ABSTRACT
This paper concerns itself with establishing the nexus between identity conflict and its impacts on socio-economic and political relations in the West African context. The effort is motivated by the observable incidences of incessant violent conflicts and wars, all fought on the basis of ethnic and religious fault lines that threaten the stability and cohesion of the sub region in its evolution towards becoming developed regional economic community. Because of the broad nature of the study area, the paper has carefully selected Nigeria and Cote d’ Ivoire as case studies. The choice is informed by the realization that these countries share a lot of similarities especially in the area of their diversities and poor management of this otherwise important agent of social mobilization and national development. The paper has argued that while identity is a major cause of violent conflicts and civil wars often leading to state failure, the same identity, if properly managed-through equitable distribution of welfare resources through the institution of democratic practices, states within the region can overcome their economic and political challenges as they advance in the 21st Century and beyond. The data used in the study were collected from diverse sources, including documentary sources (desk review) and government reports. Data collection from documentary sources involved the evaluation of relevant literature on themes bordering on West African political and socio-cultural systems (identity question) - ethnicity, regionalism and religion. In addition, secession literature was also relied on to furnish the paper with relevant details on the subject which is a major theme of our discourse.
Key words: Ethnicity, religion, secession, democracy, political conflict.
From the last Century, Africa has experienced a phenomenal rise in identity based conflicts. By the time the colonial phase was coming to a close in the mid 20th Century, the identity dichotomy along ethnic and religious fault lines have been deeply and almost irredeemably embedded in the African continent’s political affairs. The end of the Cold War gave a refreshing assurance to observers of international affairs that Western liberalism’s (capitalism and democratic culture) defeat of communism in the global ideological war may constitute the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution, ushering a new era of peace and order in the affairs of humanity (Fukuyama,
1992), since democracies do not fight wars amongst themselves (Risse, n.d). It was the above thesis that informed the view that wars of the “twentieth Century are not about foreign policy, security, or status; they are about statehood, governance, and the role and status of nations and communities within states” (Holsti,1996: 20-21). Huntington’s (1993) reactive prediction is more specific when he states that even though the Cold War had come to an end, other equally violent conflicts were going to erupt; but these were to be sustained by primordial and identity related variables which is consistent with the internal contradictions that define the nature of the Westphalian nation state paradigm with its emphasis on sovereignty, territory and authority while according little attention to the peace and unity of the state arrangement.
Africa has a large dose of these internal contradictions with its thousands of ethnic groups and over thirteen major religions (Bongmba, 2006). This makes African countries naturally victims of Huntington’s prediction due to their formation as heterogeneous entities and their characterization along deep rooted diversities following set patterns in their evolution; ethnicity, religion, citizenship, class differentiation and indigene ship arrangements that lead to contestations, sometimes resulting into violent conflicts. It is therefore impossible to delve into any meaningful discourse covering African politics and the violence that often culminates it without articulating the nexus between political violence and the identity related elements that fire their embers. This has informed the thesis – even though debatable - that identity and especially its ethnicity/religious aspects are guilty agents of conflict generation as far as politics on the continent are concerned.
Thus, it can be assumed that identity politics in West Africa concerns the relationship between politics and the violence that characterize the nature of the people of the sub region. Therefore, it will be quick to mention that while it is correct to say that Africa’s political institutions, including their cultural identities are in crisis, it is not the kind of crisis alluded by Aristotle and Hegel who considered the capacity for state life as the peak of human historical achievement and inversely, state failure as the mark of human underdevelopment. They claim in their ‘Africa has no history’ thesis that the continent lacks these state formation/building capacities. Thus, the rationale for colonialism was attributed to the need for tutelage especially on statecraft through the socializing processes of westernization, Christianization and commerce (Bongmba, 2006). This recommendation finds legitimacy in the assumption that Africans were said to lack the capacity to build stable states and a durable law and order (Mamdani, 2005). A close examination of ‘Indirect Rule Africa’ shows the categorization of human stocks into races and ethnic groups. The racial hierarchy saw Europeans, meaning whites at the top of other human stocks. These are immediately followed by the ‘Coloureds’ comprising Asians and Arabs, while the least are ethnic groups which constitutes the Hamites (the Batutsi). “Races were considered a civilizing influence, even if in different degrees, while ethnicities were considered to be in dire need of being civilized” (Mamdani, 2005: 5), hence the need to colonize African people. This is behind Claude Ake’s (1993), thesis on ‘ethnicity as a construct’.
Contrary to the above perspective on the reasons for the failure of the nation building project in Africa, the paper argues that colonialism is largely responsible for this failure. Beginning from the colonial era, identity manipulation has been endemic and has remained so anytime the interest of the elite minority is threatened due to the colonial authorities’ successfully dichotomization of native peoples along ethnic and religious categories. The colonial powers exploited the economic deprivation of the people, which was the state of affairs for many communities on the continent and the reality of poverty to manipulate the people as willing tools to cause violence any time it served their interests. This is the legacy bequeathed to the post-colonial ethno-religious and political elite class (Nnoli, 1978).
This paper makes effort at examining the role of ethno-religious identities in West Africa. In the attempt to achieve this objective, the article makes a case study of two countries, namely, Cote d’ Ivoire and Nigeria. The choice is informed firstly by the fact that the two countries share certain things in common. They experienced colonialism, as Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire were colonised by Britain and France respectively. Also, in the process of decolonisation, the two countries attained political independence through consensus method in 1960. In addition, both the two countries belong to different international organizations; in particular they are key members of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) And African Union (AU). In comparative terms, during the Nigeria’s civil war that took place between 1966 and 1970, Cote d’Ivoire worked against the unity of Nigeria by supporting the rebel group. On the contrary, during the political conflict in Cote d’Ivoire from 2002 to 2011, Nigeria supported the peace process in the country by playing key role in resolving the conflict (Aworawo, 2011). However, at the domestic level these countries displayed some of the characteristics of the divided societies in West Africa with the potential for politically motivated violent conflicts to erupt at short notices. In addition, these countries often experience intense competition which is a common character of their election and electioneering. In Nigeria, violence has been a normative aspect of its electoral and political process since the period it attained independence in 1960 - except for the 2015 elections due to the huge sacrifice on the part of the sitting president. On the other hand, Cote d’ Ivoirian political experience has assumed an acrimonious and volatile dimension since the death of its founding father, Felix Houphouët-Boigny.
Specifically, Nigeria’s choice is also informed by the fact that it is the most populous country in Africa with a population of about 170 million people. It is also the most ethnically diverse country on the continent of Africa with three dominant territorially concentrated ethnic identities –Yoruba in the South west, Hausa and Fulani in the North and Igbo in the South East, with approximately 350 other ethnic minorities spread throughout the vast land mass constituting and defining the demography of the country’s geography. On the other hand, every attempt at examining and explaining the history and dynamics of political conflict in Côte d’Ivoire always centre on inter-ethnic and religious tensions between the two major geographical divisions consisting the country’s formation - local/indigenous populations and immigrants/settlers, or North-South ethnic/religious cleavages (Chirot, 2006; Langer 2005). Others rely on external influences in the form of support for rebels by neighbouring states, or meddling by the former colonial power. This deep rooted question informs the choice of these deeply divided societies as case studies of the discourse on identity politics in West Africa.
THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNICITY AND RELIGION IN AFRICAN POLITICS
It has become norm in intellectual cycles to argue that politics of ideology, to some extent, came largely to an end in most heterogeneous culture. However, as pointed above, this was replaced in Africa by the politics of identity. As explanation, these (Identity politics) are opinions that aggregate the perspectives and interests of groups: race, class, religion ethnicity, gender etc. The term identity politics is a “phenomenon that arose first at the radical margins of liberal democratic societies in which human rights are recognized and has been used in political and academic discourse since over forty years ago. Its aim has been to empower those feeling oppressed to articulate their felt experiences” (Taoheed, 2016: 1). It could be conclusively submitted that identity and its ethno religious variant especially may be considered largely responsible for causing political conflicts in Africa.
In a similar vein, Meredith (2011: 487) in presenting a balanced perspective to the ethno religious and political conflicts discourse has suggested that the challenge are “caused not by ancient ethnic antagonism but by fanatical elite engaged in a modern struggle for power and wealth using ethnicity and its fiery instrument as their principal weapon”. This viewpoint is complemented by the Africa Rights (1995) that posit that political conflicts in Africa is often a result of the strategy adopted by a clique of powerful people within or outside government to remain relevant in the political process. These powerful people unfortunately use the machinery of ethnicity and religion. As there are over thirteen major religions practiced in Africa today (Bongmba, 2006: 338), with their potential for invoking the highest sense of primordial affiliations and loyalty to the ethnic and religious community (Taoheed, 2016). On the vexing question, Bezawit (2012: 54) opines that identity based ethno-religious conflicts have occurred among constituencies within national communities and these have not arisen from the existence of irreconcilable ethnic differences, but from competition over state resources. Azar (1990: 7-10) sums the argument when he maintained that protracted social conflicts occur when people are not given opportunity to “acquire the means to meet their basic needs”. Basic needs as defined by Azar (1990: 7-10) will include essentially human physiological and esteem needs; “security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation”. Apart from the scarcity of the resources to be distributed to various developmental needs, the component ethnic groups (within nations) are divided and in continual struggle for their own share of national resources. It is important to note that national identity in some countries is virtually non-existent due to the over dependence on primordial identities. These pose special problem to administrators in most Third World countries, especially in Africa where ethnic consciousness still rates very high at the expense of central political institutions” (Ojo, 1983: 97).
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The theoretical framework this article will employ to explain and do an analysis of the ethnic and political question in West Africa and its implication on relations amongst social formations is the frustration/aggression theory. This is because the frustration/aggression theory could successfully complement the human needs theory which addresses the human phenomena of identity group mobilization and conflict as the consequence of a failure to fulfill human development needs. Azar, (1990) have opined that social conflicts are the result of people’s inability to acquire the means to meet their basic needs.
The frustration/aggression was propounded by a combination of social theorists including John Dollard, James Cavies, Feierabend L. K. and Betty A. Nesvold (Ademola, 2006). The theory premises its assumption on the thinking that acts of aggression emanate from frustration previously experienced. The theory thus concludes – in some kind of absoluteness - that every frustration culminates in aggressive tendencies have defined the term frustration as an act and a process that permits the blocking of an individual or groups of individuals from getting an expected gratification (Ademola, 2006). Thus the concept could also go further to imply any behavior that intends to injure the individual to whom it is directed. In line with this hypothetical stance, aggression as a result of injury caused may be interpreted as a cause-effect phenomenon. Mathematically speaking, frustration = aggressive response.
When the theory was conceived, the proponents including Dollard et al. (1939) had made the following interesting observations, “that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression”. Furthermore, “frustration, in this context, was specified as the thwarting of a goal response, and a goal response, in turn, was taken to mean the reinforcing final operation in an ongoing behavior sequence”. At times, however, the term ‘frustration’ is used to refer not only to the process of blocking a person’s attainment of a goal but also to the reaction to such blocking. “Consequently, ‘being frustrated’ means both that one’s access to rein forcers is being thwarted by another party (or possibly by particular circumstances) and that one’s reaction to this thwarting is one of annoyance” (Gurr, 1970).
Another variant of the theory of relative deprivation is interpreted to mean a state of mind where there is discrepancy between what men seek and what seem attainable. The theory assumes that the greater the discrepancy, the greater the anger and thus the propensity of people to favour violence. Violent behavior and its acts, therefore, are caused by frustration. The higher the frustration encountered in the process of trying to achieve an end, the higher the chances of being violent and aggressive.
However, the theory has been criticized on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that the theory’s proponents believed that aggression is always based on frustration. Secondly, critics of the theory submit that frustration always leads to aggression. Critics suggest therefore that this submission is too conclusive and absolute a proposition to be generally accepted to interpret socio-political phenomenon (Galtung, 1996). Notwithstanding the inadequacies, the theory is applicable to this article because it will sufficiently help in the understanding why individuals run to their primordial entities and enclaves to gain/access to the identity that gives legitimacy to their contest for political positions, often in the pursuit of economic advantage(s) and to become violent when they are denied the opportunity using the groups that give them identity.
Methodologically, qualitative approach was adopted in this work both in data collection and analysis. Therefore, the data used in the research were collected from diverse sources. In this regard, the study relied on collection of secondary materials. The data were collected from documentary materials, such as textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, government reports, internets etc. However, in terms of analysis of data, the study adopted descriptive and narrative techniques. Thus, the research was based on a systematic analysis of content of documentation. It is on this basis that all the data collected were subjected to textual analysis.
THE CHALLENGE OF IDENTITY POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA
Nigeria in context
Nigeria is located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea between Benin and Cameroon. It has anarea of 923,768 square kilometers, including about 13,000 square kilometers of water. Nigeriashares borders with Cameroon (1,690 kilometers) in the east, Chad (87 kilometers) in the northeast,Niger (1,497 kilometers) in the north, and Benin (773 kilometers) in the west (Nigeria’s Rapid Assessment And Gap Analysis, 2016). To talk about politics in Nigeria is invariably to talk about democracy and democratization as major features of postmodern liberal political culture and civilization. Democracy – as a process has become a key aspect in the politics of nation states since the dismantling of Communist regimes across the world in the last decade of the twentieth Century. In spite of the definitional challenge confronting the concept ‘democracy’, it could be generally summed that the fundamental goal of democratic systems according to Ojo (1999: 257) concerns essentially “how to govern the society in such a way that power actually belongs to the people”. The expression of this power is usually through the representatives of the people, who are given the mandate to govern on behalf of the people through periodic elections (Mahmood, 2014: 39).
Scholars are unanimous that free and fair elections are crucial to the democratic process just as the same process and their political competitions component may turn awry as they unfold. In other words, political competitions as an aspect of African and especially Nigerian politics often become fierce to the extend they degenerate into violent conflicts (Mahmood, 2014: 39). This bloody violence most times results from the manipulation of the various definitive components that identity consists of. In West Africa especially, the challenge for most countries centres on how to use their diversities as a sense of security and also a form of identification without reconstructing it to serve violent and destructive ends. Therefore, the increase in ethnic tension and nationalism sentiments throughout West Africa ranks as the two most important parameters of intra-state conflict especially after the Cold War (Taoheed, 2016). Thus, “A lot of time and resources during Nigeria’s current Fourth Republic are being spent to fashion out ways of developing an internal conflict-management-strategies system aimed at addressing the question of nationhood and power sharing in a hopelessly skewed federalism” (Taoheed, 2016).
Nigerian political and legislative history reveals that it was the 1954 Lytleton Constitution that introduced and popularized party politics following the formation of political parties in Nigeria. The emergent political parties had their support base largely amongst their ethnic and sometimes religious enclaves and followership. This was clearly the case as shown in the nature of affiliations to the then existent major political parties which were the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroun (NCNC), the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG)-led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa and Chief Obafemi Awolowo in that order. The 1959 Federal elections marked the last election that was conducted under the direct oversight of the British administration and it witnessed, in an unprecedented way, the significant role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics (Nnadozie, 2008: 55). It is important to highlight the point that it was the 1954 Constitution that abolished the unitary system that previously directed the affairs of Nigeria and substituted it with a federal structure. This regional document according to Nnoli (1978) literally endorsed appointments on the basis of ethnic, religious and sectional identities. For instance, appointments/elections as premiers, regional governors, regional public servants, Judiciary officials and regional marketing bodies were on the basis of regions of origin and ethnic identities (Dunmoye, 2008: 60). Nnoli (1978) in pointing-out the weakness of the document shows that the constitution was responsible for institutionalizing regionalism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it reflected a successful attempt by the regional factions of the emergent privileged local classes to carve out spheres of socio-economic and political influence for themselves. To achieve the set goals, these factions set about mobilizing the masses in a bid to capture the apparatus of government in these regional empires as a means of maximizing these benefits (Nnoli, 1978: 159).
Therefore, in the attempt to show themselves as avatars of the liberation struggle against colonial rule and other potential ‘enemies’ within the union, these emergent ethnic and regional champions presented their ethnic political parties as the platforms for the struggle against any form of resource competition that was already becoming glaring as the British colonial phase was coming to a close. Unfortunately, the narrative that these ethnic champions fought for Nigeria’s – and their people’s-independence has subsisted even in academic cycles and today’s political movements have continued to be influenced by this romanticists idea (Abba, 2005). Following the same strand of argument, Bala Usman (n.d), the renowned historian has illuminated the discourse further with his own perspective when he summed the matter in the following way:
the right we have gained to our land which we call Nigeria………, is a right which was not won by a Yoruba struggle for independence, or Ibibio struggle for independence or even a northern Nigerian or
southern Nigerian; or Muslim or Christian struggle for independence, I was a right won by a Nigerian struggle for independence, It was part and parcel of a West African and global struggle by all colonized and oppressed peoples.
Despite the above revelations, “these ethnic champions have continued to use emotive ethnic symbols and played on alleged ethnic conflicts of interest as a means of mobilizing mass support for their own selfish class interest” (Nnoli, 1978: 287). On this question, Ake (1993) has hinted that conventional wisdom has ascribed to ethnicity the responsibility for causing Africa’s numerous 'irrationalities' including deterring its development project, sustaining the embers of political instability and weak national identity. It has also been “blamed for outmoded values and regressive consciousness, for fostering corruption and destructive conflict and now there is some concern that the ongoing process of democratization in Africa may release the politically disintegrative potentialities of ethnicity”. All of these have proven to be correct as far as the African context is concerned.
Babalola (2013: 89) opined that because of British colonial / administrative policies in Nigeria (especially its divide and rule policy), the country ended up deeply divided along primordial fault lines and these were the aspects the British emphasized in the administration of their colonies especially in Nigeria. Babalola (2013: 188) gave reason why the elite class, early in the life of the nation quickly chose to tow the path of regionalization, ethnicization and religionization of the politics of the country. He shows that in Nigeria, identity forms the basis for who gets what and when. This explains why ethno religious variables are of supreme importance to the understanding of failures of statehood in most parts of Africa. In deeply divided societies like Nigeria, ethno-religious cleavages, unlike other cleavages like class, appears permanent and deeply permeating thereby predetermining who will be granted and denied access to power and invariably, resources. More often than not, Political pressures from ethnic groups have had tremendous influence on Nigeria’s political culture hence explaining why identity conflicts have become common in the socio economic and political relations of interest groups. In the attempt to capture the political space for economic benefits, the different constitutive blocs within Nigeria sometimes deliberately generate hostility among themselves to secure their sphere of influence by putting out the other group through the generated violence as was the experience throughout the first republic 1960-1966. While doing this, their propaganda machinery often tilts towards accusations of perceived marginalization and conflict of interests among these groups (of course on the basis of ethnicity and sometimes religion) with each claiming to be defending the collective interests of their nationalities. The inevitable consequence of the unfolding socio-political trend was the intensification of the politicization of ethnicity (Nnoli, 1978: 159).
The new wave of Nigerian democratization
Because of the bleak scenario presented above, elections in Nigeria since the First Republic have been described by pundits as a political liability and the basis for political instability and socio economic decay. Therefore, the restoration of multiparty politics to Nigeria in 1999 brought fresh optimism for a new beginning that should bring about refinement to the conduct of electoral practices and sustenance of democratic and political culture in Nigeria. It was hoped that the new dawn of electoral politics in post military Nigeria was going to broaden the political space to accommodate all payers irrespective of ideological leaning or class station in the social hierarchy/strata. In other words, the evolving process of democratic tradition came with high expectations for opening the space to give opportunity for effective participation of the people as well as the political class in a competitive and lawful manner (Omotola: 2010).
Unfortunately, the high expectations and optimism that heralded the new dawn of democratization and democratic politics proved premature as the identity factor became the dominant pattern of the process during campaigns and elections. Consequently, despite the acclaim and accolade accorded the 2011 elections in terms of its score as the most transparent in the history of the country, over 800 lives were killed as a result of many days of bloody rioting in northern Nigeria. The violence displaced approximately 65,000 people, making the elections the most violent in Nigeria’s history (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The bloody violence was orchestrated by the assumption-rightly or wrongly- that the main opposition candidate, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Hausa Fulani Muslim actually won the election but was denied his mandate by the incumbent PDP government of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Analysts have prescribed factors responsible for the violence to include; the availability of willing protesters, the incapacity or even the outright nonchalance and disregard for citizen’s right to life by the Nigerian state hence its non provision of adequate security and law enforcement occasioned by poor preparedness and weak response capacities, the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speeches, and the existence of communal tensions generally informed by identity politics. In addition, during the 2011 electoral violence/conflict in Nigeria, the political elites from some sections of the country took the advantage of the prevailing poverty among the unemployed youth and mobilized them with stipend so as to unleash attacks on rival politicians.
Bekoe (2011) summed the matter in a rather conclusive fashion when he argued that ethnic politics is one of the leading causes of violence in Nigeria. This is because the country has not been able to take away ethnic sentiment from its elections and electioneering processes. This assumption proved to be correct during the 2015 elections when identity; especially its ethnic and religious variant came forcefully to the front burner. The 2015 general election which was the fifth in the country since the return of democratic dispensation in 1999 experienced a fierce struggle between northern and southern elites/ politicians to capture the presidency, which was the underlying cause of the 2011 post-election violence but the identity struggle reached its climax during the general election in 2015. Unfortunately, the masses that are often the cannon fodder of electoral politics were easily mobilized to perpetuate the violence that unfolded during the series of elections in Nigeria (Caleb, 2013; Danjuma, 2014). With regards to the 2015 polls, the north/south contest for the presidency was occasioned by inability of the North (Hausa/Fulani Muslim interest) to maintain power throughout the four year tenure since 1999. This fuelled the agitation by the elites of northern origin for ‘power shift’ (the transfer of political power from the south to the north and invariably from Christians to Muslims). The leading political party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which had been in power since the new political dispensation in May, 1999, operated an informal ‘zoning’ arrangement whereby it was expected that the presidency should rotate between southern and northern representatives after a two term period of eight years – four years for each term period (Bekoe, 2011).
The erstwhile President, Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian of southerner origin, found himself presiding over the affairs of state as president in 2010 sequel to the sudden demise of then President, Umaru Yar’Adua, a Muslim northerner from the core northern state of Katsina. This happened while Yar’ Adua was still in office, before the completion of his first four year term. Jonathan’s decision to contest in 2011 stirred the ire of party members from the north of the country because these political stalwarts and their followers were of the view that it was the turn of the region as a political bloc to take the rein of power after southern presidency for most of the period since 1999. Thus, even after his tenure consequent on his victory at the polls in 2011, speculation began to filter suggesting that president Jonathan was going to run again for a second term in 2015 (Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 2011). The reports further states that:
Opponents argued that a second term would mean Jonathan would in practice serve more than two terms, in violation of the Constitution, given that he first took up the office on an acting capacity in 2010. But the Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances in which he became president could not be counted towards a term in office and that Jonathan was therefore eligible to contest in 2015. There are some arguments that by overturning the zoning arrangement, he seriously destabilised the country’s ruling elites and inadvertently created space for Boko Haram’s insurgency in the north to flourish.
The evolution of the APC as an amalgam of different political parties and interest groups all united in their motive to oust the PDP control of power brought these elements under the same platform. This move further Balkanized Nigerians along ethnic, regional and religious line. The general elections of 2015 saw the PDP featuring the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian of Southern origin) and Muhammadu Buhari (a Muslim of Northern extraction). This, in addition to what happened in 2011 must have inspired the conclusion of political observers that irrespective of who emerged victorious at the polls in 2015, there was bound to be violent backlashes with attendant bloodbath trailing the process because of the intense competition between the ‘Christian southerners’ and their ‘Northern Muslim’ compatriots.
But why has competition along identity greatly influenced politics in Nigeria? Of course a major factor is poverty as we have made several attempts to confirm. Poverty is undoubtedly a key factor behind the dichotomization of Nigerians along primordial fault lines. The Nigerian National Bureau of statistics has submitted along this line that:
Whereas, the economy grew at an average of about 6.2% annually between 2002 and 2011, there is a general disconnect between Nigeria’s economic growth and human development. Nigeria is ranked 156 out of 187 economies. In 1988 the poverty level was 27.2% rising to 65.6% in 1999, an annual increase of 8.83%. In 2004, about 54.4% Nigeria’s over 130 million citizens lived below the poverty line. The situation worsened in 2011 when 69.1% of the Nigerian population or approximately 100 million people lived in abject poverty (NBS Report, 2011).
Significantly, the political elite in Nigeria have been taking advantage of the prevailing poverty condition of the majority of poor people and use them as instrument to be mobilised to unleash violence against political opponents during elections.
Resurgence of agitation for the Sovereign State of Biafra: An Overview of the Issues
The liberal thinking responsible for the behaviour and activities of terrorist and sometimes insurgent elements in most parts of Nigeria is the same factor explaining the resurgence of the agitation for the sovereign state of Biafra. Almost half a Century after the signing of the surrender document signifying the end of hostilities and the dream of the birthing of a new nation, new agitations for the reconstruction of the botched dream are being conceived. In the process, the leader of this movement has declared, like his predecessors had done before, that Biafra is now a sovereign state. The activities of these elements include the transmission of seditious and highly inflammatory statements against the corporate existence of Nigeria as an independent country. The resurgence of this nationalist movement may not be unconnected with how the Igbo have always seen themselves. The Igbos are convinced that out of the Nigerian ethnic matrix, they are as a group the most prominent and commercially most successful (Siollun, 2009: 16).
Back to the beginning; the Nigerian civil war erupted because of the bloody coup and counter coup d’états after the country’s independence in 1960. The coup d’état of 15th, January 1966 which was masterminded by five Nigerian Majors led by Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (an Igbo officer) was perceived as a selected attack against politicians and Military officers of northern Nigeria descent (Madiebo, 2000; Umoru, 2017; Siollun, 2009). Even though southern politicians like Festus Okotie-Eboh and Samuel Akintola were killed, majority of the victims were northerners like Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and the Sardauna of Sokoto (Siollun, 2009; Madiebo, 2000). Prominent high ranking Nigerian military officers killed due to the putsch included Brigadier Zakaria Maimalari, Colonels Ralph Shodeinde, Abogo Largema and Kur Mohammed. “The core of the matter was that most of the victims of this ‘ethnic power’ struggle targeted the northern officers, or so the development was interpreted” (Kolade, 2015). This made the north to conclude that the agenda of the East was to completely dominate the country’s political, social and economic affairs. Moreso, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo stalwart in Nigerian politics had in 1949, during an address to the Igbo state Union declared that “The God of Africa has specifically created the Igbo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages” (Siollun, 2009: 17).
To worsen the matter as shown above, the Nzeogwu coup was unfortunately greeted by wild celebrations in southern Nigeria. These scenes wounded Northern emotions and sensibilities. It was this development that informed the northern army officers’ counter Coup of July, 1966 as it became imminent that the wounds made on the nation by the putsch had turned septic, (Meredith, 2011). At the peak of this national tension, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra--the Land of the Rising Sun, almost immediately after General Yakubu Gowon’s creation of twelve states. ”Ojukwu’s attempt at breaking away from the Nigerian union with the goal of creating a ‘homeland’ for the Igbos made the 30 months civil war not only a foreseeable phenomenon but an imminent occurrence” (Kolade, 2015). The highpoint of the macabre drama between General Gowon the Commander in Chief of the armed forces and Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the governor of eastern Nigeria climaxed in disaster (Ezeani, 2013). Thus, by the middle of 1967, specifically by the 6th day of July, the first salvo was fired to mark the official beginning of what history chronicles as the Nigerian civil war with its horrible consequence on human security, national cohesion, sub regional integration and continental peace and security (Meredith, 2011).
Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of the agitation for the resurgence of the republic of Biafra draws motivation from the model of Ojukwu’s rebellion. Unfortunately, the demand for Biafra is known to be borne out of the political interest of certain groups in south east Nigeria who are feeling marginalized by the new All Progressives Congress’ (APC) government of General Muhammadu Buhari (Umoru, 2017). Therefore, the agitation is considered a veritable strategy to attract attention and therefore capture key positions within the national government. The Igbo are due to perceived victimization “by advocating for either more inclusion or for more separation” (Okechukwu and Nkwachukwu, 2017: 2).
The agitations for the sovereign state of Biafra have far reaching implications to the region as an entity and the Nigeria state as a whole. According to Okechukwu and Nkwachukwu, (2017: 3), the recurrent demonstrations by pro-Biafra agitators and the resulting clashes between them and the Nigerian state as represented by its security operatives have a lot of implications on the regional economy because businesses are always disrupted and even closed in locations where these protests occur, thereby discouraging investments in the locations and the South East in general. “It is also a truism that the recurring agitation for Biafra has specific regional and national security implications, including the chances that mobilization of potential protesters could escalate armed violence and worsen the existing levels of insecurity”. But by far the worst implication may relate to the one that affects the nation as a whole where it is believed that these demonstrations could increase existing security challenges, such as attacks on Igbos in the north of the country and clashes between Igbo communities and Fulani herdsmen and Hausa communities in the South. In addition, as the activities of the pro-Biafra movement widen in scope, the capacity of the security agencies to handle the movement in a peaceful and professional manner might tend to decline. At this juncture, the military/security operatives may be pressurized by the provocation of the pro Biafra activists to jettison the Rule of Engagements (RoE) which restrains their tendency to be abusive. This may of course result in serious humanitarian and human rights violations. It is also correct to submit that with the rising wave of separatist and insurgent movements agitating for partial or complete separation from the Nigerian union intensifying “in other parts of Nigeria, the persistence of the agitation for Biafra could become a rallying point for groups questioning the Nigerian project” (Okechukwu and Nkwachukwu, 2017: 2).
COTE D’ IVOIRE AND THE EXPERIENCE OF IDENTITY CONFLICT
Cote D’ Ivorian society like any other West Africa society has an equally complex history because its national cultural policy is a product of its ethnic origins. Ranging from a broad spectrum of sources including language, the arts, education, religion, and even its law and governments, all were determined by ethnic identities (Vogel, 1991). Vogel (1991) further observes further that in most Francophone states of the West Coast of Africa (as the same is true in Anglophone West Africa), it is common place to observe the tendency of national policies/cultures being replaced with the hundreds of ethnic cultures inherited from the colonial administrations. The implication is the non-formation of a cohesive national orientation that would have naturally set the tone for the growth of an organic state unit. This phenomenon is truest in Cote d’ Ivoire. In this country, ethnic and by extension identity has been viewed as a “given” of the country’s condition and this has continued to serve as impediment to its modernization, development and progress. Recent anthropological studies have confirmed that the ethnic groups seen as constituting the major categories in the country including the Baule, Bete, Dida, Guro, Senufo, Dyula to mention a few did not exist as coherent and distinct units prior to the 19th century and specifically the 1890’s. The study suggests that in the period before the advent of colonialism, an individual did not claim origin to these groups but to a subgroup, village, clan lineage or even the kingdoms (Vogel, 1991). In fact in many occasions, people did not refer or call themselves by these names; neither did they have a sense of these larger groups at all. “The colonial administrators, needing to organize people and areas into manageable administrative units, used their sketch ethnographic knowledge to create these units as though they corresponded to actual ‘tribal’ groupings and as though the highly mixed populations of a given area were homogenous” (Vogel, 1991). As observed above, ethnic categorization as we know them today did not originate in the distant past. On the other hand, it is a twentieth Century phenomenon. Irrespective of this reality, Ivorians today accept this categorization and the politics it shapes as the way things are; this identity has shaped their outlook and socio-economic relations since it became acknowledged and recognized as a medium of identification (Chauveau and Dozon, 1987).
The above scenario was what informed the challenge of contemporary ethnic politics in Cote d’ Ivoire. Basically, in Cote d’ Ivoire the political elites manipulated ethnic identities in the face of economic crisis to ensure its access to scarce resources and hold on to political power. It is for this reason that Danjuma (2016: 226) maintained “in many developing countries, the contest of election is reduced to struggle between ethnic or religious groups. ”Thus, after the demise of President Houphouet-Boighny in 1993, the country witnessed series of political crises revolving around identity issue. In relation to this, attention is given to the policy of Ivoirité, which was introduced by President Henry Konan Bedie. The policy sought to exclude migrants from neighbouring countries and northerners, from the mainstream of political power and economic opportunities (Oche, 2011). In this regard, as a result of Ivorite policy, individuals that were perceived as foreigners were prevented from contesting elections in Cote d’Ivoire. The political situation in Cote d’Ivoire became tensed when other political leaders like General Robert Guei and Laurent Gbagbo continued with the discriminatory policy.
In the beginning: The politics of ethnicity and religion
The political history of Cote d’ Ivoire as a country is intricately interwoven with its history of immigration. Immigration into the country could be traced back to colonial era when labour from Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta since 1984), “was moved by force to work on plantations in the south, in a large-scale labour migration programme set up by the French colonial administration. After independence, the rapid development of export agriculture, the relatively high economic growth as well as political stability made the country a sub regional economic hub attracting immigrants from relatively poorer neighbours within the sub-region” (Almas, 2007: 12).
The fortune of the country was drastically affected when from the 1980’s the prices of cocoa and coffee (the mainstay of the country’s economy) took a dramatic plunge. The boom of the 1970’s was immediately reversed hence. Thus began the sudden stagnation of the economy and the rise of the country’s foreign debt. “In 1981, Côte d’Ivoire was one of the first African countries to sign on to the economic reform package or Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the World Bank. During the 1980’s, the country adopted several macroeconomic restructuring programmes with the aim of restoring economic growth” (Almas, 2007: 13). Despite this move, by the end of the 80’s, the economy had worsened with its spiralling effects on the citizenry. By 1989, the Boigny regime was compelled to accept dramatic measures to redeem the economy from further plunge downward. Such measures included halving cocoa and coffee prices paid to producers as well as the abandoning of the price guarantee system. Other measures included reduction by half of the remuneration packages of teachers at the primary, secondary, and university levels of education. In addition, student’s welfare policies such as allowances, housing and transport were abandoned completely. “These measures had dramatic social consequences which provoked vehement protests by students, workers and opposition groups” (Almas, 2007).
In the midst of these chaotic environment, President Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993, giving room to a bitter succession struggle within the ruling party -Parti démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) between the constitutional successor Henri Konan Bédié, speaker of the National Assembly, and Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara.
The latter had been appointed an economic advisor, then Prime Minister (also in charge of the Ministry of Finance), by Houphouët-Boigny in the turbulent months of 1990. Ouattara was a former IMF official and President of the West African Central Bank (BCEAO), but had no political history in Côte d’Ivoire before his high-profile appointment in the country. In addition, those opposed to his candidacy in the presidential elections disputed his nationality, as his father was said to be Burkinabè, thereby disqualifying him from contesting elections on the basis of his “non-citizenship”.
The ethnic and regional identity malaise took a dramatic turn when Ouattara’s categorization by his political opponents as an “intruder” into Ivoirian power equation gained momentum and efforts were intensified to exclude him from the election process that was to usher in a new President. In the heat of the moment, Bédié (who later emerged as President) in an attempt to further estrange Ouattara from politics introduced the political strategy of ‘Ivoirité’. He did this to inject a feeling of national pride and unity amongst ‘true’ Ivoirians. This also aimed at promoting the legitimacy of his party while at the same time, creating a sense of patriotism for the country and citizenship as well as his position as president and protector of a true Ivorian national identity. “Many observers regard the Ivoirité discourse as the root cause of the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. The resort to an Ivoirité discourse by the political elite clearly led to an aggravation of xenophobia and an ‘ethnicitization’ of the political debate, whereby immigrants or foreigners were used as scapegoats for the country’s economic and political problems” (Akindès, 2004: 27). The thought in addition also fed into the politics of exclusion based on national identity, and at the same time the non-extension of citizenship rights to those considered non-Ivorian. Georges Niangoran Bouah, the renowned ethno-sociologist defined the ethno-cultural philosophy of Ivoirité in the following terms:
Ivoirité is the set of socio-historical, geographic, and linguistic data which enables us to say that an individual is a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire or an Ivorian. The person who asserts his ‘Ivoirité’ is supposed to have Côte d’Ivoire as his country, be born of Ivorian parents belonging to one of the ethnic groups native to Côte d’Ivoire. (Quoted in Akindès, 2004: 27).
While nationalist and xenophobic sentiments were clearly provoked and manipulated by Bédié, Ouattara’s support base in the north may have contributed to the strengthening of ethnic and religious cleavages through their way of handling the political conflict. They wove a narrative that gave the blunt suggestion that Alassane Ouattara was excluded from national politics due to his identity as a Northerner and a Muslim. Their strategy was to mobilize the support of Ivorians of the North, and Muslims in particular, by telling them that the political elite excluded them on grounds of their ethnic affiliation and religious inclination and the strategy worked (Almas, 2007: 14). It is interesting to note that even after Bedie, Guei, the army General who overthrew the government of Bedie- also invoked the Ivoirité doctrine to bar Ouattara ’from participating in the political process. Gbagbo did not fare any better as he also towed the infamous path charted by his predecessors leading to a bitter struggle for power between the ethnic and religious divide known as north and the south until war finally broke out between these regions.
On September 19, 2002, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a military mutiny that attempted the overthrow of President Laurent Gbagbo. At the same time rebel groups took control of northern Cote d’ Ivoire The crisis soon degenerated into civil strife and division of the country, with the South controlled by the government while the North fell into the hands of rebels forces. Consequently, rebel groups especially from the northern region of the country challenged the central authority. Series of clashes between the government forces and security agencies led to the death and displacement of several individuals in the country between 2002 and 2011 (Onah, 2011).
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
From the foregoing, it is evident that identity and the conflicts it provokes, is mostly a product of economic exclusion that is manipulated by elite interests within ethno religious constituencies to perpetuate identity politics in the West African sub region. It is these fears that shaped the stance of early nationalist avatars to champion the cause of ethnic and religious interest at the expense of national interest across the West Coast of Africa and even the African region as a whole. In the 1940’s (1942-43) for instance, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe had published an article in the West African pilot suggesting that the country’s (Nigeria’s) twenty five provinces be regrouped to form eight states. According to the Great Zik of Africa, the creation of these states had the potential for assuaging the fears of those who feel a bigger union with central authority in the nation’s capital was going to exclude them from the benefits of the resources accruing from the national government. In a similar vein, Chief Obafemi Awolowo had in 1947, argued in favour of a federal constitution based on ethnic consideration, in “which each ethnic group, irrespective of size, is autonomous in regards to its internal affairs” (Nnoli, 1978: 256). In the same year, Zik’s NCNC had floated what it called the Freedom charter to oppose the Richard’s constitution. The freedom charter had suggested that ethnic/linguistic states be created within Nigeria as a strategy for allaying the fears of minority groups within the country’s union. Later in 1953, Awolowo again recommended the creation of nine states in recognition of the identity type of politics that is indicative of Nigeria as an evolving country. This has continued to constitute the Nigerian debate and political narrative since independence.
In Cote d’ Ivoire, they have the Ivoirité doctrine that aboriginal Ivoirians used as instrument to exclude those they considered strangers due to their religious and ethnic identity from mainstream socio-economic opportunities and political competition for power.
The solution to the challenge of identity threats to the evolution of an organic national identity across the sub region lies simply in the entrenchment of broad based democratic values that favours the equitable distribution of scarce resources and the inclusiveness of stakeholders in the development project of the sub region; irrespective of ethnic, religious, class and socio-economic and political station in life. Of course some groups insists that except they are allowed to run their affairs autonomously through direct access to the decision making process that affects them, the resources to be appropriated to them from the coffers of the commonwealth will not reach them. Thus, the resultant frustration may end up birthing conflict amongst social formations and groups.
The solution to the myriad challenges occasioned by identity differentiation throughout the sub region could be achieved not necessarily through the constant creation of smaller political units known as states regions or prefectures as the case may be, but through good governance and transparency in public administration in general (Nnoli, 1978).
Further to the above, the notion has been favoured, especially by the Willink Commission in Nigeria that it is possible to ameliorate or even eliminate the fears (including the fears of some elements of the big three), and agitations of minority groups which undermines national cohesion and unity through a determined resolve to ensure justice and fairness and not necessarily through the creation of smaller political units in the form of states.
It has been further recommended that to enjoy a harmonious relationship between groups within the polity, it is important to institute a system and mechanism that favours and entrenches the tenets of the fundamental human rights of people across the sub region. In addition harmony and respect for each other amongst partnering groups (the ethnic constituting units) could be attained through establishment of special development authorities that should ensure growth and sustainable development of people thereby reducing suspicion and agitations bordering on marginalization of ethnic groups. Thus with the “right leadership, and a good government committed to balanced development, it will be possible to contain states agitations and complaints of marginalization arising from neglect, discrimination and minority fears of socio-economic and political exclusion (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1976).
The history of Africa since post-independence has been the history of the control of the political space by ethnic and regional interests. The struggle of virtually all ethnic militias often translates into the struggle for political power. Apart from the scarcity of the resources to be distributed for various developmental needs, the component ethnic groups in different countries are divided and engage in continual struggle for their own share of national resources. Thus, it can be argued that national identity is virtually non-existent in some African countries. In addition, it could be safely stated that the contest for power and national resource distribution is an African challenge. Based on this, it is crucial to bring to the fore the lessons that may be learned from the negative effect of the politicization of ethnicity in West Africa. A major lesson may involve the reality that as in most African state formation process, the phenomenon has hindered the attainment of development and prosperity. This is because the energies and resources that should be deployed to address socio economic development are mostly channelled to patronizing primordial cleavages. The consequence of patron and primordial politics is the creation of disgruntled constituencies which is often the bedrock of politically motivated violent conflicts across West African sub-region. It must be noted that if identity and its ethnic and religious variants are not properly managed through peace and development driven initiatives, the end result is bound to be violent conflicts. The paper thus recommends that states within the sub region should ensure that they deploy their immense human and material resources towards ensuring –of course through justice and fairness -that they shape a national identity directed at the unification of their people and harnessing the vast resources enmeshed in their diversities. Of course, this is achievable only if corruption, a major feature of public bureaucracy across the sub region is reduced to the barest minimum.
The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.
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