The wave of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) which included reforms in the public sector such as change in governance systems and privatisation had its toll in different countries especially in the developing world. In the context of governance, most countries adopted decentralisation as a system of Local Government (LG). In Uganda, LG has its roots in two key pieces of legislation: article 176 within chapter eleven of the 1995 constitution as well as the Local Government Act (LGA) also known as ‘CAP 243’. Upon its commencement on 24^th March, 1997; the Act aimed to amend, consolidate and streamline the existing law on Local Governments in line with the constitution in order to give effect to decentralisation and devolution. Therein contained was the component of subsidiarity whereby power was transferred from central government to respective local governments in a coordinated manner.

The most fundamental aspect of this devolution was the power of decision making which meant power to perform devolved functions such as planning, initiating and executing policies in respect of all matters affecting the people within their jurisdiction. Consequently, a five tier structure of LG comprising two separate wings (technical and policy) was set up with the district being the highest. The political wing was supposed to work in tandem with the technical wing. As per this arrangement only Local Council III and V constitute LG while Local Council I, II and V are administrative units. A district local government in rural areas often consists of the district council and the subcounty councils while those in urban areas include a municipal council, the municipal division council and where there is no municipal it consists of a town council. Institutionally, there are rules and regulations governing each level. Being the highest political authority within its area of jurisdiction, the council has both legislative and executive powers which can be exercised in accordance to the constitution and the LGA.[1]

The LG arena in Uganda is composed of both corporate and individual actors. The council, the District Executive Committee (DEC) and the different boards and other committees represent corporate actors. As per the objectives of decentralisation, local councillors including the district chairperson being directly elected by the locals are accountable to their electorates. As a corporate body with legislative and executive powers, the council can be sued or can sue. On the other hand, individual actors are categorised in two groups namely politicians and technocrats (administrators). Political actors include the district chairperson, vice chairperson, speaker, and the respective councillors while technocrats include the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), deputy CAO, the Senior Assistant Secretary (SAS), and the different departmental staff such as clerks, procurement officers, office administrators et cetera. Constitutionally, all political actors are supposed to serve a period of five years unless removed from office due to abuse of office, or severe illness. The 1995 constitution also provides for appointment of a Resident District Commissioner (RDC) by the president for each district. The RDC is responsible for monitoring the implementation of central and LG services in the district, and acts as the chairperson of the district security committee of the district.[i][ii] The problem with Uganda’s LG system is that the creation of new institutions of governance did not only create more power centres, but also powerful actors whose exercise of power led to the emergence of micro-hegemony.[2] Accordingly, this paper explores policy decisions within the bounds of constitutionalism, allocation and reproduction of power and its exercise using field studies from four Ugandan districts.

Based on empirical evidence, it argues that in the context of LG, public policy decisions are not only informed by constitutional provisions, rather other factors such as power play a decisive role. The interplay between actors’ application of their formal positions fused within power centres contained in the system’s structural design play together to produce micro-hegemony, making it a more decisive factor in policy decisions. It is therefore undoubtable that the making of public policy decisions goes beyond constitutional provisions and is more complex and dynamic than it appears to be.

Data for this paper were collected using qualitative research methods such as face to face and telephone interviews, and participatory observation with the aim of exploring the power dynamics in Uganda’s LG setting and its implications on decision making processes bearing in mind the presence of institutional asymmetry and a vast majority of actors. The study is predominantly based on information derived from empirical field studies conducted between 2012 and 2013 in four Ugandan districts namely Kabarole, Mukono, Wakiso and Pallisa. These districts were purposely chosen to provide a geographical balance that is to enable the research to cover all regions in the country. The four districts are located in west, central and east respectively. Furthermore economic and political factors were taken into consideration. Each district presents different features in terms of these factors, for instance Kabarole is mainly a strong hold for the ruling party—National Resistance Movement (NRM), the central districts of Mukono and Wakiso are opposition strong holds while Pallisa in the east often produces a mixture of NRM and opposition. In addition, there was need to examine LG in kingdom and non-kingdom areas. Kabarole, Mukono and Wakiso are located in kingdom territories while Pallisa is not. Kabarole and Pallisa represent rural LG while Wakiso and Mukono are urban LG. Respondents in this study included politicians, civil servants herein referred to as technocrats and academicians drawn from within and outside of government. Participants were chosen based on their role and status in the political arena. The main period of examination is the NRM era (1986 to date). Using Actor-centered Institutionalism, the study examines how actor and institutional interaction influences the decision making process in LG. Data are thematically and critically analysed reflecting constitutional provisions. The rest of the paper is structured as follows; the next section presents an examination of LG in the context of decentralisation drawing on some scholarly literature on the subject. This is followed by empirical evidence on how micro-hegemony develops and how it is applied to influence public policy decisions.

Conceptualising local government and decentralisation

Local government refers to formal agencies within the state (Johnston and Pattie, 1996: 672). It is a system where by locally elected members represent their communities and make policy decisions on their behalf. Local governments often act within powers delegated to them by legislation or central government. This implies that they have authority to perform such duties as may be delegated to them. Authority often denotes some sort of formal power contained or constituted in legal institutions. In the context of Uganda, LG is decentralised. Decentralisation is ‘the restructuring or reorganisation of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels’ (UNDP, 1999). In the context of LG, decentralisation is seen to provide better future prospects that would revamp it and restore its authority thus remedying LG from domination by central government. Decentralisation thrives on three broad assumptions namely (i) the principle of subsidiarity, (ii) improved governance, accountability, transparency, democratisation and citizen participation, (iii) improved service delivery. In the context of this article, each of these involves policy decisions as the next section explores.

The principle of subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity holds that for decentralised LG to function properly, decisions should be made at the most appropriate lowest level as possible. This principle aims to redistribute authority and responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the government to LG. By devolving power and authority, the principle of subsidiarity bridges the gap between government and its citizens. As such, it enables citizens to participate in public policy decisions especially on matters that affect their daily lives. By shifting the responsibility to make policy decisions to LG, power is redistributed among various groups/actors within. Proponents of decentralisation believe that reallocation of power and authority to these key stakeholders will enable elected leaders to make decisions that address local needs, because as governance functions are decentralised, LG are able to establish clear decision making parameters for devolved responsibilities. This implies that local leaders have significant discretionary power necessary to create infrastructure that makes decentralisation effective, but at the same time remain accountable to local communities (Ribot, 2004:1). As shall be shown later, this is not always the case. Most often, government retains unrestricted power that enables it to dictate policy decisions on LG.

Improved governance, accountability, democratisation and citizen participation

This assumption suggests that decentralisation facilitates promotion of democratic principles. First of all, LGs are able to conduct elections at local level, thus citizens are able to directly decide who they want to be their representative. This enhances the relationship between people and their leaders who in turn are assumed to better know the needs of their communities; hence can better address them. By encouraging people’s participation in local politics, awareness on political issues is increased and people can hold their leaders accountable. Accountability translates to transparent decision making while decisions will reflect community interests. As a result, LGs can perform better and effectively (Rondinelli et al., 1984). In this way, participation is seen as a form/pathway to democracy. In the case of Uganda, the restructure of LG that resulted from decentralisation/ devolution created more avenues for more people to join politics, thus increasing local participation in politics. Participation enables people gain political agency and wield influence over the context and direction of their lives (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). The structure of Uganda’s devolution also puts in place community development workers who interact with local communities as a means of involving them in decision making. Devolution thus empowers both communities and local leaders to make and implement policy decisions. This implies breaking down the monopoly of the government while increasing political participation (Steiner, 2004: 11). This assumption is however questionable given the fact that several studies including this one have found out that in most cases participation in decision making by local communities is limited and if any, it is passive. In addition, there is a tendency for elected representatives who participate in decision making to make decisions that favour their interests and not those of the communities.

Improved service delivery

The conviction that decentralisation improves services is based on the premise that the shift of responsibility from government to the private sector implies that functions and/ or duties that used to be provided by the state are provided by the private sector (Cohen et al., 1979). Rondinelli et al. (1984) observe that in most cases, the private sector is more efficient and effective in providing public services. They add that delegating responsibility for planning to officials who are working closer to the problems helps overcome the severe shortfalls of multi-sectorial national planning and facilitates economic growth. Similarly, the UNPD (2000) argues that, significant benefits accrue when decision making is brought closer to those most affected by them. Indeed Uganda’s key thesis for decentralisation was that, when those closest to where decisions are made are empowered to make decisions and given ownership of results, better decisions will be made. This would result in increased efficiencies and an improved quality of social services. But Saito (2003) argued, there is no direct match between decentralisation and improved services delivery. The findings of this study also confirm this argument.

Therefore, whereas decentralisation facilitates decision making at local level, in the perspective of decision making involving local communities, the policy cannot be credited since there is no direct corroboration in this regard. In most cases, the idealistic assumptions attached to decentralisation do not match the practical situation on the ground. For such assumptions to yield positive results it requires statutory reforms that establish functional institutions that promote a system of checks and balances. This however, is not the case in most African countries. Several scholars on decentralisation have argued that the system has not yielded much (cf. Lambright, 2008; Rondinelli, 1989; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). Moreover, democracy is not just about political pluralism, elections and participation. Falleti (2004) is right to argue that decentralisation reforms may take place in either authoritarian or democratic contexts, thus it should not be confused with democratisation. In Uganda for example and indeed in most African countries, weak formal institutions has limited participation to a small group(s) of actors and subjected ordinary citizens to being periodic electors. As a result, their involvement in policy decisions is minimal and passive, if any.

On the other hand, efficient and effective service delivery necessitates establishment of semi-autonomous organisations with a great deal of discretion in decision-making. But as Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) argue, in most countries, these organisations are non-existent and if they do, they are subject to heavy government control. The implication is that decision making in these organisations is highly influenced by government or state agents. Moreover decentralisation involves several stakeholders in many different fronts, which decision making has to take this into account. Crook and Manor describe it as ‘a policy forced to carry an unrealistic burden of expectations regarding its ability to transform whole societies dominated by authoritarian or patronage politics’ (Crook and Manor, 1998:302). Outcomes of this bold effort are often negotiated and bargained over how political power and material benefits are shared and contested. It is indeed a much bolder attempt to transform the wide range of social interactions among different stakeholders than what is often assumed in the literature, especially those adopted among donor agencies. In the case of Uganda, Saito observes that there are not much improvements especially measured on the fact that decentralisation was supposed to reduce poverty levels in the country by improving the essential public services like health, education, transport and environmental management (Saito, 2000). He adds that LG can barely perform locally initiated plans/ activities due to insufficient financial autonomy. Therefore, the perception that local governance labels the process of making decisions is far from reality. From this perspective, it is therefore generic to conceive government and in particular the process of decision making as one involving actors and institutions.

To this effect, Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) provides a heuristic framework for understanding and analyzing actors and institutional interaction in government. Institutions are systems of rules that structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose (Scharpf, 1997:38-39), while actors are players or agents in the policy-making process. They are characterised by their orientations (perceptions and preferences) and by their capabilities. ACI argues that, ‘social phenomena are to be explained as the outcome of interactions among intentional actors—individual, collective, or corporate actors, that is—but that these interactions are structured, and the outcomes are shaped by the characteristics of the institutional settings in which they occur’ (Scharpf, 1997:1). The approach seeks to explain these phenomena by examining how institutional arrangements structure interactions that in turn shape policy making across jurisdictions. ACI further argues that policy decisions are a result of how actors define a problem, their interests, orientations and capabilities and their interactions in a given policy environment and the institutional setting.

Local government in Uganda

Uganda’s decentralised LG is structured in five levels known as Local Councils (LC). The lowest is called LC1 (village) and often comprises 300 people. This is followed by LCII (parish), LCIII (Sub County), LCIV (County) and LCV (district) which is the highest level of local government. It is important to note that despite this structure, only LCIII and LCV constitute what is known as LG while other structures are considered administrative units. The official name of LG is District Local Governments (DLG). DLGs are structured differently depending on their location, that is, city, urban or rural[1]. Uganda has only one city which doubles as the capital city and is equivalent to a district. Local governments in rural areas consist of the district council and the subcounty councils. In urban areas with a municipal it includes the municipal council, the municipal division council and where there is no municipal it consists of a town council. Institutionally, there are rules and regulations governing each structure. Being the highest political authority within its area of jurisdiction, the council has both legislative and executive powers which are to be exercised in accordance with the constitution and the LGA (LGA, 1997:581). This mandate is however limited to only decentralised functions. This mostly cover primary services such as primary and secondary education, primary health care, environment sanitation and vector control among others. All matters pertaining national policies for example on arms, ammunition and explosives, defence and security, banks, banking, promissory notes, currency and exchange rates control, taxation policy, citizen immigration, emigration, refugees, deportation, extradition, passport and national identity cards as well as policies on health, education, judiciary and agriculture are the responsibility of government (LGA,1997:696-700). The district council is the decision making body within its area of jurisdiction. The district is headed by a chairperson who is the political head of the LG and is directly elected by adult suffrage. The district also has a District Executive Committee whose duty is to monitor the general administration of the district, monitor the implementation of council decisions, oversee performance of persons employed by government to provide services in the district and to monitor the provision of government services or the implementation of projects in the district and be answerable to the council. The fact that decentralisation brought in more actors into LG means that the locus of decision making became wider and more complex. The following sections present empirical evidence to this effect.

Power is ‘the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ or the possibility to impose one’s will upon the behaviour of other persons (Max Weber, 1925; Reinhard, 1962: 290; Parson and Henderson, 1962:290). Considering that power is sometimes associated with those seen to dominate the policy environment or those well-known to the locals, it is inevitable that political power is exercised within a political system and can be used to change or control the behaviour of another actor (Birch, 2001). Thus its exercise does not occur in a vacuum, but within an organisational structure. Just as North (1990) argues, institutionally defined situations institutions are rules defined in relation to stable configurations of actors with particular identities and interests. The restructure of LG yielded voluminous improperly defined power centres and corresponding powerful actors whose duties often lacked clarity. Currently, LG consists of the district chairperson (LCV) who is political head of the district, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), then District Internal Security Officer (DISO), Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who represents the president and is in charge of security. These are all new powerful offices in addition to the traditional positions like the District Police Commander, Criminal Investigations Department chief extra.

‘There are a lot of power centres at the district; you have the RDC, you have the district chairman, you have the CAO; so all these, who take precedence over the other is not clear and on the district the chairman who is overseeing the implementation of projects is not clear. We do not know whether it is the district chairman or it is the RDC. The RDC essentially is for security, isn't it—representing the president at the district and ensuring security and mobilising people for the ruling party. Now the district chairman is an elected leader, what is his role now,—isn't it also political supervision? So you find that this is also political supervision in addition to political supervision. There is clashing between the RDC and the chairman over who takes precedence in the district’[i]

Although the constitution empowers the president to appoint his district representative, the appointments are not subject to any sort of parliamentary approval or any other legislative body. The RDCs thus serve as the president’s watchdogs on the ground. As indicated in the above quotation, there have not only been conflicts between the RDC and the LCV, but they have also been accused of using their office to penalise those seen as non-supporters of the regime through fabrication of information which they presented to the president depicting the victims as wrong elements working against the system.[ii] Responding to complaints about the behaviour of RDCs, state house spokesman aptly said that some RDC appointments were only meant to please or give jobs to certain people because of their earlier contribution to the regime.[iii] Due to weak formal institutions to enforce checks and balances, such behaviour is not reprimanded. Sections of the Ugandan public are convinced that the creation of power centres was intentionally designed to frustrate the opposition, but has nothing to do with the betterment of LG practices as presumed by devolution.[iv] At subcounty level (LCIII), friction between the LCIII chairperson who is the political head at that level and the SAS who is the technical head have become the norm to the detriment of LG’s daily operations. The assumption of more power by councils has enabled them dictate over issues even when they are not knowledgeable about them.[v] The creation of power centres was perceived as enhancement of the concept of subsidiarity contained in decentralisation and although these structures are constitutionally constructed, the different actors report to different authorities whose leaders equally often habour individual interests. What this tells us about LG in Uganda is that, power centres are not only a gateway to politics, but also facilitate the exercise of this power. In the process of carrying out their duties, actors with LG recreate, defend and modify micro-hegemony. In the face of many institutions of governance, there is bound to be duplication of duties as well as actors engaging in power struggles. This suggests that policy decisions are shaped and moulded by the challenges and options available to actors at local level. In other words, they are drawn to use their formal positions as a source of power to enhance both their individual interests as well as those of their bosses.

Historically, sub- county chiefs now known as SAS were very powerful persons who exercised their authority to ensure implementation of LG policies. However, the new design, shifted power to political leaders causing antagonism between the two wings. The restructure of LG can then be said to have yielded a new form of power appropriation, paved way for the rise of the ‘powerful’ and the consequent exercise of micro-hegemony. It has meant reconstruction of the power map. Since this power comes from formal positions, the constitution serves as an avenue for power appropriation, which power has become a major factor determining public policy decisions. Power centres can thus be perceived as systems of domination of policy decisions. As such decisions are based on individual interests and how best one can utilise his/her formal position. As Locke (1960) rightly put it, ‘it is not names that constitute governments but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them (cited in Lasswell and Kapland, 1976).

The Exercise of Micro-Hegemony and its Impact on Policy Decisions in LG

This article conceives micro-hegemony as manipulation of political power and authority by policy actors in the different levels of government. Empirical evidence from Uganda shows that micro-hegemony can be displayed and/ or exercised at different levels of government so long as the structures therein accord actors some sort of power. The exercise of micro-hegemony in the process of public policy decisions often surpasses constitutional provisions. It is a daily practice that informs the political order in Uganda’s LG. The amalgamation of actors through decentralisation implies that decision making is a complex process mainly because different actors represent different interests which require making choices; this is where powerful actors come to the top. Micro-hegemony is conducted by those in the political domain who often perceive themselves as being in control of resources hence influence on public policy. In LG, micro-hegemony often presents itself in human resource recruitment, finance, public procurement and policy formulation at local level. Decision making around these areas provides an avenue through which actors assert their respective power to influence policy decisions.

On personnel recruitment, devolution and the respective establishment of the District Service Commission (DSC) enables LG to recruit and confirm appointments of its employees. This was meant to shorten the duration of the exercise and minimise the often bureaucratic tendencies that characterised government recruitment and above all build competitive staffing. The exercise was to be conducted within the legal provisions contained in the LGA. In the course of this study, it came out that recruitments to LG were politically influenced and was a privilege of powerful actors. In most cases, the district chairman had an upper and because of his position he was the one to nominate members of the DSC, he was in charge of nomination of technical staff, had the vetting power thus he decided who got the job and without any objection from the commission. Moreover, members of the commission are equally appointed by the district chairperson. This implies that they were at his mercy. This gave him the possibility to recruit his relatives, friends or associates irrespective of whether or not they were qualified. In such instances, even the CAO whose technical competence was necessary to identify qualified people played no major role.[vi] After recruitment the same power was extended to control them. Through this control, clear lines were indirectly drawn between the boss and a junior worker. But above all recruits were subject to orders of the one who recruited them and not to formal provisions contained in the LGA. Accordingly, politicians often used their positions to direct things their way. In order to avoid confrontation with their bosses and risking their jobs, technocrats had opted to comply and/ or make decisions that lined with the interests of powerful actors.[vii] Such practices of micro-hegemony suggest that the viability and neutrality of the DSC are severely undermined by powerful actors. On the other hand, government had reverted the policy on recruitment of CAOs to public service. In all the sampled districts, CAOs argued that the decision was meant to enable government have more control over them. Although the decision did not go well with LG, CAOs themselves welcomed it arguing that it has relived them from local forces[viii].

In the absence of a proper system of checks and balances, micro-hegemony is used to ensure that the one who recruited you directed your actions and this applies to both technical and political actors. In Pallisa and Mukono, two councillors confirmed this by arguing that, their ears were inclined to the district chairperson because he had elevated them to the position of vice chair. They listened to him and did whatever he said because he had the power to appoint and dismiss.[ix] This evidence demonstrates how different actors utilise their positions to construct and apply micro-hegemony to influence policy decisions. In terms of recruitments into the system, personal relations other than technical skills are valued and decisions made accordingly. As a statutory organ the DSC is rendered powerless as its power is shifted to the person heading the structure. Whereas the LGA delineates civil servants as professionals who should apply their technical expertise in the implementation of LG programmes, the above experience shows that their technical expertise is often ignored by self-interest driven political actors. It can be argued that the civil servants are thrown into a quandary whereby they have to choose between letting their bosses have their way or risk their jobs by insisting on professionalism, which in most cases is seen as insubordination. Thus decisions depend on the person heading a given LG unit and how he/she chooses to exercise his/ her power. The practice undermines merit recruitment, poses a danger in the quality of technical staff and consequently performance is weakened. It falls short of recognising meritocracy as central in ensuring success of policy implementation and regulation including provision of services which is a major role of LG (Olowu, 2000:133). Flouting meritocracy in civil service appointments is not only violation of formal institutions, but tantamounts to political interference which can be seen as nepotism. The amount of power bestowed on the district chairperson makes him feel so powerful within the LG setting. In terms of accountability, the practice of micro-hegemony subjects other political actors to be accountable to their ‘boss’ and not local communities, yet the LGA which put into effect decentralisation assumed that directly elected political leaders should be accountable to their electorates and to the council as the decision making body.

Concerning recruitment of the CAOs by government, it becomes clear that this was motivated by the fight over resource control since the CAOs are accounting officers. The decision did not only contravene the essence of devolution and undermine the autonomy and independence of LG, but also subjected CAOs to government influence. In the first instance, CAOs were subject to local forces hence listened to them and made policy decisions that matched their interests. In the second instance they were now inclined to government, which means that they now listened to government and decided accordingly. Power is indeed a strategy to influence policies without the exercise of violence (Laswell and Kaplan 1982). It is no different from Bayart’s concept of ‘big men’ and ‘small men’ (Bayart 1993).

Concerning financial decisions, it all started with government taking over of recruitment of CAOs. Since CAOs are the accounting officers, it implied that having them under its control, government could directly influence their decisions.[x] In a country whose economic base is so weak, competition for the very scarce resources is high and indeed only powerful actors have the ability to exert control of these resources and consequently influence decisions pertaining resource allocation. Describing what control of resources had to do with LG, a politician stated that power was resources which LG did not have because all the money was at the centre. LG always had to ‘kneel for it before they send, you cannot do anything’.[xi]

 ‘you will plan to construct a road say from here to Gongonyo, first of all you don't have the money, somebody else is giving you the money to do it and you know the people who are using that road, need it to be motor able and even yourself as a leader you appreciate that it is not in a very good condition. But then having put out your work plan you don't receive the money so in that direction there is no achievement’.

Section 77 of the LGA enables LG to formulate, approve and execute their budgets and plans. The Act grants LG power to identify sources of revenue, levy and collect taxes and appropriate funds. In order to put this in place, the LGA establishes District Planning Committee (DPC) whose duty is to generate development plans that reflect the needs of the people in a given locality. In the context of decentralisation, a bottom-up approach should be used in planning and decisions should reflect people’s needs. Nevertheless, with ninety per cent of LG funding coming from government this is almost unpractical. Moreover, eighty per cent comes in as conditional grants, ten per cent is equalisation grant[xii] and only ten per cent is unconditional grant. It is the duty of LG to locally raise the remaining ten per cent to fill up the funding. Conditional grants are meant to finance programmes agreed upon between LG and government and are expended for the purpose for which it is made in accordance with the conditions agreed upon (LGA; 83:3). This implies that in deciding how to execute these plans/duties, LG and government are at par; policy decisions are guided by legal provisions and reflect the interests of all parties. Empirical experience however, shows that this is not always the case. The use of power and the practice of micro-hegemony continue to dominate policy decisions.

Concerning local revenue, the Act empowers LG to identify sources to fill up this gap in order to finance activities like facilitation and allowances for councillors. The challenge with this provision is that government reserves that right to decide which sources can be exploited, which taxes can be collected by LG or not and which taxes can be collected and retained or remitted to government. In addition economically vibrant sectors like fisheries and forestry are under government control even when they are located within the jurisdiction of LG. Using the case of revenue collected from Nile, it was observed that all the revenue collected from tourists went to the national budget from where it was unfairly distributed; thus not benefiting the LG where it is located.[xiii]

Some scholars have criticised this arrangement arguing that for one to conceive Uganda’s decentralisation as real devolution it must be commensurate with financing of the devolved responsibilities, because without resources, LG cannot perform especially given the fact that the locally generated revenue is so minimal. Due to the feeling that they were being forced to do government work other than that of LG, policy actors at local level were reluctant to enforce implementation because it is ‘not their project.’[xiv]

Issues pertaining to local revenue generation therefore demonstrate that the practical political dynamics of the system are not necessarily consonant with the constitutional provisions. Subjection of LG depends on government funds; it implies that they (LGs) are forced to serve the interests of central government. In situations where the two levels of government have different interests, the end result is an endless debate and perhaps failure to achieve policy goals. The practice as manifested above reveals the exercise of structural power with government being the main actor determining rules of procedure and influencing the behaviour of actors as well as the decisions they make on policy.

Another manifestation of micro-hegemony often occurs in the process of tendering and project allocation. The establishment of the District Contracts Committee was to ensure that the process of public procurement in LG was conducted within formal provisions. This has however been taken over by individual actors who habour particular interests and given their official status; they tend to use their positions to get the bargain as herein stated; ‘the people who are at the top have special interests in some areas, either, they are born there, they have their projects or they stay there. So they feel that they should consider those ones very fast.’[xv]

In Pallisa, power was used to reject a proposal by the CAO to halt the revenue collection by a private firm because they had bridged the contract.[xvi] In this particular case, the district political head used his position to direct the subcounty not to affect the CAOs decision. According to my informants, ‘he had interest because they (politicians) were the people who took the tenders using shoddy companies.’ Talking about shoddy companies, both the former minister of Refugees and Disaster Preparedness and the former Prime Minister acknowledged that functional constitutionalism in Uganda was far from reality because in most cases politicians were able to beat the system by opening up companies in different names and awarding themselves contracts against provisions of the LGA.[xvii] This according to them showed lack of balance between power and policy enhanced by the absence of control mechanisms and lack of oversight.

Some respondents saw this as nepotism, corruption and lack of political interest to fight it. Accordingly, administrators at local level were forced to adhere to their pressure.[xviii]

‘I may say that this party here has satisfied all the requirements or conditions but because somebody heavier than me has interest, he will come up with somebody. These councillors have been mandated to control all these other issues. They control even the subcounty council with all the systems. So they can even decide to do anything with you. They can dissolve when they sit and you have nothing to do. When a council sits and says our chief here is doing this and this, they have a right to stop you’.[xix]

This is what is called micro-hegemony whereby government exercises power over LG and the district also exercises power over the subcounty—actors using their formal positions to influence policy decisions. This subjects the ‘powerless’ actors to giving up so as to avoid confrontation with the powerful actors. The feeling was that, ‘it was a waste of time to do things knowing that no good use of it would be made’.[xx] The decision taken by technocrats impacts LG in terms of service delivery. This kind of practice is not only experienced by local civil servants. It is the kind of behaviour that seems to run around the whole country. In 2013 a presidential advisor resigned citing negligence of his advice. He argued that he was tired of advising president Museveni while he (president) does not listen to any advice—‘the president is not advisable.’[xxi] Olowu (2006:125) argues that policy issues in society are complex; thus require professional and specialized experience. The Ugandan experience however, does not seem to observe this. Policy decisions follow a totally different dynamic—that of power and not formal procedures.

Regarding policy formulation at local level, empirical evidence suggests that policies were often formulated in a manner that served the interests of powerful actors. In Mukono and Wakiso, complaints about the RDCs’ use of their positions to interfere with local policies was very pronounced, for instance; RDCs opposed the local council policy on school feeding which obliged parents pay for their children’s feeding. The RDC’s position was that Universal Primary Education (UPE) was free, but free education does not include free feeding. Similarly a decision to tax Boda boda’s[xxii] in order to raise local revenue was rejected by the president. When local authorities attempted to enforce, it, Boda bodas sought the intervention of the RDC asking him to talk to the president. The fear of the RDC as the president’s representative gave him the power to influence LG policy decisions because any antagonism with him is seen as provoking higher authority (the president).[xxiii] In this case, the president’s name symbolises power and use its usage grants and increases micro-hegemonic practices that heavily influence public policy decisions in LG.

This paper has explored the political orders of LG in Uganda departing from an examination of its day to day practices. It has analysed the creation of power centres and the consequent institution of powerful actors. The discussion demonstrates that actors within LG have transformed their offices/positions into sources of power. As such there has been a development of micro-hegemony exercised by actors to shape public policy decisions beyond constitutional provisions. The paper has shown that by decentralising and restructuring local government, the dynamics of public policy decisions in LG have also been restructured to capture the interests of powerful actors in the government apparatus. As a result, the façade of decentralisation enabling and involving local communities in decision making is far from reality, because as actors carry out their duties, they recreate, defend and modify micro-hegemony. This practice threatens constitutional order in the country. Therefore, public policy decisions in local government in Uganda do not necessarily follow constitutional doctrines, but are shaped by powerful actors and how they (ab)use their power.

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.