state has ever absolutely through market attained development. Ezema and Ogujiuba (2012), reviewing the works of Polanyi (1957), Chang and Nolan (1995) and Stiglitz (2001), have submitted that efficacy of markets requires heavy state involvement. The “severe economic crisis” (Stiglitz, 2001) that many former communist countries have faced since opting for neoliberal reform has revealed how dangerous it is to assume the primacy of the market and believe that it will naturally develop as far as the state does not interfere with its evolution (Chang, 2003b). Just as the market is important, the developmental achievements of the Asian tigers has persuaded even the protagonists of Washington Consensus to yet see the important roles the state has to play as vanguard of development. But, this is not just any type of state. Where altruistically pursued, state acting as vanguard of development has its merit. This is the reason neoliberal institutions are initiating public service reforms in countries such as Nigeria.

In their analysis of the failure of the state at promoting development in Nigeria, Ezema and Ogujiuba (2012) emphasized the need for the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs that possess the required tacit knowledge for rapid industrialization and development of the manufacturing sector. Recognizing more of collaboration than a shift from state to market, they argued “this proactive stance with capable institutions would move Nigerian economy to the desired direction”. In line with the growing development imperatives therefore, this paper attempts an assessment of the resurgence of developmental regimes across Nigerian southwest. It aims to establish the presence or otherwise of some of the critical conditions needed for success at reinventing state-anchored development.

In particular, the paper seeks to assess the chances of sub-national opposition state governments acting as vanguard of development within their jurisdiction against the backdrop that the Nigerian political system has been such that is characterized by deep intergovernmental animosities and uncertainties, pervasive primitive accumulation by the elites, and historical failure of political regimes at meeting public aspirations. Observing the manifest opposing interests and intentions of both parties and governments, the paper seeks to, among others, explore the effect that intergovernmental relations (IGR) and the motives of the ruling elites or leadership integrity may have on the developmental ambitions of the opposition-led Nigerian southwestern states.

This is with a view to ascertain the extent to which the various sub-national state governments are getting profiled towards ensuring: (a) non-antagonistic inter-governmental relations with the government at the centre, (b) genuineness of the ‘social bases’ of political participation and development, (c) embeddedness of ‘social benefits’ of development as the expression of the cult of leadership motives. There are seven opposition-

led sub-national state governments (Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, Ondo and Edo) in southwest axis of Nigeria. And all except one (Ondo) in the same party, from observation, all are pursuing these developmental state ideals. Therefore, a study analyzing what promises these moves hold in regard to socioeconomic development and poverty reduction among the citizens, as against promotion of elitist accumulation in the region is most compelling.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ‘DEVELOPMENTAL STATE’

Worried at the failure of the so-called developmental state experiments in most of underdeveloped regions of the world, Neoliberals were in the late seventies and eighties loud on state eclipse in preference for private sector, almost exclusively, as the bedrock of development in regions having problems of underdevelopment. The state was inevitably seen as source of corruption, inefficient resource allocation, arbitrary redistribution of wealth, and obstruction of economic progress (Kotz, 2005) and therefore had to be rolled back. However, arising from the experiences of the developmentally successful Asian tigers, the idea of developmental regime is again being reappraised and its conceptual understanding enlarged, acceptably, to incorporate some hitherto neglected socio-political variables as democratic developmental state (DDS). On this note, the errors made by the then newly industrializing countries (NICs) now grappling with challenges of post-development conflict and agitations seeking equity in wealth distribution, teaches that emerging developmental states can no longer afford to pursue development at the expense of popular participation, transparency, accountability, equity and social justice.

Institutionalizing developmental state or regime

There exists mass of literatures on developmental state that it serves no purpose attempting a lengthy repetition here than to make some observations. One, that notwithstanding the post-independence failure at pursuing developmental state ideals, there exists evidences, even within most European account that precolonial Africa did see the need to and pursued, under the vanguard of state-like structures, the task of community development as a collective enterprise. Two, that despite profound adoption of market liberalism in their post-development eras, when it was considered expedient, some of the present developed nations adopted some ideal developmental state. Orthodox history traced modern emergence of developmental state (DS) to American and German protectionist regimes of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. The emergence of

import substitution in Japan and Latin America (O'Donnell, 1982 cited in Vernengo, 2004), and more conspicuously, the regionally contagious exploit of the NICs, eventually made 'developmental statism', just as the 'Washington Consensus', an ideology of the 20th century for both the developed and developing nations.

The above signposts of developmental state paradigms, even in America, Germany and Japan, as some of the most-advanced countries, are more or less antithesis (Hirschman, 1982; Rieger and Veit, 1990; Weis and Hobson, 1995; Chang, 2003, Fine, 2011) of what Williamson described as 'Washington Consensus' formulae¹ to salvage "crisis wracked developing countries" (Williamson, 1989) and the neoliberal obsession for market. Therefore, no nation, irrespective of developmental paradigm adopted, seeking to record rapid development can ignore some of these development-facilitating conditions. To this extent, many of the consensus contents, such as liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, redirection of public spending from subsidies to provision of infrastructures, deregulation and breaking down of barriers to competition, tax reforms and broadening of tax base, as well as legal security for property rights are altogether likewise not alien to nations pursuing developmental state paradigm (O'Donnell, 1982 cited in Vernengo, 2004).

Away from the neoclassical analysts' statist-neoclassicist controversy (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2001) which credited 'the market' than its 'fixer'- the state, a clear analysis of the existing view of the state-market controversies (Mimiko, 1999; Chang, 2003; Fine, 2011) has shown that a state will go into extinction that neglects to pay adequate attention to production of material goods and services as a safeguard against poverty (Nikitin, 1983). Borrowing from the protectionist history of America and Germany, Britain's curtailment of *laissez faire* and the more recent experiences of Latin America (O'Donnell, 1982 cited in Vernengo, 2004) and Asia sufficient logical grounds now exist to properly put in focus and explore the undeniable role that state has to play in the development strives of ailing less-developed countries (LDCs). Specifically, the task remaining towards "getting the institutions right" (Fine 2011) has to do with analyzing the 'nature' of state as well as the 'role' that state will be playing to take advantage of the resurgence of developmental state (DS) paradigm. As condition for success, rather than jettison the state in preference for market, resurgent development regimes should seek to unite the strengths and limit the vagaries. The logical question that follows is: what then should be the defining features of a truly developmental state?

The following distillations have appeared in the literatures profiling the nature of a true developmental state (DS). Reflecting on 'Asian miracles', Chang (2003) cited in Ezema and Ogujiuba (2012) posited that these states exhibited industries with high growth potential and widespread externalities through array of means, which

included: infant industry protection; export subsidies, tariff rebates on imported inputs used for exports; coordination of complementary investments; regulation of firm entry, exit, investments, and pricing intended to 'manage competition'; subsidies and restriction of internal competition intended to help technology upgrading and geared towards meeting international competition as an aspect of outward-oriented economy. As observed from development history, Korea successfully imported and assimilated foreign technologies because the state skillfully integrates its education and training policies with industrial goals. While providing public-sector-led research and development (R&D) in key areas, the Korean state encouraged and subsidized similar endeavours in the private sector.

Furthermore, taking advantage of international technological know-how, these nations consciously regulated technology licensing and foreign direct investments in a way that maximized technology spill-over. Following a review of Korean development (2003), some of which seems true of the contemporary China, Marwala (2009) presents some key steps to rapid development. These include: emphasis on market share over profit, economic nationalism, protection of fledging domestic industries, focus on foreign technology transfer, large government bureaucracy, alliance between the state, labour and industry, skepticism of unguided neoliberalism, prioritization of economic growth over political reform, legitimacy and performance, and emphasis on technical education. Wade (1990) in 'governed market theory' described this manifestation as state-directed-market and hinted that departure from this model was the cause of the mid-1990s East Asian crisis (Browbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1999). They hold that where effectively used, developmental statism, typifying state autonomy and capacity in certain direction achieved unparalleled and crucial gains for the nations adopting it. To be successful, a truly developmental state or regime should among others exhibit the following:

1. Matching or staking state legitimacy with achievement
2. Providing industrial leadership example to guide and encourage interested prospective private participants
3. Enabling the government to control for the benefit of all the macro and micro indices of the economy-export/import, interest rates, external borrowing and lending etc.
4. Maintaining efficient and professional bureaucracy recruited on the basis of merit, thus disallowing mediocrity, patronage and clientelism.
5. Promoting multi-sectoral encouragement of research
6. Existence of economic and developmental-oriented bureaucracy of experts protected from political pressures that will design and implement policies as it was in South Korea (Alam (1989, Browbridge and Kirkpatrick 1999).

Other defining character of DS identified by Grindle

(1996) is the indispensability of 'technical capacity', and use scientific knowledge as an input into decision-making and management of public affairs.

For an average African state such as Nigeria, therefore, the idea of state distancing itself from promotion of economic development in favour of an unguided private sector no longer seems realistic. To achieve success, political legitimacy, administrative power, infrastructural power, technical and extractive capacity, rule of law/enforcement capability (Onyeoziri, 2002; Onyeoziri, 2005; Grindle, 1996; Lichtensein, 1993) must be defining features of a developmental state. Above all, such state will be one led by a regime of political elites with the right motives, manifest display of and respect for public morality and possessing very high dosage of economic and financial integrity. How much of these indexes of ideal developmental state a sub-national government could exhibit in a political settings such as Nigeria will among others determine the success or otherwise of these developmental regimes.

Embeddedness of social bases of development

In line with the focus of this paper, besides properly profiling the state, to be meaningful, gains of development effort must be widely distributed. Social embeddedness of developmental gains remains the credible path to reduction of poverty among the citizenry. Without a developmental state that works with society and not against it, poor nations are not likely to be able to quickly close the gap between the rich and the poor (Chang, 2002). Therefore, in the spirit of neostatism, state can no longer do it all alone; though still leading (Donner, 1992), states are more effective when they work with rather than against the society (Evans, 1995, 1997, 2009). The point of emphasis, for Evans, is '*connectedness to the society*' rather than '*autonomy from the society*'. Towards securing social embeddedness of development, Evans (1995) affirmed the need for institutional integrity, arguing that:

State autonomy derives from the existence of a cohesive and competent bureaucracy that is recruited on merit. Officials who are... less likely to bow to particularistic social pressures or engage in predatory behaviour.

With competent institution, "a network of links to social groups with an interest in state's project of industrial transformation will magnify rather than reduce the capabilities of the state; connectedness means increased competence, instead of capture" (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Evans, 1995; Piladino, 2001). Through connectedness to society, state leaders can be expected to use these opportunities to alter societal preference to some degree even if they do not see themselves as statistes (Mares, 1993). UNECA (1989) insists that for success in development initiatives and drive, establishing

pragmatic balance between the public and the private sectors is a must. Working with non-state actors, relevance of developmental state will be underlined by the extent to which it meets both the immediate and future needs and aspirations of the citizens. Effective balance of the immediate and future components of developmental gains is crucial to ensuring citizens' material satisfaction and securing their electoral support for sustenance of regime and developmental drives.

Intergovernmental relations

As a leading example of developmental state in Asia, it remains incontrovertible that relations between different tiers² of government were very favourable in Korea. Hence, their synergy and combined responses to external economic shocks and changing international economic environment were pragmatically flexible. With active participation of her sub-national organs, the Korean state was able to penetrate its society and advantageously regulate its social contexts (Midgal, 1988; Olowu, 1995) towards attainment of rapid development. No doubt, mutually reinforcing intergovernmental relations between the national and sub-national tiers of government remains the best strategy for achieving widespread development.

Most of LDCs in Africa, contrary to the experience in Asia lacked these cooperative intergovernmental relations. Particularly for Nigeria, access to cheap 'unearned income' (Moore, 2001 cited in Grabowski, 2005) and bitter politics of revenue allocation has made intergovernmental relations very contentious. With relations between the centre and sub-national governments becoming excessively trivialized and unpredictable, most operators of the state have become so constrained, visionless, inefficient and heavily predatory to the point of losing public credibility and support. Poor intergovernmental synergy remained a potent challenge to good governance and development in underdeveloped societies. Hence, it is argued that there is no easy way out of the difficulties that beset a relatively backward society seeking rapid economic growth. Cause and effects interact. Therefore:

Unless a society [through its operators] breaks itself free from some of the shackles of the past, overcomes internal resistances and releases new forces of change, it is unable to achieve a high rate of growth (Government of India Planning Commission 1964).

Cult of leadership motives

Cult of leadership motives, here defined as non-manifest but sometimes selfish and disguised motives of leaders for primitive accumulation, is a key determinant of success in governance. It determines how much benefits

could accrue to the citizens in any given politico-economic dispensation. It is one major factor capable of making the state 'work against' instead of 'working with' the society. Developmental state is never achieved by mere appellation but by the nature and logic of operation (Agbaje, 2009:262). The efficacy of institution, definition of social bases of development, and nature of the synergy between critical agents of development (manner of intergovernmental relations), are determined more by the motives of the leadership cult. How much a regime can achieve in alleviating the suffering of the masses depends on the extant logic of leadership-society development matrix availed by motives of the ruling elites. Leadership motives affects the suitability of instruments (agencies) and contacts (synergies or lines of connection with the public) used by those having responsibility for managing the affairs of nations. It determines the amount of rationalism brought to bear on formulation of programmes and the character of their implementation.

From the above analyses, it could be conjectured that despite the negative characterization (Grindle, 1996) exhibited by an average African state in past development efforts, the argument against developmental state is facing serious challenge. National competitiveness in all modern societies depends on the capacity of states to coordinate industrial growth and development in partnership with private industry. To protagonists of state-market-society synergy, none of the three necessarily inhibits the development of the other; instead, where properly composed, they foster mutual facilitation. Therefore, rather than think of state being rolled back, by working with the private sector, as it grows in strength, it becomes more of an equal partner; the state's power potentially remains undiminished (Weis and Hobson, 1995). For effective performance, a market economy, and any other type for that matter, requires an efficient administrative input, sound and comprehensive politico-legal system (Lichtensein, 1993) and effective-interagency co-ordination. Above all, the genuineness of commitment by state elites, here expressed as cult of leadership motives, to ideal mass development plays a significant role in determining whether a nation's developmental efforts succeed or fail.

Development history and imperatives: The case of Nigerian Southwest

This section, in particular, attempts a review of the development history of the Nigerian southwestern states. Generally, the spreadsheet of development history in Nigeria is perforated with failures and missing gaps that prevent comprehensive understanding of the nation's development focus and practice. With a culture of developmental failure, only a very few developmental policy has ever achieved its stated aims in Nigeria. With

clear understanding of the challenges, an assessment is made of the present efforts of the progressives at reinventing development dreams across this section of the country.

Originally made up of much of the area now re-delineated into eight separate sub-national states including the present day Delta State, the area was governed from 1946 to 1964 as Western region within the pre-independence Nigerian three-region federal structure. In the fifties through sixties, the region witnessed massive state-led development in all areas of human endeavour-social, economic, infrastructural, and political. Most outstanding achievement of the region under the Awolowo-led developmental regime was the unparalleled attention paid to education and human development. In Africa, the region was notably one of the first to avail mass free education. Despite having the Nigerian premier University (the University of Ibadan) located within it, the region's desire for rapid human development pinnacled in the establishment of the first regional government-owned university in Nigeria -The University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University). These efforts till date remain a landmark in Nigerian and African history of manpower development.

Also during this period, development of agriculture, economic and infrastructural facilities in the region was unparalleled. It was among the first to establish regional produce marketing board, several industrial estates³ under the auspices of WEMABOD Estates Limited, and several public corporations and enterprises under Odua Investment Company. In its bid to ensure widespread public mobilization and engagement, the region was the first to establish a television station in Africa. In fact, the present African largest television network (the Nigerian Television Authority -NTA) derived its existence and strength from this legacy.

Through the region's pursuit of rapid agricultural development and cocoa export, its produce marketing board was the most extensively developed of the era. In addition to widespread infrastructural development, this gave birth to the construction of the first African tallest building named the 'Cocoa House' in Ibadan, the regional headquarter. One great distinction between the experience of the region compared to even other regions in Nigeria then, and the recent experiences of developmental disappointments in Nigeria is the fact that, the initiatives of the fifties and early sixties were not only rooted in popular needs, they were driven by a cult of leadership with over-doze of integrity and probity. The Awolowo-led administration was one gifted with a leadership that was sacrificially selfless in the service of the people and the nation. Though, the pattern of intergovernmental relations then was, for many reasons as it seems now also conflict-ridden, a measure of autonomy exists within the Nigerian federal framework that allowed sub-national governments at the regions to pursue their goals unconstrained by the centre. Therefore,

when these new sets of democratic regimes and 'progressives' in Nigerian southwest promised developmental state initiatives, the people of Nigerian southwest can be said to know exactly what to expect in terms of prospects and challenges.

Unfortunately over decades, as a fall-out of military-induced culture of political centralization and the resulting leadership bankruptcy in Nigeria of mid-sixties through nineties, the region has lost a great deal of her political homogeneity, administrative efficacy, and legacy of developmentally-envisioned selfless leadership. For meaningful development to take root, in the present circumstance, there is a formidable challenge of bridging these missing links. In assessing the present efforts at resurgence of developmental state paradigm across the region, it is necessary to: (1) determine the extent to which the present development initiatives permeates and appeals to the critical 'social bases' of development by ascertaining the extent to which these new developmental moves addresses the actual and immediate survival and developmental needs of the people; (2) speculate on what possible impact the changeable motives of the cult of leadership could have on the development moves; and, (3) examine the strategies fashioned to keep under check the tendency towards antagonistic intergovernmental relations between the government at the centre and the periphery capable of frustrating goals of the sub-national governments.

Bridging the missing links in development aspirations of the Nigerian Southwest: An evaluation of the new developmental regimes

Using the above stated parameters (a) social bases of development, (b) manner of intergovernmental relations, and (3) motives of the cult of leadership, this section assess the performance of the new progressive state governments in Nigerian southwest. As background to understanding the motive for the current avowed resolve to pursue aggressive state-led development, few of the major factors that are closely related are highlighted below. The first is the manner and process through which the current leadership in Edo, Ondo, Ekiti and Osun reclaimed their electoral mandate through a long and well-tortured judicial intervention. For Lagos, Ogun and Oyo, their emergence was through a serious political and electoral struggle. In particular, this is pivotal to their unfolding developmental ambition. Two, the developmental resolve of the state governments in six of the seven states is ignited by the fact that they belong to a new, but most potent opposition party in Nigeria- the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) now All Progressive Congress (APC), that has just within two cycles of democratic elections, risen from controlling one state (Lagos) to six states (now Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti and Edo states) and yet through political defection of

state governors to it wining more. Three, many of the key actors in various arms of those new sub-national state governments in Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, and Edo states at one time or the other, either as politicians, public servants, labour leaders, academics and journalists, were active development or democratic struggle partners in Lagos State that is, as of now, the most politically and economically vibrant state in Nigeria. So the new administration and administrators apart from belonging to the same party and political circle, share similar ideas about development and its imperatives in Nigeria. But, what stands as test of success for all is the extent and manner in which each determine the social bases of development, manage interagency or intergovernmental relations, exhibit public morality and piousness of the cult of leadership motives. As a notable example of the new development effort, The State of Osun (one of the seven sub-national state governments in the region) is focused as a model to provide insight into what is going on in other states within the zone.

At one time, the present Governor of the State of Osun was a State Commissioner in a key ministry in the highly developmental Lagos state. Among his contemporaries, the governor seems the most challenged to rewrite and surpass the Lagos experience. Therefore, the Osun State government under the current dispensation ensured that extensively platforms are created to champion this course. While extensive administrative cum operational platforms are often achieved with high cost to developmental capital, right from its inception, the seeming frugal disposition of the new government in the State of Osun appeared determined to check financial recklessness by running an austere administration. The Governor, given the tortured judicial battle that preceded the reclaim of his mandate, on assumption of office in November 2010 for several months covering almost the whole of his first year in office concentrated, with assistance of few political aides and advisers, on extensive planning and direct supervision of establishments and agencies. This led to the new administration not appointing commissioners -political heads of ministries- and boards of other agencies for about one year, thus, according to the governor, conserving the funds that could have been paid as emoluments and cost of running such offices.

At the last count, within the framework of the government's six-point developmental agenda, more than fifteen development-oriented agencies/service-anchoring organs with the acronym "O" meaning 'Osun' as prefix of identification, have been added to the development-anchoring structures of the state. These include:

1. O-School (a programme of aggressive expansion and vast modernization of school structures)
2. O-Knowledge (provision of hi-tech handy computer loaded with relevant course materials for all students of secondary schools)

3. O-Uniform (provision of school uniform for all school children)
4. O-Meal (an integrated structural arrangement that ensures provision of one hygienic meal per student per day for primary school pupils creating effective marketing synergy with the state's agricultural sector.)
5. O-Callestine (a programme of all-round psycho-physiological development for students and youths)
6. O-Renewal (a programme of urban renewal in at least ten major cities within the state to facilitate state-wide socioeconomic development)
7. O-Roads (extensive construction and rehabilitation of major roads across the state and construction of 10 kilometer of roads in every of the local government areas within the states targeted to be completed during his first four year in office, many of which has successfully been completed to the admiration of citizens across the state)
8. O-Security (provision of extensive state-sponsored and well-facilitated security outfits to complement the ones provided by the federal security agencies, which has rendered the state one of most secured states in Nigeria)
9. O-Medical (enhancement of medical services at state hospitals, through construction of primary health centres, provision of medications and emergency services within communities and major highways)
10. O-Agba (a programme charged with provision of monthly stipend or living allowance to identified indigent aged citizens which according to available data covers about 2000 people)
11. O-Meat (a programme aimed at improving the protein ration of the citizens as a safeguard for good health)
12. O-Environment (declaration of a state emergency on environmental matters, and enforcement of a bi-monthly state-wide sanitation exercise lasting three hours on each occasion, in addition to the ones observed every Thursday, 6-10am in all markets and commercial centres, all geared towards safeguarding the health of the citizens)
13. O-YES (a youth empowerment programme that employed 20,000 within the 100 days in office for an initial period of 2 years on a revolving basis costing the state about N400m monthly wage, initially engaged in environmental services but has lately been reformed with introduction of specialized-training given to members based on their area of education and training with some of them now redeployed to their primary areas of specialization- as teachers to schools, health workers to hospitals, law enforcement to road traffic management and security units, environmental agencies, agro-allied establishments and so on).
14. O-REAP (a programme aimed at rural empowerment through agricultural exploit)
15. O-Market (construction of modern markets across some major cities to boost economic activities of the state as the potential economic-transit hub of the Western zone of the country)
16. O-Local (an attempt at further decentralization of

governance through creation of more local governments in form of Development Areas, (DAs) likened to the experience in the Nigerian Midwest of fifties and sixties aimed at bringing development closer to the people)

Commenting on one of the programmes, the Governor of the state, Aregbesola stated:

Within the limits of our capacity and resources, Osun State must be praised and commended for the courage to even initiate the Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES)... in the Federal Allocation table ... Osun is the 34th [out of 36 states]. So, in terms of what comes to us, we should not even contemplate such a huge social programme as youth empowerment.

He went further despite the clear limitation, "we boldly confronted the huge unemployment challenge". The Governor reiterated, "if you understand the implication of the armies of unemployed youths nationwide, you will realize that it is really a bogey leaving youths who have acquired the best of education idle and unengaged. It is like piling up dangerous explosives and setting fire to the bush around the explosives". Stating further:

So, conscious of the social implication of the army of unemployed, we discarded the luxury of economics to confront it headlong ... Within 100 days in office, we engaged 20,000 of them. If all the states in Nigeria had done half of that, there would have been out of the unemployment market, 300,070 youths engaged nationwide...

All the states in the region are pursuing several facets of these development initiatives in their respective jurisdiction. Across the seven states, efforts are being made to embark on massive socioeconomic and infrastructural development in the areas of road construction, and improvement health, education, agriculture, etc. Several administrative reforms have also been embarked upon by most of the states to ensure that the agendas of development are well assimilated and pursued. As more broadly examined below, however, reflecting on Nigerian political history, the attainment of goals will depend ultimately on:

1. The manner of relations between the federal and the various state governments, in particular, as well as the relations with, and the roles assigned to local governments as agent or structure for grassroots mobilization.
2. Another factor that will determine success which hitherto has received little analytic attention is the genuineness or otherwise of the 'social bases' of development, that is, the degree of embeddedness of the entire development aspiration.
3. The third factor that will be most crucial is 'the motives of the cult of leadership'. As history teaches, Nigeria has

never been lacking in good programmes, it is the dearth of goodwill, integrity and sincerity on the part of the leadership that has frustrated most of the past efforts.

Considering the importance of the identified factors to attainment of the development dreams of the new political progressives in Nigerian southwest, they are further discussed below.

Social bases of development

Scholars on state-society synergy, as crucial determinant of development and those of rational choice school, have properly situated that public interest can be faked based on the preoccupation and mindset of the governing elites. While studies are still ongoing on the subversive roles of some variants of civil societies that are seen to be metamorphosing into individually sponsored cartels, there is the need to sound the caution that rather than form and use pecuniary connections based mainly on partisan expediency to determine the social bases of development, state governments in the region, should operate through existing credible public and civil institutions to dispense social benefits. For average ruling elite in Nigeria, rather than work with the society to promote mass development, cases of mutual undermine and collusions to shortchange the system often seems manifest. Kleptocratic perversions and predatory tendencies by stakeholders are usually not ruled out. Across the current developmental experiments, there have been such insinuations among section of the populace and political opposition. Firstly, a section of the public in some of the states are of the opinion that the initial development moves of the progressive regimes should focus less on projects with huge capital outlay where primitive accumulation by the elites can be best facilitated with no immediate positive impact on the life of the populace. Rather, it is argued, the regimes should direct their efforts towards addressing areas of immediate needs of the populace as a springboard to securing their support for long-term aspirations. Critics opined that areas deserving more attention include: (i) ensuring more aggressive and extensive development of agriculture and agro-related industries, (ii) stimulation of the existing infrastructural facilities towards promoting development of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), and (iii) immediate intra and interstate facilitation of microeconomic activities as a potent avenue for creation of mass employment across the region.

Secondly, as a nodal condition for development, the populace expects a reorientation and motivation of the entire public service bureaucracy, as there is the need for a robust inter-agency synergy that is not constructed on partisanship. It is noticed that across the states under consideration, there have been fundamental reforms in the administrative and operational arms. Initial observation reveals that these reforms were not just informed

by change in political platform of the states, but are more visibly geared towards the new development orientation. In all the Nigerian southwest opposition-controlled states, new structures with specific mandate to see to various aspects of development governance (education, urban and rural infrastructures, employment generation, agriculture, environment, security and grass root development) are coming up all geared towards rapid socioeconomic development. But, while these agencies were necessary to promote rapid development, rather than rely more on the dominant presence of political aids, greater emphasis should be given to enabling better performance by the core bureaucracy in planning and implementation of programmes. It is a fundamental fact that attainment of development depends on a bureaucracy that is not only well-acquainted with the knowledge of challenges but one that is also efficiently profiled to facilitate the realization of publicly declared goals. Even when development roadmaps and their schedules of implementation are defined by political stakeholders, to achieve last sustainable success, committed involvement of the bureaucracy and the critical sectors of society is a sine-qua-non.

Thirdly, also, not to negate the social bases of development, local content (particularly where available) of projects execution should be well-considered. More of the projects to be executed should be handled using local expertise. Thus, much of the immediate benefits (project surpluses) that should accrue to immediate community members are not carted away by outsiders and foreigners. With extensive developmental aspiration of these regimes, the public expects promotion of deeper mutual synergy between the governments and the local private sectors as engines of growth. Externalization of dividends of development negates social bases of development.

Fourthly, the regime should identify credible platform to interface with the masses. They should discourage all forms of patronages that will be detrimental to the interest of the larger populace, as this will serve no good democratic purpose. Nigeria is a free economy, all forms of cartels in the name of one trade associations or groups having tendencies to limit individual creativity and economic adventures are demobilizers of development, and should not be encouraged. Cartels operating as trade associations and cooperatives should not be allowed to enjoyed state-facilitated connections. The new regimes should liberalized contacts with the citizens through established public institutions as banks, registered trade unions, and employers, community development associations (CDAs). Arguably, the governments of these states, just emerging as a political force in the region, agreed, needs social bases of some pecuniary connections to be well-assured of the much needed electoral mobilization and support for re-election; it nevertheless should be pursued with caution. Rather than weave social bases of democratization and popular participation around faceless individuals that may emerge

on the springboard of political opportunism, credible organizations such as unions of teachers, local government workers, civil societies of communal essence –community development associations, duly registered unions of tradesmen and market women, cooperative societies, religious organizations and other communally-rooted associations which are broad based, rather than bodies registered under the perpetual trusteeship of a few privileged individuals should be explored as means of dispensing public goods. Even then, rather than tie distribution of development benefits to such bodies, they only should serve as facilitators of contact and guarantors of state assistance where needed.

The history of socioeconomic development in Nigeria has been so porous that cases of few elites privatizing the gains of democratic struggles have been an enduring legacy. For a lasting popular mobilization and development, platform for state-assisted development opportunities should be liberalized across all sectors of the society and based on diverse socioeconomic inclination of the people. The issue is whether in the public sector or in the private, all categories of the poor in Nigeria have been underdeveloped by past misrule of the states and governments, and all needs to be attended to. For a lasting and enduring democratic development and electoral support consolidation, as it seems the philosophical inclination of the regime holders in the State of Osun, all classes and groups of the citizens should be encouraged to unleash their developmental potentials and all, without exception if sought, should be assisted in accordance to their degree of depravity, needs and capability.

Intergovernmental relations and the new regional development initiative

It was only in the region now ideologically covering about seven states, that the incumbent president, who belongs to the ruling party at the centre (Peoples' Democratic Party- which sitting governments were displaced in most of the seven states), recorded the least electoral support across the country. In fact, arising from the impressive developmental promises of the then newly installed opposition government in the state of Osun, in the entire southern Nigeria, it was only in Osun State that the president, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan did not have a majority vote in the 2011 election. If the usual politics of bitterness and zero-sum antics in Nigeria is anything to go by, securing needed developmental facilitation from federal agencies by the opposition generally, and Osun state in particular, may pose a great challenge. Contrary to the principle of territorial sovereignty and governmental imperatives, if the indications from the countrywide Good Governance Tour (GGT), the utterances and dispositions of principal actors at the federal level are anything to go by as signs of what to expect, the states and region

where the incumbent president recorded low support may not enjoy as much developmental attention as other regions. Though not altogether un-usual in Nigerian history of jaundiced political development, the federal government is seen to be more interested in states and regions where it enjoys unchallenged electoral support. Therefore, even though the government at the centre is a national government that should cater for all without perceived bitterness, there is a great need for caution on the part of the functionaries of the states in this region to avoid mismanaging their relations with the federal authorities not to inflame further the already politically compromised intergovernmental relations.

Much of such unfriendly posture has been noticed in the immediate past during the attempt at creating more local governments in Lagos state. This led to the federal government withholding the allocation of the state for several months. Though unconstitutional, but it is a well considered political strategy of arm-twisting the opposition in Nigerian troubled political climate. The governor of Edo State, in his presentation during the launching of a new Code of Conduct for the Nigerian Police, publicly accused the federal authority of using police to foster double-standard in the handling of the pre-election crises in the state.

Noticing the increasing decline of federal development initiatives in the region, statesmen and elders from the region recently complained against the perceived marginalization of the region in almost all facets of national affairs. They argued that the region has not only been shortchanged in federal appointments, but has also been marginalized in allocation of development programmes. Specifically, they mentioned that while massive infrastructural developments are ongoing in other part of the country, financed with national revenue, those embarked upon in the Nigerian southwest were based on concessionary arrangement with private developers and concessioners. This inevitably means placing the development of the regions in the hands capitalists and obviously at a higher cost to the people.

In view of the above, there is the need to consider putting in place astute intergovernmental machinery to avoid creating further crises of intergovernmental relations. From history, it is better to avoid such crises than to seek redress at courts when assumed relational privileges are denied. The fact that judicial machineries are still more greatly facilitated in Nigeria by the federal governments necessarily limits the chance of early resolution of such relational crisis when the outcome is likely to be in favour of the sub-national authority. This has been well proved in the Second Republic case involving Ambrose Ali-led of Bendel State (Unity Party of Nigeria) Vs Federal Government (National Party of Nigeria (NPN) on issues bothering on revenue allocation. Even though Ali finally won, it was at great cost and delay. Though, Ali spent his time and the resources of Bendel state, under his party UPN and leadership, to

prosecute the battle, his administration, the party and the people of the state never succeeded in enjoying the reward of his legal battle for too long. NPN (the party then at the centre) later through violent-laden electoral victory reclaimed the state from UPN shortly before the military eventually overthrew the government of the Nigerian second republic. The lesson is that strained intergovernmental relation is capable of aborting developmental dreams of sub-national government in achocate federations such as Nigeria. Caution is therefore required on the part of the development-envisioned Southwest governments not to unnecessarily inflame intergovernmental relations but to seek ways of managing intergovernmental issues as prudently as possible.

Cult of leadership motives and the fear of misdirection of gains of development

For too long, as earlier stated, particularly for Nigeria, access to cheap revenue has rendered the state most inefficient. The reason for this has been that the state and its operators do not depend on popular support and contribution of the people to raise revenue (Moore, 2001). Therefore, the operators of the state across levels in most of Nigerian past neither see the need to be prudent nor be accountable. The state, fully hijacked by the elites rarely pay attention to the needs of the masses. While it appears that the new regimes, with the example of Osun state will be different, effort must be made to balance the elitist interests in the choice of programmes and projects with the more pressing needs of banishing poverty and hunger among the overwhelming majority of the populace. The ongoing commitment to urban renewal, road construction, and establishment of modern markets and infrastructures are no doubt, welcome developments. However, there is the need to address the socioeconomic dislocations that this may entail for those whose means of livelihood may be affected by the changes. Pareto's principle of development must never be compromised. In Nigerian history of development, the poverty of the poor has always been the signpost of the rich's affluence. For sustainable politico-economic development, this must be reversed. The poor and those at the lower rungs of the society should never be made to bear the brunt of modernization and development.

If modernization must force the poor out of that which originally is theirs, and which they have established before modern re-planning and restructuring, then, provision for resettlement should be made available, affordable and timely. Those who established and initially built for human habitation places like Maroko and Lekki slums in Lagos have now been displaced by the emergent affluent elites whose mansions are now adorning those places. Many of them, though having the fund, neither have any link with nor make any contribution to ease the resettlement plights of the people displaced to have their mansions erected. Where modernization will entail

displacement of people from occupied territories witnessing city renewal, adequate state-facilitated measures should be put in place for all round resettlement, including new means of livelihood.

For the ongoing development drives in the Nigerian southwest, in addition to making the modernization as less painful as the governments are striving to do, greater efforts should be made to equally promote more effectively corresponding poverty-banishing programmes. This may include assistance towards resettlement of those displaced to their choice of new rural settlement and facilitation of their agricultural preoccupation through state-assisted access to land and implements. It is noted that for a state like Osun, the government is intensifying action in this regard through series of programmes such as O-REAP, O-Farm, O-Cattle, O-Chicken and O-Fish etc. All the states within the region should intensify efforts in this direction. No doubt, apart from boosting food production, this will facilitate the development of cottage industries within the states' agricultural revolution, increase supply of raw materials for industrial take-off and improve employment opportunities. Failure to do this will mean that many of the displaced persons who inadvertently may have lost their means of livelihood will soon constitute social problem within the region and beyond. Establishing non-partisan pragmatic interaction between the state and the civil-society will, rather than retard, accelerate the course of development. State distancing itself from any section of its public will not aid maximum gains of development synergy. All should be involved. Importantly, towards ensuring this, necessary forum should be facilitated to court the contribution of all potential industrialists –indigene, non-indigene, partisan and non-partisan across political divides. States focused in the paper, to make a difference should not neglect the gains accruable from state-gown-town synergy. As trivially insignificant as tertiary education development is in Nigeria (Ezekwesili, 2013), it is gravely sad, that knowledge generated from these institutions are not factored into strategic paradigm of development by policy makers. Existing research institutions, working with the industry and the media, should, through participative governance, contribute towards sustainable economic and industrial development with the state securing the much needed popular inputs into policy formulation and delivery of development programmes. The confluence of knowledge and practice availed by the state-gown-industry-media nexus will ensure that development visions are popularly owned, shared and pursued. As witnessed in the 50s and 60s, this will pace the Nigerian southwest states ahead of others in the country and African sub-region.

Conclusion

The paper examined the bases for the reawakening of intellectual and applied interests in developmental state

paradigm. With the recent shift in political alignment and increasing radical progressive orientation, it focused on the exploits of the Nigerian southwest opposition-controlled state governments towards accelerated socio-economic and political development. Due cognizance was taken of the massive all-round development initiatives and projects of the new governments, which in terms of scope and speed, seem unparalleled in the previous five decades of development history of the region and the nation.

The paper, however, drew attention to some hitherto neglected factors of underdevelopment in the area of challenges relating to intergovernmental relations, appropriate definition of 'social bases' of political participation and developmental embeddedness. It went further to stress cult of leadership integrity and the need to limit the social cost of transformation on the 'poor indeed'. At the end, necessary suggestions required to truly make these states pacesetters in Nigeria development were advanced. Specifically, the promoters of the new developmental regimes must: (a) avoid strained intergovernmental relations with the government at the centre that could frustrate some crucial developmental moves, (b) prevent wrong definition of 'social bases' of development and loss of much needed broad-based socio-political support, (c) shun elitist-fostering of reform benefits, (d) put concrete measures in place to mitigate the negative effect of transformation on the lower rungs of the society, and (e) bridge the existing gulf between the three critical partners (the state-the knowledge and the business communities) in development.

In conclusion, while in the present dispensation, most of the states in Nigerian southwest have started on a good note with their preference for developmentalism, there is the need for caution. This can be tied up in the submission that development derives from state autonomy and capacity to implement programmes that are considered beneficial to the needs of the people and society. For this to be, as a first condition, it becomes indispensable to have a bureaucracy that is efficiently profiled to facilitate the realization of the publicly declared goals as against the ones fixed on the basis of political opportunism. Secondly, there is the need for a robust inter-agency synergy that is not constructed on partisanship. Thirdly, the motives of the cult of ruling elites or leadership must be truly rooted in the conviction to salvage the critical conditions of the masses rather than pursuing goals that will only further wealth accumulation interest of the ruling elites.

NOTES

1. As put forth by Williamson, the 'Consensus' has its ideals and logics- fiscal policy discipline, redirection of public spending from subsidies, tax reform that broaden the tax base and emphasis on less progressive tax, flexible labour market, market-dictated interest rates,

competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization particularly of import, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization of state enterprises, deregulation and breaking down of barriers to competition, and legal security for property rights. These formulae were said not to be so radically different from the self-intuited Latin American paradigm (Stanislaw and Yergin 1998; Birdsall, de la Torre and Caicedo 2010).

2. There three or more levels of government made up of 16 provincial and 235 local level (municipal) governments including 72 *si* (city) governments, 94 *guns* (county) governments, and 69 *gu* (autonomous district) and the private sector (the *chaebols*] in South Korea with network of intergovernmental relations between the central and periphery

3. These estates located at different sites across the regions under the management of WEMABOD Estates Limited together with chains of public corporation and enterprises formed the industrial hub of the nation from the point of their establishment in 50s to the point in 90s at which the haphazard introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) led to the sharp decline in Nigerian industrial development.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interest.

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