Review

Can there be an African logic?

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Since the myriads of questions and keen debates concerning the existence or otherwise of African philosophy have been defused and now become obsolete, some thinkers are poised to argue for contextual or African peculiar perspective of the various branches of philosophy, including logic. The preoccupation in this study is to make an inquiry into whether logic is culture bound or contextualizable, and, by extension, whether there is or there can be a logic that is peculiarly African, a logic of the Aristotelian, Boolean, Eulerian and Russellian kinds. While some philosophers argued for contextual logic, some, more directly, argued for African logic. They attempt to carve out a logic that is peculiarly African. This study critically assessed, moderated and mediated the arguments raised stage by stage to ensure adequate attention and response to such issues. The work agreed on the universal nature of logic and on African capacity of this order of logic. While it concluded that the energy, that is, the ability, capability and capacity for logic is a given to humans, it did not avow to culture-dependent logic or any logic that is peculiarly African.

Key words: African logic, culture dependent logic, Contextual logic, Ibibio affective logic, status laden, universality of logic.

INTRODUCTION

Africans were at a time denied of history, and civilization. They were also denied of philosophy and culture. But presently there are counter claims to these denials. It is now evident that Africa has history, culture and civilization. It is also evident that Africa has philosophy. But before this admittance of philosophy, over the years philosophers devoted their time and energy to questioning, supporting, or rejecting the existence or otherwise of African philosophy. For example, C.S Momoh, Paul Hountondji, T.I Okere, W.A Hart, Peter Bodunrin, Oruka Odera, Kwasi Wiredu, Nkeonye Otakpor, Kwame Gyekye, K. C. Anyanwu, E.A.Ruch, Innocent Onyewuenyi, C.B.Okolo, Joseph Omoregbe, and many others were engrossed in this matter (Iroegbu, 1994: 129-133). But more recently there is a shift in the geography of discourse. Most philosophers are no longer interested in this old debate believed to be antiquated, overtaken by events and thus irrelevant. Rather they are engrossed in ascertaining the actual content of the different branches of African philosophy. Such engrossments are of two sets. The first set concerns change in degree. The second set concerns change in kind.

The first set which concerns change in degree raises such questions as: whether given the existence of Africa philosophy can there also be African Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and so on? The second set of questions which concerns change in kind is involved in such questions as: What is African Epistemology, Logic,
Metaphysics, Ethics, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and so on? This change in kind has two features. First, it has taken for granted that there is African philosophy. Secondly, it has also taken for granted the existence of the different branches of African philosophy. The philosophers concerned here attempt (or are attempting) to present, elucidate, and unravel the actual content of these different branches of African philosophy. Anselm Jimoh (1999: 18-37; 2004: 66-81); Etuk (2002: 98-116), among others have philosophized in this way.

This transition from the old questions and debates to new ones is a demonstration of the dynamic nature of philosophy. Just as some are philosophizing with respect to other branches of philosophy so also some are philosophizing with respect to logic. But can Logic be contextualized? Can logic be culturally situated? The problematic challenges which this study sets to address include: ‘Is there an African Logic?’ If yes, then, ‘What is African Logic?’, and ‘what makes it African?’ If not, (at least for now), ‘can there be an African Logic?’ To examine this subject, this study adopts the philosophical approach of critical analysis and descriptive method. The purpose of this study is to draw attention to this debate and point out some infelicities and inconsistencies that may be contained in arguing for culture-dependent logic.

The arguments for contextual and culture-dependent logic

Some group of thinkers believes that logic can be contextualized. The outcome of the episodic tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9) among others may serve as a justification for this contextualization. Prior to this episode, (that is, before the Lord confused the sole language of men), the whole earth was made up of one people with only one language. But when the Lord confused the language of men, there was proliferation of languages and cultures and the people were no longer able to understand one another’s speech. They were scattered all over the face of the earth. There and then began the multiplicity of language, of culture, of thoughts, of philosophy, of civilization and perhaps of logic, and so on. Havi Carel and David Gamez opine that as the Lord scattered the peoples, philosophy became philosophies. The scattered peoples who inhabited Europe invaded those who were scattered in other parts of the world, “… wipe out or profoundly altered their traditions and taught them that European religion is religion; European philosophy is philosophy” (Carel et al., 2004: 99-102).

From the above, it is evident that the proliferation of language and the scattering of peoples all over the earth is the historical antecedent of the proliferation of cultures, races, religions, philosophies and so on. These philosophies were not taken away from or lost by those scattered outside Europe. When the common language was lost, the common logic of understanding the building procedure, that is, the basic logic of constitutive activities was lost. As Len Doyal and Roger Harris hold, a logically necessary foundation for agreement in what people say and mean is to be found in what they do (Doyal and Harris 1983: 59-78). Otherwise, if it is only the logic of language they lost, by the simple logic of constitutive activities, they should have been able to continue the labour project. There is no human group no matter how primitive that does not engage in labour. Humans must be logical before they can engage meaningfully in constitutive activities or labour.

Part of the implications which this story has for our purpose is that as these people were scattered outside the vicinity of this episodic Tower which is now suffixed Babel, they retained their logic of things or understanding in their respective new languages and in their new forms of lives. From this, it can be deduced that before this episode, all men has a common logic but after the episode, logic was proliferated in respective cultures and forms of lives. Thus, to now claim that some of these people are not logical or are prelogical, not rational, and without philosophy, is not only a distortion but also an abuse of facts of history – a historical fallacy, a generational fallacy, and racial fallacy of supremacy.

It is for their capability of logic and rationality that humans are able to have organized language, which enables communication. This is why they have shared meaning. This is why they can organize society and settle dispute. The fact that men can settle dispute and have organized society is an attestation that they are logical. Consistency and coherency are needed to do these. Language can neither be understood nor have meaning if it is not logically structured, organized and systematized. This is also why humans are capable of concept formations and classifications. This story shows that even from the outset all men are capable of logic. In another sense, and consequent upon this episodic Babel, it seems logic is context or culture dependent. In the light of this, it seems logic can be proliferated. To sustain any argument of this kind, it is often put forward that different forms of life has different paradigm of discourse (Sogolo, 1993: 71-72) or different criteria of assessment. Wittgenstein submits that the logic of our reasoning resides in the language we speak. In accordance with this Wittgensteinian dictum, Peter Winch rejects any attempt to assess the rationality of traditional modes of thought with the logic of science. According to him, every discipline or form of life has its own paradigm of rationality. The language of discourse in one form of life is inapplicable in assessing the language of discourse of another form of life. Winch holds a relativist position. He therefore rejects the claim that there are some universal principles of reasoning by which any given thought system can be judged to be logical or illogical. Instead, he holds that there are different forms of life and each has its own criteria of assessing what is logically intelligible or what is not. He defines a form of life as a
set of linguistic rules and practices with specific procedures for judging the validity or otherwise of a given claim (Winch, 1958; Sogolo, 1993: 72). He holds that, criteria of logic... arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social life.... For instance, science is one such mode and religion is another and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself. So within science or religion actions can be logical or illogical; in science, for example, it would be illogical to refuse to be bound by the result of a properly carried out experiment; in religion it would be illogical to suppose that one could pit one’s own strength against God’s; and so on. But we cannot sensibly say that either the practice of science itself or that of religion is either logical or illogical because they belong to different forms of life and one cannot be assessed by the logic of the other, both are non-logical (Winch, 1958: 100-101; Sogolo, 1993: 72).

This Winch’s argument for forms of life can be extended beyond context to culture. Winch may be right to some extent because we cannot for example claim that the rules of logic apply universally to the game of football as in medicine, technology, physics and other sciences to mention just few. For example, if in football encounters Ghana defeats Cameroon and Cameroon defeats Guinea, it does not follow that Ghana will defeat Guinea in their encounter; or that anytime these teams meet the result must be the same with or resemble their past encounters. But if we want to adopt Winch’s submission to logical conclusion, logic will be proliferated or contextualized into absurdity. This will lead to communication breakdown. Argument of this nature could be misleading and disastrous. Scientists and religious adherents in a context must have to some extent some basic logical denominators. They can, to some extent, inter-marry differences in their independent linguistic universes to have common universe of discourse through dialogue. There is a logic which underlies all things. There must be logicness, the essence of logic that underlies all logical thoughts that make such thoughts logical. This is why some religious discourses can make sense and thus be intelligible to the scientists, vice versa. As experience has shown, the scientists and the religionists can share some meaning. Some claims, including scientific and religious claims are intelligible to others independent of their professions or modes of life. If there is no common logical denominator that underlies different modes of life as Winch would want us to believe, then it would be impossible for people in different forms of life to understand one another at all. It requires logic to be able to judge a mode of life illogical. In other words, the accurate judgement of illogicality requires logic to pronounce such judgement.

Now that the position of Winch has been presented and interrogated in this regard, next is to turn to Pantaleon Iroegbu’s position about culture dependent logic. In his argument in favour of contextual or culture dependent logic, Pantaleon Iroegbu holds that,

[there is not one logic but several, not only the subclasses of traditional, modern, mathematical or symbolic within the Western Aristotelian stream, but also among various peoples. Basically a way of thinking, logic nevertheless varies from place to place, depending on the point of departure, background, mentalities, and values of a given people. 2 + 2 may be four in a given context. But more or less than 4 in another. For instance, in a society where 2 camels equal 1 woman, 2 (camels) + 2 (women) will equal 6 camels or 3 women (Iroegbu, 1994: 135).

While we agree with Iroegbu that logic is basic to a way of thinking, but his arithmetic example like the other arguments raised so far missed the argumentational track of logic. For example, in Christian marriage terrain, 1 + 1 = 1, that is, one husband plus one wife is equal to one married couple. This is a religious value which is only meaningful within the context of Christian marriage. Even within the same Christian terrain, this value does not apply elsewhere (outside marriage). Such Christian belief cannot be logically rationalized. It belongs to the domain of value rather than logic.

The enumerated indicators of logic by Iroegbu, that is, the point of departure, background, mentalities, and values of a given people as the determinant factor or the barometer for the presence of logical discourse (contextual logic) cannot be actual indicators for logical presence and logical discourse. They are not the foundation upon which logic emerge. What he presented in his example as logic is not logic but arithmetic only understandable within a given formula. Without the formula it will be an arithmetic nullity or an abuse of arithmetic procedure. This formula is only meaningful because it is tied to concrete objects. And it holds for all cultures. Using Iroegbu’s example, if a woman has been defined as an equivalent of two camels there is no where or culture two women + two camels will be equal to 4 women or 4 camels given this definition. Or else it will miss the point. It will abuse the defined formula. When this formula is properly followed, the answer must be 3 women or 6 camels anywhere. When considered as purely abstract arithmetic, 2 + 2 = 3 or 6 will be a clear demonstration of arithmetic incompetence. Having gone thus far, it may now be necessary to exposit and interrogate the position of African logic per se. This is because some thinkers are not only engrossed in justifying contextual logic, but they are more specific in justifying and arguing for a logic that is peculiarly African.

The arguments for African peculiar logic and clarification of some misconceptions

Some philosophers advocate African logic. This group of
philosophers argues for a logic that is peculiarly African. In his "The Possibility of African Logic", Udo Etuk was self-critical when he asked: "Are we now going to suggest that there could possibly be logic in superstitions and myths and folk-tales and oral traditions and religious rituals which are common features of Africa?" (Etuk, 2002: 98-116). He asked this question not because he wants to doubt or denigrate or deny African Logic. Rather he is advocating African logic. Although he is advocating African logic and in fact suggests and calls it Affective Logic for want of a better coinage (as shall be exposited later in details), what he itemized as the common features of Africa (in which he raises doubt if African logic can be derived) are not all there is in Africa and about Africans. Felix Airoboman argues that even if they were to be all there is in Africa, most of these features of African beliefs, customs and practices are logically derived either inductively, deductively or both. For example, beliefs are inductively reached. The conclusion, that is, the accepted beliefs now become the customs (premises of deduction) where the particular actions or practices of the people are informed, evaluated and judged. It is difficult (if not impossible) to find such belief systems and practices which are not supported with reasons (Airoboman, 2014: 175-186; Airoboman, 2016: 186-200). What is possible is that we may not know the reasons which inform these beliefs and practices. This argument is not in any way a support for African peculiar logic, but a claim that what are often regarded as myth, superstitions and the like, are sometimes products of rationality.

One other argument put forward for the possibility of African logic is that provided by Ijiomah. According to Ijiomah "if logic is a part of philosophy, and if it is generally agreed that philosophy is culture bound, it follows necessarily that logic is culture bound" (Ijiomah, 1995: 11; Etuk, 2002: 102). We do not subscribe to this inference made by Ijiomah because some fallacies could be involved. For instance, the inference can misconstrue a part for the whole. This Ijiomah's argument may be analogous to the ahistorical argument that: America is a great nation. Therefore, All Americans are great. This is ascribing the quality of a whole to its individual parts. We do believe that in America there are lunatics, jail birds, imbeciles, drug addicts, drug barons, criminals and perpetrators of other vices and incompetence.

Take another example. If we say that Nigeria is the giant of Africa whether in reality or in myth, it does not follow that all Nigerians are giants or that all Nigerians are more giants in size, intellect, competence, and so on, than other Africans that are non-Nigerians. Take the last example. If we say that philosophy is concerned with analysis, this does not mean pragmatism, Marxism, idealism, existentialism, normative ethics, metaphysics, for example, because they are parts of philosophy are therefore concerned with analysis. Put more generally, it does not mean that all branches, schools and movements in philosophy are concerned with analysis. If it is held that philosophy is culture bound, it may mean that some part and not all part of it is culture bound. Because of some unanticipated consequences inherent in what Ijiomah puts forward, proponents of African logic, if they can, need to argue for African logic in a different dimension because Ijiomah's inference like others examined so far will miss the track of the argument if used in defense of African logic, and it will lead to unintended consequences or conclusion. This is because whatever is true of philosophy as a whole may not be true of logic in particular. This is why as Udo Etuk holds, logic could be an exception. If we say for instance, that philosophy studies morality and being, it is true. But it will not be true to say because logic is a part of philosophy it studies morality and being. While the study of morality belongs to the branch of philosophy called ethics, the study of being belongs to the branch called metaphysics.

Also with regard to African logic, Pantaleon Iroegbu holds that "[t]he logic question in African philosophy must address the specific African conceptual framework that is different from the western" (Iroegbu, 1994: 135). But we can ask: whose culture is specific or conceptual framework? Let us bear in mind that Africa is a multicultural society and each culture may have many contexts. Following this Iroegbu's submission, we are only going to have logics of the litanies of different cultures and contexts and certainly not a unified African logic. It should also be noted that even if there were only one African culture or a unified African logic, this would still be insufficient, since the African logic would have not only to be shared by all Africans, but also not to be shared by non-Africans, in order to be considered properly African. But if for example, we found that type of logic in other non-African cultures, such as Eskimo, South American and Thai cultures, it would be problematic to call such culture African culture and such logic African logic.

Udo Etuk holds that "... in proposing the possibility of African logic, our concern is not with traditional African.... If there is anything like African logic, it would be neither traditional nor contemporary, but African" (Etuk, 2002: 109). Although the traditional man may not be skilled in writing, systematized writing is not all there is in logic. Writing is good, but it is not everything. "Thought and reason are part of the furniture of the objective world, and there is no way a human group could have existed for any length of time without the ability to think and reason... there is strong evidence that there is logic even in predominantly oral cultures" (Etuk, 2002: 109). Etuk is making a point here, a good point at that: that logic is not epochally bound. From his argument one can also infer that there is no culture without logic. Logic transcends both time and space. Logic is fundamental to human nature and is basic to human communication and understanding. From this premiss, Etuk deflects to the
idea that logic is contextual and can be culturally situated. Godwin Sogolo substantiates this claim of competence of logic by traditional Africans when he holds that,

the notion of intellectual transition in traditional Africa does not admit of the very common misconception of a movement from a logically retarded stage to an advanced logically refined stage. This is because the new does not automatically in some normative sense constitute a more desirable form than that which it succeeds in intellectual transition (Sogolo, 1993: 35).

All these claims bore down to consolidating the submission of Etuk why any African logic to be proposed should be “neither traditional nor contemporary, but African” because all men independent of epoch are capable of logic. Wiredu was also right when Oladipo submitted of him to have attached great importance to the fact that among the traditional people of Africa uninfluenced by modern education, there are genuine philosophers who “are capable of fundamental reflection on man, society and nature. They do not merely recite the folk philosophies of their communities; they are able to subject these philosophies ‘to criticism and modification’. More than this, they support their views or ideas with reasons or arguments” (Wiredu and Oladipo, 1995: 9). This submission by Wiredu shows that traditional Africans are logical. But is this African competence in logical demonstration peculiarly African or is it as a result of the universal nature of and participation in one mode of logic? Can logic really be culture dependent? Can it be proliferated? Some philosophers will answer in the affirmative (as it is already evident from the above). In fact Udo Etuk and Jonathan Chimakonam affirm and demonstrate it respectively with affective logic among the people of Ibibio and ezumezu logic in Africa. We shall limit our discussion and examination to Etuk’s position for clarity, economy of space and also because Chimakonam tends not to be clear headed in view of the fact that the arguments for culture dependent logic and the claim that logic is universal are both evident in his work (Chimakonam, 2014: 101-123). His position is reserved for copious and careful consideration and examination elsewhere.

African Logic: The Ibibio example

Udo Etuk is of the view that within Africa there is the possibility of many logics because of the diversity of her ethnic groups. In self-assessment, he felt this argument is not convincing when compared to Western World. While making references to the people of Ibibio, he submits that logic in Ibibio is affected by the status of the individual involved vis-à-vis the issue at hand. This means it is of different form and it is status laden. From this Ibibio’s experience, Etuk suggests a different kind of logic for Africans to be affected by status which he calls affective logic as mentioned earlier.

Etuk (2002: 122) explains this logic this way: If someone, for instance, commits an offence against a community, the African thing to do is to first of all determine the status or relationship which the offender has or stands to the offended community. If the offender is an in-law or a grand-child (not necessarily understood as a blood grand-child, but rather as the child of any daughter who belongs by birth to that community), the penalty may be waived altogether or greatly tempered. Let us suppose that we put the reasoning behind such behaviour in the following syllogism:

If anyone cuts another person’s palm fruits, then he will pay this fine.

S has cut another person’s palm fruits.
But given the two premises, it does not follow that:
S must pay this fine;
Because the status of the person intervenes.
But S is a maternal grand-child of this community (italicized mine).
Therefore, S will not pay this fine.

Etuk tells us that this is a common sort of occurrence among the Ibibio people of Nigeria. He also holds that this submission is not a trivial matter; instead, it has tremendous consequence for reasoning and praxis.

We can simplify this argument to make it easier and clearer for logical discourse and symbolization. If anyone cuts another person’s palm fruits, then he will pay this fine.

S has cut another person’s palm fruits.
Because the status of the person intervenes (S is a maternal grand-child),
Therefore, S will not pay this fine

If we want to symbolize this argument, we may have the following representation. Using A to represent the antecedent, B to represent the consequent, and D to represent status intervention, then,

\[ A \rightarrow B \]
\[ A \]
\[ D \]
\[ \therefore \sim B \]

This type of argument, in the authors’ understanding, and among others, is asyllogistic. Besides it can better be ascribed code of conduct or etiquette rather than logic. It is not all arguments that are logical arguments. Some are moral, epistemological, metaphysical, sociological, political, and so on. But if we chose to call it logic there will be problems with this type of logic for Africa. In the first place, it is riddled with contradictions, unless it has a way of curtailing contradictions which was not made
known by Etuk. Also, the major premis which is the conditional premis is too all-embracing because of the conclusion needed to be drawn from it. It does not include the status factor or condition. This proposed logic can be harmonized to fit into general kind of logic proper by better choice of concepts or language classifications.

If we hold in the submission of Etuk about the Ibibio conditional logic that “if anyone cuts another person’s palm fruits, then he will pay this fine, if S cuts another person’s palm fruits”, then it will be a contradiction, an improper logical procedure for S not to pay fine because he is classified among the group of “anyone”, the status notwithstanding. This Etuk’s submission on Ibibio logic can be rehabilitated to avoid the contradictions that may make it an improper logical procedure, but the status factor can still remain. For example, if anyone in this community cuts another person in this community’s palm fruits, [and] if he is a true blood, then he will pay this fine. S has cut another person in this community’s palm fruits. S is a true blood of this community
Therefore S will pay this fine.
If we use A to represent the first antecedent, D to represent the second antecedent which is also the status factor or status intervention and B to represent the consequent, then we have something like the following symbolic representation.

\[(A \land D) \supset B\]

\[A\]

\[D\]

\[\therefore B\]

Put conversely,
If anyone in this community cuts another person in this community’s palm fruits, [and] if he is a true blood, then he will pay this fine.
S has cut another person in this community’s palm fruits.
S is not a true blood of this community
Therefore S will not pay this fine.

\[(A \land D) \supset B\]

\[A\]

\[\neg D\]

\[\therefore \neg B\]

Our ordinary understanding of the principles used to query arguments takes care of S not paying fine. If S is not paying fine, then we can ask by querying the argument: Did he really cut the palm fruits? If yes, then we can ask further: Is he a true blood of the aforementioned community? If not then this is why he is not paying this fine. His not paying fine can also be valid because it has been explicitly stated that those who do not, by true blood, belong to the aforementioned community will not pay fine. Bad argumentation procedure can only result when a true blood child is not paying fine for transgression or when a non-true blood child is paying fine over a rule that does not apply to him. This type of logic may be termed logic of class limitation because it is limited to a class to which its rules can only apply and not elsewhere. We may also call it logic of class exclusion because by its nature certain items in the class are not included, but excluded - that is, the item or sub-class of not being true blood is excluded from the larger class of anyone cutting someone’s palm fruit and the consequent payment of fine. It is not claimed here that the Ibibio reasons concretely in this way, in which the writers attempt to rehabilitate Etuk’s submission on Ibibio logic. Besides, Etuk did not by himself suggest this or tells us that the Ibibio reasons this way. The attempt is to see how contradictions, incoherency and ambiguities can be eliminated to make his submission fits properly into logical pattern of argumentation. If these attempted clarifications do not suffice, then if Etuk’s Ibibio syllogism will stand, then his ‘anyone in this community’ needs to be substituted with ‘some people in this community’. This ‘some’ will take care of the inherent lacuna in this argument. These terms and argument may not be different from the one we know which are common to logical discourse. This Etuk’s presentation may be akin to what is obtainable among the Esan people of Nigeria, and probably most other African cultures.

Any time adultery is committed in the community, if it is by a member of the female folk, then it will require cultural cleansing to avert doom.

Adultery is committed in the community
It is not by a member of the female folk
Therefore, it will not require cultural cleansing.

Whether in this form or in the form of Etuk’s example, these arguments are matters of value and not of logic. However, when properly formulated, they can also be matters of logic, but not peculiar. To substantiate his argument of status intervention, and its consequent Affective logic, Etuk also submits that “[w]hether we are dealing with a problem needing settlement, or with an amount of goods to be distributed, or with justice to be dispensed, there is hardly any such thing as following it to logical conclusion in the Western sense. There is always some special considerations given to status or relationship” (Etuk, 2002: 113). The response to this is that even in the Western sense of philosophy in which we are maximally tutored; everything is not always taken to logical conclusions because logic is not all there is. There are values and ideals. Things are only followed to logical conclusions when and where necessary. This is because taking things to logical conclusion can cause some harm when dealing with matters of facts, values and ideals. When Africans do not take things to logical conclusion, it is not because they are not capable of doing so or that not doing so is fundamental to their logical system of things, but they do so out of reverence for culture, traditions, and ideals. For the sake of these values, the

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1 We have to make this reformulated premis so explicit since we were not told what will happen when a person in the said community cuts the palm fruits of a person in another community.
African voluntarily concedes his positions and rights. This is not limited to Africans. Universally there are problems sometimes in taking things to logical conclusion.

For example, John Rawls in his *A Theory of Justice* (1973: 85-86) rightly shows that law which is followed to logical conclusion in the dispensation of justice is often tainted with "miscarriage of justice" resulting from imperfect procedural justice. We do not need to follow logic to its conclusion all the time when dealing with matters of facts, reality, truth and values, because of the problems associated with consistency and coherency. We do not also need to do this because the conclusion of logic may be antithetical to them. In the distribution of goods for instance, there may be no justice in giving equal amount of food to an elder and a younger person, or a king and a subject or children with different stomach capacities for the simple reasons that all men are born equal and are equal before the law. Status and needs need to be considered. Equitable distribution may be preferred to equal distribution. Justice is fairness.

From their submissions, it seems obvious that there is nothing spectacular in the concrete argumentations by these proponents that African logic is peculiar and different from standard logic. Most of their instruments of rationalizations, projections and argumentations are values and they cut across cultures and races. Even the premises of the argument submitted by Etuk on Ibibio, as noted earlier, are not properly formulated to suit logic; but ironically, the attempted reconstruction may have twisted the argument out of the Ibibio reasoning pattern submitted by Etuk. It is important to note that the writers do not have any empirical evidence that the Ibibio really endorse the amended premises other than the fact that they ought to reason with the amended premises if what Etuk submitted about them is correct concerning logic.

**Conclusion**

This study made an inquiry into the possibility of African logic. It presented and interrogated various attempts to justify contextual logic. It also presented and interrogated some attempts to justify the claims that there is the possibility of logic that is peculiarly African using arguments and examples which suggested that logic can be contextualized or can be related to particular to specific cultures. One of such arguments is that of “form of life”. Different forms of life have separate logic of evaluations. As such it will not be intelligible to use the logic of one form of life as a barometer for another. Another argument among others is that because there is African philosophy, and logic is part of philosophy, then there must be African logic. The study also examined the argument that there are several logics among various peoples and that the logic question in African philosophy must address the specific African conceptual framework that is different from the Western. It also presented and interrogated Etuk’s *Affective Logic* where he attempted to justify the claim that there is the possibility of logic that is peculiarly African with his Ibibio example. The authors attempted some modification or reconstruction to make these value arguments logical arguments. Here, it is not claimed that the Ibibio reason empirically along the pattern of the modification made regarding Etuk’s submission; instead, the study held that this modification is needed to make Etuk’s rationalization or submission on Ibibio more logically potent.

From the arguments in this essay, the writers disagreed with the claims to any logic that is peculiarly African. It is obvious that universally all cultures, primitive or civilized, ancient or contemporary, traditional or modern are capable of logic. While the writers agreed on the universal nature of logic both in time and space and on African capacity for this order of logic because the energy, that is, the ability, capability, capacity of logic is a given to all humans irrespective of race or colour, they refused to accede to the claim that logic is context or culture bound and therefore that there is any logic that is peculiarly African.

**CONFLICT OF INTERESTS**

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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