Abstract

Based on the concept of ‘spoiling’, this paper posits that it was not only within the domain of the rebels or militia from Southern Sudan or from Darfur to indulge in violent activities that were spoiling peace and stability in Sudan. Rather, the Government of Sudan (GOS), a state actor whose mandate is to protect civilians including their properties perfected the art of spoiling by doing little to encourage peace mediation and frustrating the implementation of peace agreements in Sudan. Using secondary and primary sources of data, this study aims to examine two questions. 1) Why were various actors engaged in spoiling peace in Sudan? 2) What are the relevant internationally recognised mechanisms that are applied to end the action of spoiling in south Sudan? In answering these questions, two key findings are revealed. First, state and non-state actors were locked in violence as a strategy of either retaining status quo, to forcefully take power, or in the worse case to share political seats in the government. Second, in accordance to the institution of the CPA, a formation of the JIU, the launching of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program and attempts made in disarming Other Armed Groups (OAGs) were commendable mechanisms for reacting to spoiler consequences in South Sudan, although, with modest success.

Key words: Sudan, spoilers, civil war, violence, peace agreement, rebel, militia, negotiation.