Journal of
Public Administration and Policy Research

  • Abbreviation: J. Public Adm. Policy Res.
  • Language: English
  • ISSN: 2141-2480
  • DOI: 10.5897/JPAPR
  • Start Year: 2009
  • Published Articles: 152

Review

Rule of law in Africa and Asia: Solving the principal-agent problem

Jan-Erik Lane
  • Jan-Erik Lane
  • 10 Charles Humbert, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland
  • Google Scholar


  •  Received: 03 November 2014
  •  Accepted: 11 December 2014
  •  Published: 30 December 2014

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